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Software is big business. It has been estimated that 
expenditures for software development and maintenance were 40 
billion dollars in 1980, or approximately 2 % of GNP. Even 
more impressive are the projections that software will be the 
dominant portion of an information processing industry that 
is expected to grow to 8.5 % of GNP by 1985 and to 13 % of 
GNP by 1990. 
The growth in the softwal:e industry has not, however, 
been painless. The record indicates that the development of 
software systems has been plagued by cost overruns, late 
deliveries, and users' dissatisfaction. A set of 
difficulties that some refer to as the "software crisis." 
The problems persist inspite of the significant software 
engineering advances that have been made over the last decade 
in tackling many of the technical hurdles of software 
production. In recent years, the managerial aspect of 
software development has gained recognition as being at the 
cores of both the problem and the solution. Along with this 
recognition there are, however, serious and leg~timate 
reservations and concerns. Chief among them is the belief 
that, as of yet, we still lack the fundamental understanding 
of the software development process, and that without such an 
understanding the likelihood of any significant gains on the 
managerial front is questionable. 
The objective of this research effort is to enhance our 
understanding of, and gain insight into, the general process 
by which software development is managed. To achieve this 
objective we accomplished the following three tasks: 
First, we developed an integrative system dynamics model 
of software development project management. The model was 
developed on the basis of an extensive review of the 
literature supplementad by 27 focused field interviews of 
software project managers in 5 organizations. The model 
complements and builds upon cvrrent research efforts, which 
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tend to focus on the micro components (e.g., scheduling, programming, productivity, ••• etc.), by integrating our knowledge of these micro components into an integrated continuous view of the software d~uelopment process. 
Second, a case-study in a sixth organization was conducted to test the model. The model was highly accurate in replicating the actual development history of the software project selected (by the organization) for the case-study. Project variables tracked included: the workforce level, the schedule, the cost, error generation and detection, and proQucti vity. 
Third, the model was used as an experimentation vehicle to study/predict the dynamic implications of an array of managerial policies and procedures. Four areas were studied: (i) scheduling; (2) control; (3) Quality Assurance; and (4) staffing. The exercise produced three kinds of results: (i) uncovered dysfunctional consequences of some currently adopted policies (e.g., in the scheduling area); (2) provided guidelines for managerial policy (e. g., on the allocation of quality assurance effort): and (3) provided new insights into software project phenomena (e.g., Brooks' Law) • 
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Stuart E. Madnick 
Associate Professo.r of Management Science Sloan School of Management . Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
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I. INTRODUCTION: 
BACKGROUND, OBJECTIVE, AND APPROACH 
~ Background: 
In the brief history of the electronic digital computer, the 1950s and 1960s were decades of hardware. The 1970s were a period of transition and a time of recognition of software. The decade of software is now upon us (Pressman, 1982). 
One convincing impact of software is directly on the 
pocketbook. It has been estimated that, here in the U.S., 
ey,penditures for softwa.e development and maintenance were 40 
billion dollars in 1980, or about . 2 percent of the"' Gross 
National Product (Boehm, 1981). Even more impressive, Boehm 
projects that "computer software will be the dominant portion 
of an (overall computer and information processing) industry 
expected to grow to 8.5% of the Gross National Product by 
1985 and to 13% of th .. GNP by 1990." 
This growth in demand for software has not, however, 
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9 
been painless. Indeed, as the industry was making the 
transition in the 1970s, " we . (grew) to recognize . . . 
circumstances that are collectively called the 'software 
crisis, , (a term that) alludes to a set of problems ... 
that are encountered in the development of software" 
(Pressman, 1982). 
The record shows that the software industry has been 
marked by cost overruns, late deliveries, poor reliability, 
and users' dissatisfaction. [For example, see (Block, B58), 
(Boehm, 1981), (Frank, 1983), (Glaseman, 1882), (J'=nsen & 
Tonies, 1979), (Mills, 1976), (McKeen, 1983), (Thayer & 
Lehma~, 1980), and (Thayer el aI, 1981).] 
A report to Congress by the Comptroller General, General 
Accounting Office (GAO), FG MSD-80-4, November 9, 1979, cites 
the dimensions of the "software crisis" within the federal 
government. The report's title summarizes the issue: 
"Contracting for Computer Software Development Serious 
ProblemS' Require Management Attention to Avoid Wasting 
Additioaal Millions." 
The report reflects the views of 163 software 
contracting firms and 113 federal government project 
officers, as well as experience with specific contracts for 
software development. The summarized indictment is severe: 
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1. Dollar overruns are fairly common in more than 50 
percent of cases 
2. Calender overruns occur ih more than 60 percent of 
cases 
·3. Of the nine contracts examined (eight of which were 
admittedly in trouble), of $6.8 million expended, the 
r.esults were: 
a. Software delivered but never used: 
million 
b. Software paid for, but never delivered: 
million 
c. Software extensively reworked before 
$1. 3 million 
d. Software used after changes: $198,000 
e. Software used as delivered: $119,000. 
$3.2 
$1. 9 
used: 
As the report concludes, "The government got for its 
money less than 2 percent of the total value of the 
contracts." 
Big as the direct costs of the "software crisis" are, 
the indirect costs can be even bigger, because software, in 
many cases, is on the critical path in overall system 
development (p..g., weapon systems such as the B-1 bomber). 
That is, any slippages in the software schedule translate 
directly into slippages in the overall delivery schedule of 
the system. For example: 
----~------
_.' ., ... 0 ...... _,~~ ___ ~.:-:_ .... ~ 
; " 
~ -~. : 
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Let's see what this meant in a recent software 
development for a large defense system. It was planned 
to have an operational lifetime of seven years and a 
total cost of about $1.4 billion --- or about $200 
million a year worth of capability. However, a 
six-month delay caused a six-month delay in making the 
system available to the user, who thus lost about $100 
million worth of needed capability --- about 50 times 
the direct cost of $2 million for the additional 
software effort. Moreover, in order to keep the 
software from causing further delays, several important 
functions were not provided in the initial delivery to 
the user (Boehm, 1973). 
The ~software crisis" is, by no means, contined to 
-software projects developed by or for the federal government. 
There is every indication that it is similarly prevalent 
within private sector organizations [(Brooks, 1978), (Mclure, 
1955), (McFarlan, 1974), and (Zmud, 1980»). For example, in 
his most recent book, DeMarco (1982) writes about: 
... some disquieting facts to be considered: 
* Fifteen percent of all software projects never deliver 
anything; that is, they fail utterly to achieve their 
established goals. 
* Overruns of one hundred to two hundred percent are 
common in software projeets. 
(And that) So many software projects fail in some major 
way that we have had to redefine "Success" to keep 
everyone from becoming despondent. Software projects 
are sometimes considered successful when the overruns 
are held to thirty percent or when the user only junks a 
quarter of the result. Software people are often 
willing to call such efforts successes, but members of 
our user community are less forgiving. They know 
failure when they see it. 
In an effort to bril~g discipline to the development of 
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software systems, attempts have been made since the early 
1970s to apply the more rigorous discipline of engineering to 
software production. This new discipline is called "Software 
Engineering." And it encompases both the technical aspects 
of software d~velopment {e.g., design, testing, validation, 
. . . etc. } as well as the managerial ones {Thayer, 1979}, 
{Boehm, 1980}}. 
However, even though both technology and management were 
equally recognized very early on as parts of both the problem 
and the solution [{Kolence, 196B}, {Perlis, 1969}, and 
{Mills, 1974}], there was a huge disparity in the attention 
they received from the research Community. 
On the technology side, a number of methodologies have 
evolved, over the last decade, that address many of the 
technical problems experienced in software development. A 
large number of articles addressing such topics as better 
coding style "Structured programming", structured design, 
testing, formal verification, lan$uage design for more 
reliable coding, diagnostic compilers, and so forth, have 
appeared in the literature (e.g., in the IEEE Transactions on 
Software Engineering, Proceedings of the International 
Conferences on Software Engineering, Proceedings of the ACM 
Conferences on the Principles of Programming Languages, 
•• , ). {See, for example, (Dijkstra, 1971), (Fag,::n, 1976), 
(Jensen and Tonies, 1979), (Mills, 1971), (Parnas, 1972), and 
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13 
(Stevens et aI, 1974).) 
••• software engineers have progressed to the point 
where many major issues relevant to the technology of 
software production have been identified and 
considerable progress in addressing these issues has 
been made. Practical working tools to support improved 
software production are commonly available, and their 
design and generation have become a recognized topic for 
university instruction (Thayer et aI, 1981). 
A comparable evolution in Management methodologies, 
however, has not occured [( Cooper, 1978) , (DoD, 1982) , 
(Gehring and Pooch, 1980), (Jensen and Tonies, 1979), (Hausen 
and Mullerburg, 1982a), (McClure, 1981), (McFarlan, 1974), 
(McKeen, 1981), (Reifer, 1979), (Thayer, 1979), (Weinberg, 
1982), (Zmud, 1980), and (Beck and Perkins, 1983)]. 
In a special isssue of the IEEE Transactions on Software 
Engineering devoted to project management, Dr. Richard E. 
Merwin (1978), the Guest Editor, pointed out that an overall 
software engineering management discipline is missing. He 
stated: 
Programming discipline such as top-down design, use of 
standardized high level programming languages, and 
program library support systems all contribute to 
production of reliable software on time, within budget 
••• What is still missing is the overall management 
fabric which allows the senior project manager to 
understand and lead major data processing development 
efforts. 
And, within the same issue, Cooper, (1978). commented 
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Although the need is apparent, there appears to be 
precious little innovative activity in the area of 
software management. Perhaps this is so because 
computer scientists believe that management per se is 
not their busine~s, and the management professionals 
assume that it is the computer scientists' 
responsibility. 
Three years later, Thayer et aI, (1981) writing in the 
same Journal, stated that: 
Software engineering project management (SEPM) has not 
enjoyed the same progress (as the technology of software 
development). While it might be argued that SEPM has 
been defined, it is far from a recognized discipline. 
Softwar~ developers who have demonstrated competence as 
developers and programmers have been elevated to project 
managers without training or guidelines to help them. 
The major issues and problems of SEPM have not been 
agreed on by the computing community as a whole, and 
consequently, priorities for addressing them have not 
been widely established. Furthermore, research in this 
area has been scant. 
This position is further substantiated by a survey, 
reported in the same paper, of a number of leading 
universities, which revealed that only a handful of the 
prominent universities surveyed offered courses exclusively 
on SEPM. 
But what have been the consequences of this "deficiency" 
in our "research repertoire?" 
First, our difficulties in producing software that is on 
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15 
time, within budget, and that meets user requirements, are 
obviously very much still "alive." (Refer to the many 
references cited in the early part of this discussion.) 
Second, and because this continues to be the case 
inspite of substantial progress in the technological 
(vis-a-vis the managerial) aspects of software production, 
there is a decided shift in "faith." Consider: 
There are more opportunities productivity and quality in the 
anywhere else. (Boehm, 1976) 
for improving software 
area of management than 
Many of our technical and managerial leaders believe that the more effective management of a software development project (i.e., project management) would eliminate or reduce the severity of these software failures (Thayer, 1979). 
The basic problem is management itself (Gehring and Pooch, 1977). 
A major barrier to the successful design and implementation of information systems has been the management of the fy:tware d~velopement activity itself (Moore, 1979). 
Poor management can increase software costs more rapidly than any other f~ctor (Weinberg, 1982). 
A comprehensive ~tudy for the U.S. Air Force found that the problems of s0rtware productivity on medium- to large-scale projects are mostly problems of management: thorough organization, good contingency planning, thoughtful establishment of measurable project milestones, continuous monitoring as to whether the milestones are properly passed, and prompt investigation and corrective action in case the milestones are not met. However, beyond these familiar concessions to classic management theory, the study group offered no novel approaches to finding out why they do not work for software 'deve.lopment. (Pooch and Gehring, 1980) 
We ran into problems because we didn't know how to manage what we had, not because we lacked the techniques 
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themselves (Thomsett, 1980). 
Along with the growing "faith" in software engineering 
project management, there are, however, rserious and 
legitimate reservations and concerns. Chief among them is 
the belief that, as of yet, we still lack the' fundamental 
understanding of the software development proce!;s [(Comper, 
1979), (DOD, 1982), (Fireworker, 1980), (Gehring, 1976), 
(Merwin, .1978), (McKeen, 1983), (McKeen, 1981), (Oliver, 
1982) , and (Wesserman, 1980)], and that wi. thout such an 
understanding the possibility or li kelih()oo of any 
significant gains on the management front is questionable 
[(Basili, 1982), (Basili and Zelkowitz, 1978), (Brooks, 
1978), (Basili, 1981), (Canning, 1978), (McKf~en, 1981), and 
(Mitchell, 1980)]. 
This is no trivial impediment «McKeen, 1981), (Oliver, 
1982»). But, if it is any solace, it ·is not one that is 
unique to our young field: 
Any 
art 
worthwhile human endeavor emerges first as an 
. . . 
Over the centuries, management as an art has progressed 
by the acquisition and recording of human experience. 
But as long as there is no orderly underlying scientific 
base, the experiences remain as special cases. The 
lessons are poorly transferrable either in time or in 
spac, •• , (And) in time (the art) ceases to grow 
because of the disorganized state of its knowledge ••• 
The development of the underlying science 
motivated by the need to understand 
foundation on which the art rested ••• 
(is then) 
better the 
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17 
When the need and necessary foundation coincide,' a 
science develops to explain, organize, and distill 
experience into Q more compact and usable form ••• Such 
a base of applied science would permit experience to be 
translated into a common frame of reference from which 
they could be transfered from the past to the present or 
from one location to another, (and) to be effectively 
gpplied in new situati'ons ••• (Forrester, 1961). 
To summarize: 
* The record shows that the software industry continues 
to be plagued by cost overruns, late deliveries, poor 
reliability, and users' dissatisfaction. 
difficulties that some refer to as the 
Crisis." 
A set of 
"Software 
* In an effort to bring discipline to the development of 
software, attempts have been made since the early 1970's 
to apply the more rigorous discipline of engineering to 
software production and management. The new discipline 
is called "Software Engineering." 
* While significant inroads have been made in tackling 
the technical hurdles of software development, the 
managerial aspects of software production attracted much 
less attention. 
* There is a growing "faith" that the next significant 
"battle" will be won on the "managerial front." 
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* A necessary first step, however, is gaining a 
fundamental understanding of the general nature of the 
software development process. 
I.2. R~search Objective and Approach: 
The objective of this research effort is to develop and 
test an integrati ve system dynamic's model of software 
development project management which would enhance our 
understanding of, provide insight into, and make predictions 
about, the general process by which software development is 
managed. 
The first, and primary, purpose of the model is to 
enhance our understanding of the software development 
process. In general; 
What is gained in understanding through' the use of a 
scientific model to portray a portion of the real world 
is achieved by comprehending the law or laws built into 
the model. The locus·of understanding in a scientific 
model is to be found in its laws of interaction (i.e., 
the modes of interaction among the the variables of a 
model) (Dubin, 1971). 
There are hundreds of variables that affect software 
Furthermore, these variables are not development. 
independent; many of them are related to one another (Myres, 
1976) • So far; 
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The many studies on the'subject emphasize the 
and complexity of the process, but have done 
reveal ' a well-defined methodology or to 
precise relationships among project variables 
1982). 
difficulty 
little to 
delineate 
(Oliver, 
Even though we do not de-emphasize the "difficulty and 
complexity of the software development process," we feel that 
the powerful formalization and simulation tools of the System 
Dynamics methodology, have allowed us (as we shall explain in 
more detail later in this section) to adequately manage it. 
The second purpose of our model, is to make predictions 
about the general process by which software systems are 
developed. As such, the model would serve as a framefork for 
experimentation, e,g., to test \~ut the implications of new 
managerial policies and procedures. Providing such a 
capability, is "especially useful for analyzing consequences 
of changes in the (modeled) system where controlled 
manipulation of the system itself is impossible, or at least 
impractical or undesirable due to time, cost, 
inaccessibility, political or moral considerations, or other 
reasons" (Schultz and Sulliven, 1972). 
In the remaining part of this section we will elaborate 
further on the above ideas. We will do that as we argue for 
the two characteristic features of our model and which 
together distinguish it from most others in the software 
engineering area. The two characteristic features being: 
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(i) It i~ integrative, and (2) it is a system dynamics model. 
I.2.1. Why an Integrative Model: 
Our model is integrative in the sense that it integrates 
the multiple fl1nctions of the software development process, 
including the management~type functions, e.g., planning, 
controlling, and staffing, as well as the production-type 
functions that constitute the software development life 
cycle, e.g., designing, coding, reviewing, and testing. 
A major defect in much of the research to date has been 
its inability to integrate our knowledge of the micro 
components, such as project management, programming, testing, 
etc., for deriving implications about the behavior of ... 
the organization in which the micro components are embedded 
«Boehm, 1976), .(Thayer, 1979». 
Tonies (1979): 
Paraphrasing Jensen and 
There is much 
functions of the 
little on the 
continuous process 
optimized. 
attention on individual phases and 
software development sequence, but 
whole life cycle as an integral, 
--- a process that can and should be 
Clearly, this "micro-oriented" type of work is a useful 
beginning in helping us obtain a better understanding of the 
software development activity. However, before we can say 
that .we have a complete understanding of any such activity, 
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" it is necessary to show that our knowledge of the . . . 
individual components can be put togehter in a total system, 
i.e., an organization can be synthesized, which allows for 
the interactions of all the relevant variables and of all the 
structural components" (Cohen, 1965). 
The basic argument for this, is that interactions and 
interdependencies are common in all social systems, e.g., 
management-type systems (Kotter, 1978), (Schein, 1980) , 
(Weick, 1979). Paraphrasing Cleland and King (1972): 
The management system is a conglomerate of interrelated 
and interdependent functions. No one management 
subsystem can perform effectively without the others. 
Action taken by one subsystem can be traced throughout 
the entire management system and throughout the complex 
environment in which the management system exists. 
And, that as a result: 
The behavior of an individual subsystem in 
be very different from its behavior when 
with other subsystems (Cohen, 1965). 
isolation may 
it interacts 
It is no wonder, then, that integrative-type models are 
viewed as useful and powerful aids in understanding 
management-type social systems generally, and in trying to 
improve their functioning (Schein, 1980). And the management 
of software development is, certainly, no exception: 
• •• the solution to the (software management) 
problem involves more than just finding better tools and 
local optimization methods; it calls for an integrated 
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approach ••• (Jensen and Tonies, 1979). 
In addition to the benefit of helping us achieve overall 
understanding, an integrative perspective can be useful in 
two more "tactical" ways: 
evaluation. 
problem diagnosis and solution 
A "corollary" of the above statements by Cleland and 
King (1972), is that the interactions and interdependencies 
which tend to characterize our management systems generally, 
will similarly chara~terize the problems that beset such 
systems (Cleland and King, 1975). Which does indeed seem to 
be the case in. software development (Glassman, 1982), where" 
... no one thing seems to cause the difficulty •.. But the 
accumulation of simultaneous and interacting factors " 
(Brooks, 1978). 
An integrative perspective would, therefore, be useful 
since, at worst, it would not "inhibit" our search for the 
multiple, and potentially "diffused," set of factors that are 
interacting to cause our software problem(s),. while, at best, 
actually "prompting" and "facilitating" such a search. Such 
prompting should be useful since experience suggests that 
more often than not people opt for a "parochial mode" of 
problem solving (Ackoff, 1978), (Cleland and King, 1975). By 
doing so, the problem solve, in effect,. brings to the 
problematic situation under study a set of ready-made 
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criteria of relevance. Quite a "risky" strategy when we 
admittedly lack a fundamental understanding of the problem 
area. 
To see the second potential benefit of our integrative 
perspecti ve, we need a second "corolla.ry," namely: the chain 
of effects in going from a particular managerial intervention 
(e.g., to solve a perceived problem) to immediate 
consequences, and then to second- and third-order 
consequences and newly created problems is another pervasive 
characteristic of management-type social systems ({Cleland 
and King, 1975), (Weick, 1979». 
By providing us with a comprehensive world view, the 
model would help us to more fully assess such second- and 
third-order consequencies of, for example, a set of 
management policies and procedures we need to test. And it 
would do that, again, by, at worst, not "inhibiting" our 
search for such multiple, and potentially diffused, set of 
consequences, while, at best, actually "prompt ing" and 
"facilitating" such a search. Such prompting should be 
useful, since often, 
, . - . 
••• consequences are not given much attention, and 
apparently logical solutions may prove faulty as their 
consequences ramify. Furthermore, since the 
cO;lsequences of a decision often occur much later than 
the decision itself, it is difficult for the members to 
trace backward from the disruptive consequences to 
determine precisely what caused them. The members 
cannot make such an analysis, simply because there are 
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too many competing explanations. Thus, the 'only thing 
members 'can do when a new problem arises is to engage in 
more localized problem-solving {Weick,1979}. 
Notice that Weick's statements highlight two "new" 
complicating factors, namely, that the consequences are 
dynamic and that they are complex. And that's quite timely, 
since these are issues we address next. 
I.2.2. Why a System Dynamics Model: 
"System Dynamics is the application of feedback control 
systems principles and techniques to managerial, 
organizational, and socioeconomic problems" {Roberts, 1981}. 
The System Dynamics philos.ophy is based on several 
premises {{Forrester, 1961}, and {Roberts, 1981}}: 
1. The behavior {or time history} of an organizational 
entity is princ ipally caused by its structure. The 
structure includes, not only the physical aspects, but 
more importantly the policies and procedures, both 
tangible and intangible, that dominate decision-making 
ih the organizational entity. 
2. Managerial decision-making takes place in a 
framework th~t belongs to the general class known as 
information-feedback systems. 
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3. Our intuitive judgement is unreliable about how 
these systems will change with time, even when we have 
good knowledge of the individual parts of the system. 
4. Model experimentation is now possible to fill the 
gap where our judgement and knowledge are weakest --- by 
showing the way in which the known separate system parts 
can interact to produce unexpected and troublesome 
over-all system results. 
Based on these philosophical beliefs, two principal 
foundations for operationalizing the system Dynamics 
technique were established. These are: 
1. The use of information-fe,:dback systems to model and 
understand system structure (Premises 1 and 2). 
2. The use of computer simulation to understand system 
behavior (premises 3 and 4). 
In tbe remaining part of this section we would like to 
discuss these two important concepts in more detail, e.g., 
find out what they mean and why they are useful? 
(a) The use of information feedback systems: 
"Feedback," is the process in which an action taken by a 
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person or thing will eventually affect that person or thing. 
A feedback loop is a closed sequence of causes and effects, a 
closed path of action and information. Feedback loops divide 
naturally into two categories which are labelled 
deviation-amplifying feedback (DAF) or positive loops, and 
deviation-counteracting feedback (DCF) or negative loops. An 
interconnected set of feedback loops is a feedback system 
(Richardson and Pugh, 1981). 
The first year of exploration (in System Dynamics) 
pointed toward the concepts of feedback systems as being 
much more general, more significant, ana more applicable 
to social systems than had been commonly realh:ed ••• 
Feedback processes emerged as universal in social 
systems and seemed to hold the key to structur:ng and 
clarifying relationships that had remained baffling and 
contradictory ( Forrester, 1968). 
The 'significance and applicability. of the feedback 
systems concept to managerial systems has, since then, been 
further substantiated by a large number of studies in the 
System Dynamics field. (See for example Roberts, 1981). But 
what, perhaps, is more interesting is to see "endorsements" 
of the concept from outside the System Dynamics community. 
For example: 
The cause-effect relationships that exist in 
organizations are dense and often circular. Sometimes 
these causal circuits cancel the influences of one 
variable on another, and sometimes they amplify the 
effects of one variable on another. It is the network 
of causal relationships that impose many of the controls 
in organizations and that stabilize or disrupt the 
organization. It is the patterns of these causal links 
that account for much of what happens in organizations. 
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directly visible, these causal patterns 
more of what happens in organizations than 
the more visible elements such as machinery, 
••• (Weick, 1979). 
Embracement of the feedback concept can even by 
"spotted" 
example: 
in the software engineering literature. For 
Discussion and research into the framework of software 
development and support, by dividing such efforts into 
phases of work, has overemphasized the discrete nature 
of that work. Indeed such project life cycles can be 
viewed, at least after the fact, as having been composed 
of such segments. However, the dynamics essence, the 
behavior over time, of the process is distorted. The 
emphasis is upon discrete sets of activities separated 
in time and lacking any base of underlying common 
elements to bind them. From this it is clear, that the 
fundamental systems nature of the process is ignored. 
The e'ler-present and controlling feedback between 
action, results, information, and new action is 
overlooked by such an approach (Mercer, 1982). 
Feedback processes in software development were also 
discussed by Belady and Lehman (in Wegner, 1980), (lehman, 
1978), (Putnam, 1980), and (Zelkowitz et al., 1979). 
A point which is important in particular to the 
application of deviation-amplifying feedback (DAF) to 
management, concerns the distinction between (1) the initial 
event (from outside a loop) which starts the deviation 
amplifying process in motion, and (2) the dynamics of the 
feedback process which perpetuates it. While the initial 
event is important in determining the direction of the 
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subsequent deviation amplification, the feedback process is 
more important to an understanding of the system (Ashton, 
1976). The initial event sets in motion a cumulative process 
which can have final effects quite out of proportion to the 
magnitude of the original push. The push might even be 
withdrawn after a time, and still a permanent change will 
remain or even the process of change will continue without a 
new balance in sight. A further problem is that, after some 
period of time has elasped, it may be difficult, if not 
impossible, to discover the initial event. An interesting 
example of this has been provided by Wender (1968): 
••• a fat and pimply adolescent may withdraw in 
embarrassement and fail to acquire social skills; in 
adulthood, acne and obesity may have disappeared but low 
self-esteem, withdrawal, and social ineptitude may 
remain. Social withdrawal and low self esteem are apt 
to stay fixed because the DAF chuin now operates: 
social ineptitude leads to rejection, which leads to 
lowered self-esteem, greater withdrawal, less social 
experience, and greater ineptitude. What has initiated 
the problem is no longer sustaining it. A knowledge of 
the problem's origin would not be expected to alter the 
currently operative loop unless such insight served to 
motivate behavioral change ••• 
Finding the" initial event (acne and ob~sity) may have 
less usefulness than understanding the current 
sustaining feedback mechanism. Furthermore, in some 
instances the initial event may have left no traces of 
its existance and may be undiscovered. 
It is no wonder, then, that "most managers get into 
trouble because they forget to think in circles, I mean this 
literally. Managerial problems persist because managers 
continue to believe that there are such things as unilateral 
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causation, independent and dependent variables, origins, and 
ter-minations" (Weick, 1979). 
(b) The use of computer simulation: 
So far, we have argued for an integrative model of 
software development, which in addition captures its 
information feedback systems. To stop here is not enough. 
We need a tool for handling the high complexity of such a 
two sources of high complexity; and model. There are 
computer simulation can be an effective tool to handle both: 
First, 
Managerial systems contain as many as 100 or more 
variable~ that are known to be relevant and believed to 
be related to one another in various nonlinear fashions. 
The behavior of such a system is complex far beyond the 
capacity of intuition. Computer simulation is one of 
the most effective means available for supplementing and 
correcting human intuition (Roberts, 1981). 
And second, 
The behavior of systems of interconnected feedback loops 
often confounds common intuition and analysis, even 
though the dynamic implications of isolated loops may be 
reasonably obvious. The feedback structures of real 
problems are often 'so complex that the behavior they 
generate over time can usually be traced only by 
simulation (Richardson and Pugh, 1981). 
Simulation's particular advantage is its greater 
fidelity in modeling processes, making possible both more 
complex models and, models of more complex systems. It also 
allows for vicarious experimentation. 
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using the simulation model as an experimentation 
vehicle, should be particularly welcomed by the software 
engineering community. Several authors have "complained" 
about the lack of tested "ideas" in the software engineering 
field (Thayer, 1979), (Weinwurm, 1970). 
(1979) commented: 
For example Weiss 
•• , in software engineering it is remarkably easy to propose hypotheses and remarkably difficult to test them. Accordingly, it is useful to seek methods for testing software engineering hypotheses. 
Unfortunately, controlled experiments in the area of 
software development tend to be costly and time consuming 
(Myers, 1978). Furthermore, those who try it often find that 
... the isolation of the effect and the evaluation of " 
impact of any given practice within a large, complex and 
dynamic project environment can be exceedingly difficult" 
(Glass, 1982). 
In addition to permitting less-costly and less-time 
consuming experimentation, simulation models make "perfectly" 
controlled experiments possible. Which, as the following 
quotation shows .. addresses the difficulty expressed by Glass 
above: 
The effects of different assumptions and environmental factors can be tested. In the model system, unlike real systems, the effect of changing one factor can be observed while all other factors are held unchanged. 
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. Such experimentation will yield new insights into the 
characteristics of the system that the model represents. 
By using a model of a complelt system, more can be 
learned about internal interactions than would ever 'be 
possible through manipulation of the real system. 
Internally, the model provides complete control of the 
system organizational structure, its policies, and its 
sensitivities to various events. Externally, a wider 
range of circumstances can be generated than are apt to 
be observable in real life (Forrester, 1961). 
Finally, the very process of constructing the simulation 
can be useful in several ways (Schultz and Sullivan, 1972): 
1. 3. 
1. Confrontation --- vague generalizations crumble when 
put to the test of modeling. 
2. Explication --- assumptions must be made explicit, 
logical, and precise in order to build a simulation 
model. 
3. Expansion the tendency to a holistic approach in 
simulation forces a broadening of one's horizon, a 
looking into other relevant fields for ideas. 
4. Communication --- problem-oriented simulation lead 
to jumping of disciplinary boundaries, less 
parochialism. And, 
5. Involvement it can be fun, the construction 
process motivates the modeler to attempt to fill in the 
knowledge gaps. 
Research Accomplishments: 
As mentioned in Section 1.2., the objective of this 
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research effort is to enhance our understanding of, and gain 
insight into, the general process by which software 
development is managed. To achieve this objective we 
accomplished the following three tasks: 
1. Developed an integrative system dynamics model of 
software development project management. 
2. Conducted a case-study to test the model. 
3. Used the model as an experimental vehicle to 
study/predict the dynamic implications of an array of 
managerial policies and procedures. 
In the remaining part of this section, we will elaborate 
further on the above three research accomplishments. 
Model Development: 
The development of the integrative system dynamics model 
of software development project management constitutes the 
follt;;wing set of accompli shments: 
1. The mathematical formulation of a system dynamics 
model forces explication, i.e., structural relationships 
between variables must be explicitly and precisely 
defined. As such, the model sets the foundation for the 
development of a theory of software project management. 
Paraphrasing Dubin (1973.): 
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A theory is the attempt of a man to model some 
aspects of the empirical world ••• A theory tries 
to make sense out of the observable world by 
ordering the relationships among 'things' that 
constitute the theorist's focus of attention in the 
world 'out there' ••• The process of putting 
things or units together in lawful relation to each 
other establishes the fundamental building blocks 
out of which a theory is constructed. 
2. The model complements and builds upon current 
research efforts, which tend to focus on the micro 
components (e.g., project 
testing, productivity, 
management, programming, 
... etc.), by integrating our 
knowledge of these micro components into an integrated 
continuous view of the software development process, 
allowing us to identify and capture a richer set of 
interactions and interdepencies between the variables of 
software project management. 
3. The model identifies feedback mechanisms, and uses 
them to structure and clarify relationships in software 
project management. While the significance and 
applicability of the feedback systems concept to the 
study of managerial ~ystems has been substantiated in a 
large number of studies outside software engineering, it 
still remains largely foreign to the software 
engineering project management community. We, 
therefor~. view our work as having an "educational" 
value to the software engineering community. 
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4. The high degree of explication required in the model 
helped us ferret out "knowledge gaps" in the literature. 
And a set of 27 interviews with software development 
managers in 5 organizations helped us fill these 
knowledge gaps. ,The model, therefore, incorporates new 
findings about, the management of software project 
management (e.g., on manpower acquisition policies under 
diffe~ent scheduling considerations). 
Case Study: 
The model was developed on the basis of both an 
extensive review of the literature and information 
gathered through a set of 27 interviews in 5 
organizations involved in the production of software. 
After the model was developed, we then conducted a 
case-study in a sixth organization to test the model. 
The model was highly accurate in replicating the actual 
development history of the software project selected (by 
the organization) for the case study. Project variables 
tested included: the workforce level, the schedule, and 
the cost. 
Experimentation 
If "understanding" is the intellectual outcome of a 
theoretical model, then "prediction" is its practical 
outcome (Dubin, 1971). The model was used as an 
experimental vehicle to study/predict the dynamic 
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implications of an array of managerial policies and 
procedures. Four areas were studied: (1) scheduling; 
(2) Quality Assurance; (3) control; and (4) staffing. 
The exercise produced three kinds of results: (1) 
uncovered dysfunctional consequences of some currently 
adopted policies (e.g., in the scheduling area); (2) 
provided guidelines for managerial policy (e.g., on the 
allocation of quality assurance effort); and (3) 
provided new insights into software p.oject phenomena 
(e.g., "90 % syndrome") • 
!.4. Thesis Outli~e: 
Each chapter of this thesis may be considered in 
terms of its relationship to the model, which is the 
focus of the study. 
Chapters (I) and (II) serve as a background and an 
introduction. In Chapter (I), we discussed the '.roblems 
and challeng'.!s of software development project 
management. We also argued for the integrated System 
Dynamics modeling approach, as a vehicle to address 
those problems and challenges. 
In Chapter (II), we conduct a survey of the 
literature. The presentation is conveniently ~roken 
into two sections. First, we survey the System Dynamics 
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literature that addresses the general area of project 
management. This is a particularly appropriate starting 
point, since it is this research track that provided the 
first stimulant to our work. The second part of the 
chapter, is a survey of the software engil"aering 
literature to see what has been proposed /done to 
understand and solve the problems of software project 
management • 
Chapter (III) is on model development. In it we 
discuss in detail the development, structure, and 
equation formulation of the model. The model has four 
sectors. At the heart of the model is the software 
production sector, where software production activities 
such as coding and testing are modeled. The project 
management activities comprise the remaining three 
sectors: planning, human resource management, and 
control. 
In Chapter (IV) we discuss the results of a case 
study conducted to test the model's ability to replicate 
the development history of a 'completed software 
project. Project variables tracked development 
included: the workforce level, the schedule, and the 
cost. 
In Chapter (V), the model is used as an 
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experimentation vehicle to study/predict the dynamic 
implications of an array of managerial policies and 
procedures. Four areas are -studied: (1) scheduling; 
(2) control; (3) Quality Assurance; and (4) staffing. 
Finally, Chapter (VI) concludes the thesis with a 
summary of findings and suggestions for further 
research. 
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II. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
In this chapter two bodies of literature relevant to our 
research are reviewed. The first is the System Dynamics 
literature 
management. 
that addresses the' general area of project 
This is a particularly approriqte starting 
point, since it is this research track that provided the 
first stimulant to our work. In the second part of the 
chapter, we review the software engineering literature in the 
area of software development project management. Thus, while 
in the first section we look at research works that share 
with us our basic research approach, in the second section we 
.. turn our attention to those that share with us our research 
objective (i .e., the understanding of the software 
development process). 
11.1. System Dynamics Modeling of Project Management: 
Professor Edwards B. Roberts, of MIT's Sloan School Of 
Management, has been the pioneer of this research effort, as 
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well as continuing to be its major driving force. His 
doctoral dissertation on "The Dynamics of Research and 
Development," in 1962 (which was also published as a bookj 
was the first scholarly effort to apply the then young System 
Dynamics methodology to the project management area (within 
an R&D environment). It still continues to be the most 
comprehensive treatment of the subject. Since then, and 
primarily in his capacity as a thesis advisor, he continues 
to play an active "guiding" role in the field's advancement. 
And which, as a result, continued to focus on the study of 
R&D type projects. Roberts' thesis work together with that 
of his MIT students, constitute the bulk of this body of 
research. 
It might be.interesting to make a brief digression here 
and explain how and why this body of research, lying at the 
overlap between the System Dynamics and the Management of R&D 
literatures, first attracted our attention and interest. It 
was (surprisingly) while we were surveying the latter and not 
the former. At the time, feeling frustrated by the lack of 
innovative activity in the area of software management, we 
decided to look into other more established fields for ne~ 
ideas. The management of R&D was the obvious first choice. 
And for good reason. It is the area we found to be most 
often likened, in the soitware engineering literature, to 
software production. For example, paraphrasing Gehring and 
Pooch (1977): 
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The stages of research and development are similar in 
many respects to the stages of software analysis and 
design. First, the determination of what the system is 
to do (specification of outputs and inputs) is very 
ill-defined, making the estimation of the time and cost 
of its development uncertain (like the research stage). 
Second, the specification of how inputs (file 
specification, programmning) is easier to estimate (like 
the development state). These similarities suggest that 
a good many managerial practices and procedures from the 
latter may be applied to the former. 
The similarity in project cost estimation, between the 
two fields, was also suggested by Wolverton, in his highly 
referenced 1974 paper, when he wrote:- "The general 
principles involved in pricing large R&D efforts of any kind 
apply to large software development as well." . . . 
Also, it is interesting to note, that Putnam's 
celebrated SLIM model for software cost estimation {Putnam, 
1980) is based on the R&D work of Peter Norden. Norden had 
showed that R&D projects have a well defined manpower pattern 
of the Rayleigh form (Norden, 1963) 
Norden's findings (on R&D projects) 
When Putnam "adapted" 
to the software 
environment, he found that, here too, manpower application 
follows the same Rayle:~h pattern. 
So, with great enthusiasm and anticipation we embarked 
on a survey of the R&D literature. 
doctoral thesis. End of digression. 
And read Roberts' 
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While perhaps interesting as a historical perspective on 
our research effort, the above digression serves an 
additional purpose. For, it suggests that our stated 
argument for the relevance of the System Dynamics modeling 
work of R&D project management to our own, namely, their 
sharing of the same research methodology and approach, is 
really a conservative one. The two areas have, in fact, much 
more in common. And with this in mind, we now resume our 
review of the literature. 
As stated above, Roberts' System Dynamics model of R&D 
project management, continues to be the most comp~ehensive 
work published in the area. The model traces the full life 
cycle of a single R&D project. And it incorporates the 
interactions between the R&D product, the firm, the customer, 
and the processes relating to the nature of the work itself. 
Figure ILL (from Robert's thesis) is an overview of the 
model's sectors, and the interrelationships among them. 
Rather than delve into a detailed discussion of Roberts' 
R&D model, we will limit out discussion of his work to those 
aspects of the model which we found particularly relevant to 
the study of software project management. Specifically, we 
will present some of his models' conceptual building-blocks 
(i.e., his assumptions/ findings about R&D projects). And to 
underscore the correspondance to the software production 
environment, we will append the presentation with "excerpts" 
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from the software 'engineering literature. 
On project Planning 
Roberts: 
No unerring formula can be used to estimate the total number of man-years required to carry out a given (R&D) project. This kind of general statement reflects the inherent nature of research and development: The exact character of a specific task is indefinite, (and) the specific technical requirements are uncertain ••. 
The Software Engineering Literature: 
* ... quantitative software engineering has not progressed to the point that we can even begin to provide (software sizing) formulas. And it is not clear that we will ever get very close to such an ideal (Boehm, 1981) • 
* We lack the means" to provide, clear, concise, and unambiguous statements of user requirements ••• The problem here again has to do with the "absence" of a clear understanding on the part of both software users and developers as to what can be accomplished with software" (DeRose and Nyman, 1979). 
* The production of software is not a 
activity. Product specifications are 
shifted (Trichritzis, 1977). 
Roberts: 
deterministic 
liable to be 
Two factors significantly influence the initial estimate of the job size: (1) the firm's previous experience; and (2) the general over-all tendency to underestimate the job size. 
The Software Engineering Literature: 
* ... when methods of estimating are ranked, the list 
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is headed by the Experience Method ••• This approach 
takes advantage of experie.lce on a similar job •• • The 
major problem in the method is that it does not work on 
systems larger than the base used for comparison. 
System complexity grows as the square of the number of 
system elements~ therefore, experience with a small 
system cannot account for all the things that will have 
to be done in a large system. Neither will the 
Experience Method apply to systems of totally different 
content" (Aron, 1976). 
* The software undersizing problem is our most critical 
road block to accurate software cost estimation ••• 
there are no magic formulas that we can use to overcome 
the software undersizing problem. In the absence of any 
such formula, it is important to understand the major 
sources of the software undersizing problem ••• A major 
(reason) is a strong tendency to underestimate the size 
of support software (e.g, compilers, tools, utilities), 
which for large operational systems is generally three 
to five times as large as the operational software 
(Boehm, 1981). 
On the Management of the Human Resource: 
Roberts: 
* Whatever the know-how developed in solving the R&D 
.project problems, some time is required for it to be 
adequately, absorbed. Then, as the experiences 
accumulate, the firms' engineers supplement their 
nonproject skills with these new, more specific insights 
and approaches to the task. 
The Software Engineeririg Literature: 
* Progr~mmers become more effective during larger 
programm~ng operations because of "learning." The 
programmer gains familiarity with program logic, coding 
notation, testing restrictions, and other requirements 
as he progresses through each major activity in the 
programming methods (Shell, 1972). 
Roberts: 
* Above a certain level, the assignment of additional 
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personnel to a large project 
time proportionality, but 
time to accomplishment. 
may not only reduce total 
in fact may increase total 
The Software Engineering Literature: 
* Increasing the size of a software team increases 
amount of software produced per unit time, up 
point. Then the problems of communication among 
programmers begin to dominate the project and reduce 
amount of software being produced (Boebert, 1979) 
And finally, on the Control of Progress: 
Roberts: 
the 
to a 
the 
the 
(Control) problems 
precise measurement 
... result from lack of tangible, 
in R&D " 
The Software Engineering Literature: 
* Abstraction, or intangibility, is a management 
challenge for such rudiments as recognizing process, 
eXhibiting results, and communicating between packets of 
work. And compounding this is lack of hardware-like 
measures ••• "(Sampson). 
* It is difficult to measure performance in programming 
••• (And) it is difficult to evaluate the status of 
intermediate work such as undebugged programs or design 
specifications and their potential value to the 
completed project (Mills, 1983). 
Roberts: 
* One particular difficulty is that, during the very 
early phases of a project, milestones have a tendency to 
be less precisely definable, and hence less accuratily 
measurable, than during later phases of the project ••• 
The shortcomings of the concept, "percent complete," 
were sufficiently great to negate its value. While 
projects tended to make rapid progress towards 
completion when work first began, it took an 
inordinately long time to get from 90 percent to 100 
percent. 
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The Software Engineering Literature: 
* In the early stages of a project, it is difficult to 
distinguish between 5% completion and 10% completion, 
yet the resultant projection can vary 100% based on 
which number is chosen (Donelson, 1976). 
* One frequent difficulty stems from an over-reliance on 
individual percent-complete estimates as indicators of 
project progress (Boehm, 1981). 
* (This) method of estimating progress typically leads 
to estimates of the fraction of work completed which 
increase as originally planned until a level of about 
80:-90% is reached. The programmers' indi vidual 
estimates then increase only very slowly until the task 
is actually completed (Baber, 1982). 
It is clear from the above presentation that some of the 
problems that Roberts' model was built to address do resemble 
some of those we are struggling with today in the software 
engineering arp.a. It is no wonder then, that we felt (and 
did find) that the approach he effectively used i.e., Systems 
Dynamics Modeling, to be an effective tool for addressing the 
problems of software development project management. 
As we mentionad in the beginning of this discussion, 
Roberts' thesis was to become the foundation for further 
System Dynamics studies of the R&D project management area. 
One obvious extension was to study multi-project 
environments. In such an environment project competition for 
company resources becomes a significant dimension. Two such 
multi-project models are those of Nay (1965) (a four-project 
model) and Kelly (1970) (a two-project model) • In both 
models the focus remained, as was in Roberts, on project life 
cycle behavior. Edelman's (1975) work, however, is a 
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departure from that. While building on Nay's model, he chose 
to focus, instead, on the allocation and utilization of 
manpower resources and the eff"ects of t,~ management system 
design on effectiveness. 
Richardson (1982) took still a different tack. Rather 
than focusing on a project, he focussed, instead, on the 
development group. His model, therefore, does not trace the 
life cycle(s) of one or more projects~ rather, it reproduces 
the dynamics of a development group over an eight year period 
as a continuous stream of products are developed and placed 
into production. The model focuses on the number of products 
under development, the use of resources required, and the 
aggregate average product development time. 
Finally, several more recent models are emphasizing the 
role of rework in project management. Rework can be caused 
by errors committed in the earlier phases of a project (e.g., 
design errors of a VLSI circuitry) that escape detection 
until later in the projects' life cycle. Of course, the 
longer an error goes undetected, the more extensive the 
necessary rework and the greater the cost. Changing design 
specifications after development bw;ins, a2so generates the 
need for rework. Cooper (1980), describes a large system 
dynamics study of cost overruns in a shipbuilding contract. 
The study showed that the rework required by frequent design 
changes imposed by the Navy were the major contributing 
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factor to a $500 million dollars -overrun. Undiscovered 
rework is also the focus of the simple R&D project models in 
Roberts (1981b) -and (Richardson and Pugh, 1981). 
I I .2. Software Engineering Project Management Literature 
Review: 
As we stated in chapter (I), the focus of this research 
is on software development project management, and our 
objective is to imp.:;:)ve our understanding of it. In this 
section we review the software engineering literature on 
project management, to assess the current 
"state-of-understanding," and the means/tools used to achieve 
it. 
We will begin by reviewing overview--type models and 
frameworks. This will then be followed by separate 
discussions on software project planning, human resource 
management, and control i.e., the three project management 
subsystems that together constitute the project management 
activities in our model (as will be explained in chapter 
II I) • 
II.2.1. Overview Models and Frameworks: 
Richard Thayer's 1979 Ph.D dissertation at the 
University of California at Santa Barbara on "Modeling a 
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Software Engineering Project Management System," is a fitting 
starting point for this discussion. For one, it probably was 
indeed "the first attempt to completely model a 
software engineering pT:oject management system" (Thayer, 
1979). Btlt, perhaps more important, if we judge from the 
number of publications it generated (one in IEEE Transaction 
on Software Engineering (Thayer et aI, 1981), two in computer 
(ThaYflr et aI, 1980) and (Thayer et aI, 1982), plus several 
conference papers) , the thesis' results did have a 
significant impact on the software engineering community. 
Thayer's research goal was twofold: (1) to develop and 
verify "a generalized descriptive management model of a 
software engineering project management system," and (2) to 
"identify and verify the major issues of software engipeering 
project management." 
To develop his model, he first identified the various 
functions, actions, procedures, and tools used, or proposed 
for use, in managing a software engineering project. This 
was done on the basis of a literature survey as well as his 
own personal experience. He then superimposed these 
functions, actions, procedures, and tools on the "classic 
management model," i.e., that breaks the management activity 
into the five functions of planning, organizing, staffing, 
directing, and controlling. 
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The "skeleton" of his modei is shown in Figure (11.2). 
Each of the shown eight model section~, i.e., "Project 
Identification," "Requirements and Constraints," "Planning," 
. . . etc., was then expanded further. For example, his 
"detailed planning Section" is shown in Figure (1l.3.a), 
together with the set of assumptions he used to formulate it 
(in Figure (II.3.b). 
As we mentioned above, in addition to developing the 
model, Thayer had a second objective, namely, to "identify 
and verify the major issues of software engineering project 
-management. " And, it is interesting to note, that even 
though Thayer considered the development of the model to be 
the most important contribution of his work, it was his 
findings here that has, in fact, generated all his above 
mentioned publications. 
To identify the major issues of software engineering 
project management, his first step was to review the 
literature for software engineering problems. Then, by using 
the software engineering delivery and success model shown in 
Figure (11.4) he hypothesized which of these problems can 
most affect the success of software delivery. 
believed were the major issues. 
These, he 
The issues were then reworded as problems as seen by the 
project manager, and classified on the basis of the "classic" 
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Det.C'rr:;i::(' .allrn,::t(·!, of dl'l iVt·rc".l 
501l\,';::r<.': r,'>l1<:.L1f.. 1:I!l:fllo:intll,lc-, 
usC'ah!.·, ('te. 
DC't<:n:dr.e C'.,~t l:w1 tot"ln:-d:dt· La dro" 
Ij\,(:c H·{l\;o:rL-. 
Sdcct J,l::~!'lin~ ~nr! vrc .. il'>ct. (;Ollt rei.' 
tools ol:Jd tt'dmiqIJ(:~. 
De'\"r:lo~ qll~lit.y :l.!>!>II:'Mler pLm. 
SelCeL dc-~:tn, pro;o:r;w::nin1:, and 
te!stinJ:; t t.>CJ1 , tcd.oj c~u'.! t ;snd hlt-I.h-
ods, 
Samc 
DC!t('rndne rriorilr l!nd rnilcslotlC!!l 
!o'C cvtmts. 
BudtC"t, ]PCJ:ltt:" and St',ur'" rt'~olJn.'(~~: 
funus, rro£rOlr.:lnpr/Ol.fI,,'l)'~l, cOfl1lwtt'T 
lir:u;~ I etC". 
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ORIGINAL PAGE is 
OF POOR QUALITY 
A separate organization f=n the developnent organization 
=uld perfOJ:!ll the planning and scheduling (this is also 
an elerrent of the organizing rrodel) 
Plarming =uld be acrornplished through the use of fonnal 
planning g1.1ides, methods, and tools 
The plan, no matter how well accanplished by the planning 
group, =uld be m::xiified ry either the senior manager or 
the custorrer 
Planning documentation =uld be prepared 
The planning function =uld be a fonnal function with 
time allocated for planning . 
M:Xl.ular planning design and deliveIy techniques would be 
used on the software development project 
The planning function =uld include a software quality 
assurance program 
Each project =uld use sorre of the tools, techniques and 
procedures known as "rrodern programming techniques" 
Software development tools, techniques and aids =uld be 
used on the software develor:ment project 
Software test tools, techniques, and methods would be used 
in the software development project. 
Figure 11.3" 
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Software Development Delivery and Success Model 
o Oeliveries: 
Software 
Document'ltion 
o Success Attri butE's: 
On time 
Within resources 
Meets requirements 
Useable 
Rel ;"ble 
Maintainable 
Figure 11.4 
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management model of planning, organizing, staffing, 
directing, and controlling. He found that "By far, the two 
dominant (problematic) activities are planning and 
controlling, which together (accounted) for 80 % of the 
issues, with planning alone involving ten isues." 
issues he identified are shown in Figure (II.5). 
The 20 
To verify his hypothesized issues he did two things. 
First he conducted "an opinion survey with a selected sub-set 
of the computer community." This included: "technical 
leaders in computer science," "software engineering authors," 
"project managers." "R&D personnel," and "software 
engineering educators." (Two hundred and ninety four replies 
were received.) The surveyees were asked to comment on 
whether or not they felt each of the hypothesized problems 
was a critical problem, an im[.ortant problem, not important, 
not a problem at all, or lastly, disagree with the hypothesis 
completely and by the way it was stated. The surveyees were, 
in addition, asked to state how they would (or did) solve the 
problem. 
The 13 starred (*) issues in Figure (11.5) were the ones 
verified on the basis of this survey, (Verification meant 
that at least 70% of the respondents felt that the issue was 
either "critical" or "important".) 
(Note: Most of his surveyees either came from large 
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ORIGINAL PP.Gf:: U! 
OF POOR QUALITY 
Twenty hypothesized problems in SEPM 
Planning 
~ + 1. Requirements: Requirement specificalions are 
frequently incomplete, ambiguous, inconsistent, 
and/or unmeasurable. 
'*' 2. Success: Succes',ft criteria tor a softw~re 
development are frequenlly Inappropriale, which 
result in "poor-quality" delivered software; i.e" not 
maintainable, unreliable, difficult to use, relatively un· 
documented, etc. 
~.,. 3. Projeci; Planning for software engineering proj. 
ects is generally poor. 
*' T 4. Cost: The ability to estimate accurately the 
resources required to accomplish a software develop. 
ment is poor. 
*+ 5. Schedule:The ability to estimate accurately the 
delivery time on a software development is poor. 
*+6. Design: Decision rules for use in selecting the 
correct software design techniQues. equipment. and 
aids to be used in designing software in a software 
engineering project are not available. -
fr + 1. Test: Decision rules for use in selecting the cor-
rect procedures. strategies, and tools 10 be used in 
testing software developed in a software engineering 
project are not available. 
8. Maintainability: Procedures, techniques, and 
strategies for designing maintainable software are not 
a .... ailable. 
.. 9. Warranty: Methods to guarantee or warranty 
that the delivered software will "work" for the user Bfe 
not available. 
.... 10. Controi: Procedures, methods, and techniques 
for designing a projec1 control system that will enable 
project managers to successfully controllheir project 
are not readily available. 
Organizing 
11. Type: Decision rules for selecting the proper 
organizational structure: e.g., project, matrix, func· 
tion, are not available. 
'* 12. Accountability: The accountability slructure In 
many software engineering projects Is poor, leaving 
some question as to who is responsible for various 
project functions. 
Staffing 
... 13. Project manager: Procedures and techniQues 
for the selection of project managers are poor. 
Directing 
14. Techniques: Decision rules for use. jr, sl~!~cting 
the correct management techniques for software 
engineering project management are not (;vailaole. 
CDntroliing 
+'5. Visibility: Procedures. techniques. strategies, 
and aids that will provide visibility of progress (not just 
resources used) to the project manager are not 
available. 
• '6. Reliability: Measurements or indexes of 
reliability that can be used as an element of software 
design are not available and there is no way to predict 
software failure; i.e., there is no practical way to show 
the delivered software meets a given reliability criteria. 
*' 17. Maintainability: Measurements or indexes of 
maln~ainabillty that can be used as an element of soft· 
ware design are not available; I.e., there is no practical 
way to show that a given program is more maintainable 
than another. 
18. Goodn'ess: Measurements or in1exes of 
"goodness" of code that can be used as an element of 
software design are not available; i.e., there is no prac· 
tical way to show that one program is better than 
another • 
t+19. Programmers: Standards and techniq' ... f': for 
measuring the qUblliy of performance and the 1:', "ntlty 
of production expected from programmers and data 
processing analysts are not available. 
20. Tracing:Techniques and aids that provide an ac· 
ceptable means of tracing e software development 
from requirements to completed code ar.e not general. 
Iy available. 
Figure 11.5 
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57 
companies or obtained their knowledge from data processing in 
large companies. Therefore, it can be assumed that the 
viewpoint as to whether or not a given problem was critical, 
important, or not important at all, was the viewpoint of the 
large DP shop.) 
The second verification step was through a second 
separate survey of 60 software development projects in the 
aerospace industry. And he checked for whether "the 
condition described in the major issue existed, and (that) 
the existence of the condition was a problem to the project 
manager If the data substantiates (this) the 
hypothesized issue is labelled a problem." 
Nine of the 20 major issues (marked with + in Figure 
(11.5» were verified as problems, two were inconclusive, and 
nine were not problems. As a result, six major issues 
concerning planning and one concerning controlling were 
judged conclusively as problems by both surveys. 
Thaye~ noted with interest, though, that "there is some 
disagreement between the general data processing community 
and the project managers and developers." Which prompted him 
to comment: "The fact that these two groups do not, in 
general, agree on the major issues is in itself a fundamental 
problem of project management." 
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In addition: 
Similar to the problem in identifying the major issues, the computing community is divided on the solutions to the major problems. there are no well defined software management techniques to guarantee a successful software delivery. 
Finally, we conclude our discussion of Thayer's work 
with some of his own concluding remarks: 
Future research should continue to "refine" this model 
••• This model, as a first attempt, has, many ommissions and frequen~ generalizations. Similar research projects, uS1ng a different approach, could fi~e-tune this model and find more elements with a full range of values for each element. 
This research identified a number of major issues of software engineering project management and ~roposed a number of solutions. What is needed 1S a good definitized expe'rimentation method that can be used as a test bed for validating new project management tools, techniques, and procedures, ••• etc. 
There is still a long way to go, this is only the beginning. 
In another doctoral thesis, Riehl (1977) developed a 
"planning and control framework to assist in the management 
of computer-based information systems development in large 
organizations." The general scope of the research 
encompassed two basic a,renues of endeavor: (1) an extensive 
Ii terature survey to compile "th,)se concepts and practices 
that are advanced by authorities in the field of 
computer-based information systems and electronic data 
processing management," and (2) a determination of those 
policies and procedures actually employee in practice by 
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59 
companies "judged to be effective managers of computer-based 
information systems." 
His model, termed the "Composite-Working Model," 
consisted of some 25 "principles " and 50 "issues." 
Principles are those "specific concepts, policies, and 
procedures upon which general agreement was found to exist in 
the literature and in the observed practices of the (5) 
companies investigated." Issues, on the other hand, 
"identify those proposed practicies about which 
disagreement or uncertainty exists within the literature or 
which are the subject of clear divergences between the 
concepts advanced in the literature and the majority 
practices of the firms in the research." The principles and 
issues were classified into 4 categories: strategic 
planning, project planning, project control, and 
organizational behavior considerations. 
For purposes of reference, a summary of the major 
categories of the Composite-Working Model is presented in 
Figure (II.6). As an illustration, consider the "Consensus 
Principle v (PP) : Project Plan," within tlie "project 
planning" category. It was included because "the importance 
of a project plan is widely recognized in the source 
literature ... (and) the research findings supported the 
principle." Furthermore, "A single issue was generated 
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concerning the degree of detail that should be included in 
the project plan. Brandon, for example, proposes a very 
comprehensive scheme based on an automated system. Other 
writers generally provide considerably fewer details on the 
subject." A similar disagreement was observed between the 
companies studied. 
In his conclusion, Reihl asserts that he has met his 
research goal, namely, to develop "a planning and control 
framework to assist in the management of computer-based 
information systems development in large organization, by 
identifying those practices and procedures which are both 
advocated in the literature as well as used by (selected) 
large business organizations with a reputation for effective 
computer-based information systems management." 
Instead of focusing, as the above two pieces of research 
did, on the set of issues that are common among software 
development projects generally, 
focus was on the differences 
McFarlan's (1974) research 
between projects. ' "One 
conclusion from my research stands out," he wrote, and that 
was: 
A monolithic approach to systems and programming project 
managment is unlikely to produce the most satisfactory 
results. There are critical differences in project 
composition which influence the mix of tools that 
should be brought on its management. 
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ORIGINAL PAGE is 
OF POOR QUALITY 
sm':·!ARY OF TP.<: COioiPOSIT::-';ICitKI:,G ;.:OP::L 
Consensus Principle I(SP): :·!aster Syst.e::ls PlanninG 
Issue t..: 
Issue B: 
Structure for Planni~g 
Type of Planning 
Consensus Principle I!(SP): ~~na~e::snt In":olve:ne!1t 
Issue A: 
!snue B: 
Issue c: 
Top Hanabe:=ent !nv·::I1 ve:o::cnt 
U!jer-:·!n.na,::;cr.len-:. !nvol'"e::s~t 
Chief Executive Orficer lnvolye~en~ 
Consensus P"i:1c~ple III (S!') : :·~as"e,. Sy~:e:7.s ?la."! 
Issue A: Planning Details 
Consensus ?r~neiple IVeS?): Pl~i~~ C~ordi~ation 
Issue A: PlarM~ing InteG~ation 
Consensus Principle V(S?): Provision for Change 
Issue A; :'~eans for Achieving Cha!1ge 
Consensus Pr~nc~pl~ I(P?': Sys~e~ Develo?~ent Life Cycle 
Issue A: Description of the Syste::l Development. 
Li.fe Cycle 
Consensus Principle 11(1'1'): Feasibility Study and Project Proposal 
Issue A: Analysis of Alternative Desi£ns 
Issue B: FeaSibility Study 
Consensus Principle IrZ(pp): Econo~c Analysis 
Issue A: 
Issue !l: 
Issue c: 
Issue D: 
Treat~ent of Re~iability 
Present Value Disco~ti~~ 
Es~imacing Intangible Ee~erits 
kpproval Crit~ria 
Figure 11.6 
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ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUALITY 
(Project Pl~~nin~--Con~inued) 
Cor~ensus Principle IV(PP): Projec~ !·!ana.;ement. 
Issue f..: 
Issue ill 
Issue C: 
Issue D: 
Assi&~~ent. of Prcjec~ 
Project.-St.atus Audit 
Project Threshcl~s 
Projact Establi5h:.e~t 
Consensus Principle V(PP): Project Plan 
Issue A: Project Pl~~ Det.ail 
Censens~s Principle V:{P?): Project. Cont.rol Repo~tinb 
Issue A: 
Issue :2: 
Rencrted In~o~tio~ 
:-:a.nage:::er.i~ Revi ew 
Consens~s Principle \~:(P?): Est.ioat.ion Process 
Issue 1..: 
Issue il: 
Est:'::.at.ing :·~et~ods 
Reliabili~y of Es~i~ates 
Consensus ?rinci?le 1:!I(??): Change Con~rol 
Issue A: 
Issue ill 
Review of Changes 
Li~it.i~g Zm?ac~ of ChFn£es 
Consensus ?~inciple !X(?P): Syste~ Developille~t Standards 
Issue A; Fo~~ of St.~~dard5 
Consensus Principle XC??): Cost Allocacion 
Issue A: J·!ethod of Cost Allocation 
Issue B: !r~lue~ce O~ User BehaVior 
Pr-ciect Ccr:trol 
Consensus Princi?l e I (PC) : User-!·:a.,~~e:::ent. Cont.:"'ol 
Issue :.: 
Issue S: 
Issue C: 
Level of l.:anage:nent Control 
Key Check-Points 
Fortl of Check-Point. Revis\<ls 
Consensus Pr~nciple II[PC): In!o~ation Require=en~s Definition 
Issue 1..: 
Issue ill 
:·~et.hods of Require:::lent.s !dentificat.ion 
Requirement.s Va1ic.a~ion 
Figure 11.6 
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ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUALITY 
(Project Con"rol--Con"i~ued) 
Consensus Pri~ciple III(PC): Functional Specifications 
Issue A: 
Issue B: 
User Pnr~icioation 
Conversion. Pian 
Ccnsensus Principle rv(PC): Per!o~ance Criteria 
Issue A: Pe~for.mance Criteria 5pec~rications 
Conse~sus Principle V(?C): Detailed Desi&n Speci!icatio"-s 
Issue 1..: User Part~·cip&tion 
Consensus ?rir.c!ple V~(PC): Syste~ Im?le=e~tation 
Issue A: User Pa~ic!pation 
Cor~ensus Pr~nciple V:I(PC): Syste~ Tes;ing 
Issue A: U.3~r-!'!un.at:e:=le::t Invol-,·e:nent, 
Issue B: User Represe~ta~ive P~ic!pation 
Consensus Principle VIZ"(?C): Conversion ~~d Cut-Dver 
Issue A: 
Issue E: 
Conversion Organi:ation 
)!a.'1ager.:e:l't Control 
Consensus Pri~ciple !X(?C): Pos~-I~?le~entation Audit 
Issue A: 
Issue B: 
Conduct of Audit 
Doc~~enta~ion Audit 
Or~ani~ationa~ Behavior Co~side~ations 
Consensus Prinoiple I(3C): User Aooept~~oe 
Issue A: 
Issue B: 
Issue C: 
Issue D: 
Issue E: 
Intergrou? Co~~unications 
Perso::.nel :.!anagement 
User-!·!a~a£ement !nvol ve!.lent 
User Par~~cipatio~ and Con~rol of Change 
...\Vlareness of 'User At.'tit.uties 
Figure 11.6 
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64 
He identified three "important" dimensions for 
characterizing software developm~nt projects. These are: 
(1) The degree of predetermined structure inherent in the 
project (he defined a highly structured project to be "one 
where the processing routines and outputs of the sjstem are 
so determined by the project's environment in advance that 
there are little or no design 
architect or user"): (2) 
computer technology implicit 
options open to the system 
The degree of company-relative 
in the project (a high 
"company-relative technology" project is defined as "one 
which involves complex hardware-software features which have 
not been dealt with previously in the organization"); And 
(3) Project size in terms of man-years of effort or manpower 
dollars of expenditures ( "In this context a $50,000 project 
will be c,onsiCiered small while a $1 million project will be 
considerEd large"). 
Figure (II.7) shows how, using these dimensions, a 
project may be classified as falling into one of eight 
different categories. 
As stated above, McFarlan felt that a project's 
classification should "influence the mix of tools that should 
be brought on its management." To show hOW, he first 
provided a scheme to divide project management tools into 
four main groups. The four groups are: (1) Formal, 
integration procedures with users of the project's output, 
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ORIGINAL PAGE f13 
OF POOR QUALITY 
Classification of Systems and Programming Project Types 
Degree of Structuredness 
High w.~ 
I. V. 
LARGE PROJECT LARGE PROJECT 
Degree of Low 
Compan>··Rela. II. VI. 
SMALL PROJECT SMALL PROJECT 
tive 
Techr,alogy III. VII. 
LARGE PROJECT LARGE PROJECT 
High 
IV. 'VIII. 
SMALL PROJECT SMALL PROJECT 
Figure 11.7 
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66 
who are located outside the EDP department (e.g., a formal 
User-EDP project advisory committee); (2) Formal integration 
procedures within the EDP design team and between the various 
units of the EDP department (e.g., formal flow charts and 
other documentation to highlight interfaces between key 
systems components); (3) Formal planning tools (e.g., PERT 
or CPM); and (4) Formal control tools (e.g., regular use of 
formal post-audit procedures). 
The final step was to put the two pieces together into 
what he called a "contingency theory" of EDP systems and 
programming project-management. The outcome is exhibited in 
Figure (11.8). 
At still a higher level of specifity are the research 
efforts to delineate phase differences within the life of a 
single project. According to McKeen (1981): 
The dominant organizing framework for application system 
development is the life cycle concept. This methodology 
apportions the total developmental effort into 
identifiable stages each stage representing a 
distinct activity characterized· by a starting point, an 
ending point, and deliverables in concert with an 
express purpose. 
The life cycle model was formally acknowledged as an 
important element in systems development by its inclusion in 
the information system curricular proposed by the ACM 
Curriculum Committee on Computer Education for Management 
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ORIGINAL PAGE i~ 
OF POOR QUALITY 
EJ:tt~'· Intt~1 
tntf'9':- ~ 
Lo. M~dium 
Low Lo. 
L,. HISh 
Low Hi5lh 
HI9h MedIum 
H;gh Lo. 
High High 
k:;!': Medium 
fc~~1 F!:Irmal 
~ ~ 
His:h High 
Mt~it;.'n High 
M!'I:!Io."m Mtd/ul:! 
L:-w Lo' 
:-;.!ih H;~h 
t,'::I;;~ Hi!ih 
lc~ L""';' 
Low Lo. 
• No 2!::m~t Is mace "ttt to sl.I!!gtSt how Utrrr.al Intf'9'r.ticlI rna)' ;!'Irft P'ltr lrmt Zl t:l~ ust'r beeor.lu more sc:phis:i:tt::! L~mu!ih tlperltnee, My research $UIi!ltSU lhii r.-.111 I:t Important, 
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(Ashenhurst, 1972). In recent years, many books and papers 
on the life cycle concept have been published (e.g., (Boehm, 
1981) (Gaffney, 1980) (Metzger, 1981) (Thomsett, 
(Yourdon, 1982». 
Accot:ding to Davis (1974), the foundation for the 
1980) 
life 
cycle concept is that application systems need to undergo a 
similar process when they are conceived, developed and 
implemented. Further, neglecting any portion of the life 
cycle activities may have serious consequences for the end 
result. The contribution of the life cycle concept to 
systems development is described by ,~vis as follows: 
Information system development involves 
creativity, the use of the life cycle is 
obtaining more disciplined creativity 
structure to a creative process. The 
important in planning, management, and 
information system application development. 
considerable 
the means for 
by giving 
life cycle is 
control of 
The steps or phases in the software development life 
cycle are described differently by different authors, but the 
differences are primarily in amount of detail and number of 
categorizations. 
(1979): 
A common breakdown is given by Glass 
Requirements/Specifications 
Design 
Implementaion 
Checkout 
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Maintenance 
The mere enumeration of the phases is not, however, an 
adequate model of the software life cycle because it 
nconcealsn the iterative nature of the software development 
process (Artzer and Neidrauer, 19B2) (A16). The life cycle 
is not followed in 1,2,3 fashion, rather "the process is 
iterative so that, for example, the review after the system 
design phase may result in going back to the beginning to 
prepare a new design" (Davis, 1974). Boehm's (19B1) 
"waterful" model, shown in Figure (11.9), emphasizes this 
highly iter.ative nature of software development, indicated by 
the' feedback arrows from each phase to its predecessor(s). 
In additi.on to the identification of the component 
phases and activities in the software development process, it 
is important to evaluate the relative consumption of 
resources by each of these activities in order to obtaip a 
proper perspective of the nature of the overall process. 
Numerous authors have presented figures indicating life cycle 
resource consumption by phase. In (11.10) a 
comparison of three author's results done by McKeen (19B1) is 
exhibitted. Commenting on the figure, McKeen stated that: 
Substantial differe~ces do exist particularly in the, 
coding and testing phases of development. These 
differences may be du~ to the inherent ~ttributes of the 
systems being developed, or to terminological 
variatiolls, or to a combination of both of these. In 
the absence of a careful description of the systems and 
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ORIGINAL i:lfilGE iii 
OF POOR QUALITY 
Verification 
Code 
Unit test 
Inte~tion 
Product 
verification 
Implementation 
The waterfall model of the sohware life-cycle 
Figure 11.9 
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the environment in which they 
generalization of results 
environment in not possible. 
were developed 
beyond the 
. " . the 
immediate 
The above views are shared by others in the literature. 
example, Kustanowitz (1977) supports the notion that 
system size effects the life cycle resource distribution as 
shown in Figure (11.11). While Myers (1978) reported on a 
study in Boeing which showed that "the costs were shifted 
into earlier stages (of the life cycle) by the use of modern 
programming practices." 
The life cycle resources distribution issue plays an 
important role in the estimation of resource allocation for 
software development. This role will be discussed in some 
detail within our review of the literature on project 
planning next. 
11.2.2. Planning: 
In his IEEE Tutorial on Software Management, Reifer 
(1979) defined planning as follows: 
It is deciding in advance what to do, how to do it, when 
to do it, and who is to do it. It is setting 
objectives, breaking the work into tasks, establishing 
schedules and budgets, allocating resources, setting 
standards, and selecting future courses of action. It 
bridges the gap from where we are to where we want to 
be. 
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There is abundant support in the software engineering 
literature for the import of planning in the management of 
software projects (MCGowan, 1978) (Thayer, 1979). 
Unfortunately, however, there is as ample an evidence for its 
poor standing (Boehm, 1980), (Jones and McLean, 1970), 
(Keider, 1974), (Metzger, 1981), (Pressman, 1982), (Thayer et 
aI, 1981). Gehring and Pooch (1980) support both assertions 
in a single "breath:" 
One universal management principle, for example, has 
been called the "principle of the primacy of planning." 
In other words, planning has primacy over the other 
managerial functions of organizing, staffing, directing, 
and controlling. Thus, the degree of control over a 
programming project can be no greater than the extent to 
which adequate plans have been made for the project ••• 
Inadequate planning is the primary reason for loss of 
control on many computer programming projects. It is 
not the comparative newness of the computer programming 
process, difficulties with programmers, or technical 
factors It is simply that programming projects are 
not adequately planned in the first place. 
When Thayer (1979) surveyed the software engineering 
literature to identify the "major problems of software 
engineering project management," he ended up with 20 
"hypothesized" problem areas. Of these, a full fifty percent 
(or 10 problems) were identified as being planning-type 
problems (see Figure 11.5). And when he proceeded to verify 
his list, the dominance of planning-type problems was even 
more "impressive:" of the seven problem-areas that were 
verified, six were planning-type problems (the seventh was in 
the control area). 
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In addition, Thayer's work, which incorporated a survey 
of 60 software projects (i~ the aerospace industry), shed 
some light on the planning a~tivity. 
reported that: 
For example, he 
* The primary tools or techniques used in planning a 
software development project were workload charts, work 
break-down structure (WBS), and the subdivision of the 
software development into phases or tasks. 
* About one-fourth of the (planning) time was spent in 
developing an overall project plan. An equal amount of 
time was devoted to planning for the (project) 
organization, planning on how to staff the organization, 
and developing control procedures. 
*, (Contrary to his initial assumption) a separate 
planning group does not normally perform the planning 
and scheduling functions. The data showed that in 92% 
of the cases, planning was done by the future manager of 
the project. 
* The predominant estimation method was "estimation 
based on a similar project" (used in 67% of the 
projects), followed by "use of a formula" (40%), "expert 
opinion" (17%), and "crystal ball" (12%). [Note: Some 
projects combined methods.] 
A further analysis of the data suggested that " ... it 
makes little differnce what type of technique is used in 
estimating delivery schedule and project cost. None of the 
used techniques significantly improved the project manager's 
ability to deliver the project on time and within cost" 
(Thayer, 1979). 
Software estimation historically has been, and continues 
to be, 'a major difficulty associated with the management of 
software development (Devenny, 1976), (Distaso, 1980), 
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(Mills, 1976), (Pooch and Gehring, 1980), (Yourdon, 1982), 
(Zelkowitz et al., 1979), (Zmud, 1980). Farquhar (1970), 
articulated the significance of the issue: 
Unable to estimate accurately, the manager can know with 
certainty neither whnt resources to commit to an effort 
nor, in retrospect, how well these resource,s w,ere used. 
The lack of a firm foundation for these two judgements 
can reduce programming management to a random process in 
that positive contro] is next to impossible. This 
situation often results in the budget overruns and 
schedule slippages that are all too common today. 
A number of reasons for the difficul~y have been 
suggested in the literature: 
1. Software development is a process, that is not yet 
by "estimators." (Myers, 1972) , fully understood 
(Oliver, 1982), (Gehring and Pooch, 1980), (Synnott, 
1981), (Pietrasanta, 1968). This often leads to the 
overlooking of significant cost factors (Myers, 1972), 
Canning, 1977), (Boehm, 1981). 
2. The phases and functions which comprise the software 
development process are influenced by a large number of 
ill defined variables (Gehring and Pooch, 1980), 
(Devenny, 1976), (Aron, 1976), (Distaso, 1980), 
(Pressman, 1982), (Oliver, 1982). 
3. Most of the activities within the process are still 
primarily human rather than mechanical, and therefore 
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prone to all the subjective factors which affect human 
performance (Gehring and Pooch, 1980), (Pressman, 1982;, 
(Oliver, 1982). 
4. The lack of a historical data base of cost 
measurements (Clapp, 1976), (DeMarco, 1982), (Fox, 
1976), (Myers, 1972), (Oliver, 1982), (Zelkowitz, 1979). 
5. Little penality is often associated with a poor 
estimate (Zmud, 1980). 
Over the years, estimation of project size and 
development time and cost has been an intuitive process. 
Experience and the prevaili.ng industry norms have been used 
as a basis to develop estimates for any given project 
(Oliver, 1982), (McKeen, 1981), (Auerbach Inc.), (Gehring, 
1976) • Myers (1972) has identified several "traps" in the 
experience mehtod (i.e., basing estimates on actual costs of 
similar past projects), namely: 
1. The relationship between cost and system size is not 
linear. In fact, cost increases approximately 
exponentially as size increases. Therefore, the 
experience method should only be applied when the sizes 
of the current project and past projects are equivalent. 
2. Products with similar names are normally very 
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dissimilar. For instance, chances are slim that two 
products titled "Payroll 
development costs. 
System" have the same 
3. Frequent budget manipulations by management in order 
to avoid overruns makes historical cost data 
questionable. For example, the movement of cost from an 
over-budget a,ccount to an under-budget account disguises 
the real costs and makes future use of this data very 
dangerous. 
In the last two decades, several quantitative' software 
t~stimation models have been developed. They range from 
highly theoretical ones, such as Putman's model (1978), to 
empirical ones, such as the Walston and Felix model (1977), 
and Boehm's COCOMO model (Boehm, 1981). An empirical model 
uses data from previous projects to evaluate the current 
project and derives the basic formulae from analysis of the 
particular data base available. A theoretical model, on the 
other hand, uses'formulae based upon global assumptions, such 
as the rate at which people solve problems, the number of 
problems available for solutions at a given point in time, 
. . . etc • 
However, 
Even today, almost no model can estimate the true cost 
of software with any degree of accuracy. (Furthermore,) 
it is highly unlikely, that any two will produce the 
same cost estimate for a given project ••• The 
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variations in cost estimations are influenced by both 
the many factors involved and the quantization of these 
factors by the users of the models. Therefore, in order 
to estimate a software project and develop appropriate 
manpower guidelines, it is essential to know the factors 
that influence the software development process at a 
given facility (Auerbach Inc.). 
Finally, we conclude this discussion by Pietrasanta's 
(1968), frequently quoted, insights into the estimation 
problem and its solution: 
••• Many of the problems of resource estimating 
are symptoms of an underlying ignorance of the program 
system development for which the estimates are being 
made. The serious student of estimating must first be 
willing to probe deeply into the fascinating and complex 
system development process, to uncover the phases and 
functions of the process, to highHght the subtle 
interrelationships of the program system being developed 
and the project organization doing the developing ••• 
examining the influence variables and their causal 
relationships is precisely what is required if estimates 
are ever to be improved. Only then can we do meaningful 
quantitative research and scientific analysis of 
resource requirements. 
1I.2.3. Management of the Human Resource: 
People and organizational issues have gained 
recognition, in recent years, as being at the core of 
effective software development project management 
(Semprevivo, 1980). For several reasons: 
Personnel costs are skyrocketing relative to hardware 
costs. Chronic problems in software development and 
implementation are more frequently traced to personnel 
shortcomings. Information systems staff sizes have 
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mushroomed with little time for adequate selection and 
training. It is little wonder that Information Systems 
(IS) managers find themselves focusing increasing 
amounts of attention on "human resource issues (Bartol 
and Martin, 1982). 
In this section we will review the human resource issues 
software project management at two levels: (A) 
Individuals (e.g., selection, motivation, ••• etc.); and 
(B) Groups (e.g., organization, communication, • • • etc.) • 
(Al Individual Dimensions: 
On Motivation: One of the major challenges to managers 
is to motivate employees to high levels of performance. The 
few studies that have focused on motivational issues among 
data processing personnel have mainly concerned themselves 
with rankings of various job factors (Bartol and Martin, 
1982). And the findings have been generally supportive of 
the notion that the work, achievement, and growth are 
important job factors for data processing personnel (Couger 
and Zawcki, 1980). 
For example, Fitz-enz's (1978) study provides rankings 
of the job factors considered most important by the 1500 data 
processing professionals who participated in the study. The 
items' rankings were as follows: (1) Achievement, (2) 
Possibility for growth, (3) Work itself, (4) Recognition, (5) 
Advancement, (6) Supervision, technical, (7) Responsibility, 
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(8') Interpersonal relations, peers, (9) Interpersonal 
relations, subordinates, (10) Salary, (11) Personal life, 
(12) Interpersonal relations, superior, (13) Job security, 
(l4) Status, (15) Company policy and administration, and (16) 
Working conditions. 
A motivation mechanism which is attracting interest in 
the software engineering field is "goal setting" (Boehm, 
1981) • An experiment by Weinberg and Schulman (1974) 
investigated the motivational value of setting clear goals in 
a programming environment. In the experiment, five teams 
were given. the same programming assignment, but each team .was 
given different directions about what to optimize while doing 
the job. One team was asked to complete the job with the 
least possible effort, another team was to minimize the 
number of statements in the program, another was to minimize 
the amount of memory required by the program, another was to 
produce the clearest possible program, and the last· team was 
to produce the clearest possible output. When the programs 
were completed and evaluated, the researchers found that each 
team finished first (or, in one case, second) with respect to 
the objective they were asked to optimize. They also found 
that none of the teams performed consistently well on all of 
the objectives. 
On Selection: Programmer aptitude tests are available, 
but their effectiveness is widely questioned {Schneiderman, 
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1980). Instruments such as the IBM'Programmer Aptitude Test 
(PAT) or the Test on Sequential Instructions (TSI) for 
measuring programming ability and the Strong Vocational 
Interest Blank (SVIB) for measuring interest or motivational 
level have at best produced very weak correlations with 
analyst capability or programmer capability (Weinberg, 1971) 
(Boehm, 1981). 
On Performance Appraisal: The general literature on 
performance appraisal suggests that overall, global 
judgements regarding individual performance constitute 
inferior means of measuring and appraising performance 
(Bartol and Martin, 1982). Instead, performance in most jobs 
consists of a number of different dimensions (e.g., quality 
versus quantity pr efficiency of program execution Versus 
ease of alteration by another programmer). 
Gilb (1977) has suggested a number of possible metrics 
of performance. Jones (1978) has pointed to the difficulties 
in using certain standard measures, such as lines of code per 
programmer-month, and has suggested other approaches, such as 
separating quality measurements into measures of defect 
removal efficiency and defect prevention. 
On Turnover: Turnover continues to be a chronic problem 
for software project managers. Willoughby (1977) estimates 
that annual turnover in the DP field ranged between 15 and 
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20% during the 1960s, declined to about 5% in the early 
1970s, and began to rise again by the end of the decade. 
More recent studies place the annual turnover rate at 25.1 % 
(Tanniru et aI, 1981), 30 % (Richmond, 1982), and even as 
high as 34 % (Bott, 1982). As McLaughlin (1979) points out, 
at such rates the equivalent of a work unit turns over every 
three to four years --- no minor matter in a profession where 
it frequently takes 12 to 18 months before a new employee 
makes significant work contributions. 
There are few predictive studies of DP turnover. In one 
such study, Bartol (1979) investigated the relative 
importance of two individual factors, personality and 
professional attitude, versus two organizational factors, 
professional reward system and tenure, in predicting turnover 
among computer professionals. Only the. professional reward 
system and tenure variable were found to be significantly 
predictive for the turnover variable, both in the expected 
negative direction. 
(B) Group Dimensions: 
There are two basic issues involving the use of groups 
in software development, One relates to structural factors 
(i.e., how the groups are formulated), and the second 
involves process factors relevant to the ongoing operations 
and interrelationships of group members. 
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On Structure Factors: Software development projects are 
structured in one of three basic organizational forms: (1) 
Functional form; (2) Matrix fO,rm; or (3) Project form 
(Daly, 1982) (Thayer, 1979). Youker (Y2) suggests that these 
three organizational forms may be represented as a continuum 
ranging from functional on one end t~ project on the other 
end, with matrix falling in between and including a wide 
variety of structures from weak matrix near functional to a 
strQng matrix near project. Several authors have presented 
proposed guidelines or checklists for choosing the 
"appropriate" organizational form. (e.g., see Green (1982), 
Youker (Y2), and Daly (1982». 
In a survey of 60 software development projects in the 
aerospace industry, Thayer (1979) found that "the matrix 
organization is predominant, with 58% of the projects using 
this type of organization, 38% of the projects using a 
project organization, and 4% using a functional 
organization." He also found that very small projects were 
split between project and matrix organizations, medium priced 
projects (between 1 and 5 million dollar) were r.lightly 
biased in favor of project organization, while expensive 
projects (5 million to 50 million) are almost always matrix 
organization. A comparison of organizational form to "on 
time" and "within budget" delivery of the software showed 
that "it made little difference as to what kind of project 
(organization) type is used." 
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Thayer's data also showed that the team concept is much 
in use. About 95% of the projects were handled by teams 
under the direction of technical leaders of some sort. 
Two philosophies for organizing programming teams have 
achieved a moderate amount of popularity in the data 
processing field. These are the egoless programming team 
proposed by Weinberg (1971), and the chief programmer team 
proposed by Mills (1971) and implemented by Baker (1972). 
Little experimental work on programming team and task 
interaction has been carried out (Mantei, 1981). Weinberg's 
are an~cdotal and Baker's conclusions are suggestions 
confounded by the team personnel and the programming methods 
selected. 
On Process Factors: The attention here has focused on 
the communication plocesses between members of a programming 
team. In what is probably the most cited reference on the 
topic, Brooks (1978) suggests that human communication in a 
software development project is a significant overhead. And 
that the overhead is made up of two parts, training and 
intercommunication. Each worker must be trained in the 
technology, the goals of the effort, the overall strategy, 
and the plan of work. This training cannot be partitioned, 
so this part of the added effort varies lineary ,wi th the 
number of workers. Intercommunication, Brooks further 
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suggests, is worse. It increases as n(n-1)/2 (where n is the 
number of team members). 
The implications I,f this, is that increasing the size of 
a software team increases the amount of software produced per 
unit time, only to a point. Then the problems of 
communication among the programmers begin to dominate the 
project and reduce the amount of software being produced 
(Boebert, 1979) • Or in Brooks' words 
"Oversimplifying outrageously, we state Brooks' Law: 
manpower to a lat~ software project makes it later." 
(1978), 
Adding 
The relationship between human communication and 
programmer product i vity was investigated by Scott and 
Simmons. First, while using the Delphi survey technique to 
identify project variables that influence programmer 
productivity, they found .that "effect of project 
communication" to be one of·the "eight consensus variables 
which have an important influence on productivity" (Scott and 
Simmons, 1974). And in a later study (1975), they used 
computer simulation to e'laluate the communication overhead as 
a function of a team's communication structure. 
Finally, taking a different tack, Parnas (1971 ) 
considered the impact of human communication on the product 
of software development. He suggests that too much 
communication between the members of a programming team could 
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negatively affect modularity, because team members would tend 
to use informal information to bypass structured interfaces. 
11.2.4. Control: 
Once a plan becomes operational, control is necessary to 
measure progress, to uncover deviations from plan, and to 
indicate cCJrrective action' (Koontz and O'Donnel, 1972). 
While in most production environments, control is a standard 
business practice (Mills, 1983), in the production of 
software control is a "perilous activity" (Arseven, 1975), 
(Boehm, 1976), (Fox, 1976), (Gehring, 1977), (Gansler, 1976), 
(Gehring, 1976), (Lehman, 1979), (Metzer, 1981), (Miller., 
1955) , (Pooch and Gehring, 1980), (Thayer, 1979). 
Paraphrasing Mills (1983): 
It is difficult to measure performance in programming. 
It is difficult to diagnose trouble in time to prevent 
it. It is difficult to evaluate the status of 
intermediate work such as undebugged programs or design 
specification and their potential value to the complete 
project. 
Such a state of affairs has stirred, not only 
self-criticism within the profession [(Lehman, 1979), (DeRose 
and Nyman, 1979), (Metzger, 1981), and (Jensen and Tonies, 
1979)] but open criticism from the user community as well: 
You software 
story about 
out to check 
guys are too much like the weavers in the 
the Emperor and his new clothes. When I go 
on a software development the answers I get 
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sound like, 'we're fantastically busy weaving this magic 
cloth. Just wait a while and it'll look terrific.' But 
there's nothing I can relate to, no way to pick up 
signals that things aren't really all that great. And 
there are too many people I know who have come out at 
the end wearing a bunch of expensive rags or nothing at 
all. 
(A U.S. Government Spokesman quoted in (Gehring and 
Pooch, 1980).) 
The manifestation of poor software project control 
has more than one form. For example: 
1. The "90% Syndrome," (Baker, 1982), (Boehm, 
1981), (DeMarce, 1982), (Donelson, 1976). 
2. The production of inadequate software e.g., 
that doesn't meet user requirements (Tansworthe, 
1977), (Glass, 1982). 
3. Building systems 
expensive (McKeen, 1981) 
due to unconstrainted 
1974), 
1982). 
(Boehm, 1981) , 
that are inor.dinately 
(Wolverton, 1974) e.g., 
goldplating (Wolverton, 
(Kirby, 1982), {Radice, 
4. Lack of historical software cost data bases 
(Boehm, 1981) (Thayer, 1979). 
Why is it difficult to control software development 
projects? Two classes of factors have been proposed in 
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the literature: (1) product-type~ and (2)'people-type 
factors. 
Product-Type Factors 
1. Software is basically an intangible product 
during most of the development process, and for 
which there are no visible milestones to measure 
progress and quality like a physical product would 
(Wegner, 1980), (Corbato, 1979), (Miller, 1955), 
(Jones and Mclean, 1970), (Boebert, 1979), 
(Wolverton, 1974), (Reynolds, 1970), (Gehring, 
1976), '(Boebert, 1979), (Hales, 1982a). "This 
invisibility is compounded for large software, for 
which logic:al complexity cannot be maintained in 
one person's mind, and for which development must 
be partitioned into a number of tasks assigned to 
different people" (Zmud, 1980). 
2. ,High. complexity (McKeen, 1981), (Corbato and 
Clingen, 1979). "In an overly ambitious project, 
managers who do not understand the details of what 
they are managing are easily blustered and misled 
by subordinates. Conversely, low-level staff may 
be unable to appreciate the significance of details 
and fail to report serious problems" (Corbato and 
Clingen, 1979)._ 
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3. Volatility of requirements (Distaso, 1980), 
(Metzger, 1981), (Tsichritzis, 1977), (Toellner, 
1977), (Zmud, 1980). "Since software system 
modules are not visibly connected, in contrast to 
hardware systems, the impact of a change is often 
not readily apparent even to the designers of the 
system" (Gehring, 1976). 
People-Type Factors: 
1. The "software wizard syndrome" (Boebert, 1979). 
This or;curs when management abdicates its 
responsibility to some highly trusted software 
specialist, whose pronouncements are viewed as 
correct by defini Hon. The trouble with the 
syndrome is that software wizards, unlike the 
mythical kind, are both fallible al1d mortal. 
2. Inaccurate reporting (Boebert, 1979), (Jones, 
1979), (Gehring, 1977). In software development, 
"The employee has control of the resource, his 
time, and he accounts for the resource on his time 
sheet. The employee knows that his time sheet is a 
performanc.e evaluation factor and is a written 
record. He knows the estimated time for the 
project serves as a recorded budget. This 
combination of written records makes a pressure 
device and 'adjusted amounts' often result" {Reed, 
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1979), e.g., to hide problems or embarassing 
situations (Jones, 1979). Another explanation was 
given by Boebert (1979): "Programmers are paid to 
program, not to pay attention to progress ••• 
Management should not expect to get progress or 
status information by asking programmers, the 
typical programmer doesn't know or care, and will 
usually give whatever answer is needed to end the 
meeting and get back to programming." 
3. Optimism, (Corbato, 1979), (Oliver, 1982), 
(Jones and McLean, 1970), (Snyder, 1976), (McKeen, 
1981) , (Gunther, 1978) • "All programmers are 
optimists," Brooks (1978) remarked, always 
unjustifiably assuming that "'This time it will 
surely run' or 'I just found the last bug'" 
(Brooks, 1978). 
The persistence of the industry's difficulties in 
controlling softwar~ development does not seem to be the 
result of either a scarcity of "advice" from the 
research community, or a reluctance, on the industry's 
part to "heed" that advice. 
Numerous techniques, often adapted from other 
industries, have been pr~posed in the literature. These 
include: Work Break Structure (WBS) (Tausworth, 1980), 
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PERT (Boehm, 1981), Gantt Charts (Knutson, 1980), Formal 
Reviews (Freedman and Weinberg, 1982), Unit Development 
Folder (UDF) (Ingrassia,1979), and Automated project 
Management Systems (Canning, 1976). 
Furthermore, evidence indicates that most of these 
"proposed solutions" have been disseminated into the 
industry (Glass, 1982), albeit at varying degrees. For 
example, Thayer's .survey of software projects in the 
aerospace industry showed the following: 
Technigue 
Formal Reviews 
WBS 
Automated Project 
Management System 
PERT ' 
Gantt 
% of Projects using it 
97 % 
60 % 
57 % 
38 % 
32 % 
Thayer further investigated whether the utilization 
of the above "state-of-the-art" techniques was effective 
in resolving the control-type difficulties in those 
aerospace firms surveyed. (Note: Thayer (1979), as 
well as others (e.g., Lehman (1979), believe that the 
aerospace industry is the most advanced and experienced 
in employing software project management techniques.) 
His results indicated that they, in fact, did not. 
Results reported by Lehman (1979), on a survey of 
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software development projects also in the aerospace 
industry, were more surprising: 
17% of the projects had no project control mechanism. And more surprisingly yet, that group fared better than average relative to on-time delivery ••• 
A similar finding was reported by (Powers and 
Dickson, 1973). In a study of 20 MIS-type projects they 
found that: 
With respect to the project control techniques used for the projects in the study, they tended to be dysfunctional to project success. The use of project control methods was not significantly related to any criterion of success, and, indeed, had a negative relationship to the reported quality of project documentation ••• In general, project leaders appeared to feel an implicit pressure from tight project reporting requirements, to which they responded by cutting corners on documentati.on and preparations for implementation. 
So, what is the prognosis on the status of software 
project control? Bauer (1980) put it this way: 
We are able to identify the sources of our troubles, but in many cases we have nothing to offer but good advice. We are in the situation of a physician who keeps trying out different pills on his patient in the hope that some will finally cure him (Bauer, 1980). 
(.")~! 
/~I 
'- ) 
'~ 
I. 
-1 
j 
, . ~~~: 
'''~~'''.'; 
I :~'~.'~ 
1 
-I 
, 
.' 1 
I , .
. 1 
1 
"-, I 
",. I 
· ~: 1 
· ,. I 
i 
· t: I 
":.~> f 
,I', r 
.... I ~\. 1 
., 
"': .:.. 
· . r. I 
· . 
. 1 
~ 
94 
III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
III.1. Introduction: 
As stated in Chapter I, the objective of this research 
effort is to develop and test an integrative system dynamics 
model of software development project management which would 
provide us with understanding and insight about the general 
process by which software development is managed. 
A system dynamics model of software development can 
increase our understanding of the p.ocess through both the 
formulation of the model's structure and the analysis of its 
behavior. Experimentation and analysis of model behavior 
will be the focus of the next two chapters. In this chapter, 
on the other hand, our objective is to enhance our 
understanding of the software development process through 
model formulation. 
Model formu13tion can enhan;e understanding in several 
ways (Schultz and Sullivan, 1972): 
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1. Confrontation --- vague generalizations crumble when 
put to the test of modeling. 
2. Expansion --- the tendency to a holistic integrative 
approach in modeling forces a broadening of one's 
horizon, a looking into other relevant fields for ideas. 
3. Communication --- problem-oriented models lead to 
jumping of disciplinary boundaries, less parochialism. 
4 • Organization organizing data and structuring 
experience. 
In addition, the formulation of the model forces 
explication i.e., structural relations between variables must 
be explicitly and precisely defined. This, in Dubins (1971) 
view, is the "locus of understanding" of a theoretical model: 
A (theoretical model) tries to make sense out of the observable world by ordering the relati"onships among 
"things" that constitute the (modeler's) focus of attention in the world 'out there' ••• What is gained in understanding ••• is achieved by comprehending the law or laws built' into the model. The locus of understanding in a scientific model is to be found in its laws of interaction. (That is, fhe modes of interaction among the variables of the model). 
Before relationships are defined, however, one has first 
to choose the "things" or variables whose _,'elationships are 
of interest. That is, one has to define the model's 
boundary. Models have a boundary within which they are 
expe9ted to "mirror" the empirical world. Beyond that 
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boundary it may be problematic as to whether the model holds. 
Our model's boundary is discussed in Section III.3. below. 
This is then followed by a detailed description of the 
model'S structure and equation formulation in Section III.4. 
In the section immediately following this, we discuss 
the sources of information, on software development project 
management, we used to construct the model. 
III.2~ Sources of Information: 
To build the model, we went through three information 
gathering steps: 
First, we conducted a series of ten interviews with 
software development project managers in three organizations. 
The purpose of this set of interviews was to provide us with 
a first hand ~~count of how software projects are currently 
managed ·in software development organizations. 
The system dynamics approach starts with the concepts 
and information on which people are already acting 
(Forrester, 1979). 
In general sufficient information exists 
descriptive knowledge possessed by the 
practitioners --- to serve the model builder in 
initial efforts (Forrester, 1961). 
in the 
active 
all his 
The information collected in this pha5~, complimented 
with our own software developm~nt experience, were the basis 
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for formulating a "skeleton" system dynamics model of 
software project management. 
The second step was to conduct an extensive review of 
the literature. The "skeleton" model served as a useful 
"road-map" in carrying out this literature review. 
A model should come first. And one of the first uses of 
the model should be to determine what formal data need 
to be collected (Forrester, 1961). 
When this exercise was complet~d, many knowledge gaps 
were filled, giving rise to a second much more detailed 
version of the model. 
In the third, and final step: 
The model is exposed to criticism, revised, exposed 
again and so on in an iterative process that continues 
as it proves to be useful. Just as the model is 
improved as a result of successive exposures to critics 
a successively better understanding of the problem is 
achieved by the people who participated in the process 
(Roberts, 1981C). 
The setting for this was a series of 17 interviews 
conducted between October 7,1982 
software project managers at Digital 
MIT, and General Motors. 
and July 
Equipment 
7,1983 with 
Corporation, 
In the remaining part of this section, we explain the 
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above three information gathering steps in more detail. 
Step (1): 
As stated above, this step constituted a "formulative 
study." The objective was to increase our familiarity with 
the software development process, ir. particular, "the 
concepts and information on which software project managers 
are already acting," in order to formulate an initial 
skeleton system dynamics model of the process. 
The technique we used was the "focused interview." In 
the focused interview, as described by Selltiz, Wrightsman, 
and Cook (1976), 
••• the main function of the interviewer is to focus 
attention upon a given (list of topics). Interviewers 
know in advance what topics, or what aspects of a 
question, they wish to cover. This list of topics or 
aspects is derived from a formulation of the research 
problem ••• This list constitutes a framework of topics 
to be covered, but the manner in which questions are 
asked and their timing are left largely to the 
interviewer's discretion. 
This type of interview, according to Green and Tull 
(1978), " is useful in obtaining a clear understanding . . . 
of the problem and determining what areas 
investigated {further).w 
should be 
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Before each interview, two things were done. First the 
interviewee was briefed, in a telephone conversation, about 
the objectives of the research. The interviewee was also 
told that the primary objective of the interview is to find 
out how software projects are, managed in his/her 
organization. The list of topics shown in Exhibit 111.1. 
was read to each interviewee. The second thing we did, was 
to mail each interviewee a copy of our internal report titled 
ttThe System Dynamics Approach to Designing Software Project 
Planning & Control Systems: A Research Proposal." The 
report, written in January 1982, constitued the first "rough" 
version of our research proposal, and it provided, in 
addition, a non-technical introduction to the system dynamics 
methodology. 
Ten interviews were conducted in the period between 
February 5,1982 and April 30,1982. Each interview was, on 
the average, tWQ hours long. The names of the interviewees, 
their organizations, their titles, and the dates of the 
interviews are shown in Exhibit 111.2. 
All ten interviewees were reached through contacts, 
primarily those of Sloan faculty members. Each one of the 
interviewees was currently managing one or more software 
development projec.ts , had been software project 
manager/leader for at least two years, and had managed at 
least two completed software projects. This, we felt, would 
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v Project types, sizes 
o Hardware environment 
o Organizational structure 
o Software tools 
o Standards 
o. Error rates 
o QA pol i cy 
o Estimati ng 
o Effort Distribution 
o Control tool s 
o Mi 1 es tones 
o Reporting frequency 
o Hiring/firing policies 
o Training 
o Turnover 
o Overtime policy 
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Intervi ew II Date Intervi ewee Title 
1 -2/5/82 ,John ,James Group Leader 
2 2/10/82 William Stein Member of Technical Staff 
3 3/5/82 C1 ement McGowan Princi pal Consultant 
4 3/15/82 G1 en Gage Project Manager 
5 3/15/82 Joanne Ri ccardi Project Leader 
6 3/22/82 Dave Gri ffi n Project Leader 
7 3/22/82 Jim Doy1 e Project Manager 
8 3/29/82 Bonni e Donahue Project leader 
9 4/7/82 Wayne Babich Lead Designer & Technical Mgr. 
Softech Federal System Div. 
10 4/30/82 Franci sO' Conner Group Leader 
EXHIBIT III.2 
~ '~ • ..c _,~~., __ _ .~~.~~' 
Organization 
MITRE 
MITRE 
MITRE 
DEC 
DEC 
DEC 
DEC 
DEC 
Softech 
MITRE 
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provide a level of managerial experience and maturity that 
would be adequate for gaining insights into the management of 
- software projects. 
As is shown in Exhibit III.2., three organizations were 
represented, namely, Digital Equipment Corporation (5 
interviewees), MITRE (3 interviewees), and SofTech (2 
interviewees). This provided us with an exposure to three 
quite different software development environments. In DEC, 
all five interviewees were involved in developing software 
for in-house use (e.g., order administration sy~tems). In 
MITRE, the projects involved the development of 
embedded-software for the Air Force. And il. SofTech, the 
projects involved a wide range of systems developed on 
contract for client organizations, both private and public. 
The outcome of the above exercise was, ~s mentioned 
above, the formulation of an initial simple system dynamics 
model of software project management. The mOdel is discussed 
in detail elsewhere (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick, 1982b). This 
initial model, in addition to serving as a road-map for the 
succeeding literature reviewing step, was also the "skeleton" 
for developing our final more detailed version. Which, 
therefore, means that the informatioo gathered here is also 
incorporated in the formulation of our final model. This 
will become more evident when we discuss that model's 
structure and equation formulation in Section III.4. In 
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those- discussions we will, in· many occasions, make reference 
to the interviews of Exhibit 111.2. Such references will 
always be in the form: (interviewee-name, intervie~1 number). 
Step (2): 
Starting the extensive review of the literature with the 
initial model serving as the road-map had several important 
advantages. It was helpful, for example, in organizing the 
findings, as well as in integrating them. In addition, the 
integrative nature of our model "prompted" us to broaden our 
horizon, and look into other relevant fields for ideas. 
Examples of these "ventures" include: Management Control 
{e.g., Anthony (1979), and Lawler (1976}), Cybernetics (e.g., 
Ashton (1976», Organizations (e.g., Kotter (1978), Schein 
(1980), and Weick, (1979», Project Management (e.g, 
Maciariello (1978», and Psychology (e.g., (Ingham el aI, 
1974), Leavitt (1978), and Steiner (1966». 
In discussing the final model's structure and its 
equation formulation in Section 111.4., we will make 
extensive use of the massive amount of information gathered 
in this literature review. And, it will then become evident, 
how effective such a model truly is in organizing and 
integrating the various bodies of knowledge mentioned above. 
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step (3): 
The written record has (a major shortcoming) compared to the mental data from which the written data were taken 
••• the written record usually cannot be queried. Unlike the mental data base, the written record is not responsive to probing by the analyst as he searches for a fit between structure, policy, and behavior (Forrester, 1979b). 
That was one reason to conduct the second set of 
interviews, which constitued our third information gathering 
step. That is, there were still unanswered questions that 
had to be addressed. 
The second reason, was to expose the more detailed model 
that emanated at the end of Step (2) above, to, in Roberts" 
(1981c) words, "crit1cism, revise it, expose it again and so 
on in an iterative process that would continue as long as it 
pr~ves to be useful." 
As a result of these two objectives, the model's· 
structural components became a core around which the 
interviews were built • The interviews were, thus, more 
structured in terms of content than those in Step (1) • 
However, the interviews were unstructured in the sense that 
no standardized set of questions was used. Such a format, 
according to Isaac and Michael (1971), allows the interviewer 
to adjust the interview so as to take advantage of an 
interviewee's personal areas of expertise. 
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As in Step (1), before each interview, interviewees ~ere 
contacted by telephone and briefed on the objectives of the 
research. The topics covered were basically the same as 
those in the Step (1) telephone briefings, except for an 
additional brief discussion of the Systems Dynamics 
methodology. Interviewees were then mailed copies of: (1) 
"A Model of Software Project Management Dynamics" 
(Abdel-Hamid and Madnick, 1982b): and (2) "System Dynamics 
--- An Introduction" (Roberts, 1981c). 
It was necessary that this group of interviewees have 
some understanding of the Systems Dynamics methodology, since 
one of our objectives was to expose the model to their 
critique. This waS not a major hurdle, however. What was 
needed was basically an understanding of the feedback 
concept, and its representation in terms nf causal loop 
diagrams. Both of which are adequately covered in the 
Roberts' introductory paper. In the interviews, references 
were made only to "pieces" of the model, and these were 
always in the form of causal loop diagrams. An example 
"conversation piece," on the effects of "schedule pressure" 
on "productivity" and "error generation," is shown in Figure 
!ILL 
Sevent~en interviews were conducted in the period 
between October 7,1982 and July 7,1983. The names of the 
interviewees, their organizations, their titles, and the 
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dates of the interviews are shown in Exhibit 111.3. below, 
A comparison of Exhibits 111.2. and 111.3. would show 
that none of the interviewees of Step (1) were among those 
interviewed later in Step (3). This, we feel, had two 
positive results. Firstly, it provided us with a larger and 
rnor.e varied pool of experiences and ideas to draw upon, and 
secondly, it decreased the possibilities for bias in the 
interviewees' critique of the model. 
Except for Mr. Sheldon of MIT who was reached through 
the personal contacts of an MIT faculty member, this group of 
interviewees was reached through MIT's Center for Information 
Systems Research (CISR). Both GM and Digital are CISR 
sponsors, and occasionally serve as field sites for research 
in the MIS area. Again, each of the interviewees was 
"currently managing one or more software development 
projects," "had been a software project manager/leader for at 
least two years," and "had managed at least two completed 
software projects." 
Because the discussions at this stage were at a more 
detailed level than those of Step (1), we needed more time 
per interviewee. On average, we conducted three 
two-and-half-hour-long interviews per interviewee. 
This battery of seventeen interviews constituted the 
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Interview # Date Interviewee Titl e Organi zati on 
11 1017/82 Mi ke Landolfi Mrg. of Plann1ng, Analysis 
& Control ,Finacial &Admin 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
Infosystem DEC 
11/3/82 Garrett Sheldon 
Mi ke Lal)do Hi 
Al Chan 
Mrg. of Business Systems 
Development 
(see above) 
Proj. Laeder,NAVO Fin.Syst. 
MIT 
DEC 
GM 
11/4/82 
111ll/82 
11 1ll/82 Sam Hisamune Sr. Supervr. Syst. Devt.,CANISCA Gm 
11/16/82 Frank Lombardi Mrg. Revenue Disbursement Syst. 
11/23/82 Frank Lombardi (see above) 
11/23/82 Barbara Nichols Syst. Mrg. Export Services Group 
11/24/82 Garrett Sheldon (see above) 
(see above) 
(see above) 
(see above) 
(see above) 
12/15/82 
12/15/82 
1/17/83 
1/17/83 
2/16/83 
2/18/83 
6/29/83 
717/83 
Al Chan 
Sam Hisamune 
Mike Landolfi 
Frank Lombardi 
Garrett Sheldon (see above) 
Barbara Nichols (see above) 
Sam Hisamune (see above) 
Barbara Nichols (see above) 
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third and final information gathering step. And it lead to 
the formulation of the final model ••• which we discuss ·in 
the next two sections. 
III.3. Model Boundary: 
(Models are) analogues of existing or conceivable 
systems, resembling their referent systems in form but 
not necessarily in content. In some way they exhibit, 
display, or demonstrate structural relationships among 
elements found in the referent system. At the same 
time, they are abstractions and idealizations, omitting 
some aspects of the referent systems and duplicating 
only those that are of interest for the purposes at hand 
(Schultz and Sullivan, 1972). 
A clsar understanding of the purpose of a modeling 
effort helps to answer questions relating to the system 
boundary --- i.e., what should be included and what should be 
excluded. 
As was stated in Chapte~ I, the primary purpose of our 
model is to "provide us with understanding and insight about 
the process by which software systems are developed and 
managed." 
Notice that our focus is confined to the development 
phases of software production. Our model's boundary will 
thus e:;tend only until the last phase of SOftware 
development, namely, the testing phase. Not inc;'.uded in our 
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model are, therefore, the subsequent maintenance activities. 
It was also indicated that the model would int",e!t~_,te the 
man<'lgerial functions of planning, controlling, and 
human-resource management as well as the software production 
activities of design, coding, and testing. Notice that the 
model's boundary extends from the beginning of the design 
phase of the software life cycle, excluding the requirements 
definition phase. There were two reasons for this. First, 
Analysis to determine requirements is ••• distinguished 
as an activity apart from software development. 
Technically, the product of analysis is non-procedural 
(i.e., the focus is functional) while the prime 
development is the basis for mutual agreement between 
the customer and the developer as to what the system 
must accomplish (McGowan and McHenry, 1979). 
Secondly, our focus in this study is on the software 
development organization, i.e., pr.oject managers and software 
development professionals, and how· their policies, decisions, 
actions, ... etc., affect the success/failure of software 
development. The definition of user requirements is 
therefore excluded from the model's boundary for the 
additional reason that it lies beyond the control of the 
software development group. 
Such arguments have also been the bases for excluding 
the software requirements phase from the "boundaries" of 
quantitative-type software cost estimation models such as 
~j ~, .. 
I', '~ .. ' ! ·1 I I 
I 
i 
I' 
I 
1 
• . ,
i 
'.:( j 
1 
., '~. 
I: 
! ~ 
i···~·c~.;{J 
.. '-" f 
, 
t.· J 
'. I 
I 
, 
. . -
-J' 
1'._ i 
,. , I 
•• #. 
'- , 
.. 
, 
! 
, ' 
" 
• 
1i 
il ~ 
l 
~,,~,~. 
",' -"': i--' ,~ 
. k' 
111 
COCONO (Boehm, 19B1). 
Together with ,l!xcluding the requirements definition 
phase, we will make the simplifying assumption that once 
requirements are fully specified (outside the boundary of the 
model), and the architectural design phase is initiated 
(within the model's boundary), there will be no significant 
subsequent changes in the users' requirements. We do realize 
that changes in users' requirements are frequently blamed for 
cost/budget overruns in software projects (Aron, 1976) 
(Boehm, 1980) (Zolnowski and Ting, 1982), and for which the 
users are often "charged" and found "guilty" (Distaso, 1980), 
(Thayer, 1979), (Toellner, 1977). However, let us reiterate 
that our focus in this study is on "the software development 
group members and their policies, decisions, actions, ••• 
etc." And we suggest that investigating those policies, 
decisions, and actions which can cause cost/budget overruns 
inspite of stable user requirements is a more interesting and 
challenging research endeavor than to answer the question "do 
changes in users' requirements negatively impact the 
development process." 
Looking witnin a model's boundary (e.g., at the actions 
of the software development team) for the causes/cures of 
problematic behavior rather than outside it (e.g., the 
actions of the users) is a characteristic of the system 
dynamics approach. Richardson and Pugh (1981), called it the 
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"EnQogenous Point of View," and elaborated on it as follows: 
••• the system dynamics approach tends to look within a system for the sources of its problem behavior. Problems are not seen as being caused by e~ternal agents outside the system ••• 
The internal vie~1 creates a dramatically different problem focus. The external view places an individual, a firm, a city, or whatever, at the mercy of exogenous events ••• The external view is frequently predisposed to search for blame: "instabilities in our workforce and inventory are caused by errotic and seasonal customer orders" (or software projects overrun schedules merely because of changes in user requirements) ••• The internal view searches (instead) for structures within (the system), which can create or exacerbate the system's problem behavior. 
As we mentioned above, our model's focus is on the 
decisions and actions of the software development group 
including both project management as well as software 
development professionals (e.g., designers and programmers). 
In addition to excluding users (as indicated above), it, 
therefore, also excludes computer center operators, pers(:mnel 
department personnel, secretaries, higher management, 
janitors, and so on. 
Finally, this model is not a model of small 
one-programmer-type projects, nor of super-large projects 
involving hundreds of software professionals over a period of 
several years. Instead, our domain is that of medium sized 
projects. Jones (1977) defined "medium-sized" software 
projects as follows: 
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••• (they) range between 16K and 64K lines in size, (and in which) development teams or departments are the norm ••• Below the "medium" size range, programming as a business endeavor is often successful: at least the programs tend to work fairly well ~nd insurmountable problems are not often ecountered. At the "medium" size and above, cost and schedule overruns pop 'up more frequently, and are more serious when they do occur. 
111.4. Model Structure: 
This section describes the structure of our integrative 
system dynamics model of software development project 
management. An overview of the model first presented, 
highlighting the four major subsystems of the model, namely, 
human resource management, planning, controlling. and 
software production, together with the various flows which 
connect them. Next, each of the four subsystems, will be 
described in more· detail, in terms of its basic components 
and relationships. The various assumptions and propositions 
comprisins the model are supported by reference to the 
literature and to the interviews of section I1I.2. The 
outline of the presentation will be as follows: 
I11.4.1. Model Overview 
111.4.2. System Dynamics Schematic Conventions 
I11.4.3. Human Resource Management 
I11.4.4. Software Production 
111.4.5. Controlling 
111.4.6. Planning 
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A documented listing of each subsystem's DYNAMO 
equations is included in Appendix (A). DYNAMO is the 
computer simulation language used. It is a language 
specifically designed to handle non-linear feedback models of 
the sort associated with the system dynamics method. (For an 
introduction to DYNAMO see (Pugh, 1976).) 
III.4.1. Model Overview: 
Figure III .2. is an overview of the model's four 
subsystems, namely: (1) The Human Resource Management 
Subsystem; (2) The Software Production Subsystem; (3) The 
Controlling Subsystem; and (4) The Planning subsystem. The 
figure also illustrates the interrelatedness of the four 
subsystems. 
The Human Resource Management Subsystem captures the 
hiririg, training, assimilation, and transfer of the project's 
human resource. Such actions are not carried out in vacuum, 
they, as Figure III.2. suggests, both affect and are 
affected by the other subsystems. For example, the project's 
"hiring rate" is a function of the "workforce needed" to 
complete the project on a planned completion date. 
Similarly, the "workforce available," has direct bearin~ 
on the allocation of manpower among the different software 
production activities in the Software Production Subsystem. 
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The four primary software production acti vities are 
development, quality assurance, rework, and testing. The 
development activity comprises both the design and coding of 
the software. As the software is developed, it is also 
reviewed e.g., using structured-walkthroughs, to detect any 
design/coding errors. Errors detected through such quality 
aSsurance activities are then reworked. Not all errors will 
be detected and reworked, however, some will flescape fl 
detection until beyond the end of development e.g., until the 
testing phase. 
As progress is made, it is reported. A comparison of 
where the project is versus where it should be (according to 
plan) is a control-type activity captured 
Controlling Subsystem. As was indicated in 
within the 
Chapter II, 
determining where a software pruject really is e.g., in terms 
of % of tasks completed, is not always possible. (E.G., 
because software is basically an intangible product during 
most of the development process, and for which there are no 
visible 'milestones to mea"Sure progress and quality like a 
physical product would.) Once an assessment of the project's 
status is made (using available information), it 
important input to the planning function. 
becomes an 
In the Planning Subsystem, initial project estimates are 
made to start the project, and' then those estimates are 
revised, when necessary, throughout the project's life. For 
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example, to handle a project that is perceived to be behind 
schedule, plans can be revised t~ (among other things) hire 
more people, extend the schedule, or do a little of both. 
With this overview of the model's subsystems, and their 
interrelationships, we are almost ready to proceed to a more 
detailed description of each of the four subsystems. Because 
all the subsystem diagrams will be in terms of the schematic 
conventions used in system dynamics, we feel it would be 
useful to preface the discussion of the model's subsystems 
with an introduction to these conventions. 
III.4.2. System Dynamics Schematic Conventions: 
From a System Dynamics perspective all systems can be 
represented in terms of "level" and "rate" variables, with 
"auxiliary" variables used for added clarity and simplicity. 
A level is an accumulation, or an integration, over time 
of flows or changes that come into and go out of the level. 
The term "level" is intended to invoke the image of the level 
of a liguid accumulating in a container. The system 
dynamicist takes the simplifying view that feedback systems 
involve continuous, fluid-like processes, and the terminology 
reinforces that interpretatiQn. 
The flows increasing and decreasing a level are called 
(> 
( 
, 
" i 
I, 
, , 
l: 
I 
I 
" 
, 
.' ,_ . 1 
•. - f 
. " _" .1 
, " ,'I' 
-, - -
" , I 
' .... I 
• ~ . .. ! 
· ,'; 1 
\ :~:t" . 
,,1 ' 
, ' .... '. ;., '''' 
dr, to. 
, .... ,'" I "::"~i 7:" 
\~~\"l . .. - ,. 
· ,',-. ~ -r , 
~"y;~ ~, !' 
•• , 
I 
" 
. ' 
( 
:--.~ ·c.,'-., '". 
118 
rates. Thus, a manpower pool would be a level of people that 
is increased by the'hiring rate and decreased by the firing 
and/or quit rate. 
Rates and levels are represented as stylized valves and 
tubs, as shown below, further emphasizing the analogy between 
accumulation procesDes and the,flow of a liquid. 
I R -IL..-_L_E_VE_L_---' Z , 
RATE RATE 
The flows that are controlled by the rates are usually 
diagramed 
involved. 
differently, depending on the type of quantity 
We will use the two types of arrow designators 
shown below: 
INFORMATION 
FLOWS 
OTHER FLOWS 
----.........,. 
(e.g., PEOPLE, SOFTWARE) 
Flows will always, of course, originate somewhere and 
terminate somewhere. Sometimes, the origin of a flow is 
treated as essentially limitless, or at least outside the 
model-builder's concern. 'In such a case the flow's origin is 
called a source. Similarly, 'when the destination of a flow 
is not of interest, it is called a sink. 
sinks are shown as little "clouds. ft 
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Both sources 
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SOURCE 
SINK 
All tangible variables are either levels or rates i.e., 
they are either a~cumulations of previous flows or are presently flowing. But there is one more type of information 
variable, which is called an auxiliary. Auxiliary variables 
are combinations of information inputs into concepts e.g., 
"desireq workforce," or policies e.g., "training policy." Auxiliaries are represented by a circular symbol. 
A few other symbols will complete the designation of items included in formal system dynamics diagrams. In 
addition to the variable symbols shown above, models also 
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---+OUTPUT 
include constant terms, i.e., parameters of the model whose 
values are assumed to be unchanging throughout a particular 
computer simulation. Constants are pictured as is shown 
below, the name of the constant being underlined, with an 
information arrow going to the variable that is affected by 
the constant. 
CONSTANT 
\ , 
....... ~ 
Finally, because complex models are often diagramed in 
multiple displays, situations arise in which variables 
pictured on one diagram are used in another diagram.·. These 
variable cross-references are shown by including the name of 
thj other diagram's variable in parentheses as shown below. 
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~ _ _ VARIABLE THAT IS 
{ 
INFLUENCING ~ 
ON OTHER DIAGRAM 
III.4.3. Human Resource Management: 
- ~'" 
-{ 
VARIABLE BEING ) 
INFLUENCED ON 
- - OTHER DIAGRAM 
The Human Resource Management Subsystem is depicted in 
Figure III .3. As the figure indicates, a project's total 
workforce is comprised of two workforce levels, namely, 
"Newly Hired Workforce" and "Experienced Workforce." 
Disaggregating the workforce into these two categor.ies of 
employees was done for two reasons. 
First, newly hired project members pass through an 
"orientation phase" during which they are less than fully 
productive (Canning, 1977), (Cougar and Zawacki, 1980), 
(Weil, 1981) I (Wolverton, 1974), (Chrysler, 1~78), (Tanniru 
et al, 1981), (James, 1), (Lombardi, 16), and (Hisamune, 26). 
(Remember, a reference citation in the form (name, i) where 
"i" is a number between 1 and 27, refers to one of the 27 
interviews of Exhibits III.2. and III.3.) The orientation 
process has both technical as well as social dimensions. On 
the technical side, 
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••• (newly hired) personnel often require considerable training to become familiar with an organization's unique mix of hardware, software packages, programming techniques, project methodologies and so on (Winrow, 1982) • 
And paraphrasing Schein (1980) on "social orientation:" 
••• (it) refers to the processes of teaching the new recruit how to get along in the organization, what ,the key norms and rules of conduct are, and how to behave with respect to others in the organization. The new recruit must learn where to be at specified times, what to wear, what to call the boss, whom to consult if he or she has a question, how carefully to do a job, and endless other things which insiders have learned over time. 
Of course, not all new project members are necessarily 
recruited from outside the organization, some might be 
"recruited" from within e.g., transferred from other 
projects. For this type of employee, there will still be a 
"project orientation" period (Brooks, 1978) e.g., to learn 
the project's ground rules, the goals of the effort, the plan 
of work, and all the details of the system (GRC, 1977), 
(Thayer and Lehman, 1977). Although obviously less costly 
than the "full orientation" needed by an out-of-company 
recruit, project orientation can still be a significant drag 
on productivity, especially when a project lacks adequate 
documentation (Canning, 1977). In a GRC (1977) report it was 
noted that when workforce additions are made to "rescue" a 
project e.g., that is behind schedule, it is often the case 
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that such a project also suffers fT."om sparse and outdated 
documentation. 
The important point to be made here is that, because of 
the "orientation phase," "Newly Hired Workforce" are, on the 
average, less productive than the "Experienced Workforce." 
Later, in our discussion on "Productivitv" within the ~ 
Software Production Subsystem in Section 111.4.4., we will 
take another closer look at this issue in order to quantify 
this productivity differential. 
This productivity differential was the first reason to 
disaggregate the workforee. The $econd reason was to capture 
the training overhead involved in adding new members to a 
software development project. This training of newcomers, 
both "technically" and "socially," is usually carried out by 
the noldtimers" (T7), (Corbato and Clingen, 1979), (GRC, 
1977), (Winrow, 1982), (Bott, 1982), (Lombardi, 16), (Thayer 
and Lehman, 1977). This is costly, because "while (the 
oldtimer) is helping the new employee learn the Job, his own 
productivity on his other work is reduced" (Canning, 1977). 
The determination of the amount of effort to commit to 
the training of new employees is made, we found, on the basis 
of managerial intuition and organizational custom. There are 
no proposed formulas in the literature, nor did we find any 
in the organizations we interviewed in. We did find, 
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however, rules-of-thumb, and these ranged from committing 15% 
of an experienced employee's time per new employee (Hisamune, 
21) to a 25% commitment (Nichols, 18). In the model, the' 
value of the parameter ~Trainers per New Hiree" is set to 
0.20 i.e., on the average each new employee consumes in 
training overhead the equivalent of 20% of an experienced 
employee's time for the duration of the training or 
assimilation period. 
Estimates for the average assimilation period vary 
between 2 months (Lombardi, 16) and 6 months (Corbato and 
Clingen, 1979) (Brandon, 1970). In the model, the "Average 
Assimilation Delay" is set to 80 days. (Note: "Days" in the 
model represent working days. One week is five working days, 
and one year is 48 working weeks.) The assimilation delay is 
formulated in the model as a first-order exponential delay. 
Such delays are primary building-blocks of system dynamics 
models, and they are extensively used in this model. In 
Exhibit 111.4., we show how a first-order exponential delay 
looks schematically, how it is formulated mathematically, and 
how it behaves over time. 
Thus, if a number say L{O) of project members a=e 
recruited at time (0), they will be assimilated into the 
experienced workforce pool at a rate similar to the one shown 
in the figure of Exhibit 111.4. That is, some will be 
assimilated quickly e.g., those recruited from within the 
',., .. _16-
~ ,I 
if~', ~',' ~T' " 
'~'" -
.' 
.~ 
( 
( 
'. 
126 
ORIGiNAL \"lAG\! i~ 
OF POOR QUAl.ITY. 
---- ...... 
AVERAGE 
TIME 
DELAY 
l T) 
-r ,.. 
,.. 
,.. 
/ r-------~~ , 
(A) SCHEMATIC 
(B) MATHEMATICAL 
INFORMATION 
(cl BEHAVIOR 
LEVEL 
( L) 
L 
RATE 
lR) . 
At any time (t), 
R(t) = L(t)1 T 
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dt 
L(t)1 T 
Separating var~ables and integrating both sides yields, 
L(t) = L(O) e.-tiT 
And it can be shown that the average time spent in 
in the delay = T 
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company, others will take a much longer time e.g., new hirees 
fresh from school, while the average new employee will be 
assimilated at the "Average Assimilation Delay" i.e., in 80 
days. 
On deciding upon the "Total Workforce" level (i.e., 
newly hired plus experienced workforce) desired, project 
management considers a number of factors. One important 
factor is the current scheduled completion date of the 
project. As part of the planning function (see ,Section 
III.4.6. for details), management determines the workforce 
level that it believes is necessary to complete the project 
tasks perceIved to be remaining within the scheduled 
completion time. In addition to that, consideration is also 
given to the "stability of the workforce." Thus, before 
hiring new project members, management tries to contemplate 
the duration of need for these new members. Different firms 
weigh this factor to various extents. In general, however, 
the relative weighing between the desire for workforce 
stability on the one hand and the desire to complete the 
project on time, on the other, changes with the stage of 
project completion. For example, toward the end of the 
project there could be'considerable reluctance to bring in 
new people, even though the time and effort perceived 
remaining imply more people are needed. It would take too 
much time to acquaint new people with the mechanics of the 
project, integrate than into the project team, and train them 
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in the necessary technical areas. 
As will be further explained in the "Planning 
Subsystem," based on the above two considerations, management 
determines the "Workforce Level Needed." This level, 
.however, still does not automatically translate into a hiring 
goal for the human resource management function. A further 
consideration is given to the project's ability to absorb new 
people into, to train them and make them an integral part of 
a productive team (Brooks, B23). We shall here recognize a 
policy, formal or more usually implicit, that the rate of 
hiring of new project members be restricted to that number 
which project managment feels its fully integrated staff can 
handle (Landolfi, 22) (Chan, 20). 
This restriction is formulated in the model using the 
variable "Celling on New Hirees." Which simply equals the 
"Full-Time-Equivalent Experienced Workforce" level multiplied 
by the most number of new hirees that a single full-time 
experienced staff can be expected to effectively handle. In 
the model, the value of "Most New Hirees per Full-Time 
Experienced Staff" is set at 3. 
Because in some organizations software developers are 
assi9ned to more than one project (1. e., the "Average Daily 
Manpower per Staff" per project would be less than 1 
man-day), the "Full-Time-Egl,livalent Experienced Workforce" 
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level can be less than the "Experienced Workfot'ce" level. 
So, for example, if there are only 2 experienced project 
members, each of which assigning 50% of hisjher time to the 
project (Le. , "Average Daily Manpower per Staff" = .5) then 
we'll have.5 X 2 = 1 "Full-Time-Equivalent Experienced 
Staff." And in that case the "Ceiling on New Hirees" will be 
1 X 3 = 3. 
The summation of "Ceiling on New Hirees· and the value 
of the current "Experienced Workforce" levf)l establishes the 
"Ceiling on Total Workforce." The value of this variable 
constitutes a ceiling on the number of employees sought i.e., 
to be ~ired. That is, "workforce Level Sought" would be set 
to the value of "Workforce Level Needed" as long as this is 
less than or equal to the "Ceiling on Total Workforce." 
Otherwise, "Workforce Level Sought" is set to the value of 
the latter. 
Thus, the three factors: (1) schedule completion time; 
(2) workforce stability; and (3) training requirements, all 
affect management's determination of the "Workforce Level 
Sought." Once the determination is made, management will 
face one of three possible situations. First, the "Workforce 
Gap" between the "Workforce Level Sought" and the current 
"Total Workforce Level" could be zero i.e., the two levels 
are exactly equal. In that case .no further action is 
necessary. 
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A second, more likely, situation would be one where the 
"Workforce Level Sought" is larger than the current "Total 
Workforce Level." In this case, new employees will be hired. 
This, of course, takes time. The delay in hiring software 
professionals, is on the average, on the order of several 
months (McLaughlin, 1979). Some recruits are generally 
available in a short period from elsewhere in the 
organization, whereas others (especially when the project 
management is seeking special skills, or new college 
recruits) will not be available for a much longer time. 
After averaging these variables, the "Hiring Delay" is set to 
40 days (McLaughlin, 1979) (Babich,9) (Hisamune, 26). 
The third, and final, possibility would be for the 
"Workforce Level Sought" to be less than the current "Total 
Workforce Level." In this case, project members will be 
transferred out of the project. We will assume that if there 
are new recruits still in training i.e., in the "Newly Hired 
Workforce" level, then these will be the first to be 
transferred out. If still more transfers are needed, they 
would then be made from the "Experienced Workforce" pool. 
Those who are being transferred out require some period 
of time e.g., for paper work and transfer arrangements, 
before they actually leave the project. The average transfer 
delay is set in the model to 10 days (Landolfi, 22). 
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Finally, there is the effect of turnover on the 
project's workforce. Turnover continues, of course, to be a 
chronic problem for software projef:t managers. Willoughby 
(1977) estimates that annual .turnover in the DP field ranged 
between 15 and 20% during the 1960s, declined to about 5% in 
the early 1970s, and began to rise again by the end of the 
decade. More recent studies place the annual turnover rate 
at 25.1% (Tanniru et aI, 1981), 30% (Richmond, 1982) and even 
as high as 34% (Bott, 1982). 
Turnover is captured in the model, through the "Quit 
Rate" of "Experienced Workforce." That is, we are assuming 
no turnover among the "Newly Hired Workforce," since it is 
quite unlikely for a new recruit to quit within 80 days of 
joining the project (i.e., during the assimilation period). 
The annual turnover rate is set in the model to 30%. 
This translates into an "Average Employment Time" of 673 
days. To see why, first notice from Figure 111.3. that the 
"Quit Rate" is (as was the "Workfo~ce Assimilation Rate") a 
first-order exponential delay. So, we can use the equation 
of Exhibit 111.4., 
L(t) = L(O)*e- t/T 
where, 
L = Experienced Workforce (men) 
t = time (years) 
T = Average Employement Time (years) 
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For a 30% annual turnover rate, 
0.70L(O) =L(O)*e- 1 / T 
Thus, 
T = 1/-ln(.70) = 2.8 years 
Which translates into 673 days, since one year is 240 working 
days. 
111.4.4. Software Production: 
There are four primary activities in the Software 
Production Subsystem, namely, development, quality assurance, 
rework, and system testing. The development activity 
comprises both the design and coding of the software. As the 
software is being developed, it is also reviewed e.g., using 
structured-walkthroughs, to detect any design/coding errors. 
Errors detected through such quality assurance (QA) 
activities are then reworked. Not all errors will be 
detected during the development phase, however, some will 
"escape If and remain undetected until the te'~ting phase. 
This subsystem is too complex to diagram and explain as 
one piece. We will, therefore, break it into four sectors, 
namely: 
(A) Manpower Allocation 
(B) Software Development 
(C) Quality Assurance & Rework 
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(D) System Testing 
These sectors will be connected, not only through 
information-type variables, but also through flows e.g., 
software will flow from the "Software Devel09ment" sector to 
the "QA & Rework" sector and from there to the "System 
Testing" sector. To diagram such inter-sector flows we will 
make use of a new symbol, a "sector-symbol .• " The symbol was 
proposed by Morecroft (1980), and is shown below: 
SECTOR 
The shape of the symbol has been selected to avoid any 
ambignity or overlap with the standard system 'dynamics 
symbols. Figure III.4. shows how, for example, the symbol 
will be used to depict the flow of software into and out of 
the "QA & Rework" sector. 
(Al Manoower Allocation: 
The "Total Daily Manpower" available for the project is 
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simply a function of' the "Total Workforce" level and the 
"Average Daily Manpower per Staff." In some organizations, 
sof'tllare professionals are assigned to one project at a time. 
In such a case the "Average Daily Manpower per Staff" would 
be 1 man-day i.e., each staff member contributes 1 man-day 
every day on the project. In other organizations, however, 
software professionls are assigned to more than one project. 
So, for example, if on the average each staff member is 
assigned to say two projects on a 50-50 basis, then the 
"Average Daily Manpower per Staff," for each of the projects, 
would be 1/2 man-day. 
Part of the available manpower will be consumed in 
training overhead, as was explained in Section 111.4.3. The 
"Daily.Manpower Available after Training Overhead" is what is 
then allocated to quality assurance, 
development and testing. 
rework, software 
Quality assurance is defined in Pressman (1982) as a set 
of activities ... performed in conjunction with (the " 
development of) a software product to guarantee the product 
meets the specified standards. These activities reduce 
doubts and risks about the performance of the product in the 
target environment." Several techniques are used including 
walkthroughs, reviews, inspections, code reading (a process 
where code logic and code format is scrutinized by a 
programmer other than the original designer) , and 
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integration-testing (Jones, 1982) (Daly, 1977). Not inciuded 
in this activity is unit or module testing, which is commonly 
considered to be part of the coding process (Mckeen, 1979). 
There is a lack of data in the literature on actual 
quality assurance effort expenditures. There are, instead 
estimates, e.g., 6% of development effort (Knight, 1S79), and 
15-20% (Boehm, 1981). 
In the organizations we interviewed in, estimates for 
the QA effort included 10% (Nichols, 27), 15% (Landolfi, 22), 
and in one case as high as 25% (Hisamune, 26). 
In the model, the "Planned Fraction of Manpower for QA" 
will be set to a uniform 15% level. Notice, though, that in 
Figure 111.5. the variable "Planned Fraction of Manpower for 
QA" is shown to be a function of"% of job worked." This 
will allow us to experiment with other QA policies i.e., ones 
in which the QA effort is not uniformly distributed 
through-out the life cycle. 
As indicated in Figure 111.5., the "Actual Fraction of 
Manpower f r QA" can be different from the "Planned Fraction 
of Manpower for QA" because of schedule pressures. Several 
authors have observed that as schedule pressures mount, 
quality assurance activities are often relaxed (Mitchell, 
1980) (Shooman, 1983) (Devenny, 1976) (Ergott, 1979). For 
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example, paraphrasing Glass (1982): 
Modules and changes were initially inspected in depth but with less severity as work pressure increased and greater risks were taken to meet delivery schedules. 
Walkthroughs and inspections are usually the larger 
casuali ties. Under schedule pressures, they are not only 
relaxed, but often they are altogether suspended (Fagan, 
1976). Hart (1982) provided an explanation: 
As the project progressed, there were the usual pressures to meet the project deadline. The walkthroughs were a natural area of concern in the schedule, since they represented a significant time commitment before their effectiveness was obviously demonstrated •.• 
As the deadline neared, there were pressures to hurry the walkthrough and, eventually, to 'temporarily suspended' them. 
In the model, "Schedule Pressure" is formulated as 
follows, 
where, 
Schedule Pressure = (TMDPSN - MDRM) / MDRM 
TMDPSN = Total Effort Perceived to be 
MDRM 
still needed to complete the 
project (Man-Days) 
= Total Effort remaining in 
current plan (Man-Days) 
Thus, when the project is per.ceived as being completely 
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on target i.e., effort still needed is exactly equal to the 
effort actually remaining in the project's budget, schedule 
pressure will be zero i.e., no schedule pressure. But, if 
the effort perceived still needed is say 150 man-days, while 
in the project's budget there is only lOOman-days left, then 
schedule pressure is 0.5. Conversely, if what is perceived 
to be still needed is less than what is remaining, than 
schedule pressure will be less than zero i.e., there is a 
slack. 
The effect of schedule pressure on "Actual Fraction of 
Manpower for QA" is assumed to be as shown in Figure III.6. 
Such a graph i.e., that depicts a relationship (usually 
nonlinear) between two variables in a system dynamics model, 
is called a "Table Function." Table functions are used 
extensively in system dynamics modeling. 
Table functions would be based on measurements, if such 
measurements are available. In many cases (including this 
one), however, measurements are not available i.e., there are 
no published data on the effect of schedule pressure on the 
QA effort. 
There seems to be a general misunderstanding to the effect that a mathematical model cannot be undertaken until every constant and functional relationship is known to high accuracy. This often leads ,to the omission of admittedly highly significant factors (most of the 'intangible' influences on decisions) because these are unmeasured or unmeasurable. To omit such variables is equivalent to saying they have zero effect 
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••• 
probably the only value that is known to be 
wrong ••• 
A mathematical model should be based on the best 
information that is readily available, but the design of 
a model should not be postponed until all pertinent 
parameters have been accurately measured. That day will 
never come. Values should be estimated where necessary 
••• (Forrester, 1981). 
Because of the lack of published measurements, it was 
necessary to estimate the relationship between schedule 
pressure and the QA effort. To give the reader a tlavor of 
how both judgement and available information are used to 
formulate a Table Function, we will go through the 
formulation of Figure III.6. in some detail. 
There are three potential considerations in formulating 
a table function: Slope, one or more specific points, and 
shape. 
The slope of the relationship between schedule pressure 
and adjustments to QA effort is easy to determine. It must 
be negative, since, as the above quotes indicate, as schedule 
pressure increases, QA effort decreases. 
We can also identify at least one point on the graph 
quite straight forwardly. It is the point (O,O) i.e., in the 
absence of any schedule pressure (i.e., "Schedule Pressure" 
is Zero), the % adjustment to the planned fraction of 
manpower effort for QA will be zero i.e., actua! QA effort 
will be equal to the planned effort. 
. ~'-.; 
.f ) 
" 
" " 
I 
, 
- !; 
, 
. J 
! 
. i 
.~; .! 
. I 
" \ 
r'" ""--:'-,'i"-,c.-'-+'-'-_ ~,- "-
1 
, 
! 
.i 
1 
I 
I 
• 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 , 
I ( 
, : .... 
143 
As schedule pressure mounts, quality assurance 
activities are relaxed i.e., cuts are made into the planned 
QA effort. QA activities are not, however, eliminated 
completely e.g., while walkth~oughs might be decreased or 
even temporarily suspended, integration testing might not. 
In the judgement of the project managers we interviewed, 
planned quality assurance activities could be cut by as much 
as 50% under Severe schedule pressures, which were defined as 
situations in which "Schedule Pressure" is equal to or 
greater than .5 (Gage, 4) (Babich, 9) (Nichols, 25) 
(Hisamune, 26). On the basis of these judgements (the best 
available information), the point (.5, -50) of Figure 111.6. 
is identified. 
_ The final step was to figure out the shape of the 
negatively sloping curve connecting the two points (O,O) and 
(.5, -50). 
It is reasonable to expect the curve flattens out at the 
two extreme points. As schedule pressure starts to rise, 
people react, not only by cutting conners, they also start 
working harder (Boehm, 1981). This absorbs some of the 
effects of schedule pressure on QA effort allocations at the 
vicinity of point (O,O) • Also, as indicated above, as 
schedule pressure increases it gradually reaches a saturation 
point at which it ceases to affect further adjustments to the 
QA effort i . e. r 
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finally, these two extreme flat parts of the curve are 
connected by a negatively sloping smooth curve. "Any sharply 
bent or kinked curve is probably not realistic. A bend or 
kink implies something special about the exact conditions at 
which the bend or kink occurs" (Graham, 1980). 
Now, we resume our discussion of this section's main 
topic, namely, the allocation of the project's manpower 
resource. So far we have accounted for manpower resources 
consumed in training and quality assurance activities. The 
remaining bUlk of the manpower resou~ce, labelled in Figure 
III.5. as the "Da.ily Manpower for Software Production," is 
to be allocated to software development (i.e., design and 
coding), testing, and rework. 
As software errors are detected through the quality 
assurance activities, manpower effort is allocated to correct 
them. The amount of daily effort allocated is a function of 
both the "Desired Error Correction Rate" i.e., the daily rate 
at which these discovered errors are to be corrected, and the 
"Perceived Rework Manpower Needed per Error." In other 
words, the effort is allocated on the basis of the rework job 
to be done, and the perceived rework productivity. 
The "Perceived Rework Manpower Needed per Error" is 
diagramed in Figure III.5. as a special kind of a level, 
namely, one with an input that is not a rate. This is a 
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nshorthand notation" for an exponential smoothing operation. 
That is, "Perceived Rework Mar-oower Needed per Error" is the 
exponential smoot~ of its input, the "Actual Rework Manpower 
Needed per Error." (Because smoothing or averaging of 
information accumulates that information, a smoothed variable 
is represented by a level's rectangular symbol.) 
Why smooth? Because, "Full and immediate action is 
seldom taken on a change of incoming information (e.g., on 
the sudden drop in yesterday's rework productivity) 
(There is a) tendency to delay action until the change is 
insistent ••• " (Forrester, 1961). 
A full schematic representaion of the smoothing 
operation is shown in Figure III.7., together with its 
mathematical formulation. (Readers familiar with smoothing 
formulations may want to observe that the equation for a 
smoothed variable can be written in the familiar 
weighted-average form for exponential smoothing.) In Figure 
III.7., we also show the behavior of the "smoothed variable" 
in response to a spike in the "variable to be smoothed." 
Thus, a sudden change (e.g, increase) in the "Actual 
Rework Manpower Needed per Error," will not initially affect 
the project member's rework-manpower allocation decisions. 
If, however, the increase persists over a period of time, the 
change will be perceived as permanent {i.e., "Perceived 
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Rework Manpower Needed per Error" catches up with the actual) 
and thus incorporated in the allocation decision making 
process. The smoothing time is set in the model at 10 days. 
As mentioned above, the amount of daily effort allocated 
for rework activities is a function of not only the 
"Perceived Rework Manpower Needed per Error," but also the 
"Desired Error Correction Rate," i.e., the daily rate at 
which the discovered errors are to be corrected. For 
example, if it is desired to correct one error a day, and if 
it is perceived than one Man-Day is needed on the average to 
correct an error, then one Man-day will be allocated daily 
for rework activities. 
The "Desired Error Correction Rate" is the value of the 
total number of discovered errors divided by a "Desired 
Rework Delay." When an error is detected, it, usually, is 
not immediately corrected. Some time elapses before a 
software professional "deals" with it. In a TRW study 
(Thayer et aI, 1978) this delay was found to be in the range 
of 8-19 days. The "Desired Rework Delay" is set in the model 
to 15 days (James, 1) (Lombardi, 16) • 
As is shown in Figure III.S., after mi'.npower is 
allocated to.rework activities, the remaining (often larger) 
portion of the "Daily Manpower for Software P.roduction" is 
devoted to the development (Le. , design and coding) and 
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testing activities. These activities are discussed in detail 
below in Sectors (B) and (D) respectively. 
ill Software Development: 
Figure III.B. depicts the software development process 
i.e., the design and coding of the software product. A 
software project will be defined in terms of a number of 
"Tasks." Thus, the software development rate will be in 
terms of "tasks per day," software developed in terms of 
"tasks" developed, and software development productivity in 
terms of "tasks per man-day." (A precise definition of a 
"Task" will be provided shortly, when we discuss nominal 
productivity. ) 
As we indicated earlier, after manpower allocations are 
made for training, quality assurance, and rework activities, 
the remaining bulk of the available manpower resource is 
allocated to the development of the software product. This 
continues until it is perceived that most of the software 
development tasks are completed, at which point the System 
Testing phase is initiated. This switch in manpower 
utilization is affected in the model through the variable 
"Fraction of Effort for System Testing." The value of 
"Fraction of Effort for System Testing~ is initially set at 
zero, i.e., no effort is allocated for System Testing. When 
all development tasks are perceived to be completed, the 
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value of the "Fraction of Effort for System Testing" becomes 
a 1, i.e., 100% of the effort available for software 
development/testing is utilized in system testing activities. 
The switch is not abrupt, however. There is, usually, some 
overlap between the development and testing phases {Thibodeau 
and Dodson, 1980) (Daly, 1977) (Hartwick, 1980). For 
example, the design of test cases usually commences towards 
(not at) the end of the software development phase (Adrion et 
aI, 1982). This overlap of the phases is captured in Figure 
111.9. It shows the assumed gradual increase in the value of 
the "Fraction of Effort for System Testing" as a function of 
the fraction of development tasks perceived remaining. 
During the software development phase, the rate at which 
the software will be developed will be a function of not only 
bow much manpower is utilized, but in addition, it will also 
depend on the productivity of the software developers (as is 
shown in Figure 111.8.). 
"Software Development· Productivity" is a 'function of a 
complex set of factors, and as such it comprises a 
significant portion of the model. We are, therefore, using a 
separate figure, to provide a detailed depiction of its 
formulation. 
Our formulation of the productivity of the software 
development group is based on a model of group productivity 
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in the Psychology literature proposed by Ivan Steiner (1966). 
The model can be simply stated-as follow~; 
Actual productivity = Potential Productivity -
Losses Due to ~aulty Process 
Where Losses due to faulty process refer basically to 
communication and motivation losses 
Potential productivity is defined as the maximum level of productivity that can occur when an individual or group employs its funds of resources to meet the task demands of a work situation. It is the level of productivity that will be attained if the individual or group makes the best possible use of its resources (that is, if there is no loss of productivity due to faulty process} ••• Potential Productivity can be inferred from a thorough analysis of task demands and available resources, for it depends only upon these two types of variables. 
Actual productivity, what the individual or group does in fact accomplish, rarely equals poten~ial productivity. Individuals and groups usually fail to make the best possible use of their available resources. Problems qf coordination and/or motivation are responsible for inadequacies in process, and for consequent losses in productivity (Steiner, 1966). 
The three pieces of Steiner's model, namely, actual 
productivity, potential producti vi ty, and 
communication/motivation losses are all incorporated in the 
formulation of Figure III.10. Their structures fall in the 
middle part, the left part, and the right and bottom parts of 
the figure, respectively. 
According to Steiner, potential productivity is a 
function of two determinants, the nature of the task and the 
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group's resources. The effects of these two sets of factors 
on the productivity of software development has been 
investigated in the software engineering li terature. 
However, because the idea of distinguishing between actual 
and potential productivity didn't take root in the software 
engineering literature (yet), in all such studies the 
dependent variable is always the actual prr.ldllcti vi ty of 
software development. 
E'or. el~ample, Scott and Simmons (1974) used the Delphi 
technique "to determine what programming project variables 
have the greatest impact on programmer productivity." They 
identified three resource-type variables including, the 
availability of programming tools, the availability of 
programming practices, and programmer experience, as well as 
two task-type variables, namely, the programming language and 
the quality of external documentation, as 
significant influence on productivity. 
all having 
Boehm's COCOMO software cost estimation,)odel (1981), 
incorporates the following determinants of productivity: 
(1) Task-type Variables: Product complexity, required 
reliability, memory constraint, and database size. 
(2) Resource-type Variables: Software tools available, 
turnaround time, and personnel experience. 
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Finally, Chrysler {1978}' mapped several research 
findings into a model that categorizes the determinants of 
software . producti vi ty inti:> 6 categories. Three of the 
categories were of the task-type, they were "programming 
problem characteristics," "Source Language," and "Computer 
Hardware Characteristics." The other three categories 
included resource-type factors, and they included "Programmer 
Characteristics," "Organizational Characteristics," and 
"Programming Mode." 
Notice that most of the above factors, while they would 
vary from organization to organization {e.g., availability of 
software tools, personnel capability, and computer-hardware 
characteristics} and from project to project within a single 
organization {e.g., programming language, database size, and 
product complexity} they would, however, remain constant 
within a single project. From our modeling viewpoint, this 
observation is quite significant. It means that, in modeling 
the behavior of a single software development project, most 
of the above variables would remain constant and can, 
therefore be simply captured by a single constant parameter 
in the model. Such a parameter would then need adjustments 
only when modeling different projects and/or different 
organizations. 
This is achieved in the model through the formulation of 
the "Nominal Potential Productivity" parameter. It 
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represents the maximum level of software development 
productivity that can occur when an individual employs 
his/her fund of resources to meet the task demands for the 
specific work situation modelled i.e., a specific project 
within a specific organization. 
The value of the "Nominal Potential Productivity" 
parameter will be defined in terms of a number of 
"Tasks/man-day." Which, of course, means that its value 
depends on what we define a "Task" to be. This provides us 
with two options in modeling different project situations in 
which the nominal potential productivity differs e.g., due to 
differences in the degree of complexity of the project. We 
can either fix in the model what a "Task" is defined to be, 
and change the value of the "Nominal Potential Productivity" 
parameter, or we can do the reverse, that is, fix the value 
of the "Nominal Potential Pr,oducti vi ty" parameter to say (X) 
tasks/man-day, while changing the value of what a "Task" is. 
We opted for the second alternative. We will, 
therefore, define "Nominal Potential productivity" to be a 
certain number, (X) (to be specified shortly) of 
tasks/man-day, and formulate "Task" as a parameter in the 
model that can be set at different values to reflect 
different project and resource characteristics. 
A "Task" is essentially some unit for sizing up a 
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software product. In 'principle, a "Task" can be any 
arbitrary unit by which we can measure a software project's 
size e.g., it can be defined in terms of lines of code, 
function-points, modules, input/output files, . . . etc • From 
a practical point of view, though, the "lines of code" unit 
is the most attractive alternative. Defining our sizing 
measure, the "Task", in terms of "lines of code" provides us 
with direct access to most published results on software 
productivity measurements. 
A "Task" is, therefore, defined in terms of a number of 
Delivered Source Instructions (DSI). The definition of 
Delivered Source Instructions (DSI), as provided by Boehm 
(1981), is as follows: 
Delivered. This term is generally meant to exclude nondelivered support software such as test drivers. However, if these are developed with the same care as delivered software, with their own review, test plans, documentation, etc., then they should be included. 
Source Instructions. This term includes all program instructions created by project personnel and processed into machine code by some combina t i on of preprOCeS!IOrS, compilers, and assemblers. It excludes comment cards and unmodified utility software. It includes job control language, format statements, and data declarations. Instructions are defined as lines of code or card images. Thus, a line containing two or more source statement counts as one instruction; a five-line data declaration counts as five instructions. 
Let us provide an example to further clarify the 
concepts of "Normal Potential 
Assume two different software 
Productivity" and "Task." 
development organizations, 
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(ORG-l) and (ORG-2), have each just completed the development 
(i.e., design and coding) of a software project. The two 
projects, (PROJ-l) and (PROJ-2), are two completely different 
projects (e.g., one is an embedded piece of software for a 
military satellite and the other a payroll system), except 
that they are both exactly 8000 DSI in size. NOw, let us 
assume that in (ORG-l) the development effort consumed a 
total of 400 man-days to design and code the 8000 DSI 
(PROJ-i), while in (PROJ-2) the development effort was 200 
man-days. If for purposes of simplification, we disregard 
the communication and motivation losses in both organizations 
i.e., assume that actual productivity = potential 
producti vi ty, we could then conclude that the potential 
productivity in (ORG-i) is half that of (ORG-2) • This 
distiction would be realized in the model as follows: The 
"Nominal Potential Productivity" parameter would be defined 
in both runs of the model at the same value, say 1 
Task/Man-day, but in the (PROJ-i) run we would define a Task 
to be 20 DSI, while in the (PROJ-2) run a "Task" would be set 
at 40 DSI. That is, the 8000 DSI project (PROJ-i) will be 
defined in the first run as a 400 Task project, while the 
BODO DSI project (PROJ-2~ would be defined as a 200 Task 
project. 
We have thus far only addressed one set of factors that 
affect the potential productivity on a software development 
project, namely, those factors which remain constant 
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throughout a particular project. While most of the factors 
listed in the literature are of this variety, at least two 
are not, namely, workforce experience level (Chrysler, 1978) 
and increases in project familiarity due to learning-curve 
effects (Crowley), (Shell, 1972), (Weinberg, 1982). 
To capture the effect of experience, we will formulate 
two nominal potential productivity parameters, one to 
represent the nominal potential productivity of the average 
experienced staff member, and the second represents that of 
the ave~age newly hired employee. And at any point in time 
in the project the "Average Nominal Potential Productivity" 
for the workforce as a whole would be the weighted pverage of 
the two parameters, (in which each parameter is weighted by 
the fraction of its corresponding employee-type in the total 
workforce) • 
producti vity 
Thus, while 
parameters for 
the 
the 
two nominal 
two types of 
potential 
employees 
remains constant throughout a project, the project's '"Average 
Nominal Potential Productivity" may not, since the mix of 
e'xperienced and new employees could (and probably would) 
change. 
We will take the nominal potential productivity of an 
average experienced staff member to be our reference point, 
and define it to have a value of 1 Task/Man-day. The value 
of the nominal potential productivity of the average employ~e 
within the newly-hired workforce pool is then determined 
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relative to that 1 Task/Man-day reference point. In the 
literature, estimates for the productivity of a newly hired 
staff member relative to that of an experienced staff member 
included 0.45 (Weiss, 1973), 0.5 (Okada, 1982), 0.6 
(Toellner, 1977), and 0.64 (Boehm, 1981) (Benbasat and 
Vessey, 1980) • Estimates provided from interviews ranged 
from 0.33 (Hisamune,26) to 0.5 (Lombardi, 16). It should be 
noted, however, that all these estimates are for actual 
productivities and not potential productivities. But since 
there is no evidence to suggest that there are significant 
differences in the communication and motivation losses 
between the two types of employees, we will accept the above 
estimates as a "reasonable" approximation for the ratio 
between the potential productivities of the two groups of 
employees. The value of the nominal potential prod~ctivity 
for the average newly hired employee is, accordingly, set in 
the model to 0.5 Task/Man-day. 
The second factor affecting potential productivity, in 
the model, is the increased project know-how due to the 
learning-curve effect (Crowley) (Shell, 1972) (Weinberg, 
1982) • "As a project proceeds, the implementers learn their 
job better. The 'learning curve' is the rate of improvement" 
(Aron, 1976) • Several authors have suggested that an 
S,-shaped type learning-curve characterizes this "rate of 
improvement" in the software development environment 
(Crowley) (Weinberg, 1982). Reflecting on his experience at 
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IBM, Aron (1976) estimates that the total improvement for a 
medium sized project (e.g., 12-24 months long) would be a 25% 
improvement in productivity. 
In the model the learning curve effect is formulated as 
the variable "Multiplier to potential Productivity Due to 
Learning." It is, as is shown in Figure III.l1, S-shaped and 
it is a function of progress in the project, starting with a 
value of 1 at the beginning of the project, and peaking at a 
value 25% higher (i.e., at 1.25) towards the end of the 
development period. 
As defined above, potential productivity is the level of 
p'coductivity that will be attained if the individual or group 
mr~kes the best possible use of his/its resources (that is, if 
there is no loss of productivity due to faulty process). 
However, due to losses caused by communications and 
motivation problems actual productivity, i.e., what the 
individual or group does in fact accomplish, rarely equals 
potential productivity (Steiner, 1966). 
In the model, "Software Development Productivity" is 
formulated as the product of "Potential Productivity" and the 
"Multiplier to Productivity Due to Communication and 
Motivation losses." In the absence of any communication and 
motivation losses the multiplier assumes a value of 1, in 
which case actual productivity would be equal to potential 
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Multiplier to 
Potential Productivity 
Due to Learning 
i 
o .2 .4 .6 .8 1.0 
Figure III. 11 
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productivity. However, losses will occur, and these will 
drive the multiplier to values that a,< less than 1, thus 
depressing the value of actual productivity to levels below 
that of potential productivity. 
The "Multiplier to Productivity Due to Communication and 
Motivation Losses" has the following interpretation. It 
represents the average productive fraction of a Man-Day. In 
other words, if the nominal man-day for a full-time employee 
is 8 hours, because of communication and motivation losses, 
the daily contribution by the average employee to the project 
will be less than 8 man-hours. For example, if the 
communication and motivation losses amount to a 4 man-hour 
loss per day (for the average employee) i.e., half the 
nominal 8 man-hour value, then the value of the multiplier 
would be a 0.5. 
The effects of communication' and motivation are 
multiplicative. Motivation factors first determine the 
fraction of a man-day devoted to project work. This fraction 
will usually have a value less than 1, since time is often 
lost on personal matters, coffee-breaks, and other 
miscellaneous non-project related activities. Communication 
losses refer to project-type communication losses, and are 
thus formulated as a fraction of "project hours" i.e., the 
hours devoted to project work, hence the multiplicative 
formulation of the two components of productivity loss. The 
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detailed formulation of the effects of both communication and 
motivation losses on productivity are shown in Figure 111.10. 
In considering the effects of motivation losses on 
productivity we need to make the same distinction we made 
while formulating the "potential productivity" structure, 
that is, between those factors that would remain constant 
during a single project (while possibly varying between 
projects and between organizations) 
chang~ throughout the life of the 
and those that could 
single project. A 
reference back to our review of the literature on motivation 
(in Chapter II) would indicate that most of the motivational 
factors identified and studied e.g., possibility for growth, 
advancement, responsibility, salary, company policy and 
adII)inistration, ... etc., are of the former variety i.e., 
factors that tend to characterize the overall organizal 
setting and climate. Such invariant factors would therefore 
be "implicitly" incorporated wi thin the definition of the 
potential productivity parameters. 
"Another motivation approach which is particularly 
appropriate to the data processing area is goal setting" 
(Bartol and Martin, 1982). The authors further suggest that 
project goals and schedules can play a significant 
motivational role throughout the life 
development project. 
of a software 
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Boehm (1981) went a step further and provided the means 
to "operationalize" this idea. He suggests that the 
motivational role of schedule pressures and project deadlines 
is to expand or contract the project members' "slack time." 
The slack time bning the fractio'n of project time lost on 
off-project activities, e.g., coffee-breaks, personal 
business, non-proj,ect communication, ••• etc. 
The motivation mechanism in the model is designed to 
capture this motivational impact of schedule pressures on 
"slack time." That is why, motivation losses are formulated, 
as indicated above, in terms of man-hour losses. 
In the absence of schedule pressures, which can be 
either positive (i.e., when the project is perceived to be 
behind schedule) or negat.ive (i.e., when the project is 
perceived to be ahead of schedule), the fraction of daily 
hours allocated to project-relateG work by the average 
full-time team member is defined by the parameter "Nominal 
Fraction of a Man-Day on Project." In designating a value 
for this parameter, we were able to draw upon the experiences 
of our interviewees as well as that of a large number of 
authors. And we found that most of the estimates were 
clustered within the 50-70% range, e.g., 50% (Brooks, 1978) 
(Nichols, 25), 50-60% (Gehring and Pooch, 1977) (Pooch and 
Gehring, 1980), 60% (Basili and Zelkowitz, 1979), and 70% 
(Boehm, 1981). In addition, Stalnaker (1968) rep'orted on the 
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results of a large study that investigated how software 
professionals utilize their time.' The findings indicated, on 
the basis of over 7000 observations of a gtoUP of production 
programmers, that 35% of the time was lost on "Personal 
activities," "being away or out," and other "miscellaneous" 
non~project related activities. Furthermore, within the 
remaining 65% of the available working time, there were 
further losses e.g., time spent on mail, company business, 
. . . etc • 
On the basis of the above findings, the value of the 
parameter "Nominal Fracthln of a Man-Day on Project" was set 
to 60% i.e., in the absence of schedule pressures, a 
full-time employee would allocate, on the average, 
0.6 X 8 = 4.8 hours to the project (assuming an 8-hour day). 
Under these nominal conditions, therefore, the "contribution" 
of motivation losses to the "Multiplier to Productivity due 
to Motivation and Communication Losses" amounts, in effect, 
to a 40% cut in potential productivity. 
The loss in productivity due to motivational factors, 
does not, of course, remain constant at the 40% level 
throughout the life of the project. The motivational effects 
of schedule pressures can push the "Actual Fraction of a 
Man-Day on Project" to both higher (under positive schedule 
pressure) as well as lower (under negative scnedule pressure) 
values i.e., leading to motivation losses that would be lower 
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than the 40% level in the former case, but higher in the 
latter. 
As shown in Figure III.l0, the "Actual Fraction of a 
Man-Day on Project" is formulated in the model as a level 
variable. Its value is set, at the initiation of the 
project, to the value of "Nominal Fraction of a Man-Day on 
Project" i.e., at 60%. And it maintains that nominal value 
at the absence of any schedule pressures. To see how 
schedule pressures influence the "Actual Fraction of a 
Man-Day on Project," let us first consider the effects of 
p"sitive schedule pressures. 
Schedule pressure was previously defined as, 
Schedule Pressure = (TMDPSN-MDRM)/MDRM 
where, 
TMDPSN = Total Effort perceived to be 
still needed to complete the 
project (Man':'Days) 
MDRM = Total Effort remaining in 
current plan (Man-Days) 
positive schedule pressures arise whenever the project 
is perceived to be behind schedule. That is, whenever the 
total effort still needed to complete the projec.t is 
perceived to be greater than the total effort actually 
remaining ('L. e., when the numerator in the schedule pressure 
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equation is positive). Such a difference represents a 
perceived shortage in man-days on the project. 
When confronted with such a situation, software 
developers tend to work harder, i.e., allocate more man-hours 
to the project, in an attempt to compensate for the perceived 
shortage and bring the project back on schedUle (Larkin) 
(Ibrahim, 1978) (McGowan, 3) (Babich, 9) (Lombardi, 16) 
(Nichols, 18) (Sheldon, 19) (Chan, 20) (Hisamune, 21). In 
one experiment, Boehm (1981) found that the number of 
man-hours increases by as much as 100%. And he asserts that 
most of the gains are achieved by "reallocating (i.e., 
compressing) peoples' slack time." In other words, under 
schedule pressure, people tend to spend less time on 
off-pr.°tect activities such as personal business and 
non-project communication. This then decreases the man-hours 
lost per man-day, while increasing the daily man-hours 
allocated to the project. 
Recall that the value of the "Nominal Fraction of a 
Man-Day on Project" was set to 60%, which translate into 4.8 
hourl of project work per man-day. This would seem to 
indicate that, at most, another 3.2 hours per man-day can be 
gained under schedUle pressure (assuming an 8-hour day), 
i.e., a 67% increase. And since it is quite unlikely that 
people would in fact allocate every minute of their 8-hour 
working day to project work, the attainable increase will be 
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even less than 67%. How then could we' explain the 100% 
increase reported by Boehm? 
A 100% increase is attainable because workers, in 
addition to partially compressing their slack time, may also 
work overtime hours. For example, OJ working 12 hours a day 
at 80% efficiency, a team member would be allocating 9.6 
hours to the project i.e., double the nominal 4.8 hour$. 
In fact, by further compressing the slack time (say to 
10 or 15%) and/or increasing the overtime hours, an increase 
of more than 100% could be achieved. But this would cause 
actual productivity to be larger than potential productivity, 
which by definition should not be possible. That is, by the 
current definitions. To accomodate this situation, we, 
therefore, amend the definition of potential productivity to 
be "the level of productivity that will be attained if the 
individual or group makes the best possible use of its 
resources under regular working conditions," and define 
"regular" to exclude overtime working conditions. 
To recapitulate, when a project is perceived to be 
behind schedule, people tend to work harder to bring it back 
on schedule. They ~o that by compressing their slack time 
and/or working over-time, and thus allocating more man-hours 
to the project. But what if such a situation persists ... 
would workers be willing to work harder indefinitely? The 
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answer, according to our interviewees, was overwhelmingly no 
[(McGowan, 3), (Babich, 9), (Lombardi, 16), (Nichols, 18), 
(Sheldon, 19), (Chan, 20), and ~Hisamune, 21)]. There is, it 
was indicated, a threshold on how long employees would be 
willing to work at an "above-normal" rate. 
We refer now to Figure 111.10. to explain how the above 
f f • ",. .., t d· .. h A I ~et Q __ lnulngs 15 lIDp_emen e lrt ....... e mc ... €! • 
When the project is perceived to be behind schedule 
i.e., when the total effort still needed to complete the 
project is perceived to be greater than the total effort 
actually remaining in the project's plan, two factors 
determine the level to which the "Actual Fraction of Man-day 
on project" is boosted. The first is the value of, the 
"Perceived Shortage in Man-days" i.e., the value of the 
difference between what is needed and what is remaining. If 
this difference is below some "threshold," then it will all 
be handled, i.e., the employees will boost the hours they 
allocate to the project (e.g., by compressing their slack 
time) to what they perceive is necessary to handle all the 
"Perceived Shortage in Man-days." (How they determine this 
will be explained shortly.) The second factor is the 
"Maximum Shortage in Man-Days to be Handled," and it 
constitutes the "threshold" mentioned above. Thus, if the 
"Perceived Shortage in Man-Days" is greater than the maximum 
which the employees are willing to handle, we will assume 
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that they would be motivated to work harder to handle that 
maximum value, while arranging with management to extend the 
schedule so as to handle what exceeds the "Maximum Shortage 
in Man-Days to be handled." (Such extension to the schedule 
will be'explained in the Planning Section.) 
As employees work harder to handle shortages in 
man-days, their tolerence for working harder decreases i.e., 
the value of the "Maximum Shortage in Man-Days to be handled" 
decreases. For if this were not true, e.g., if this maximum 
value was a constant parameter, then a persistent man-days 
shortage at moderate levels (i.e., at levels below the 
maximum value) would lead to an above normal work rate 
throughout the life of the project. And this, would 
contradict our finding that "there is a threshold on how long 
employees would be willing to work at above normal rate." 
At any point in the project, the value of the "Maximum 
Sho.rtage in Man-Days to be handled" is determined by the 
product of three variables, the "Overwork Duration 
Threshold," the "Full-Time Equivalent Workforce," and the 
"Maximum Boost in Man-Hours." For example, if at a point in 
time the workforce of 10 full-time people on the project is 
willing to work at an above normal rate for a maximum of 10 
days, and they figure that they can boost their work rate by 
as much as. 100% (e.g. , allocate 9.6 hours per man-day to the 
project instead of the normal 4.8 hours) then they would 
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conclude that during 'chis 10 day period it is possible to 
handle 10 X 10 X 1 = 100 Man-days worth of backlogged work, 
over and above the regular work planned for that period. 
In the model, the value of the "Maximum Boost in 
Man-Hours" is set, as in the example above, at a value of 
100% (Lombardi, 16) (Nichols, 27). 
Estimates by the interviewees for a nominal value for 
the "Overwork Duration Threshold" ranged from 8 weeks (Chan, 
20) to 12 weeks (Nichols, 27). In the model we set the 
nominal value for the "Overwork Duration Threshold" to 50 
working days (i.e., 10 weeks). Once people start working 
harder, their "Overwork Duration Threshold," which at any 
point in time would represent the maximum remaining duration 
for which they would be willing to continue working harder, 
would decrease below the nominal value. Thus the "Overwork 
Duration Threshold" is formulated as a nominal value (Le., 
of 10 weeks) that is adjusted downwards by a multiplier. One 
option for the multiplier was to have it be a function of the 
calendar time during which the project members, have been 
working harder. This option was rejected, though, because it 
would not differentiate between say a ten day period during 
which the staff were working 10% harder, and another ten day 
period in which they worked 100% harder. We wanted the 
formulation of the multiplier to induce a cut in the 
"Overwork Duration Threshold" that would be greater at the 
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end of the latter case. 
This was accomp~ished by formulating the "Multiplier to 
the Overwork ]:;luration Threshold due to Exhaust ion." Where 
"Exhaustion" is simply a level whose value reflects the level 
of exhaustion of the workforce due to overwork. The rate at 
which this level increases needs, therefore, to be a function 
of some measure of overwork. Such a function is shown in 
Figure III.12. 
Before interpreting Figure 111.12., let us first refresh 
ourmemories about some assumptions we've made so far. 
First, we are assuming that a full time employee allocates" 
on the average, 60% of his or her time to the project (i.e., 
NFMDPJ = 0.6), which for an 8-hour day amounts to 4.8 hours. 
Under schedule pressure, more time will be allocated to the 
project (i .e., AFMDPJ > 0.6). This would be achieved by 
first compressing the slack time, and then if needed, by 
working overtime. Furthermore, we are also assuming that 
there is a' "Maximum (Possible) Boost in Man-Hours" of 100% 
i.e., AFMDPJ can attain a maximum value of 0.6 X 2 = 1.2. 
The first thing to note about Figure III .12. is that 
when AFMDPJ is less than or equal to NFMDPJ (Le. , when X is 
greater than 1) the value of RIEXHL is zero. That is, when 
.people are working at their normal pace (or slower) there 
will be no rise in their exhaustion level. This must be so 
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Y=RIEXHL 
3 ; 
2 Overwork Increasing 
1 
o ~----~------~----~~-----. 
-.5 o .5 1 X= 1 - AFMDPJ 
1 - NFMDPJ 
Where, 
AFMDPJ =Actual Fraction of a Man-Day on Project· 
NFMDPJ=Nominal Fraction of a Man-Day on Project 
RIEXHL=Rate of Increase in Exhaustion Level 
Figure III. 12 
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by definition, since the "Exhaustion level" in the illodel is 
defined to be that of exhaustion due to overwork. 
Second, note that the exhaustion rate is really a 
function of (l-AFMDPJ), since the denominator of (X) i.e., 
(l-NFMDPJ), is a constant term. Also note that the value of 
(l-AFMDPJ) is a measure of the average "Slack Time." What we 
are saying, therefore, is that the. exhaustion rate of the 
workforce.is a function of the compression in the average 
slack time. And the reason is this: the exhaustion of 
working harder is mostly "psychological," rather than 
"physiological." That is, people enjoy their slack time 
(e.g., coffee breaks, social communications, personal 
business, ••• etc.), and they would not tolerate prolonged 
deprivation of such "breathe~s." Thus a compressed slack 
time exhausts them in the sense that it cuts into their 
tolerance level for continued hard work since that would mean 
a con~inued "deprivation" of their slack time. 
However, when·the value of (l-AFDPRD) approaches zero 
and moves into negative territory, people would, not only be 
compressing their slack time,. but they would in addition be 
working overtime. At those values, in addition to the 
psychological component to exhaustion, there will also be 
"physiological" exhaustion. And that is why, the curve 
increases at a faster rate for negative values of (X). 
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The effects of exhaustion on the "Overwork Duration 
Threshold" is formulated as the "Multiplier to the Overwork 
Duration Threshold due to Exhuastion." As we explained 
previously, the nominal value of the threshold is 50 days. 
And as people start working harder, i.e., at a rate above 
their normal rate, that threshold is cut down, until possibly 
it reaches a value of zero. But notice that setting the 
nominal value of the "Overwork Duration Threshold" to 50 days 
is not enough. It is also necessary to specify at what level 
of overwork, since people might be willing to work for 50 
days at a rate 50% above their normal rate, while not willing 
to do so at a 100% increase. We thus amend our definition of 
the nominal value for the "Overwork Duration Threshold" to be 
50 working days at a rate of a hours per man-day (i.e., when 
AFMDPJ is approximately 1). Notice that when AFMDPJ is 
approximately 1, RIEXML in Figure III.12. would be also 1 
i.e., at such a work rate, each man-day contributes 1 to the 
Exhaustion level. And after 50 such days, the Exhaustion 
level reaches a level of 50, which should be enough to drive 
the "Overwork Duration Threshold" to zero. That level of 
Exhaustion is termed the "Maximum Tolerable Exhaustion" 
level. That level of exhaustion could of course be reached 
in less than a 50 day duration if people are work'ing even 
harder (i .e., if AFMDPJ is greater than 1), and conversely, 
if the work rate is less than a-hours per man-day, it would 
be reached in more than 50 days. But once reached, it drives 
the "Overwork Duration Threshold" to zero. This is 
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accomplished by the formulation of the "Multiplier to the 
Overwork Duration Threshold due to Exhaustion," shown in 
Figure III .13. 
Once a period of overwork comes to an end, either 
because the threshold has been reached and/or schedule 
pressures cease, and the workforce returns to a normal work 
rate (Le. , when AFMDPJ = NFMDPJ), the workforce's 
"Exhaustion level" depletes. The "Rate of Depletion of the 
Exhaustion level" is modeled as a first order exponential 
delay, with a time delay equal to 4 weeks. The 4 weeks delay 
time was chosen on the basis of discussion with (Lombardi, 
23) and (Nichols, 25). 
During the "de-exhausting" period, the workforce remains 
unwilling to "re-overwork" (Lombardi, 23) (Nichols, 25). 
This is achieved in the model through the formulation of the 
variable "Willingness to Overwork." This is a SWITCH 
variable that can attain one of two values, namely, zero or 
one, and is multiplied into the formulation of the "Maximum 
Shortage in Man-Days to be Handled." Whenever the maximum 
exhaustion level is reached and the "Overwork Duration 
Threshold" is driven down to zero, the "Willingness to 
Overwork" variable is switched to zero. The "Willingness to 
Overwork" variable will remain at that zero level until the 
workforce is "de-exhausted" i . e. , until the "Exhaustion 
Level" is depleted. And as long as the "Willingness to 
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Multiplier to the Overwork Duration 
Threshold Due to Exhaustion 
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Overwork" is zero, the "Maximum Shortage in Man-Uays to be 
Handled" will also be zero i.e., the worforce remains 
unwilling to handle any (further) man-day shortages through 
overwork. When the "Exhaustion Level" is eventually 
depleted, the "Willingness to Overwork" is switched back to a 
value of one i.e., the workforce would again be willing to 
overwork (if and when the need arises). 
Recall that determining the value of the "Overwork 
Duration Threshold" was necessary in order to determine the 
value of the "Maximum Shortage in Man-days to be Handled." 
The latter, in turn, is necessary to determine the value to 
which the "Actual Fraction of Man-days on Project" is 
boosted. When tne project is perceived to be behind schedule 
i.e., when the total effort still needed to complete the 
project is perceived to be greater than the total effort 
actually remaining in the project's plan, indicating a 
shortage in man-days, the staff members would then seek to 
boost their wo:k rate to what they perceive is nec~ssary to 
handle either all the "Perceived Shortage in Man-Days" or the 
"Maximum Shortage in Man-Days to be Handled," which ever is 
smaller. The smaller of the two values would then constitute 
the "Handled Man-Days." The"% Boost in Work Rate Sought" to 
handle these man-days is determined by dividing the value of 
"Handled Man-Days" by the product of "Full-Time Equivalent 
Workforce" and "Overwork Duration Threshold." For example, 
if 100 man-days are to be handled by a 10 person team in 50 
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days, the % Boost would be 100/(10X50) ; 0.2. That is the 
workers would figure that by increasing their work rate by 
20% they can handle the 100 man-days of backlogged work in 
addition to the regular work planned for the 50 day period. 
Notice our assumption that the backlogged work will alw~ys be 
stretched over the full period defined by the "Overwork 
Duration Threshold." This .should be a good approximation in 
cases when the value of "Handled Man-Days" is close to the 
"Maximum Shortage in Man-Days to be handled." When the 
"Handled Man-Days" is much smaller, though, the team might 
decide to handle it in a shorter "spurt" of overwork e.g., 
"to get it over with." However, we will simplify and use a 
single formulation for all cases (i.e., one in which the 
backlog is stretched over the "Overwork Duration Threshold" 
period) • 
Once the "% Boost in Work Rate Sought" is determined, it 
defines a work rate goal in terms of tne man~hours to be 
allocated to the project. Such a goal is not achieved 
instantaneously, since workers take time to adjust their work 
habits. There is, therefore, a delay before the "Actual 
Fraction of Man-Days on Project", in fact attains the level 
sought. The average delay is set in the model to 2 weeks. 
So far we have been discussing the effects of positive 
schedule pressures on productivity. To both complete and 
conclude this discussion on the effects of motivational 
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factors on productivity, we turn our attention next to those 
(probably rare) situations in which the project is perceived 
to be ahead of schedule i.e., the case of negative schedule 
pressures. 
Such a situation exists whenever the total man-days 
remaining in the project's plan exceed what the project 
members perceive to be needed to complete the project. This 
could happp.n, for example, if management over-estimates a 
project' s ~'icope. The question we are interested in addessing 
here is what effects would a perception of such "excesses" 
have on productivity, if any? 
Recall, in the case of positive schedule pressures, the 
shortage in man-days was handled first by adjustments in 
productivity and then if needed by additional adjustments in 
the schedule. Analogous behavior occurs in the negative 
schedule pressure situation. That is, when project members 
perceive some "excesses" in the schedule parts, if not all, 
of those excesses will be "absorbed" by the 'workers, in the 
form of "under-work," before downward adjustments are made in 
the project's schedule (Ibrahim, 1978) (Boehm, 19B1) 
(Griffin, 6) (Babich, 9) (Lombardi, 16) (Sheldon, 19). Por 
example, paraphrasing Boehm (19B1): 
••• if the software 
meeting a milestone is 
Parkinson's Law indicates 
time for ••• personal 
cost or schedule estimate for higher than the ideal, 
that people will use the extra 
activities, catching up on the 
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mail. etc. 
Again. analogous to the positive schedule pressure 
situation where there was a limit on how much backlog could 
be handled. there are limits on how much "fat" employees 
would be willing. or allowed, to absorb. And beyond thbse 
limits, excesses \IIould be translated into cuts ia the 
project's schedule. 
The above ideas are captured in the table function of 
Figure III .14. The dashed 45° line represents full 
'disclosure of schedule excesses. and thus the complete 
transl'ation oJ; any excesses into schedule cuts. 
realistic project behavior is the one depicted by the 
Curve. At the upper right corner excesses are small 
A more 
Solid 
i. e. , 
"Man-Days Perc;:;ived Still Needed" is slightly less than 
"Man-Days Remaining" in the plan. Under such conditions most 
of the slack will be absorbed (not reported) i.e •• reports 
will show that the project is 2£ (not ahead of) schedule 
Le., "Man-Days Reported Still Needed" will be equal to 
"Man-Days Remaining." As we move towards conditions of 
larger and larger excesses those large excesses will be only 
partially absorbed. and the balance translated into cuts in 
the project's schedule. 
Absorbed excesses will mean. as was indicated above. a 
larger slack time. which in turn means a lower "Actual 
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Fraction of a Man-Day on Project." This is brought about in 
the model through the same mechanism used to increase the 
"Actual Fraction of a Man-Day on Project" under positive 
schedule pressure, namely, through an adjustment to the value 
of the variable "% Boost in work Rate Sought." in this case, 
however, the % boost will be a negative value. 
There are, in addition, two more differences between the 
two cases. In calculating the % boost, we will assume that 
the workers will stretch their absorpticiO of the perceived 
excesses over the remaining life of the project. That is, 
instead of a short lived and drastic dip in their work rate, 
workers are assumed to adjust to what they perceive would be 
a stable, albeit comfortably lower, work rate. 
Once the HI (DIP) in work rate Sought" is determined, it 
defines a work rate goal in terms of the man-hours to be 
allocated to the project. As in the positive schedule 
pressure situation, such a goal is not achieved 
instantaneously, since workers take time to adjust their work 
habits. It is reasonable to expect, though, that the delay 
to adjust one's habits to a more comfortable state would be a 
smaller delay than that of adjusting to a less comfortable 
state. We, therefor.e, will assume that the average delay in 
adjusting to a H% Dip" is 7.5 days i.e., 25% lower than that 
of adjusting to a "I Boost" under positive schedule pressure. 
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The value of the "Actual Fraction of a 'Man-Day on 
Project," once determined under various schedule p.essure 
conditions, becomes an important determinant of the actual 
software productivity. It represents, as 
indicated above, the losses in productivi ty due to 
motivational factors. It is not the only determinant, 
though. Additional losses in productivity are incurred due 
to the communication overhead. 
As is shown in Figure III.10., "Software Development 
producti vi ty" is formulated as the product of "Potential 
productivity" and the 
Communication and 
"Multiplier 
Motivation 
to Productivity Due· to 
Losses." The multiplier 
represents the average productive fraction of a Man-Day, 
i.e., that fraction of the "Actual Fraction of a Man-Days on 
Project" that remains after accounting for communication 
overhead. For example, if the "Actual Fraction of a Man-Day 
on Project" is 0.6 i.e., a full-time employee allocates on 
the average .6 X 8 = 4.8 hours to the project, and if the 
project communication overhead consumes 25% of that, then the 
average productive fraction of a Man-Day would be 
0.75 X 0.6 = 0.45 i.e., 3.6 hours. 
What is communication overhead? There are those who 
might argue that human communication is an essential 
component of any software development effort, and is, 
therefore, actually part of the "job" . . . not an overhead. 
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Even though human communication is indeed an essential (and 
even useful) component of software development, it does 
ccmstitute an overhead. To see why, let us examine what 
happens when a software system rather than being developed by 
a team is instead developed by one person. 
Two things usually happen. First, time lost in human 
communication is avoided. When a team is developing the 
software, 
••• it is necessary that each individual spend part of his .time communicating with each of the other team members. For example, the designer must confer with the coder to resolve any questions the coder may have about the design; both of these must talk to the individual testing the code to give him the benefit of their experience with the program; each of these must talk to the document or to assure that the documentation is proper and complete; and so on (Tausworthe, 1977). 
Such human communication is, obviously, u~necessary when 
·the software is developed by a single person. 
Second, the amount of work itself usually increases when 
software is developed by a team, vis-a-vis a single person. 
This increase in the work load takes two forms. The first, 
and obvious one, is that the amount of documentation 
increases e.g., in a one-person environment the programmer 
could get away with sketchy notes to merely augment his 
"mental documentation" (Tausworthe, 1977). The second less 
obvious increase is in the form of an increase in the size of 
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the software product itself (Gagliardi, 198'0) (Conway, 1968). 
For example, when a program is developed by two people 
instead of one, it might be designed as a two-module program 
instead of a single-module program necessi tating an 
inter-module interface that has to be agreed upon and 
developed. 
On the basis of the above observations, we can now 
answer the question we posed above: namely, "what is 
communication overhead?" The answer: It is the drop in the 
productivity of the average team member below his nominal 
productivity due to team communication. Where communication 
includes verbal communication, documentation, and any 
additional workload e.g., due to interfaces. 
It is widely held that communication overhead increases 
in proportion to n2 , where n is the size of the team (Brooks, 
1978) (Shooman, 1983) (Mills t 1976) (Zelkowi tz, 1978) (Scott 
and Simmons" 1975). Such a relationship is shown in the 
table functi6n of Figure III.15. Thus, communication 
overhead, as is formulated in the model, is zero when the 
software is developed by one person, but as the workforce 
size (n) increases, communication overhead increases in 
proportion to n2 • For example, at n=30, the communication 
overhead is approximately 50%. This means that if th'2 
"Actual Fraction of a Man-Day on Project" is 0.6, i.e., 4.8 
hours are allocated daily, on the average, by the full-time 
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team member, 50% of these, or 2.4 hours, will be effectively 
lost due to communication overhead. In other words, the 
"Mul tipHer to Productivity Due to Motivation and 
Communication Losses" would be 0.6XO.5=0.3. Which means that 
"Software Development Productivity" would be 30% of the value 
of "Potential Productivity." For example, if the latter is 1 
Task/Man-Day, then "Software Development Productivity" would 
be 0.3 TasksjMan-Day (after accounting for motivation and 
communication losses). 
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(e) Quality Assurance and Rework: 
and 
The development of software systems involves a series of production activities where the opportunities for interjection of human fallibilities are enormous. Errors may begin to occur at the very inception of the process where the objectives of the software system may be erroneously or imperfectly specified, as well as during the later design and development stages where these objectives are mechanized. The basic quality factor for software is that it performs its functions in the manner that was intended by its architects. In order to achieve this quality, the final product must contain a minimcm of mistakes in implementing their intentions as well as being void of misconception about the intentions themselves. Because of human inability to perform with perfection, software development is accompanied by a quality assurance activity (Deutsch, 1979). 
Software quality assurance is approached by two distinct 
complementary methodologies. The first is that of 
assuring that the quality is initially built into the 
product. This involves emphasis on the early generation of a 
coherent, complete, unambiguous, and nonconflicting set of 
requirements. Then as the product is designed and coded, 
review and testing of the product, the second quality tool, 
are encountered (Deutsch, 1979). 
In this section we will discuss the generation, 
detection,. and correction of errors during the development 
phase. As we indicated in Section 111.3. (on "Model 
Boundary") the development phase includes both the design and 
coding activities, but excludes the requirements phase. It 
was also indicated then, that we will be assuming that 
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f; software design commences (within the model's 'boundary) at 
the "successful completion" of a software requirements review 
(outside the model's boundary), and that there would be no 
I 
C 
subsequent changes or modifications in the system's 
requirements. 
In this section, therefore, our concern is with the 
generation of design and coding errors, and with the second 
quality tool above, namely, the review and testing of the 
product • 
Errors come in many different, "flavors." Summarized 
below are what Nelson (1974) delineated and described as the 
most prominent software design and coding errors: 
* Misinterpretation of specifiqations 
* Errors in developing the logic to solve the problem 
* Algorithm approximations that may provide insufficient 
accuracy or, erroneous results for certain input 
variables 
* Data structure defects either in the data structure 
design specification or in the implementation of the 
specification 
* Singular or critical input values to a formula that 
may yield an unexpected result not accounted for in the 
program code 
* Misinterpretation of language constructions by the 
I i 
I., 
I 
'I 
il 
:.1: 
- ~ 
I ~I 
189 
programmer 
In a system dynamics model such as ours, it is quite 
feasible, from a technical point of view, to disaggregate a 
variable such as errors into different error types. However, 
it is not always necessary or useful. 
There are two (and only two) considerations for 
reformulating a lev~l (variable) as a sequence of two or 
more levels: pO~lCy analysis and model behavior. 
First, is the disaggregation required in order for the 
model to be able to address particular policy 
issues? ... 
The second reason for disaggregating a level involves 
the dynamics of the system. Does the disaggr-egation of 
a level into two or more levels have the potential to 
change significantly the behavior of the model? ••• 
The final arbiter should be model-based policy analysis. 
If the change in behavior has the potential to alter 
policy conclusions, then the disaggregation is essential 
(Richardson and Pugh, 1981). 
Since our model's policy focus is on the managerial-type 
policies of software development, as opposed to say the 
technical issues of software reliability, an explicit 
disaggregation of errors into more than one type is, on the 
basis of the policy analysis criterion, clearly unnecessary. 
On the other hand, there are significant behavioral 
differences among error types that had to be accounted for. 
For example, findings in the software engineering literature 
indicate that errors are generated at different rates at 
different points in the life cycle e.g., design errors, in 
the ,,· .... 1 ier design phase, are generated at a higher rate than 
are coding errors (Martin, 1982). Such a factor is obviously 
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of dynamic significance. For example, it could have a direct bearing on the allocation of the manpower resource. 
Such differences will be implicitly captured in the 
model. That is, while errors will be formulated as a single 
type, "Errors," the generation, detection, and correction 
characteristics of errors will be allowed to vary throughout 
the development li fe cycle. For example "Errors" will be generated at a highfar rate in the earlier porti,ons of the life cycle (as design errors do) and th~y will, on the 
average, be "harder" to detect and correct (as design errors 
are) • 
Figure III.16. depicts how the generation, detection, 
and correction of errors are formulated in the model. 
What factors affect the "Error Generation Rate" in a 
software project? There are two sets of factors. The first 
set includes: organizational factors e,g., the use of 
structured techniques -CAlberts, 1976), the quality of the 
staff (Belford et al, 1977), .. .. etc., and project-type factors (Shooman, 1983) e.g., complexity, size of system (small, medium, or large), language, ••• etc. Notice that 
even though such factors can differ from organization to 
organization and from project to project, they do, however, 
remain invariant during the li.fe of a single project. The 
cumulative effect of all such factors can, therefore, be 
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captured in the model in the form of a single nominal 
variable,·namely, the "Nominal Number of Errors Committed per 
Task." The nominal error generation rate would then simply 
be the product of the "Software Development Rate," i.e., how 
much tasks are developed per unit of time, and that "Nominal 
Number of Errors Committed per Task." However, since this 
single nominal variable is modeling the generation of 
different error types (within the single project. that is 
within a particular organization) it is not formulated as a 
constant number, but rather as a variable that changes over 
the project's life. 
The formulation of the "tJominal Number of Errors 
Committed per Task" is, therefore,· serving two purposes: 
First, its shape over the project I slife .reflects our own 
modeling assumptions about the relative generation rates of 
different error types throughout the life of a project. 
These assumptions, as all others in the model, are expected 
to apply to all project situations to which the model is 
applied. Hence, this shape will always remain the same, even 
when ~odeling different project situations. The second 
purpose of the formulation" namely, its absolute value, 
reflects the different error generation characteristics of 
different project situations (i.e., the software product's 
characteristics as well qS those of the organization in which 
it is .developed). This, obviously, ~lould generally change 
when modeling different projects. 
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The formulation of the "Nominal Number of Errors 
committed per Task" used in the base model is shown in Figure 
III.17. Notice that the number of errors is defined in terms 
of KDSI i.e., "thousand delivered source instructions" rather 
than "Tasks." Both definitions are, of course, equivalent 
since a "Task" is itself defined in terms of DSI. However, 
it is more convenient to represent error generation in terms 
of KDSI since most published data on error rates are i~ ~erms 
of KOSI. 
The error rates range in value from 25 errors/KDSI to 
12.5 errors/KOSI, with an average value for the project of 
approximately 19 errors/KDSI. [Published error rates in the 
literature include: 10-20 errors/KDSI in (Thayer et aI, 
1978), 15-25 errors/KDSI in (Boehm, 1981), 30-35 errors/KDSI 
in (Jones, 1978).J 
As we mentioned above, the shape of the curve over the 
project's life reflects the relative generation rates of 
design-type errors versus coding-type errors. Thus, before 
we can specify the shape of the curve we ne~d first to 
delineate design versus codi'ng activities within the 
development life cycle. We will assume in the model that the 
development phase will be equally divided between design 
(including architectural and detailed design) and coding 
activities. [This approximates data reported by (Boehm, 
1981), (Gaffnery, 1982), and (Zelkowitz, 1978).J The diagram 
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at the bottom of Figure 111.16. is meant to indicate that 
the transition between the two activities is not abrupt i.e., 
there will be a period over which both activities will 
overlap (McKeen, 1981) (Thibodeau and Dodson, 1980). 
Estimates for relative generation rates of design versus 
coding errors were provided by several authors. For example, 
Design : Coding Errors Reference 
3.8 
· 
1 (Martin, 1982) 
· 2.0 
· 
1 (Alberts, 1976) • 
1.8 : 1 (Jones, 1981) 
1.7 
· 
1 (Boehm, 1981) 
· 1.6 
· 
1 (Thayer et al, 1978) 
· 
As shown in Figure 111.17., the ratio assumed in the 
model achieves a maximum value of 2:1 i.e., at the beginning 
of design the nominal number of errors committed is 25 
errors/KDSI, while towards the end of coding it drops to 12.5 
errors/KDSI. The average rates for the design and coding 
phases are approximately 23 and 14.5 errors/KDSI respectively 
i.e., a 1.6:1 ratio. 
The formulation of the nominal error generation rate 
captures, as we mentioned above, the cumulative effect of one 
set of factors effecting error generation, namely, the 
organizational and project-type factors. Such factors remain 
invariant during the life of a single project. There is a 
second set of factors, however, which do playa dynamic role 
during software development. 
and schedule pressures. 
These include the workforce-mix 
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As was stated in the discussion on Human Resource 
Management, the workforce ih the model is disaggregated into 
two types of employees, newly hired and experienced. It was 
also indicated that new hires pass through an "Orientation 
Phase" during which they are less than fully productive. The 
orientation process brings them "up to speed" through 
training that covers both the social as well as the technical 
environments of the project. For example, on the technical 
side, newly hired project numbers "often require considerable 
training to become familiar with an organization's unique mix 
of hardware, software packages, programming techniques, 
project methodologies, and so on" (Winrow, 1982). 
While not yet fully trained (during this orientation 
period) newly hired employees are, not only less productive 
on the average, but also more error-prone than their 
experiel!ced counter-parts (Endres, 1975) (Myers, 1976). We 
will assume in the model that a newly hired employee is twice 
as error-prone as an experienced employee would be (Chan, 20) 
(Nichlos, 25). To model the effect of this factor on error 
generation we formulate the "Multiplier to Error Generation 
due to Workforce Mix" as a function of the "% of Workforce 
that is Experienced." When the workforce value is comprised 
of only experienced staff, the value of the multiplier is set 
to 1 i.e., it would have a neutral effect on the nominal 
error gener~tion rate. In other words, what we are defining 
to be nominal, is defined with respect to the average error 
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generation rate of the experienced-type employee. And as the 
fraction of new hires increases, the multiplier increases in 
a linear fashion, as shown in Figure III.18., until it 
attains a maximum value of 2 , if the workforce is comprised 
of only new hires. 
The second factor that can drive the error generation up 
is schedule pressure (Putman and Fitzsimmons, 1979) (Mills, 
1983) (Radice, 1982) (James, 1) (Riccardi, 5) (Doyle, 7) 
(Nichols, 18) (Sheldon, 19) (Chan, 20). 
People under time pressure don't work better, they just 
work faster ••• 
In the struggle to oeliver any software at all, the 
first casualty has been consideration of the quality of 
the software delivered. (DeMarco, 1982). 
TwO explanations have been proposed in the literature 
for why schedule pressures cause more errors to be. generated. 
First, Shneiderman (1980) suggests that schedule pressures 
increase the "anxiety levels" of programmers. A high a'nxiety 
level, then 
interferes (with performance) , probably by 
reducing the size of the short-term memory available. 
When programmers become more anxious as deadlines 
approach, they (therefore) tend to make even more 
errors •.• 
Another explanation was provided by Thibodeau and Dodson 
(1980). They suggest that schedule pressures often r(~sult in 
the "Overlapping of activities that would have been 
accomplished bette.r st:!quentially." and this can 
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significantly increase the chance of errors. For example, 
When coding has begun before the completion of design, 
the designers are required to communicate their results 
to the programmers in a raw, unqualified state, hence 
significantly increasing the chance of design errors ••• 
This is not to suggest that systems cannot be developed 
with overlapping activities. Many systems have distinct 
parts that can be coded· before the entire design is 
completed ••• We are concerned here with the situation 
where the press of the development schedule or the 
slippage of preceding activities results in overlapping 
activities that would have been accomplished better 
sequentially. 
The effect of schedule pressure on error generation is 
formulated in the model as shown in Figure 111.19. Under 
nominal conditions there would be no schedule pressures, and 
the multiplier assumes a value of 1. As schedule pressures 
increase, the multiplier increases exponentially leading to 
higher error-generation rates. As shown in the Figure, 
error-generation can increase by as much as 50% under severe 
schedule pressures. Notice also, that we are assuming that 
errors will be generated below the nominal rate under the 
"relaxed" conditions of negative schedule pressures. 
Thus, as software tasks are developed, errors are 
committed within those tasks. Errors within a developed task 
remain as "Potentially Detectable Errors" until the task is 
reviewed and tested, at which point some of the errors do get 
detected, and those are then reworked. Usually, however, not 
all errors will be detected, some wi.ll. "escape" and pass 
undetected into the subsequent phases of software 
development. In the next section we will see how those 
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Multiplier to Error Generation 
Due to Schedule Pressure 
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errors are eventually "caught," albeit at a relatively high 
cost. 
The detection of errors is the objective of the Quality 
Assurance (QA) activities. Quality Assurance is defined in 
Pressman (1982) as: 
(A set of activities) performed in conjunction with the 
(the development of) a software product to guarantee the 
product meets the specified standards. These activities 
reduce doubts and risks about the performance of the 
product in the target environment. 
Several techniques are used including walkthroughs, 
reviews, inspections, code reading (a process where code 
logic and code format is scrutinized by a programmer other 
than the original designer), and integration testing (Jones, 
1982) (Daly, 1977). Not included in this activity is module 
or unit testing, which is commonly considered to be part of 
the Goding process (McKeen, 1979). 
The "QA Rate," of Figure III.16., has a 
non-characteristic type of a formulation, namely, that of a 
third order delay. The "characteristic" way to formulate a 
rate of doing something, e.g., the rate of developing 
software or reworking errors, is as a product of the effort 
allocated and its productivity. However, what we found, and 
what the third order delay formulation actualizes, is that 
the QA Rate is independent of the QA effort and its. .' 
productivity! What we found happening [based on discussions 
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with (Gage, 4) (Landolfi, 13) (Chan, 14) (Lombardi, 16) 
(Nichols, 18)] is this: QA effort is planned and allocated, 
usually in the form of a fixed schedule of perioaic 
group-type functions (Mitchell, 1980). For example, a 2-hour 
walkthrough for the 5 members of team (A) is scheduled for 
every Friday. During these periodic "QA Windows," all tasks 
developed since the previous one are supposed to be 
processed. And what we were surprised to find was that, in 
an almost perfect realization of Parkinson's Law, 
irrespective of how much tasks need to be processed within 
the specified "QA Window" they almost always do. No 
backlogs, therefore, develop in the QA pipeline. Even when 
QA activities are relaxed or suspended because of schedule 
pressure (as we indicated they might in Sector (A», no 
backlogs develop. That is, when walkthroughs are suspended 
for a while on a project, the requirement for a "walkthrough" 
is also suspended, not postponed (Hart, 1982). 
We can propose an explanation for how and why this 
happens. Since the objective of the QA activity is to detect 
invisible errors, invisible that is until they are detected, 
it becomes almost impossible to tell whether the QA job was 
completly done (i.e., that 211 those invisible errors were in 
fact detected). By the same token, it is as difficult to 
tell that the job has not been completely done (except much 
later in the life cycle). Under such circumstances it 
becomes quite easy to rationalize both to oneself and to 
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management that the QA job that was possible to do, was not 
insufficient. Furthermore, the QA effort that is possible to 
expend (i.e., in terms of available time- -and effort), is 
usually what is expended and not more (e.g., even if called 
for due to a larger than expected workload of developed 
tasks) because there seGms to be no significant incentives to 
do otherwise. Firstly, at the psychological level, there aLe 
actually dis-incentives for working harder at QA, since it 
only "exposes" more of one's mistakes (Weinber'J, 1971). And 
secondly, at the organizational level there are seldom any 
reward mechanisms in place that promote quali ty or 
quality-related activites (Cooper and Fisher, 1979). 
The formulation of the "QA Rate" as a third order delay, 
provides, we feel, a good approximation of the "Parkinsonian" 
execution of the QA activity as described above. (In Exhibit 
III.5., we show how a third-order delay looks schematically, 
how it is formulated mathematically, and how it behaves over 
time.) That is; software tasks that are d",veloped will 
always be QAed (or considered QAed) after a certain delay, 
and which is (assumed to be) independent of the QA effort 
allocated. In the model, the "Average QA Delay" period is 
set to 2 weeks (i.e., ~o working days) {Nichols, 25}. 
However, while the rate at which tasks are QAed {or 
considered QAed} can proceed under QA policies and procedures 
independently of the actual QA effort allocated, the 
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effectiveness of QA will, obviously, depend on that effort. 
That is, the amount of errors detected will be a function of 
how much QA effort is allocated for error detection. 
In the model (see Figure 111.16.) we define a variable 
called "Potential Error Detection Rate." It represents, the 
maximum number of errors that could be detected at a point in 
time, and is determined by dividing the value of the QA 
effort allocated by the value of the QA effort that is 
needed, on the average, to detect an error. That is, if say 
5 man-days are allocated per week to QA, and the "QA Manpower. 
Nee:ded to Detect an Error" is, on the average, 1 man-day, 
then the "Potential Error Detection Rate" would be 5 errors 
per week. 
What are the determinants of the "QA Manpower Needed to 
Detect an Error?" First and foremost, it is a function of 
error-type i.e;, whether an error is a design or a coding 
error. Thus, even if a project proceeds under some invariant 
set of nominal conditions, the QA manpower that would be 
needed, on the average to detect an error would change simply 
because the errors to be detected change from design-type 
errors to coding-type errors. 
The value of the QA effort needed per error as a 
function of the project's phase and hence of error-type i.e., 
design errors versus coding errors, are shown in Figure 
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111.20. Design-type errors are not only generated at a 
higher rate (as we saw in Figure 111.16), they are also, as 
Figure III.20. indicates, more costly to detect (Myers, 
1976) (Alberts, 1976) (Boehm, 1975). Alberts (1976) 
estimates that design errors are 2.5 times more costly (i.e., 
to detect and correct). In the formulation of Figure 
III.20., we are assuming that, on the average, a design error 
is 1.6 as costly to detect as a coding error. Furthermore, 
in terms of absolute values, the average detection effort per 
error is 0.3 man-days. Thus, on the average it t'/ould take 
approximately 2.4 man-hours (30% of an 8-hour man-day) to 
detect an error. In the case of walkthroughs and 
inspections, this effort would include, not only the effort 
expended during the walkthrough/inspection itself, but also 
the effort expended in preparation for it (e.g., reviewing 
documentation and gaining familiari ty with product) • 
Estimates in the literature for the error detection effort 
per error include: 3 man-hours (Mitchell, 1980), 2.36 
man-hours (Shooman., 1983), and 0.5-1.25 man-hours 
(Shneiderman, 1980). 
The actual QA manpower needed to detect an error, in 
addition to being a function of error-type, must also depend 
on the efficiency of how people work. In our discussion on 
productivity we indicated that a full-time employee's work 
day does not translate into an .8 man-hour input to the 
project. Man-hours are lost on communication and other 
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non-project activities (e.g., personal business). These two 
types of losses are captured in the "Multiplier to 
Productivity Due to Communication and Motivation Losses," 
which simply represents the average productive fraction of a 
man-day. In other words, if the communication and motivation 
losses amount to a 4 man-hour loss per day (for the average 
employee) i.e., half of the nominai 8 man-hour value, then 
the value of the multiplier would be a 0.5. Under such 
circumstance, the actual QA manpower needed to detect an 
error becomes twice what is nominally needed. That is, if a 
design error requires, under nominal conditions (i.e., under 
conditions of B£ losses), 0.4 man-days to be detected, it 
would actually require (under the above conditions) 
0.4 X 2 = 0.8 man-days • 
. Finally, evidence suggests that "In any sizable program, 
it is impossible to rr·move all errors" (Shooman, 1983). 
Thus, even when generous effort allocations are made to QA, 
it would still be unlikely that all errors will be detected 
(Boehm, 1981). One reason, for example, is that"... some 
errors manifest themselves, and can be exhibited only after 
system integration" (Shooman, 1983). At any point in time, 
one could, therefore, view the collection of "Potentially 
Detectable Errors" as constituting a hierarchy of errors, in 
which some are more subtle, and therefore more expensive to 
detect than others. Empirical results reported by Basili and 
Weiss (1962), suggest that the distribution is pyramid like, 
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with the majority of errors requiring approximately a few 
hours to detect, a few errors requiring approximately a day 
to detect, and still fewer errors requiring more than a day 
to detect. Notice that the results show that those few 
subtle errors are an order of magnitude more expensive to 
detect. 
We will assume in the model, that as QA activities are 
performed, the more obvious errors will be detected first. 
And as these are detected, it then becomes more and more 
expensive to uncover the remaining more subtle (although less 
predominant) errors. This is realized in the model through 
the formulation of the "Multiplier to detection Effort due to 
Error Density," shown in Figure III.21. At moderate to large 
error densities, the multiplier assumes a neutral value of 1. 
But as those "obvious" errors are all detected, and a few 
"subtle" errors remain, the multiplier increases in an 
exponential fashion, such that at a density level of 2-4 
(subtle) errors per KDSI, it becomes an order of magnitude 
more expensive to detect ap error~ 
To recapitulate, the "QA Manpower Needed to Detect an 
Error" is a function of error-type, work efficiency and error 
density. As the value of this needed effort increases, e.g., 
due to a decrease in error density, the number of errors that 
can be detected, at some level of QA effort, decreases. At 
any point in time, the "Potential Error Detection Rate" 
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{determined by dividing the value of the QA effort allocated by the value of the "QA Manpower Needed to Detect an Error"}, 
represents the maximum possible number of errors that could be detected. Because manpower allocations to QA are often 
"modest," this maximum value is seldom large enough to secure 
the detection of all errors generated. And even when effort is allocated generously to QA, a few subtle err~rs will be so prohibitively expensive to detect, that whatever the effort, 
allocated, it will not be quite enough to detect all errors. As a result, as shown in Figure III.16., some errors will 
"escape" and pass undetected into the subsequent phases of 
software development. In the next section we will deal with 
those errors, and show how they are eventually "caught." 
On the other hand, those errors that do get. detected 
through QA activites, are then reworked. The rework rate is 
a function of how much effort is allocated to rework 
activities, and the rework. manpower needed per error. For 
example, if the project members commit 10 man-days per week 
to rework detected errors, and the "Actual Rework Manpower Needed per Err~r" is, on the average, 1 man-day, then errors 
will be reworked at the rate of 10 per week. 
The "Actual Rework Manpower Needed per Error" has two 
components. The first is the "Nominal Rework Manpower Needed per Error." As in the case of error detection, this nominal 
component is a function of error-type i.e., design versus 
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(, coding errors. 
(, 
The values of the nominal rework effort needed per error 
as a function of the project's phase, and' hence of 
error-type, are shown in Figure 111.22. Design-type errors, 
in addition to both being generated at a higher rate and 
being more costlf to detect, are also more costly to rework 
(Myers, 1976) (Alberts, 1976) (Boehm, McClean, and Urfrig, 
1975) • As the formulation of Figure 111.22. indicates, we 
are assuming that, on the average, a design error is 
approximate1y 1.5 more costly to correct than a coding error. 
Under nominal conditions, a design error would require, on 
the average, 0.54 man-days to be corrected, while the average 
correction effort for a coding-type error is assumed to be 
0.36 man-days. For the nominal B-hour working day, these 
averages translate, into 4.3 
man-hours/error, respectively. 
man-hours/error and 2.9 
These values were chosen on 
the basis of the empirical results reported in (Weiss, 1979) 
and (Basili and Weiss, 19B1), which suggest that the average 
rework effort (for all errors) is in the range of 0.25 to 1.0 
man-days per error. 
The actual rework man-power that would be needed to 
correct an error, in addition to being a function of 
error-type, must also depend on the efficiency of how people 
work. That is, we need to account for the communication and 
motivation losses incurred. For example, if the "Multiplier 
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Nominal Rework Effort Needed per Error 
(Man-Days/Error) 
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to Productivity due to Communication and Motivation Losses," 
which represents the average productive fraction of a 
man-day, is 0.5, then the actual rework manpower needed to 
corr.ect an error becomes twice what is nominally needed. A 
design error that would have required under nominal 
conditions (i.e., under conditions of n£ losses), 0.5 
man-days to be corrected, would actually require (under the 
above condition) 0.5 X 2 = 1 man-day. 
To recapitulate, as errors are detected through the QA 
activities, they are reworKed. The rate at which errors are 
reworked is a function of ·the manpower committed to the 
rework activity and the rework effort needed per error. The 
"Actual Rework Manpower Needed per Error" is, in turn, a 
function of two things, error-type (i.e., design versus 
coding errors) and work efficiency. 
The reworking of software errors is not, itself, an 
errorless activity: 
Human tendency is to consider. the "fix," or correction, to a problem to be error-free itself. Unfortunately, this is all too frequently untrue in the case of fixes to errors found by inspections and by testing (Fagan, 1976). 
The problem of "bad-fixes" is widely documented in the 
literature (e.g., (Jones, 1978) (Shooman, 1983), (Myers, 
1976), (Endres, 1975), (Fagan, 1976), and (Thayer et aI, 
1978». Shooman and Natarajan (1977), suggested some of the 
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ways in which bad-fixes may be generated: 
1. The correction is based upon faulty analysis, thus 
complete bug removal is not accomplished. 
2. The corrections of a bug may work locally only 
(i.e., the global aspects of the error still remain). 
3. The correction is accomplished, however, it is 
accomplished by the creation of a new error. 
Thus, as detected errors are reworked, some fraction of 
the corrections will be bad-fixes. Unfortunately, there are 
no published data on how large that fraction is. However, 
therl~ are results that indicate that bad-fixes constitute 
6.5 - 10% of all errors caught at t~e system testing stage 
(Jones, 1981) (Fries, 1977). The balance of the errors is 
comprised of tho~e errors that escape detection, through QA, 
during development. If we assume that 50-60% of errors are 
detected and reworked during development, and that most of 
the remaining errors together with bad-fixes are later 
detected at the system testing phase, then the above findings 
on bad-fixes imply that between 4.5-11% of corrections will 
be bad-fixes. The "% Bad-Fixes" is, therefore, set in the 
model to 7.5%. 
The detection and correction of bad-fixes as well a 
those errors that escape QA detection, is the topic of the 
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(D) System Testing: 
We will assume that undetected errors i.e., those that 
QA activities (e.g., walkthrough, inspections, code reading, 
... etc. ) fail to detect while the software is being 
designed and coded, as well as those bad fixes created as a 
result of faulty rework, will all remain undetected until the 
system testing phase. Further, we will assume that all such 
errors will get detected and corrected at the system testing 
phase. Thus, even though in practice some errors often 
remain in a software product after system testing is 
completed (i.e., as the product becomes operational), e.g., 
because system testing activities fail to detect them, or 
they result from bad fixes at the system testing phase, all 
such errors will be excluded from ,our formulation. The 
primary reason for their exclusion is that the generation, 
detection, and correction of these errors are all issues of 
maintenance of the operational system, which are, as we 
previously stated, beyond the boundary of our model and thus 
the focus of this study. 
The second justification for their exclusion, is that 
errors that escape detection at the system testing phase are 
generally a "small" fraction of all the errors handled at 
that phase (Deutsch, 1979) .' This assertion might sound 
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surprising to many, since it is common to assume that the 
maintenance activity is as costly as it is primarily because 
of the costs incurred in handling such "lingering" errors. 
What empirical results have shown, however, is that 
corrections of such errors consumes only a relatively small 
portion of the software maintenance activity (Lientz and 
Swanson, 1978). The major portion of the software 
maintenance effort is, instead, devoted to software updates 
(e.g., enhancements for users, adaptation to new data or 
hardware, .,. etc.) (Parikh and zvegintzov, 1983). 
The System Testing Sector is shown in Figure III.23. As 
shown in the figure, this sector models two sets of 
processes, namely, the growth processes of the undetected 
error populations and the processes of system testing, 
the detection and correction of those errors. 
i . e. , 
The population of undetected errors is comprised, as we 
said, of errors that escape the detection of the QA actions 
as well as those bad fixes created as a result of faulty 
rework. This group of errors does not remain dormant 
awaiting detection and correction at the system testing 
phase. They, instead, lead an "active existence" reproducing 
more and more errors in the system. For example, a design 
error that remains undetected until the system testing phase 
often instigates further errors in the code, user and 
maintenance manuals, training material, ... etc., (Boehm, 
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1981) • 
In a study by Shooman reported in McClure (1981), it was determined that detecting and correcting a design error during the design phase (i.e., through the QA activities) is 
one-tenth the effort that would be needed to detect and 
correct it later during the system testing phase because of 
this additional inventory of specifications, code, user and 
maintenance manuals, ••• etc., that would require correction in the later case. This 10:1 ratio was also supported by data in Boehm (1981), but only for larger projects. For 
smaller projects, the' escalation in cost-to-fix was in the 
range of 4:1, because, Boehm argued, "The smaller size meant 
that there was a relatively smaller inventory of items to fix in later phases." 
But, besides such static estimates on cost-to-fix 
escalations at different points in the'software life cycle, 
no data are available in the literature to describe the dynamics of these "error-reproduction" processes. That is, 
even though we do know that an undetected design error 
reproduces enough errors in code, documentation, ••• etc. , 
to become 4 to 10 times more expensive to fix at the system 
testing phase, we still do not have the data that explain 
exactly how and when these reproduction processes occur. 
When the dynamic relationships are not well understood 
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(that is, when theory is not well developed), as it is in 
this case, then "the best one can do is attempt to imitate 
the change process itself in the hope of learning more about 
511~r. "elationships. Thus the model becomes an aid to theory 
development" (Schultz and Sullivan; 1972). Our "proposed 
theory" of the error reproduction process is depicted in 
Figure III .23. 
As shown in the figure, we are assuming that errors that 
escape QA detection, together with those generated due to 
faulty rework, will develop into ei~her "Active Errors" i.e., 
active in reproducing more errors, or "Passive Errors." 
Because design specs are the blue prints of the system's 
code, any errors in design will get translated into coding 
. errors. Thus, all undetected design errors should be of the 
active type. As development moves into the coding stage, a 
mixture of active and passive errors would be expected. If 
we assume, for example, that the system is coded in a 
top-down fashion, then in the early parts of the coding stage 
most of the errors committed (i.e., in the high-level 
modules) would be of the active type. As development 
proceeds to the lower level modules, the reverse should be 
true, since the errors become more and more localized in 
nature. These assumptions on how the mixture of active and 
passive errors changes over the project's life are realized 
in the model through the formulation of the variable "% 
Active Errors" shown in Figure 111.24. 
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"Undetected passive errors," as Figure III .23. 
illustrates, remain in a dormant state until they become 
detected and corrected in the system testing phase. The 
"Undetected Active Errors," on the other hand, provide a 
greater cause for concern, since they reproduce more and more 
errors into the system. This error reproduction process is a 
continuous one that keeps "feeding" on itself, that is, an 
error reproduced will itself reproduce further errors, and so 
on. For example, an undetected design error could lead to 
errors in the code, which in turn could lead to errors in the 
system's doc1.Jlmentation and/or user manuals. This continuous 
reproduction process is formulated in the model through the 
nclassic" positive feedback loop in which an increase in the 
"Undetected Active Errors" level leads to an increase in the 
"Active Error Regeneration Rate," leading to further 
increases in the level, and so on. 
We now take a closer look at this positive feedback 
loop. First, notice 'that the "Active Error Regeneration 
Rate" is a function of the "Software Development Rate," since 
errors can only be generated as ~ tasks are developed. And 
if the development activity stops, no errors can be 
generated. Second, the regeneration rate is a function of 
the "Active Error Density," which is simply the number of 
existing active errors divided by the tasks developed so far. 
More precisely, the generation rate is a function of the 
SMOOTH of the "Active Error Density." This is because 
• I j 
\: 
Ii i 'j 
~~<~ 
, , 
t
" -:: j 
" 
!-. l 
, I 
i ~ 
: -; 
t-,,:.~_: .. 
I " I 
f 
I , 
\ 
; 
, 
, ., , 
, ' I 
'. I 
~' I 
! 
t': I 
c· ! 
,;', I 
:. '. I 
, 
221 
errors are committed in one part of the system, they would 
not, in general, affect other parts that are being developed 
in parallel. Errors, instead, propagate through the 
succeeding tasks that build on one another e.g., coding tasks 
developed on the basis of the design specs. Thus, there is a 
delay before an error would reproduce further errors. 
average delay is set in the model to three months. 
This 
As was indicated by the studies cited above, a design 
error could be 4 to 10 times more costly when left undetected 
until the system testing phase. And, as was also indicated, 
this escalation in cost-to-fix results because of an 
additional inventory of various error types that would be 
reproduced and that would require correction. In the model, 
though, we do not disaggregate errors into different explicit 
types, e.g., errors are not disaggregated into errors in data 
structures, syntax, logic, . . . etc • There is only one 
explicit error-type, namely, "Error." (This aggregation, as 
opposed to disaggregation, of error-types, has been justified 
elsewhere.) As a result, the escalation in the cost-to-fix 
of an undetected "Error" is realized in the model only 
through the number of "Errors" ~h ... t the "Error" reproduces. 
For example, if an "Error" at the early phases of the 
project, reproduces (over several generations) a total of 9 
more "Errors," then at testing time instead of dealing with 
one (the original) "Error," it would now be necessary to deal 
with 10 "Errors," i.e., a 10 fold escalation in cost. 
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The escalation in the number of active errors is 
achieved in the model through two mechanisms. Firstly, it is 
partially achieved through the "feeding on itself" 
characteristic of the reproduction positive feedback loop we 
explained above. This mechanism ensures' that the earlier the 
undetected-error is, the more "generations" of errors it will 
reproduce, and thus the more costly it 'will end up being. 
Secondly, escalation is achieved through the "Multiplier 
to Active Error Regeneration due to Error Density." The 
interpretation of this multiplier is a simple one, it 
represents the average number of new errors that a single 
active error reproduces in ~ generation. (That is, it is a 
measure of "Error Fertility!") The multiplier is formulated 
as a table function, and is shown in Figure III.25. 
First, notice that the multiplier's value will always be 
greater than one. That is, an undetected error will always 
generate more than one more error (in a single generation). 
Second, the value of the multiplier increases as the density 
of active errors increases. Studies have shown that errors 
are not homogeneously distributed throughout the modules of a 
software system (Myers, 1976) (Endres, 1975), instead systems 
studied were found to be "characterized by the presence of 
'error-prone modules' that show a high frequency of the 
system's total error content" (Jones, 1981 ).. For example, if 
there are say 5 undetected errors in a system that is 
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comprised of 5 modules, it is quite possible that all 5 
errors will be clustered in one error-prone module, as 
opposed to being evenly distributed among the 5 modules. If 
there is a much larger number of undetected errors (e.g., 
100), though, it would be quite unlikely then that all the 
errors would still be clustered in what would be a single 
extremely-~rror-prone module. Such a situation is unlikely 
because we are dealing here with modules that have already 
"passed" some QA testing. Thus, as the error density 
increases, the distribution of errors among the system's 
modUles would generally also increase. As this happens, 
i.e., as errors become less localized, they also become more 
expensive to detect and correct. For example, because of the 
set-up cost of testing any single module, it is generally 
less expensive to fix 10 errors that all reside within a 
single module, than fixing an equivalent set of 10 errors 
that are distributed among two or more modules. Thus, higher 
densities of undetected errors mean a wider (but not 
necessarily an even) distribution of errors among the system 
modules, which leads to an escalation in the cost to fix 
those errors. And since, as was indicated above, the 
escalation in the cost-to-fix of an undetected error is 
realized in the model through an increase in the number of 
errors that the error reproduces, higher error densities 
should lead to a higher error reproduction rate (per error). 
This is achieved through the higher values of the "Multiplier 
to Active Errors R.egeneration due to Error Density," at 
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higher error densities. 
As was stated above, "Undetected Active Errors" can 
potentially continue to reproduce new errors as long as new 
tasks are being developed e.g., up until the last system 
module is coded. Not all of the active errors will do so, 
however. That is, for some errors the reproduction activity 
will not continue up until the end of the development phase. 
It, instead, might cease after the reproduction of one or two 
"generations" of errors. For example, an error in a 
high-level module might reproduce a number of interface 
errors at some lower level, without necessarily leading to 
any further errors in say the user manuals. When undetected 
active errors cease to reproduce, they effectively become 
"Undetected Passive Errors." The rate at which this occurs 
is termed the "Active Error Retirement Rate," as shown in 
Figure III.23. This rate is regulated through the 
"Retirement Fraction," which is the fraction of active erro~s 
that retire (i.e., become passive) every unit of time. "'~hi5 
fraction is a function o'f the developmerrt phase as shown in 
Figure III.26. Notice that, because any design error must 
translate into coding error(s), the "Retirement Fraction" 
remains at a zero level during the design phase i.e., no 
active design errors will retire and become passive since 
every design error will reproduce at least one generation of 
coding errors. As the project progresses towards the last 
stages of development e.g., the coding of the lower level 
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functional modules, opportunities for error propagation 
quickly decrease, and as a ~esult the "Retirement Fraction" 
increases sharply, and reaches a value of 1 at the end of 
development. 
As the project progresses towards the last stages of 
development, something else happens, namely, the System 
Testing activities are initiated. The objective of system 
Testing is to verify "that all elements (Df the system) mesh 
properly and that overall system function and performance are 
achieved" (Pressman, 1982). The System Testing activities 
are also depicted in Figure 111.23, 
As was explained in Section (B) on "Software 
Development," the switch in manpower allocation from 
development to testing is effected in the model through the 
variable "Fraction of Effort for System Testing." The value 
of this variable is initially set to z~ro i.e., no effort is 
allocated for System Testing. When development (i.e., the 
coding and design) is perceived to be completed, the value of 
the "Fraction of Effort for System Testing" becomes a one, 
i.e., 100% of the manpower effort available for 
development/testing is allocated to the testing function. 
The switch is not abrupt, however. There is, usually, some 
overlap between the development and testing phases (Thibodeau 
and Dodscin, 1980), (Daly~ 1977), (Hartwick, 1980). This 
overlap of the phases was captur.ed (in Section (B) above) in 
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Figure 111.9., which shows the assumed gradual increase in 
the value of the "Fraction of Effort for Systel1l Testing" as a 
function of the fraction of development tasks perceived 
remaining. 
The objective of System Testing stated above is 
operationalized in the model as follows: Test all tasks that 
have been developed to detect and correct any remaining 
(active and/or passive) errors. 
The rate at which (developed) tasks are tested is 
determined by dividing the "Daily Manpower for Testing" by 
the "Testing Manpower Needed per Task." For example, if 5 
man-days are allocated daily to the system testing activity, 
and it takes, on the average, 1 man-day to test a task, then 
5 tasks will be tested a day. 
The "Normal Testing Manpower Needed ~er Task" has two 
components, a fixed component and a variable one (Alberts, 
1976), (Herndon and Lane, 1977). The variable component is a 
function of the number of errors in a task, and it represe~~s 
the testing effort that would be consumed in the actual 
detection and correction of errors. The fixed component, on 
the other hand, is independent of the number of errors. It 
involves overhead-type activities such as dev~loping test 
plans, installing test tools, designing test cases, ••• etc. 
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The "Nominal Testing 'Overhead" (Le. , the fixed 
component) is defined in the model in terms of nominal 
man-days/KDSI. Estimates r~ported in Boehm (1981) suggest 
that this overhead effort is in the range of 2 man-days/KDSI. 
For example, for a 32 KDSI project, Boehm's estimate for the 
above overhead functions (which he labelled "Test Planning") 
amounted to 64.41 man-days. If we assume that motivation and 
communication losses will, on the average, result in a 50% 
loss in productivity, then Boehm's estimate translates into 
an overhead of 1 nominal man-day/KDSI. 
This constant parameter, could then be transformed in a 
straightforward manner into an equivalent value of nominal 
man-days/task. For example, if in a particular run of the 
model, a ",task" is defined to be, say 100 DSI, the nominal 
testing overhead would be 0.1 man-day/task. 
In addition to the overhead incurred in testing a task, 
effort is needed to detect and correct any remaining errors. 
This needed effort to detect and correct the errors remaining 
within a task is formulated as the product of the "Error 
Density" and the "Nominal Testing Manpower Needed per Error." 
The value of the former is obtained by dividing the sum of 
both the active and passive errors still remaining by the 
number of tasks yet to be tested. It represents the average 
number of errors per task. The value of the "Nominal Testing 
Manpower Needed per Error," on the other hand, is set to 0.15 
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Man-Days/Error. For the nominal 8-hour working day, this 
translates into 1.2 Man-Hours/Error. This value was chosen 
on the basis of empirical results reported in (Shooman, 1983) 
and (Herndon and Lane, 1977). 
Finally, the actual testing effort needed per task, in 
addition to being a function of testing overhead and error 
density, must also depend on the efficiency of how people 
work. That is, we need to account for the Communication and 
Motivation losses incurred. For example, if the "Multiplier 
to productivity due to Communication and Motivation losses," 
which represents the average productive fraction of a 
man-day, is 0.5, then the actual manpower needed to test a 
task becomes twice what is nominally needed. 
The testing activity continues until all the tasks that 
have been developed are all tested. When this is 
accomplished, the project is declared completed. (Remember, 
our model's boundary extends only until the end of the 
testing phase.) 
With the completion of the testing activties, we also 
complete our pr sentation of the software production 
processes in the Dlodel. We have discussed the allocation of 
the manpower resource in part (Al, the development activties 
(i.e., coding and design) in (Bl, Quality Assurance and 
Rewor.k in part (C), and finally, System Testing in this final 
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part (D). In the next two sections, we turn our attention to 
two manageL~dl functions of software developement, namely, 
controlling and planning. 
III.4.5. Controlling: 
Any control function has at least three 
(Anthony and Dearden, 1980): 
elements 
1. Measurement. To detect what is happening in the 
activity being controlled. 
2. Evaluation. To assess the significance of w;lat is 
happening, usually by comparing information on what is 
actually happening with some standard or expectation of 
what should be happening. 
3. Communication. To report what has been measured and 
assessed, so that behavior could be altered if the need 
for doing so is indicated. 
These three elements are captured in our formulation of 
the control function of software project management depicted 
in Figures 111.27. and 111.29. As work is accomplished in a 
software project, progress is measured through the amount of 
resources consumed, tasks completed, or both. Based on such 
measurements, a determination is made on the "Total Man-Days 
Perceived to be Still Needed" to complete the project. This 
includes man-days perceived to be still needed to develop and 
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QA tasks, to rework any detected errors, and to complete 
system testing. Once this is determined, the effort 
perceived to be still needed is compared to the actual 
"Man-Days Remaining" in the project's plan. Thus, if 100 
man-days are perceived to be still needed to complete the 
project but only 50 man-days are remaining, the project would 
be perceived to be behind schedule. Conversely, if only 25 
man-days are what is perceived to be still needed, while 50 
man-days remain available in the project's plan, then the 
project would be perceived to be ahead of schedule. Once an 
assessment is made of any man-day shortages or excesses, 
behavior on the project could be altered if the need for 
doing so is indicated. For example, if the project is 
perceived to be behind (ahead,of) schedule, i.e., if it is 
experiencing a man-day shortage (excess), then project 
members could be motived to work more (less) hard, the 
project's schedule could be extended (trimmed), or a 
combination of both of these could happen. In the remainlng 
part of this section, we will explain in detail how all these 
control processes are formulated in the model. 
At any point in the project, the amount of project work 
that will be perceived as still remaining will, in general, 
be a combination of three things: (1) work needed to develop 
and QA new tasks; (2) work needed to rework any detected 
errors; and (3) work needed to conduct the system testing 
activities. Thus, the "Total Man-Days Perceived to be Still 
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( , Needed" to complete the project is formulated as a summation 
of three respective components, namely, "Man-Days Perceived 
Still Needed for New Tasks," "Man-Days Perceived Needed to 
Rework Detected Errors," and "Man-Days Perceived Still Needed 
for Testing." 
Because software is basically an intangible product 
during most of the development process, and for which there 
are no visible milestones to measure progress like a physical 
product would, "It is difficult to measure performance in 
programming . . . It is difficult to evaluate the status of 
intermediate work such as underdebugged programs or design 
specification and their potential value to. the complete 
project" (Mills, 1983). HOW, then, is progress in a software 
project measured? Our own interview findings corroborate 
those reported in the literature, namely, that progress, 
especially in the earlier phases of software development, is 
measured by the rate of expenditure of resources rather than 
by some count of accomplishments (Putnam and Fitzsimmons, 
1979) , (Keider, 1974), (DeMarco, 1982), (Devenny, 1976), 
(Baber, 1982), (Griffin, 6), (Donahue, 8) , (O'Conner, 10) , 
(Lombardi, 16), (Chan, 20). For example, a project for which 
100 man-days has been estimated is 10% complete when 10 
man-days have been expended1 when 50% of the man-days have 
been expended, it is 50% complete. Paraphrasing Baber 
(1982): 
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It is essentially impossible for the programmers to 
estimate the fraction of the program completed. What is 
45% of a program? Worse yet, what is 45% of three 
programs? How is he to guess whether a program is 40% 
or 50% complete? The easiest way for the programmer to 
estimate such a figure is to divide the amount of time 
actually spent on the task to date by the time budgeted 
for that task. Only when the program is almost finished 
or when the allocated time budget is almost used up will 
he be'able to recognize that the calculated figure is 
wrong. 
As progress is measured, during the early phases of 
development, by the rate of expenditure of resources, status 
reporting ends up being nothing more than an echo of the 
original plan (McKeen, 1981), (Baber, 1982),' (DeMarco, 1982), 
(Devenny, 1976). In other words, "Man-Days Perceived Still 
Needed for New Tasks" will be equal to the "Man-Days 
Percei ved R'emaining for New Tasks." 
As the project develops, though, and the work becomes 
relatively more visible, discrepancies between % of tasks 
accomplished (remaining) and· % of resources expended 
(remaining) become increasingly apparent. For example, while 
it might not be too apparent that a project that has consumed 
50% of its estimated resources is only 25%, rather than 50%, 
complete, any such descrepancy becomes quite obvious when the 
allocated resources are almost used up. At the same time, 
and as the project advances towards its final stages, project 
members become increasingly able to perceive how productive 
the workforce has actually been (McGOwan, 3), (Nichols, 18). 
As a result, the value of the "Man-Days Perceived Still 
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Needed for New Tasksfl ceases to be a function of what the 
"Man-Days Perceived Remaining for New Tasksfl is, and, 
instead, is determined on the basis of what the project 
members perceive to be the amount of work that is still 
remaining. 
These differring modes of measuring progress, are 
captured in the model through a single formulation of 
"Man-Days Perceived Still Needed for Needed Tasks.fl As shown 
in Figure III. 27., "Man-Days Perceived Still Needed for New 
Tasks" (MDPNNT) is determined by dividing -the value of "Tasks 
Perceived Remaining" (TSKPPM) by the "Assumed Development 
Productivity" (ASSPRD). That is, 
MDPNNT = TSKPRM / ASSPRD (1) 
Where "Assumed Development Productivity" (ASSPRD) is a 
weighted average of "Perceived Development Productivity" 
(PRDPRD) and a variable we are ca1ling "Projected Development 
Productivity" (PJDPRD). That is, 
ASSPRD = PJDPRD*WTPJDP + PRDPRD*(l-WTPJDP) (2) 
The weighting factor (WTPJDP) moves from 1 at the beginning 
of the project to zero at the end of the development phase. 
The conception behind this formulation is somewhat 
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subtle, and will, therefore, require some explanation. 
As was indicated above, in the ear~'er phases of 
software development, progress tends to be measured by the 
rate of expenditure of resources. As a result, status 
reporting ends up being nothing more than an echo of the 
original plan. "Man-Days Perceived Still Needed for New 
Tasks" (MDP~NT) becomes, under such conditions, simply equal 
to the "Man-Days Perceived Remaining for New Tasks" (MDPENT). 
That is, 
MDPRNT = MDPNNT 
Substituting for MDPNNT, we get 
MDPRNT = TSKPRM / ASSPRD 
which leads to, 
ASSPRD = TSKPRM / MDPRNT 
This is an interesting result. For, it suggests that as 
project members measure and report progress by the rate of 
expenditure of resources, they, by so doing, would be 
implicit.J.y assuming that their productivity equals "Tasks 
Perceived Remaining" (TSKPRM) divided by the "Man-Days 
Perceived Remaining for New Tasks" (MDPRNT). Which is 
intersting because such an assumed value for productivity is 
solely a function of future projections (i.e., remaining 
tasks and man-days) as opposed to being a reflection of 
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accompli shments (i.e. , completed tasks and expended 
resources). This implicit notion of productivity is captured 
in the model by the variable "Projected Development 
Productivity" (PJDPRD), defined, as the above equation 
suggests, to be eqi.!al to "Tasks Perceived Remaining" (TSKPRM) 
divided by "Man-Days Perceived Remaining for New Tasks" 
(MDPRNT) • 
Thus, in the early phases of software development, we 
would like equatiol, 0.) to reduce to, 
MDPNNT = TSKPRM / PJDPRD (3) 
where 
PJDPRD = TSKPRM / MDPRNT 
which would be achieved by setting the weighting factor 
(WTPJDP) in equation (2) to 1, and substituting in equation 
(1) • 
As the project advances towards its final stages, 
though, accomplishments become relatively more visible and 
project members become increasingly more able to perceiv~ how 
productive the workforce has actually been. As a result, 
what the project members assume their productivity to be, 
i.e., the value of "Assumed Development Productivity," ceases 
to be a function of future projections (i.e., remaining tasks 
and man-days), and instead is determined on the basis of 
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perceived accomplishments. This explicit notion of 
productivity is captured in the model by the variable 
"Perceived Development Productivity" (PRDPRD). Discussions 
with (McGowan, 3), (Nichols, 18), and (Lombardi, 23) suggest 
that, towards the final stages of development, the value of 
the team's overall productivity would be determined by 
dividing the value of "Cumulative Tasks Developed" (CUMTKD) 
by "Cumulative Development Man-Days" (CUMDMD). In other 
words, if 100 man-days have been expended to develop the 
project's 100 tasks, then "Perceived Development 
productivity" would be 1 task/man-day. 
Thus, in the final stages of software development, 
would like equation (1) to reduce to, 
MDPNNT = TSKPRM / PRDPRD 
where, 
PRDPRD = CUMTKD / CUMDMD 
we 
(4) 
which would be achieved by setting the weighting factor 
(WTPJDP) in equation (2) to zero, and substituting in 
equation (1). 
To recapitulate, the value of "Man-Days Perceived Still 
Needed for New Tasks" (MDPNNT) is a function, as equation (1) 
indicates, of "Tasks Perceived Remaining" (TSKPRM) and 
"Assumed Development Productivity." In the early phases of 
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development, wAssumed Development Productivity" is implicitly 
determined on the basis' of future projections (i.e., 
remaining tasks and man-days). Towards the end of 
development, on the other hand, "Assumed Development 
ProductivityW gets to be explicitly determined on the basis 
.of perceived accomplishments (i.e., completed tasks and 
expended resources). This is achieved through the weighted 
average formulation of "Assumed Development Productivity" 
given in equation (2), i.e., by setting the weighting factor 
(WTPJDP) to 1 at the beginning of the project, and to zero at 
the end of the development phase. 
People's assumptions about their 
therefore, change as the project develops. 
productivity, 
The change, 
however, is often gradual not abrupt (McGowan, 3), (Nichols, 
18) , (Lombardi, 23) • That is, the transition from having 
"Assumed Development Productivity" being determined solely on 
the basis of future projections early in the project, to 
having it being determined entirely on the basis of perceived 
accomplishements, towards the' end of development, is a 
smooth, not an instantaneous, type of a transition. 
This transition in people's assumption about their 
producti vi ty is captured in the model through the forml.llation 
of the weighting factor (WTPJDP) of equation (2). For 
convenience, we are re-writing equation (2) below, 
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ASSPRD = PJDPRD*WTPJDP + PRDPRD*(l-WTPJDP) (2) 
In the beginning of the project, because "Assumed 
Development Productivity" (ASSPRD) is equal to "Projected 
Development Productivity" (PJDPRD), the weighting factor 
WTPJDP is set equal to 1. As was explained above, under such 
conditions status reporting ends up being nothing more than 
an echo of the original project plan as "Man-Days Perceived 
Still Needed for New Tasks" ends up being exactly equal to 
"Man-Days Remaining for New Tasks." As the project develops, 
though, descrepancies between % of tasks accomplished 
(remaining) and % of resources expended (remaining) become 
increasingly apparent, and in addition project members become 
increasingly able to perceive how productive the workforce 
has a(~tually been. As a result, "Assumed Development 
Productivity" (ASSPRD) becomes less a function of "Projected 
Development Productivity" (PJDPRD) and more a function of 
"Perceived Development Productivity" (PRDPRD) •. That is, the 
weighting factor (WTPJDP) moves from a value of 1 to a value 
of O. The rate at which this learning process takes place is 
the product of two factors, namely, the rate of expenditure 
of resources and the rate of development of tasks. Remember 
Baber'squote (1982), "Only when the program is almost 
finished or when the allocated time budget is almost used up 
will (the programmer) be able to recognize (the d~screpancy 
between % of tasks accomplished a~d % of resources expended." 
To accomplish this in the model, we will formulate the 
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weighting factor (t~PJDP) a? the product of two multipliers, 
the "Multiplier to Productivity weight due to Resource 
Expenditures" and the "Multiplier to productivity Weight due 
to ,Development." As shown in Figure III.28., both 
multipliers are assumed to have the same shape, moving from a 
value of 1 in the beginning of the project to a value of zero 
when all estimated development resources are expended or all 
tasks are developed, respectively. 
Thus far we have been only discussing how "Man-Days 
Perceived Needed for New Tasks" is determined. As was 
indicated earlier, at any point in the project the amount of 
work that will be perceived as still remaining will, in 
general, be comprised of not only wo.k needed to develop and 
QA new tasks, but in addition work needed to rework any 
detected errors and work needed to conduct the system testing 
activities., Thus, the "Total Man-Days Perceived to be Still 
Needed" to complete the project is formulated as a summation 
of ~Man-Days Perceived Still Needed for New Tasks," "Man-Days 
Perceived Needed to Rework Detected Errors," and "Man-Days 
Perceived Still Needed for Testing." 
The "Man-Days Perceived Needed to Rework Detected 
Errors" is formulated as the product of "Detected Errors" and 
"Perceived Rework Manpower Needed per Error." {The latter, 
as was explained in some detail in the section on "Manpower 
Allocation," is a SMOOTH of the "Actual Rework Manpower 
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Needed per Error.") For example, if at some point in the 
project 50 errors that have been detected through the QA 
activities are-still uncorrected, and if it is perceived that 
an error requires 0.2 Man-Days, on the average, to correct, 
then the "Man-Days Perceived Needed to Rework (those) 
Detected Errors" would be 50 X 0.2 = 10 Man-Days. 
The "Man-Days Perceived Still Needed for Testing,· on 
the other hand, is determined by dividing the value of "Tasks 
Remaining to be Tested" by the "Perceived Testing 
productivity." The "Tasks Remaining to be Tested" is simply 
the "Perceived Job Size in Tasks" minus "Cumulative Tasks 
Tested." Fo. example, if the perceived job is 100 tasks in 
size, and 60 of these have already been tested, then "Tasks 
Remaining to be Tested" would amount to 100 - 60 = 40 tasks. 
Throughout most of the development phase, and before the 
commenceme;",t of the System Testing phase, the value of 
"Perceived Testing productivity" is set equal to "Planned 
Testing Productivity." This is the value of testing 
productivity that is implicit in the project's plan. For 
example, if for the 100 task project, the plan allocates 20 
Man-Days for System Testing, then the "Planned Testing 
Productivity" would be 5 tasks/man-days. However, as the 
System Testing activity gets underway, people's perceptions 
of their testing productivity becomes a function of how 
productive the testing activity actually is, as oppo~ed to 
{~.:+"~ .• 
I' ." 
, .' 
i! ~ 
:1 
" 
, 
i 
I 
I 
I 
, , 
:~. 
~, I 
',', I' 
" 
, 
~ 
'"-'<l 
~~ 
L 
", c---",. 
-'-- .. ;.:~ 
245 
how productive it was planned to be. The "Actual Testing 
Productivity" is then determined by dividing the "Cumulative 
Tasks Tested" by "Cumulative Testing Man-Days." And, because 
"Full and immediate action is seldom taken on a change of 
incoming information (e.g., on the sudden drop in yesterday's 
testing productivity) ••• (and because there is a) tendency 
to delay action until the change is ... insistent " 
(Forrester, 1961) , "Perceived Testing productivity" is 
formulated as a SMOOTH. The smooth delay is set at 50 
working days. 
Once "Man-Days Perceived Still Needed for New Tasks," 
"Man-Days Perceived Needed to Rework Detected Errors," and 
"Man-Days Perceived Still Needed for Testing" are all 
determined, they would all be summed up to determine the 
"Total Man-Days Perceived Still Needed" to complete the 
project. And once this is determi,ned, it is then compared to 
the actual "Man-Days Remaining" in the project's plan. So, 
if 100 man-days are perceived to be still needed to complete 
the project, but only 50 man-days are remaining, the project 
would be perceived to be behind schedule. Conversely, if 
only 25 man-days are what is perceived to be still needed, 
while 50 man-days remain available in the project's plan, 
then the project would be perceived to be ahead of schedule. 
After an assessment is made of any man-day shortages or 
excesses, behavior on the project can then be altered if the 
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need for doing so is indicated'. For example, if the project 
is perceived to be behind (ahead of) schedule i.e., if it is 
experiencing a man-day shortage (excess), then project 
members could be motivated to work more (less) hard. ' The 
mechanisms that determine how much, if any, of any perceived 
man-day shortage (excess) is absorbed by the project members 
in the form of increased (decreased) work rate were fully 
explained in 
productivity. 
our discussions on software development 
Any shortages (excesses) that are not absorbed 
will be reported, and will lead to adjustments to the 
project's scope. (Such adjustments are then translated, in 
the Planning section, into adjustments to the schedule or 
adjustments to the workforce level, or both.) 
Let us consider an example. And, again, let us consider 
the case of the 100 man-day project. If, after 60 man-days 
have been expended, the values of "Man-Days Remaining" ,and 
"Total Man-Days Perceived Still Needed" were 40 man-days and 
.65 man-days respectively, then the "perceived Shortage in 
Man-Days" would be 25. If the project membe~s (based on th" 
many factors discussed in the productivity section) decide to 
absorb only 10 of the 25 man-days, then the "Reported 
Shortage in Man-Days" would be 15 man-days. If these are 
addt;ld to the value of "Man-Days Remaining" in the project's 
plan, i.e., to 40, we come up with a value of 55 man-days for 
the "Man-Days Reported Still Needed" to complete the project. 
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Any time the "Man-Days Reported Still Needed" turns out 
to be more (less) than the "Man-Days Remaining" in the 
project's plan, it would, in effect, constitute a revision of 
what the project's scope is perceived to be, i.e., that it is 
larger (smaller) than what has been planned for. For 
example, in the case above, reporting that 55 (rather than 
40) man-days are still needed after having had 60 man-days 
already expended, constitutes a revision in what the 
project's size is perceived to be, namely, from the original 
estimate of 100 man-days to a revised value of 60 + 55 = 115 
man-days i.e., a 15% increase. When such a "revelation" 
occurs in a project, project management reacts to transform 
those revised perceptions about the "Total Job Size in 
Man-Days" into actual adjustments. This adjustment process 
is captured, as is shown in Figure III.29., through the "Rate 
of Adjusting the Job's Size in Man-Days." It is the rate at 
which the "Total Job Size in Man-Days" is adjusted! upwards 
or downwards, to what is perceived as its newly revised 
value. The "Rate of Adjusting the Job's Size in Man-Days" is 
formulated as, 
where, 
GOAL 
LEVEL 
{GOAL - LEVEL)/ADJUSTMENT-TIME 
= Revised value of job size 
in Man-Days 
= Man-Days Reported Still Needed + 
Cumulative Man-Days Expended 
= Total Job Size in Man-Days 
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ADJUSTMENT-TIME = Delay in Adjusting the 
Job's Size in Man-Days 
Thus, the adjustment process is not an instantaneous 
one, instead it takes place over a time interval defined as 
the "Delay in Adjusting the Job's Size in Man-Days." 
The above formulation of the "Rate of Adjusting the 
Job's Size in Man-Days" produces the behavior pattern shown 
in Figure III.30. In the situation portrayed in the figure, 
it is assumed that up until time t 1 , LEVEL = GOAL. Then, at 
time (t l ) there is a sudden permanent increase (h) in the 
GOAL e.g., the "Revised Value of the Job's Size" jumps from 
100 man-days to 115 man-days. In response to 'such a. step 
rise in the value of the GOAL, the value of LEVEL (e.g., the 
value of "Total Job Size 
exponential, goal seeking 
in Man-Days") 
pattern. And, 
rises in an 
it can be shown 
that, the rate at which LEVEL rises is such that it would 
close 63% of the gap after one "Adjustment time," and 95% of 
the gap after 3 "Adjustment-times." 
The "Delay in Adjusting the Job's Size in Man-Days" 
ranged in the organizations we interviewed in from 2 days 
(Landolfi, 22), (Lombardi, 23) to a week (i.e., 5 working 
days), (Chan, 20). In the model the "Delay in Adjusting the 
Job's Size in Man-Days" is set to 3 working days. This value 
together with the ones reported by our interviewees might 
strike some readers as somewhat lower than what they would 
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have expected. But remember, this adjustment process is 
really the project's final, not first, reaction to some 
man-day shortage/excess. As we explained before, when the 
project is perceived to be behind (ahead) of schedule people 
first react by absorbing the shortage (excess). And only 
when this is not enough, are adjustments to the project's 
size undertaken. Thus, when, if ever, the the decision to 
~ adjust the project's size is made, people in the project 
would.have been "geared-up" for it. 
Falling behind schedule is not the only reason why a 
project's size in ~-days might be adjusted upwards. It 
could also happen, as Figure III .29. indicates, as a result 
of an upward adjustment in the project's size in tasks. 
As a software project develops, project members often 
realize that they have under-estimated the number of tasks 
(~.g., modules) that comprises the software system being 
developed (DeMarco, 1982) , (Burchett, 1982), (Daly, 1977), 
(Devenny, 1976). Boehm (1981) provides an explanation for 
this tendency to underestimate software size: 
There is a powerful tendency to focus on the highly visible mainline components of the software, and' to underestimate or completely miss the unobtrusive components (e.g., help message processing, error p'rocessing, and moving data around). 
In the model we define an initializing parameter called ., .... 
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"Tasks Underestimation Fraction." Through this parameter we 
can simulate any software under-sizing situation we wish to 
investigate. For example, if the actual size of the software 
product to be developed is, say, 100 tasks, then to simulate 
a 25% under-sizing "problem" we would simply set the "Tasks 
Underestimation Fraction" to 0.25. What this would do, is it 
would initialize the model such that the value of the 
"Currently Perceived Job Size in Tasks" is only 
(1 - 0.25) * 100 = 75 tasks. It would also initialize 
another level, namely, the "Undiscovered Job Tasks" to 
0.25 * 100 = 25 tasks. 
As the project develops, the "Undiscovered Job Tasks" 
are progressively discovered as "the level of knowledge we 
have of what the software is intended to do (increases)" 
(Boehm, 1981). The rate at which this happens, i.e., the 
number of undiscovered tasks that would be discovered per 
unit of time, is regulated, in the model, by the "Rate of 
Discovering Tasks." It is formulated as the product of the 
number of "Undiscovered Job Tasks" and the "Percent of 
undiscovered Tasks Discovered per Day." Because the rate at 
which undiscovered-tasks are discovered tends to increase as 
the project develops (Daly, 1977) (e.g., because, as the 
above quote indicates, the team's level of knowledge of what 
the software product is intended to do increases), the 
"Percent of Undiscovered Tasks Discovered per Day" is 
formulated, not as a constant, but instead as a variable that 
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increases in value as the project progresses. Its 
formulation is depicted in the table function of Figure 
III.31. 
As the additional tasks are discovered, they are then 
incorporated into the project e.g., incorporated into the 
project's Work Breakdown Structure, the Gantt and/or PERT 
charts, the Earned Value System, ... etc. This, of course, 
takes time. In the model this process is modeled as a 
third-order delay, with the "Average Delay in Incorporating 
Discovered Tasks" set to 10 working days (i.e., two weeks) 
{Landolfi, 22). 
The final piece of structure we would like to discuss is 
the one that model's the process by which the discovery of 
additional tasks is translated into additions to the 
project's allocation of man-days. This structure occupies 
the lower portion of Figure III .29. 
When additional tasks are discovered in a project, they 
do not necessarily always trigger an adjustment to the 
project's man-days estimate (Boehm, 1981). Only if the 
additional tasks are perceived as requiring a relatively 
"significant" amount of effort to handle, would project 
members "bother" to go through the trouble of formally 
developing cost estimates and incorporating them in the 
project's work plan (Chan, 20), (Lombardi, 23), {Hisamune, 
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26) and (Nichols, 27). As Figure III.29. indicates, the 
number of discovered tasks a~e first "mentally" sized-up by 
dividing them by the "Assumed Development Productiv~~y." For 
example, if 10 tasks are discovered and if, at that point in 
the project; the value of the "Assumed Development 
Productivity" is 1 task/man-day, then the "Perceived Size of 
Discovered Tasks in Man-Days" would be 10 man-days. This 
absolute number by itself is not, however, enough to decide 
whether the new tasks do or do not deserve a "formal 
treatment." This determination is based, not on the 
perceived absolute size of the discovered tasks, but instead 
on wh~t their size is perceived to be relative to the amount 
of effort that is perceived remaining. For example, while it 
would be quite possible that a 100 man-day task·discovered at 
the beginning of 100,000 man-day project would not trigger 
any adjustments in the projects's man-days estimate, it would 
be quite unlikely for this to happen if the 100 man-day task 
is discovered at the end of the development phase when only 
50 man-days are still remaining in the project's, plan. Thus, 
the value of the "Perceived Size of Discovered Tasks in 
Man-Days" is divided by the "Man-Day Perceived Remaining for 
New TasJ;s" to determine the "Relative Size of Discovered 
Tasks." Once this relative size is determined, it is then 
compared to some threshold value, namely, the "Maximum 
Relative Size of Additions Tolerated Without Adding to the 
Project's Man-Days." If the relative size is lower than that 
threshold, the newly discovered tasks are totally absorbed 
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without triggering any adjustments to the project's man-days 
estimate. If, however, the relative size exceeds that 
threshold value, parts or all of the additional tasks are 
translated into additional man-days in the project's plan. 
This behavior is captured in the table function of Figure 
III.32. Based on discussions with (Hisamune, 26), and 
(Nichols, 27), we set the "Maximum Relative Size of Additions 
Tolerated Without Adding to Schedule to the Project's 
Man-Days" to 1%. F.'or example, for a 1000 man-day development 
phase (e.g., 10 people working for 100 working days the 
threshold is 10 man-days) • 
As a result of the above decision making process, a 
decision could, therefore, be made to formally incorporate 
either part or all of those tasks discovered, at some point 
in the project, into the project's man-days estimate. Such 
an adjustment involves producing two estimates, one for the 
effort to develop and QA the new tasks, and the other for the 
system testing work. Both of these estimates are determined 
in basically the same manner. The former is. determined by 
dividing the number of discovered tasks that are to be 
incorporated by the "Assumed Development Productivity," while 
the system testing effort is estimated by dividing by the 
"Perceived Testing Productivity." 
Any such adjustments to the project's total man-days 
estimate, will, in turn, trigger further adjustments in 
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either the projects schedule completion date, the workforce 
level, or both. 
planning section. 
III.4.6 •. Planning: 
These reactions are explained next in the 
The Planning subsystem is depicted in Figure III.33. 
The "Schedule Completion Date" is formulated, not as an 
actual date (e.g., August 7th, 1983), but as a number of 
working days from the beginning of the project (e.g., 200 
days). Thus, by simply subtractin~ the current value of 
"Time" (which represents the number of working days elapsed 
in a simulation run), we can determine the scheduled "Time 
Remaining." By dividing the value of "Man-Days Remaining," 
at any point in the project, by "Time Remaining" we can then 
determine the "Indicated Workforce Level." This would 
represent the number of full-time employees believed to be 
necessary and sufficient to complete the project on time 
Le., on the (current) "Scheduled Completion Date." Fot 
example, if the "Scheduled Completion Date" is 100 days, and 
at time = 40 days the value of "Man-Days Remaining" is 600 
man-days, the "Indicated Workforce Level" would be determined 
as follows: First, the value of "Time Remaining" would be 
determined to be 100 - 40 = 60 days. Dividing this into 600 
man-days, we arrive at a value for the "Indicated, WorkfQrce 
Level" of 10 men. As we said, this value is in ·terms of 
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full-time equivalent employees. Thus, if (actual) employees 
are not assigned full-time on the project, adjustments should 
be made. This is achieved in the model by dividing the value 
of the "Indicated Workforce Level" obtained above, by the 
value of the ~Average Daily Manpower per Employee."' For 
example, if employees assign, on the average, only 50% of 
their time to the project, i. e., "Average Daily Manpower per 
Employee" equals 0.5, then the "Indicated Workforce Level" 
obtained above would be adjusted to become 10 / 0.5 = 20 
(actual) employees. 
As was mentioned, the "Indicated Workforce Level" 
represents. the number of full-time employees believed to be 
necessary and sufficient to complete the project on time 
i.e., on the (Current) "Scheduled Completion Date." If this 
number turns out to be lower than the 'value of the "Total 
Workforce" on the project, excessive employees would be 
simply transferred out of the project. The tra,nsfer 
operation was explained in detail in the "Human Resource 
Management Subsystem." If, on the other hand, the opposite 
is true, i . e. , the "Indicated Workfor~e Level" is larger, 
then this would indicate a need to hire more people. 
However, as has also been explained in the "Human Resource 
Management Subsystem," hiring decisions are not determined 
only on the basis of scheduling considerations. In addi tion" 
consideration is also given to the ,stability of the 
workforce. That is, before hiring new project members, 
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management tries to contemplate the duration of need for 
these new members. Different firms weigh this factor to 
various extents. In general, however, the relative weighting 
between the desire for workforce stability on the one hand, 
and the de·sire to complete the proj1l'Gt on time, on the other, 
changes with the stage of project completion. 
The "Workforce Level Needed" is formulated as a weighted 
average of the (Current) "Total Workforce Level" and the 
"Indicated Workforce Level." It, thus, takes into account 
both the stable workforce level, and the number of employees 
that would be required to complete the project on time. 
Specifically, it is formulated as follows: 
WF-Level Needed = Indicated WF-Level * WCWF + 
Total WF-Level * (l-WCWF) 
(Note: The above formulation only applies when the 
value of the "Indicated Workforce Level" is larger than 
"Total Workforce," indicating a need for hiring more people. 
In cases whe.re the opposite is true, i.e., "Indicated 
Workforce Level" is lower, then "Workforce Level Needed" 
would be simply set to that lower value, and any excessive 
employees transferred out of the project.) 
The weighting factor (WCWF) is termed the "Willingness 
to Change Workforce Level." It is a variable that could 
assume values between 0 and 1, inclusive. When WCWF = 1, the 
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weighting considers only the "Indicated Workforce Level" 
i.e., management would be adjusting its workforce level to 
the number perceived required to finish on schedule. As WCWF 
moves towards 0, more and more weighting would be given to 
the stability of the workforce. And when WCWF equals exactly 
0, the weighted number of employees desired becomes wholly 
dependent on the workforce stability factors. 
We formulated the "Willingness to Change Workforce 
Level" to be comprised of two components. The first 
component, WCWF-l, captures the pressures that develop, as 
the project proceeds towards its final stages, for workforce 
stability. Although different firms will weigh this factor 
to various extents, we feel that the general form of WCWF-l 
depicted in Figure 111.34.. (and which is based on 
discussions with (Lombardi, 23), (Garett, 24), and (Nichols, 
25) is representitive. To understand what Figure 111.34. 
represents, assume for the moment that "Willingness to Change 
Workforce Level" is only comprised of, and is therefore equal 
to, WCWF-l. Thus, in the early stages of the project when 
"Time Remaining" would generally be much larger than the sum 
of the "Hiring Delay" and the "Average Assimilation Delay," 
WCWF would be equal to 1, i.e., there would be total 
willingness to adjust the size of the workforce to whatever 
level is necessary to suit the project's scheduled completion 
date. As the number of days perceived remaining drops below 
1.5 * (Hiring Delay + Average Assimilation Delay), though, 
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the figure shows increasing reluctance to increase the 
workforce level. For example, if the "Hiring Delay" is 40 
working days and the "Average Assimilation Delay" is 80 days, 
then as "Time Remaining" drops below 180 days, management 
starts to become reluctant to hire new people, even though 
the time and effort perceived remaining might imply that more 
people are needed. This reluctance stems from the 
realization that most of those remaining 180 days, would be 
"wasted" in the hiring process and then in acquainting the 
new people with the mechanics of the project, in integrating 
them into the project team, and in training them in the 
necessary technical areas. When the "Time Remaining" drops 
below 0.3 * (Hiring Delay + Average Assimilation Delay), the 
table function of Figure 111.34. suggests that no more 
additions would be made to the project's workforce i.e., the 
hiring rate will fall to zero. Thus, at that stage, if the 
project is behind schedule, project management would be 
coping only by pushing back the schedule completion date. 
This, of course, is not always feasible or acceptable. 
For example, in our discussions at MITRE, we learned that in 
projects that involve embedded software for weapon systems, 
serious schedule slippages can not be tolerated. The reason 
is that, in such projects, software development is often on 
the critical path of overall system development, which, as a 
result, translates any serious slippages in the software 
schedule into very costly slippages in the overall delivery 
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Figure 111.34 
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schedule of the system (O'Conner, 10). 
track 
Let's see what this meant l~ a recent software 
development for a large defense system. It was planned 
to have an operational lifetime of seven years and a 
total cost of about $1.4 billion --- or about $200 
million' a year worth of capability. However, a 
six-month delay caused a six-month delay in making the 
system available to the user, who thus lost about $100 
million worth of needed capability --- about 50 times 
the direct cost of $2 million for the additional 
software effort (Boehm, 1973). 
Because of the software industry's less than impressive 
record in delivering projects on schedule, such 
embedded software projects are often scheduled with some 
"safety factor" incorporated (O'Conner, 10). For example, if 
some "Maximum Tolerable Completion Date" is, say, 100 days, 
and a 20% safety factor is used, then the project would be 
initially scheduled to complete in 0.8.0 * 100 = 80 days. If 
such a project starts to fall behind schedule, what would 
happen? We will assume the following scenario (O'Conner, 
10): As long as the "Scheduled Completion Date" is 
comfortably below the "Maximum Tolerable Completion Date" 
then decisions to adjust the schedule, add more people, or do 
a combination of both will continue be based on the balancing 
of scheduling and workforce stapility considerations, e.g., 
as captured by WCWF-l. However, as the "Scheduled Completion 
Date" starts approaching the "Maximum Tolerable Completion 
Date," pressures would develop that would override the 
workforce stability considerations. That is, management 
becomes increasingly willing to "pay any price" necessary to 
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avoid overshooting the "Maximum Tolerable Completion Date." 
that is And this often translates into a management 
increasingly willing to hire more people. '! 
are 
" 
The development of 
captured through the 
S'.ich overridi.1g pressures 
:1 
following formulation of the 
"Willingness to Change Workforce Level" (WCWF), 
, 
I <, 
WCWF = MAXIMUM (WCWF-l, WCWF-2) 
WCWF-2, the second component of WCWF, is the table 
function depicted in Figure III.35. Thus, as long as 
"Scheduled Completion Date" is comfortably below the "Maximum 
Tolerable Completion Date," the value of WCWF-l would be 
zero, i.e., it would have no bearing in the determination of 
WCWF, and consequently no bearing on the hiring decisions. 
When "Scheduled Completion Date" starts approaching the 
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"Maximum Tolerable Completion Date" the value of WCWF-2 I.'::·~ 
starts to granually rise. Because such a situation would be i ! 
I i 
developing towards the end of the project, the value of I '1 
I~, I 
WCWF-l would be probably close to zero and decreasing. Thus, :.<.1 
as WCWF-2 exceeds the value of WCWF-l, the "Willingness to :", \ 
Change Workforce Level" would be totally dominated by ,'t.: I 
scheduling considerations, i.e., by the desire not to ',C" I 
overshoot the "Maximum Tolerable Completion Date." 1\'1 
I', I 
rl Note that the above formulation of WCWF allows us to !\ I 
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easily simulate those environments in which there are no 
tight time commitments. In such cases we need only to set 
the value of "Maximum Tolerable Completion Date" to some high 
value. This would keep WCWF-2 always at the zero level. 
And, thus, WCWF becomes solely a function of WCWF-l. 
One final note about the formulation of the "Willingness 
to Change Workforce Level." It is important to realize that 
the variable WCWF is an expression of ,a policy for managing 
projects. Thus, a range of functions are possible here 
(e.g., different forms of the table functions WCWF-l and 
WCWF-2),capturing different strategies for how 'to balance 
workforce and schedule adjustments throughout the project to 
minimize overruns and costs. In the next chapter, we will 
take the opportunity to explore a range of other alternate 
policies besides the (representitive) one discussed here. 
Once the "Workforce Level Needed" is determined, it is 
translated into a goal for hiring in (or transfering out) 
employees. Thi's goal is termed the "Workforce Level Sought." 
The "Workforce Level Sought" is almost always identical to 
the "Workforce Level Needed." They could, however, differ. 
When this happens, it is usually in the early stages of the 
project, when the project's manpower build-up rate tends to 
be at its highest level. A consideration is given then, as 
was .explained in the "Human Resource Management Subsystem," 
to the project's abili ty to absorb new people into its 
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organization. This factor defines, in effect, a ceiling on 
-the number of employees sought i.e., to be hired. That is, 
"Workforce Level Sought" would be set to the value of 
"Workforce Level Needed" as long as this is less than or 
equal to the "Ceiling on Total Workforce." Otherwise, 
"Workforce L~vel Sought" is set to the value of the latter. 
By dividing the "Man-Days Remaining" b¥ the value of the 
"Workforce Level Soug~t" (after being adjusted if necessary 
to be in terms of full-time equivalent employees) we can 
determine the "Time Perceived Still Required." This would 
represent the remaining time, in working days, that is 
perceived to be still required to complete the project, given 
its current condition. Notice that by computing the "Time 
Perceived Still Required" in terms of the "Workforce Level 
Sought rather than the "Total Workforce" means that we are 
assuming that schedule adjustments (which would be based on 
this compu~ation), are made with full awareness of the hiring 
decisions being made in the project. For example, if at some 
point as much as 1100 man-days are still remaining to 
complete the project, 10 full-time employees are working on 
it, and it has been decided to hire an additional employee 
(i.e., "Workforce Level Sought" is 10 + 1 = 11), then we are 
assuming that management would (often through a 
back-of-the-en~elope computation) determine that the time 
still required is 1100 / 11 = 100 days. (Based on 
discussions with (Landolfi, 11), (Chan, 14), and (Lombardi, 
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16). ) 
Once the "Time Perceived Still Required" is computed, it 
would be added to the value of "Time" (i.e., the number of 
working days elapsed on the simulated project) to determine 
the "Indicated Completion Date." For example, if at Time = 
40 days, the value of "Time Perceived Still Required" is 100 
days, then the value of the "Indicated Completion Date" would 
be 140 days. Once this, in turn, is determined, it is used 
to adjust the project's formal "Scheduled Completion Date," 
if necessary. The "Rate of Adjusting the Schedule" has the 
(by now) familiar formulation, 
(GOAL) - LEVEL) / ADJUSTMENT-TIME 
where, 
GOAL = Indicated Completion Date 
LEVEL = Scheduled Completion date 
ADJUSTMENT-TIME = Schedule Adjustment Time 
The "Schedule Adjustment Time" is set in the model to 5 
working days (i.e., one calender week) (Landolfi, 22), (Chan, 
20). 
111.5. Summary: 
In this chapter on model development, we accomplished 
three tasks. First, we identified the sources of information 
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utilized in developing the model. As was explained in 
Section 111.2, the model was developed on the basis of an 
extensive review of the literature, supplemented by 27 
focused field interviews of software project managers in 5 
organizations. Second, we defined the model's boundary. As 
was shown in Section 111.3, the model focuses on the 
development phases of software production, extending from the 
beginning of the design phase of the software lifecycle, up 
untill the end of the system testing phase. Finally, in 
Section III .4, a detailed description of the model's 
structure was presented. The model is comprised of four 
sectors. ' At the heart of the model is the Software 
Production Sector, where software production activities such 
as coding and testing are modeled. The project management 
activities comprise the remaining three sectors: Planning, 
Human Resource Management, and Control. 
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IV. A CASE-STUDY: 
THE NASA DE-A SOFTWARE PROJECT 
In this chapter we report the results of a case-study we 
conducted to test the model. The objective of the case study 
is to examine the model's ability to reproduce the dynamic 
behavior patterns of a complc,ted software project. The 
dynamic behavior of a set of variables pertaining to the 
management of the project is tracked, including: completion 
date ~stimates, man-day estimates, cost (in man-days), and 
workforce loading. 
The case-study was conducted at the Systems Development 
Section of NASA's Goddard Spuce Flight Center (GSFC) at 
Greenbelt, Maryland. This organization is engaged in the 
development of application software that supports 
ground-based spacecraft attitude determination and control. 
The subsystems included in a typical attitude system are 
telemetry processing, sensor calibration, attitude 
computation, and maneuver planning. In the section that 
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follows we will provide a detailed description of one such 
project, namely, the DE-A project used in our case-study. 
This will then be followed in Section IV.2., by a discussion 
of model parameterization. That is, we will discuss the set 
of model patlmeters that are set to simulate the particular 
DE-A project environment (e.g., project size). Finally, in 
Section IV.3., we will simulate the DE-A project, observe its 
behavior, and compare it to DE-A's actual behavior patterns. 
IV.1. The DE-A Project: 
The basic requirements for the DE-A project were to 
design, implement, and test a software system that would 
process telemetry data and would provide definitive attitude 
determination as well as real-time attitude determination and 
control support for NASA's DE-A satellite. The DE-A 
satellite was designed to study the physical process of the 
earth's upper atmosphere, ionosphere, and magnetosphere. The 
overall requirements were similar to previous space mission 
requirements at the GSFC System Development Section (NASA, 
1983) • 
The DE-A project was selected for the case-study by 
NASA. Specifically, it was selected by Frank E. McGarry, 
Head of the Systems Development Section of the Goddard Space 
Flight center, who is participating, as we are, in the 
NASA/MIT "Advanced .Information Systems Project." The project 
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was selected by McGarry so as to satisfy three criteria 
(furnished by us): (1) to be medium in size (i.e.i 16-64 
KDSI); (2) recent; (3) "typical" i.e., one that would be 
considered as having been developed in a familiar in-house 
software development environment. 
In the remaining part of this section we will provide a 
more detailed account of the nature and development history 
of the project. The data presented was extracted from two 
primary sources: 
1. Interviews with Frank E. McGarry, who managed the 
project. Two lengthy personal interviews were conducted 
at the Goddard center on August 11 and 12, 1983. These 
were then followed by 4 (15-minute) telephone 
interviews. 
2. Project documentation. These included: 
* "Software Development History Explorer (DE) Attitude Ground (AGSS)," June, 1983. 
for Dynamics 
Support System 
* DE-A Resource Summary 
The life cycle phases covered in this study include the 
design, coding, and system testing phases. Excluded from the 
study are the requirements definition phase and the 
acceptance testing phase. Both the requirements and 
acceptance testing phases were excluded because they both lie 
outside the boundary of our model. This did not pose any 
......... ------_. ~ 
.. - -- -~-~ .J 
"
; 
.. +'/' 
~ 
Il 
I I ! I 
" 
273 
complications, however. The requirements phase, it turns 
out, was also not included in McGarry's group's project, 
responsibility. Requirements were, instead, the 
responsibility of the user organization, which for the DE-A 
project was the Attitude Determination and Control Section 
(ADCS) of the Goddard Space Flight Center. The ADCS, thus, 
developed the functional requirements of the system, 
including system input and output, algorithms, and timimg and 
accuracy requirements. The responsibility for the acceptance 
testing phase, on the other hand, was shared by both the 
development team, and an independent testing group. 
Excluding the acceptance testing phase posed no complications 
to our analysis s'imply bec;ause it was the last phase in the 
life cycle, hence its exclusion had no impact on any of the 
other life cycle phase's studied. 
The development a.nd target operations machines were the 
IBM S/360-95 and -75. The programming language was mostly 
Fortran (85%). (Assembler language and assembler language 
macros constituted the remaining lE,%.) The size of the 
system in Delivered Source Instructions (D0I) is 24,400 DSI. 
Recall the definition of a DSI: 
Delivered. This term is generally meant to exclude nondelivered support software such as test drivers. However, if there are developed with the same care as delivered software, with their own review, test plans, documentation, etc., then they should be included. 
Source Instructions. This term includes all program instructions created by project personnel and processed 
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into machine code by some combination of preprocessors, compilers, and assemblers. It excludes comment cards and unmodified utility software. It includes job control language, format statements, and data declarations. Insl;ructions are defined as lines of' code or card images. Thus, a line containing two or more source statements counts as one instruction; a five-line data declaration counts as five instructions (Boehm, 1981). 
The size of the project in DSI is determined by NASA as 
follows (NASA, 1983): 
Size in DS! = New Statements + 
extensively modified statem~nts 0.2*(Slightly Modified Statements) 
+ 
Where, a "Statement" is a non-comment source 
instruction. 
The project's actual key development dates were: 
Phase 
Design 
Coding 
Sys. Test 
Start 
Oct. 1, 1979 
May 10, 1980 
Nov. 15, 1980 
~ 
May 9, 1980 
March 2.7, 1981 
April 24, 1981 
Thus, the project was completed in 19 calendar months. 
In terms of cost, the project consumed 2,222 man-days of 
effort. (2,784 man-days were expended to complete the total 
project, of which 562 man-days were consumed in the 
acceptance testing activity.} 
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IV.2. Model Parameterization: 
Three sets of parameters need to be set in the model, to 
simulate a particular project situation; - These are: 
Initial Project Estimates 
1. Initial estimate of project size in DSI 2. Initial estimate of man-day expenditures 3. Initial staffing level 4. Initial estimate of project duration Human Resourc~ Management 
5. Average daily manpower per staff member 6. Hiring delay 
7. Average employment time 8. Training overhead 9. Average ·assimilation delay 
Software Development Environment 
10. Nominal Potential Productivity 11. Error rate 
We now proceed to set the DE-A project values for the 
above collection of model parameters. 
Project Planning 
1. Initial Estimate of Proiect Size: 
As was mentioned above the actual DE-A project size was 
24.4 KDSI. At the initiation of the design phase (i .e., 
October 1, 1979), though, the project's size was 
under-estimated by 45%. That is, the project was perceived 
to be only 24.4 * (1-.45) = 16 KDSI (NASA, 1983). (Note: 
Initial estimates were made in terms of source instructions 
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with comments. The actual size of the project in source 
instructions with comments was 49,500 and the initial 
estimate was 32,600 i.e., under-estimated by 45%.) 
2. Initial Estimates of Man-Day Expenditures: In a NASA 
document titled Recommended Approach to Software Development 
(April, 1983), the following estimating guidelines are 
provided: 
It is important for the manager to use a model that is 
tuned to the specific environment and corresponds well 
with the resources expended for similar past projects • 
The Meta-Model has been developed using SEL data. 
However, managers must never completely rely on any 
formal resource estimation model. Rather, they must use 
the results of the model, together with historical 
knowledge of similar systems, to update resource and 
cost estimates. The new estimates are more accurate 
because they are based on additional information and 
model support. 
The Meta-Model refered to above is a software estimation 
model developed as part of a research project of the Software 
Engineering Laboratory (SEL). The SDL is a research 
organization established in 1977 at the NASA Goddard Space 
Flight Center (Systems Development and Analysis Branch) in 
cooperation with the University of Maryland (Computer Science 
Department) , and 
Systems Operation). 
and Basili, 1981). 
the Computer Sciences Corporation (Flight 
The Meta-Model is discussed in (Bailey 
In the DE-A project, the above recommended procedure was 
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indeed followed «NASA, 1983) and discussions with McGarry}. 
That is, the Meta-Model estimates were used as guidelines, 
which were then adjusted on the basis 
experience and judgement. 
of managerial 
For Project DE-A the initial estimates were made for the 
design, coding, system testing, and acceptance testing 
phases. The value was 1,380 man-days. Since the actual 
man-day expenditures (including the acceptance testing phase) 
were 2,784 man-days the initial estimate was 50% off the 
actual. Recall, though, that our model excludes the 
acceptance testing phase. Thus, the above 1,380 value cannot 
be used, and must be adjusted downwards. To do this we will 
make the following assumption: we will apply the man-day 
estimation error of 50% to the design, coding, and system 
testing phases of the project. For these three phases, the 
actual man-day expenditures were 2,222 man-days. Assuming 
that the effort for these three phases was under-estimated by 
50% (as was the total project effort) we arrive at an initial 
estimate of 0.5 * 2,222 = 1,111 man-days. 
This total man-Clay estimate is 'then distributed among 
the project's life cycle phases. In DE-A the distribution 
used was 85% for development (Le., design and coding) and 
15% for system testing (discussions with McGarry). 
Finally, effort is also allocated to the QA activity. 
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The ~Planned Fraction of Manpower for QA" for project DE-A is 
shown in Figure IV.'. (discussions with McGarry). 
3. Initial Staffing Level: 
The project was initialized with a staffing level of 
approximately 1.5 full-time equivalent employees (NASA, 
1983) • 
4. Initial Estimate of Project Duration: 
The DE-A project was initiated on October 1, 1979, and 
it was planned to co~plete (i.e., design, coding, and system 
testing) on January 30, 1981. (The acceptance testing phase 
was planned to start on January 31, 1981 and end on April 4, 
1981. ) That is, the project's duration (until system 
testing) was estimated to be 16 months, or 16 X 20 = 320 
working days (NASA, 1983). 
Because NASA's launch of the DE-A satellite was tied to 
the completion of the DE-A software, serious schedule 
sl ippage were not tolerated. Speci fically, "all software was 
required to be accepted and frozen 90 days before launch" 
(NASA, 1983). 
The DE-A satellite's launch date was August 3, 1981. 
This meant that all software was required to be accepted and 
frozen by May 3, 1981. And because, the acceptance testing 
phase was scheduled for 2 months, this meant that the 
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Planned Fraction of Manpower 
for QA 
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"Maximum Tolerable Completion Date" for the system testing 
phase was March 3, 1981. That is, the DE-A project was 
initially scheduled for 16 months, with the realization that 
it should not slip by more than 2 more months. (Note: the 
project ended up completing on April 24, i.e., it did 
overshoot the 18 month ceiling by approximately 20 calendar 
days. As a result the acceptance testing phase was 
"compressed" in duration.) 
Human Resource Management 
5. Average Daily Manpower per Staff: 
On project DE-A the "Average Daily Manpower per Staff 
was set to 0.5. That is, on the average, DE-A project 
personnel were assigned half-time to the project (from DE-A's 
Resource Summary). 
6. Hiring Delay: 
The "Hiring Delay" was set· ·to 3D working days i. e. , 6 
calendar weeks (discussion with McGarry). This is somewhat 
lower than the industry, average (40 days). The reason is 
that prompt hirings are often made from the Computer Science 
Corporation (CSC) (under a special arrangement between CSC 
and the Goddard Center). 
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The average employment time at the Systems development 
Section of the· GSFC is 1000 working days (i.e., 50 calendar 
months). This translates into a· turnover rate of 
approximately 20% (discussions with McGarry). 
8. Training Overhead: 
As was explained in Chapter III, the determination of 
the amount of effort to commit to the training of new 
employees is made on the basis of managerial intuition and 
organizational custom. At the System Development Section, 
25% of an experienced employee's time is committed per new 
employee (discussions with McGarry). 
9. Average Assimilation Delay: 
Th", "Average Assimilation Delay" was set for the DE-A 
project to 20 working days (i.e., 4 calendar weeks). This 
value is much lower than values reported in the literature. 
The reason, given by Mc~arry, has again to do with the 
special arrangement his group has with the Computer Sciences 
Corporation. As was said earlier,' on many occasions, 
software professionals are recruited from CSC to work on 
Goddard projects. This tapped pool of software professionals 
is one that over the years has gained experience with the 
NASA project environment. And as a result, when recruited on 
a new project, a CSC profession~l is assimilated at a faster 
rate. 
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Software Development Environment 
10. Nominal Potential productivity: 
Recall that this parameter captures the set of 
productivity determinants that distinguish different software 
development environments e.g., availability of software 
tools, computer-hardware characteristics, and product 
complexity. That is, the set of factors that affect 
productivity, but which tend to remain invariant during the 
life cycle of a single project. 
To determine the nominal potential productivity for the 
DE-A project environment, we need first to determine the 
actual development productivity. As stated above, the total 
effort expended to develop the 24.4 KDSI project amounted to 
2,222 man-days. Of these, 228 man-days were expended on 
system testing, and approximately 914 man-days on QA and 
rework «NASA, 1983) and discussions with McGarry). Thus, a 
total of 1,080 man-days were expended on the development 
(i.e., design and coding) of the system. From this, we can 
determine the average development productivity as 
24,400/1,080 = 22.59 DSI/man-day. This, however, is still 
not the value we are looking for. We are looking for the 
"Nominal Potential Productivity" and what we have is the 
actual productivity. Recall, potential productivity is, 
, .. 
when 
the maximum level of productivity that can occur 
an individual or group employs its funds of 
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resources to meet the task demands 6f a work situation. It is the level of productivity that will be attained if the individual or group makes the best possible use of its resources {that is, if th.re is no 'loss of productivity due to faulty process} {Steiner, 1966}. 
As was explained in detail in chapter III, actual 
productivity rarely equals potential productivity because of 
losses due to communication and motivation problems. These 
losses are captured in the model by the "Multiplier to 
Productivity due to Communication and Motivation Losses." 
Specifically, actual productivity is fDrmulated in the model 
as the product of potential productivity and the "Multiplier 
to Productivity due to Communication and Motivation Lossel:;." 
Thus, if we can estimate the value of this multiplier, we can 
then divide it into the value of actual productivity 
calculated above, to come up with an estimate for DE-A's 
"Nominal Potential Productivity." 
The multiplier is itself a product of two variables, 
namely, the "Actual Fraction of a Man-Day on Project" and 
"Communication Overhead." The nominal value of the former 
was set in Chapter III to 0.6 {i.e., a full-time employee 
allocates, on the average, 60% of bis or her time to 
productive work on the project}. The "Communication 
Overhead," on the hand, was shown to be a function of team 
size. In DE-A, the size of the team siz.e was approximately 
10 people during most of the development period. From Figure 
111.15., we can then determine that the loss due to 
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"Communication Overhead" will be 60%. Thus, the value of the 
"!o!ul tiplier to Productivity due to Communication and 
Motivation Losses" becomes: 0.6 * (1-.06) = 0.564. By 
dividing this into the value of actual productivity (22.59 
DSI/Man-Day) calculated above, we come up with the estimate 
for the "Nominal Potential Productivity," namely, 
22.59/0.564 = 40 DSI Man-Day. 
11. Error Rate: 
In Chapter III, we explained that the formulation of the 
table function "Nominal Number of Errors Committed per Task" 
serves two purposes. First, its shape over the project's 
lite reflects the relative generation rates of different 
error types (e.g., design versus coding errors) throughout 
the life of the project. These assumptions, as all others in 
the model, are expected to apply to all project situations 
modeled. Hence, this shape would remain the same, even when 
modeling different project situations. The second purpose of 
the formulation, namely, its absolute value, reflects the 
different error generation characteristics of different 
project environments i.e., the sof.tware product's 
characterisitics (e.g., reliability requirements), as well as 
those of the organization in which it is developed (e.g., 
quali ty of personnel) • This, obviously, would generally 
change when modeling different project environments. 
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In the DE-A project, the actual number of errors 
committed was somewhere between 495 and 510 errors. {The 
exact figure is not known, because of "errors" in counting 
errors.} On the basis of this data, we formulated the 
"Nominal Number of Errors Committed per Task" for the DE-A 
project environment as shown in Figure IV.~ The shape of 
the curve is exactly similar to that of the base-case (shown 
in Figure III.17.), however, for DE-A the absolute values are 
slightly lower, ranging from 24 errors/KDSI at the beginning 
of design to 12 errors/KDSI towards the end of coding, with 
an average value for the project of 18 errors/KDSI. 
Notice that an average nominal error rate of 18 
error/KDSI would generate 18 X 24.4 = 439 errors only ... 
and not 495-510. This is because this error rate is the 
nominal rate. As was explained in Chapter III, the nominal 
error rate is defined to be that gene.rated by the average 
experienced-type employee. Such a rate is therefore a lower 
bound, attained only when the workforce is solely comprised 
of experienced personnel. When this is not the case, i.e., 
when the wor~force contains new hirees as well, the error 
rate would be adjusted upwards through the the "Multiplier to 
Error Gene~ation due to Workforce Mix." By setting the 
nominal average error rate to 18, we are, therefore, assuming 
that 15% more errors (i.e., above the nominal level) will be 
produced) because of new hirees on the DE-A project 
(18 X 24.4 X 1.15 = 505 erro.rs) • 
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Summar..,Y 
The value of the above set ·of model parameters is 
summarized in Table IV.l. Th~ parameters are in the same 
order above, and are refered to by their DYNAMO names. 
It is important to notice that the parameterization 
process of this section did not involve any of the model's 
policy formulations. By policy we mean the criteria for 
decision making. The set of parameters we have set merely 
define~ the particular environment within which the policies 
are exercised. For example, by setting parameters such as 
"Hiring Delay" and "Turnover," we do not alter in any way the 
rationale that determines how hiring/firing decisions will be 
modulated through-out the projec~'s lifecycle. Thus, while 
it can be determined from the set of parameter values of 
Table IV.l that, for example, the DE-A project is initialized 
with a workforce level of 1.5 full-time-eguivalent employees, 
one can not, on the other hand, ascertain the project's 
workforce loading pattern. The dynamic behavior of 
management systems tends to be largely a function of the 
interaction of the collection of policies that govern such 
systems (Forrester, 1979). For example, we will see in the 
next section how the workforce loading pattern of the DE-A 
software project is a function of not only the policies 
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1. 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
3. 
4.1 
4.2 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Parameter Name 
UNDEST (DIMENSIONLESS) 
TOTMDl (MAN-DAYS) • 
DEVPRT (DIMENSIONLESS) 
TPFMQA (%) 
INUDST (DIMENSIONLESS) 
TDEVl (DAYS) 
MXSCDX (DIMENSIONLESS) 
ADMPPS (DIMENSIONLESS) 
HIREDY (DAYS) 
AVEMPT (DAYS) 
TRPNHR (DH1ENSIONLESS) 
ASIMDY (DAYS) 
DSIPTK (DSI/TASK) 
TNERPT (ERRORS/KDSI) 
• , , •• J 
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Value 
35.0 
1,111. 0 
0.85 
.325/.29/.275/.255/.25/.275/.325/.375/.4/.4/0 
0.4 
320.0 
.. 
1.16 
0.5 
30.0 
1,000.0 
0.25 
20.0 
40.0 
24/22. 9/20.75/15. 25/i3. 1/12 
TABLE IV. I 
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governing the management of the human resource, but also of 
the interaction between these policies and other policies 
such as those of project scheduling. 
IV.3. Actual and Simulated project Behavior: 
Once the model was parameterized, it was run to simulate 
the DE-A project. In this section we discuss the model's 
output and compare it to DE-A's actual behavior. We will 
examine the dynamic behavior of the following four project 
variables: (1) estimated completion date; (2) estimated 
project man-day expenditures; (3 ) cumulative man-day 
expenditures; and (4) workforce lev~l. 
Figure IV.3. depicts how DE-A's estimated completion 
date and estimated total man-day espenditures changed 
overtime. The actual project values are shown as circles 
with a dot inside. The time axis is in terms of working days 
(a calendar month is 20 working days). 
Notice that the model accurately portrays management's 
inclination not to adjust the project's scheduled completion 
date during most of the development phase of the project. 
Adjustments, in the earlier phases of the project, are 
instead made in the project's workforce level. This behavior 
pattern arises, according to DeMarco (1982), because of 
political reasons: 
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Once an original estimate is made, its' all too tempting 
to pass up subsequent opportunities to estimate by 
simple sticking with your previous 'numbers. This often 
happens even when you know your old estimtes are 
substantially off. There are a few different possible 
explanations for this effect: 'It's too early to show 
slip' •• , 'If I re-estimate now, I risk having to do it 
again later (and looking bad twice)' • • • As you can 
see, all such reasons are political in nature. 
Notice also that adjustments in the project's man-days 
budget start to be made towards the end of the design phase. 
These adjustments are triggered as "undiscovered Job Tasks" 
start to be discovered (discussion with McGarry). Recall 
that at the project's initiation, the project ~as incorrectly 
perceived to be (only) 16 KDSI in size. The actual 
'adjustm.nts that were made in DE-A are, however, somewhat 
larger than those estimated by the model. This indicates 
that the visibility in the DE-A project is somewhat higher 
than that assumed in the model. Tha tis, DE'-A managemen t 
detected more of ·the discrepancies between the project's 
actual scope, and it detected 
post-project evaluation, the 
them faster. 
project was 
Indeed, in a 
rated as "above 
average" in the area of project visibility (NASA, 1983). 
This was attributed to the utilization of a number of project 
management tools, including: librarians that maintain a 
central repository of the project's records, configuration 
analysis tools (CATs), and Unit Development Folders (UDF). 
However, while the visibility in the DE-A project is 
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( somewhat better than the industry's norm (as captured by our 
( 
--.~.,; .-.- '--.-
model), it is still, by no means, total. As a result, 
significant adjustments in both the project's-man-days and 
the schedule continue to be made until the final stages of 
development. 
reproduces. 
An outcome that the model successfully 
Notice that the model's values for the project's final 
man-day expenditures (2,092) is slightly lower than the 
actual (2,222). 
model, while 
The primary reason for this, is 
it successfulLy reproducess the 
that the 
project's 
manpower loading pattern (as we shall see later), it slightly 
under-estimates the values of the manpower level. Lower 
manpower levels mean lower communication and training 
overheads, w~ich means a slight over-estimatio.n of 
productivity. 
Also, the model's project duration (387.5 days) is 
slightly longer than DE-A's actual (380 days). The reason 
for this, is again, the fact that the DE-A management behaved 
slightly more aggressively (than is assumed in the model) in 
acquiring manpower, especially during the final stages of the 
project. In DE-A, the wOrkforce level at the end of the 
system testing phase was approximately 16 full-time 
equivalent people, while the model's value was 14.8. ~Vith 
more people at hand in the actual project, a smaller schedule 
overshoot was achieved. 
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We turn next to Figures !V.4. and IV.5., which depict 
the simulated and actual manpower loading patterns, 
respectively. For the reader's convenience, we also plotted 
a number of actual values alongside the simulation output. 
The model accurately replicates the actual DE-A pattern. 
What is quite encouraging about this result is the fact that 
the model successfully reproduced such an "atypical" 
workforce loading pattern. The "typical" software project 
workforce pattern discussed in the literature is a 
concave-type curve that rises, peaks, and then drops back to 
lower levels as the project proceeds towards the end of the 
system testing phase (e.g., see (DeMarco, 1982), (Boehm, 
1981), and (Albrecht, 1979).) 
The reason why the workforce level shoots upwards 
towards the end of the project has to do with NASA's tight 
scheduling constraints. As explained above, because NASA's 
launch of the DE-A satellite was tied to the completion of 
the DE-A software, serious schedule slippages were not 
tolerate6.. Specifically, "all software was required to be 
accepted and frozen 90 days before launch" (NASA, 1983). 
This, in effect, defined a "Maximum Tolerable Completion 
Date" for the project. For the DE-A project that date was 
March 3, 1981 ... or day 380 from the start. As this date 
was approached, pressures develop that override the workforce 
stability considerations. That is, project management 
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becomes increasingly willing to "pay any price" necessary to 
avoid overshooting the "Maximum Tolerable Completion Date." 
And this translates, as the figures indicate, into a 
management that is increasingly willing to add more people. 
Finally, in Figure IV.6. we plot the model's cumulative 
man-day expenditures, together with actual project results. 
Again, the model captures the exponentially increasing 
pattern. The actual figures are slightly higher, however, 
because, as we explained earlier, the model slightly 
under-estimates the workforce level ••• especially, towards 
the second half of the project i.e., the DE-A management's 
"Willingness to Change Workforce" does not decrease as the 
project proceeds towards its final stages, nearly as much, as 
is assumed in the model. 
IV.4. Conclusion: 
The objective of this case-study was to test \:.he model's 
ability to reproduce the dynamic behavior patterns of a 
completed software project, namely, the NASA DE-A software 
project. To do this we first parameterized the model. The 
process involved setting model parameters that capture the 
particular DE-A project environment. The parameter values 
were obtained from two sources, namely, interviews at NASA 
and project documentation. The 14 model parameters that were 
set, (e.g., "Hiring Delay," "Turnover Rate," ••• etc. ), it 
-----.--~ 
\(I,+~' . l~' 
. . 
., 
1 
j 
I:' ! 
, I 
, 
1 
.. il 
!. I i ,: I 
·c.· ! 
r< 1 
!\: '.' I 
, . I 
:1 • 
!', j 
'I 
! 
I 
! 
! 
~ 
, 7 ..... · 
-,-.~. ~:.-..... " 
297 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUALITY 
? - 1~. RUf.- r.:.s:..~ I :"CiCcLR La: NA~:' DE:' r:f.C.JECT 
S CHCDT=S CU~:):D=C JE>SZIW=D PJ5SZ=.J 
c •. C l' ; •. ;., 
0.0 1000,0 
j. '. L 2 ( :' .. '. " 
0.0000 ~ • 
• 0 
, 0 
• 0 
• 0 
.•.. D 
• 0 
.. . .a ~ D .... 
• 
p 
.. • jj 
100.00 D 
-
• - --- & .. D. 
• il 
•... 0 
• 0 
• 0 
o D 
• •.• 0 
o 0 
• . 0 
2.00. «> 
o 
• 
soo.oo 
., 
o -
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
u 
[) 
o 
u 
-0-
e 
~c. t •. (1 
£000.0 
'i .' oJ. ., 
d 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
.J 
oJ 
.v 
- J 
J ... 
• .J 
o J 
• J 
• J 
• 
.. 
... 
.. 
t 
· . 
• 
.. 
• 
• 
0 
-
• 
-
il • 
00 
. Figure IV. 6 
J 
J 
.J 
-
J 
-..I-
V 
'SOQO.C; 
bt·~rl.: 
oJ 
s 
• s 
• s 
• s. 
• s 
• 5 
• 5 
• S 
• S 
o S 
-5-
. ~ s_ .... _ . 
• s s 
• s 
• s 
• s 
•. s 
o S 
• S 
-5-
o S 
S 
J •. S 
J. S 
J. S 
J. S 
J S 
J 5 
J . S 
- '-J- 5 
.J } 
oJ 
,J 
.J ~ 
.J 
.J 
.J 
.v 
4~;eO~ 
01\ 000.0 
8!) s:. un 
I 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
-- - -
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
0 
5 • 
5 • 
S • 
5 • 
5 • 
5 • 
5 • 
5 • 
S 
CD 
J 
'I 
I •. , ~ 
I , ''''' i 
" .' 
, . 
~ '. ',. ,-
:' ~ 
':.' 
.' . 
. '. , 
j 
1 , 
t 
-!, 
29B 
is important to note, do ~ involve any changes in the 
formulation of the model's policy structures. The paramter 
set merely defines the (DE-A) environment within which the 
policies are exercised. This is significant, since the 
dynamic behavior patterns generated are largely a result of 
the interac,tion of the model's (unchanged) policy structures. 
Four DE-A project variables were examined, namely, 
completion date estimates, man-day estimates, cost in 
man-days, and workforce loading. While the model was quite 
accurate in reproducing the project's patterns of dynamic 
behavior, it slightly under-estimated the absolute value of 
DE-A's workforce level. That is, DE-A's management was 
somewhat more aggressive in its manpower acquisition policy 
than is assumed in the model. This underestimate caused the 
model to slightly 
man-days (by 6%), 
duration (by 2%). 
underestimate the project's cost in 
and slightly overestimate the project's 
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One of the advantages of system dynamics modeling is l ',,:. ..! 
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that it not' only allows us to generate the dynamic i:,::,' i 
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implications of a given set of polic ies, but it in addi tion ~\,:;.'.:,', 11 
allows us to go a step further and explore the implications ' 
:;; I: I 
of new and different sets of managerial policies and !.~::,:~. I 
procedures. In the next chapter, we will take this further. \'~;\:'~'l 
stt:p, as we explore an array of managerial policies !'\ 1:,> ! 
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the stage for such an analysis, let us explore some of the 
"what-if" questiol1s that DE-A's management, having completed 
the project, might be interested in answering: 
1. What if a different estimation tool was used? In 
DE-A, estimation by NASA's Meta-Model was used as a 
guideline, that was then adjusted on the basis of 
management's experience and judgement. Like NASA, a 
number of other software development organizations have 
developed other quantitative software estimation tools 
e.g., TRW's COCOMO model. How can the applicability of 
such new tools to the NASA environment be evaluated? To 
what extent are such models portable to the NASA 
environment? If not, why not? And how can the 
portability of new estimation models be improved? 
2. What if more/less quality assurance (QA) effort was 
expended? In DE-A, 30-40 % of the development effort 
was allocated to QA activities ••• a level that is 
significantly higher than the indus~ry average. Is this 
an "optimal" allocation? How can we determine what an 
"optimal" allocation is? And what project and 
organizational factors affect such a determination? 
3. What if more people were not added at the final 
stages of the project? Brooks' Law sug~ests that adding 
more people to a late project makes it later. When 
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would the DE-A project have completed had management 
resisted adding more people at DE-A's final stages? 
These are some of the issues we turn to next in Chapter 
,--"  
301' 
V. MODEL BEHAVIOR: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE DYNAMICS OF SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 
V.l. Introduction: 
A system dynamics model is a laboratory tool. It allows 
repeated experimentation with the system; testing. assumptions 
or altering management policies. The purpose is to gain an 
understanding of, and make predictions about, the dynamic 
implications of managerial actions, policies, and procedures. 
The most important advantage of a simulation model ••• 
is its ability to 'play out' the dynamic consequences of 
a given set of assumptions in a way the human mind can 
do neither well nor consistently; a useful model 
produces scenarios which are both realistic and 
explainable in the policymaker's own terminology. In 
addition, a simulation model provides an experimental 
arena for discovering the sources of real-life problems 
and evaluating alternative policy options in relatively 
little time and with little cost. {Quoted from (Homer, 
1983) who references (Forrester,1979) and (Forrester, 
1979b).) 
Using the system dynamics model as an experimentation 
vehicle should be particularly welcomed by the software 
engineering community. Several authors have "complained" 
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about the lack of tested "ideas" in the software engineering 
field (Thayer, 1979), (Weinwurm, 1970). 
(1979) commented: 
For example weiss 
••• in software engineering it is remarkably 
to propose hypotheses and remarkably difficult to 
them. Accordingly, it is useful to seek methods 
testing software engineering hypotheses. 
easy 
test 
for 
Unfortunately, controlled experiments in the area of 
software development tend to be costly and time consuming 
(Myers, 1978). Furthermore," ... the iso'Iation of the 
effect and the evaluation of impact of any given practice 
within a large, complex and dynamic project environment can 
be exceedingly difficult" (Glass, 1982). 
In addition to permitting less-costly and less-time 
consuming experimentation, simulation models make "perfectly" 
controlled experiments possible, which, as the following 
quotation shows, addresses the difficulty expressed by Glass 
above: ' 
The effects of different assumptions and environmental 
factors can be tested. In the model system, unlike real 
systems, the effect of changing one factor can be 
observed while all other factors are held unchanged. 
Such experimentation will yield new insights into the 
characteristics of the system that the model represents. 
By using a model of a complex system, more can be 
learned about internal interactions than would ever be 
possible through manipulation of the real system. 
Internally, the model provides complete control of the 
system organizational structure, its pelicies, and its 
sensitivities to various events. Externally, a wider 
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range of circumstances can be generated than are apt to be observable in real life (Forrester, 1961). 
In this chapter we will use our integrative system 
dynamics model of software project management to 
predict/study the dynamic implications of an array of 
managerial actions, policies, and procedures pertaining to 
the development of software. Four areas will be studied: 
(1) Scheduling; (2) Controlling; (3) Quality Assurance; 
and (4) Staffing. To set the stage for this discussion, we 
will first characterize, in the next section, the software 
project (which we will simply call EXAMPLE) to be used in our 
analysis. 
V. 2. The "EXAMPLE" Software Project: 
The objective of this section is to set up the 
environment within which to conduct our experimentation and 
analysis of the dynamics of software development. To do this 
we will first characterize the "EXAMPLE" software project, 
which . will serve as the prototype project for the 
experiments. We will then run the model to simulate the 
"EXAMPLE" project, and observe its dynamic behavior. The 
behavior of a number of significant project variables (e.g., 
workforce level, schedule completion time, errors, 
productivity, ••• etc~) will be analyzed and explained. 
And we will demonstrate that the model's behavior patterns do 
replicate those reported in the literature. Once this is 
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done, we will then move on to Sections V.3. through V.6., to 
study the dynamic implications of an array of managerial 
actions, policies, and procedures pertaining to the software 
development environment • 
We ~lill define the "EXAMPLE" software project to be 
64,000 DSI in size. DSI stands for "Delivered Source 
Instructions." These are defined as follows (Boehm, 1981): 
Delivered. This term is generally meant to exclude 
nondelivered support software such as test drivers. 
However, if these are developed with the same care as 
delivered software, with their own review, test plans, 
documentation, etc., then they should be included. 
Source Instructions. This term in,~ludes all program 
instructions created by project peraonnel and processed 
into machine code by some combination of preprocessors, 
compilers, and assemblers. It excludes comment cards 
and unmodified utility software. It includes job 
control language, format statements, and data 
declarations. Instructions are defined as lines of code 
or card images. Thus, a'line containing two or more 
source statements counts as one instruction1 a 
five-line data declaration counts as five instructions. 
Recall that in Chapter III, productivity was defined, 
not in terms of DSI/Man-Day, but in terms of Tasks/Man-Day. 
And it was explained then, that the notion of a "Task" is 
tied to that of "Nominal Potential Productivity." 
Specifically, we indicated that "Task" is a unit for sizing 
up a software project, that it is defined in terms of a 
number of DSI, and that its value, for a particular 
simulation, wO.uld be set to the numerical'value of "Nominal 
Potential Productivity," when the latter is expressed in 
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terms of DSI/Man~Days. For example, if "Nominal Potential 
Productivity," for a particular project situation, is, say, 
50 DSI/Man-Day, then the value of "Task" would be set, for 
that particular project situation, to 50 DSI. This would 
then allow us to maintain the value of "Nominal Potential 
Productivity" to , Task/Man-Day, for all project situations. 
Let us provide an example to further clarify the 
concepts of "Nominal Potential Productivity" and "Task." 
Assume two different software development organizations, 
ORG-l and ORG-2, have just completed the development (i.e., 
design and coding) of a software project. The two projects, 
PROJ-l and PROJ-2, are 8000 DSI in size" Now, let us assume 
that in ORG-l the development effort consumed a total of 400 
man~days to design and code the 8000 DSI PROJ-l, while in 
PROJ-2 the development effort was 200 man-days. If, for 
purposes of simplification, we disregard the communication 
and motivation losses in both organizations i.e., assume that 
actual productivity = potential productiv·ity, we could then 
conclude that the potential productivity ill ORG-l is half 
that of ORG-2. (This productivity differential can be due to 
a number of differences between the two organizations, such 
as differences in the availability of software tools, 
personnel capability, computer-hardware characteristics, ... 
etc. ) This productivity differential would be realized in 
the model as follows: The "Nominal Potential Productivity" 
parameter would be defined in both runs of the model at the 
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same value, namely, 1 TaskjMan-Day, but in the PROJ-1 run we 
would define a Task to be 20 DSI, while in the PROJ-2 run a 
"Task" would be set at 40 DSI. That is, the 8000 DSI project 
PROJ-1 will be defined in the first run as a 400 Task 
project, while the 8000 DSI project PROJ-2 would be defined 
as a 200 Task project. 
To determine the value of "Task" in the EXAMPLE project 
we need to do the following: First, select some project 
environment; second, determine the value of "Nominal 
Potential Productivity" in terms of DSI/Man-Day for that 
environment; and finally set the value of "Task" to the 
numerical value of "Nominal Potential Productivity." 
There aren't many project environments that are 
adequately characterized. in the literature. One exception is 
Barry. Boehm's excellent book titled Software Engineering 
Economics, which provides a wealth of data on the software 
production environment at TRW. To maintain consistency, the 
EXAMPLE project will be characterized totally on the basis of 
this TRW data. In particular, we will draw upon Boehm's data 
on the set of projects he described as "the most common type 
of software project: the small-to-medi um size (project) 
developed in a familiar, in-house, organic software 
development environment" (Boehm, 1981). 
For a 64,000 DSI project, Boehm's data indicate that 
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overall project productivity would be approximately 338.4 
DSI/Man-Month. This value is arrived at by dividing the 
project's size in DSI by the total effort expended e.g., to 
develop, QA, rework, and test the software. Boehm's data 
also indicates that system testing would consume 
approximately 22% of the total effort, while the effort 
expended on QA activities would be in the range of 15 - 20% 
of the total effort. No explicit estimates are given, 
however, for the effort to rework errors during development. 
If we assume that this rework effort will be approximately 
10% of total effort, then QA, rework, and testing activities 
would together constitute approximately 50% of the project's 
man-months. (Note: Boehm's data covers the design, coding, 
and system testing stages of software production, as does our 
model.} This means that the amount of effort expended on 
developing the product (e.g., designing and coding it) is 
half the total man-days expended on the project. Which in 
turn means that the development productivity would be 
2 * 338.4 = 676.8 DSI/Man-Month. To translate this into 
DSI/Man-Day we divide by 20,· and get 33.84 DSI!Man-Day. 
This, still, is not the value we are looking fo •• We are 
looking for the "Nominal Potential Productivity" and what we 
have is an estimate for the actual productivity. 
potential productivity is, 
Recall, 
••• the maximum level of productivity that can occur 
when an individual or group employs its funds of 
resources to meet the task demands of a work situation. 
It is the level of productivity that will be attained if 
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the individual or group makes the best possible use 
its resources (that is, if there is no loss 
productivity due to faulty process) (Steiner, 1966). 
of 
of 
As was explained in detail in Chapter III, actual 
productivity rarely equals potential productivity because of 
losses due to communication and motivation problems. These 
losses are captured in the model by the "Multiplier to 
Productivity due to Communication and Motivation Losses." 
Specifically, actual productivity is formulated in the model 
as the product of potential productivity and the "Multiplier 
to Productivity due to Communication and Motivation Losses." 
Thus, if we can estimate the value of this multiplier, we can 
then divide it into the value of actual productivity 
calculated above, to come up with an estimate for EXAMPLE's 
"Nominal Potential Productivity." 
The multiplier is itself a product of two variables, 
namely, the "Actual Fraction of a Man-Day on )?roject" and 
"Communication Overhead." The nominal value of the former 
was set in Chapter III to 0.6 (i.e., a full-time employee' 
allocates, on the average, 60% of his or her time to 
productive work on the project) • The "Communication 
Overhead," on the other hand, was shown to be a function of 
team size. Again, referring to Boehm's results, we find his 
estimate for the "average staffing level" for the 64,pOO DSI 
project, to be approximately 10 people. From Figure 111.15. 
we can then determine that the loss due to "Communication 
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Overhead" will be 6%. Thus, the val
ue of the "Multiplier to 
productivity due to Communication 
and Motivation Losses" 
becomes: 0.6 * (1-.06) = 0.564: 
value of actual productivity (33.84 
By dividing this into the 
DSI/Man-Day) calculated 
above, we come up with the esti
mate for the "Nominal 
Potential Productivity," namely, 3
3.84 / 0.564 = 60 DSI 
Man-Day. 
We said there were three steps to det
ermine the value of 
"Task" in the EXAMPLE proJect. The 
third and final step, is 
to set the value of "Task" to the nu
merical value of "Nominal 
Potential Productivity" when the latt
er is expressed in terms 
of DSljMan-Day. 
defined to be 60 
maintain "Nominal 
Task/Man-Day.) 
Thus, for the 
DSI. (Which" 
Potential 
project EXAMPLE, Task is 
therefore, allows us to 
Productivity" as being 1 
Thus far' we have first defined the 
real size of the 
project EXAMPLE to be 64,000 nSI and second, by
 defining what 
constitutes a Task we have also
 (implicitly) defined the 
project's environment. When any project is
 initialized, 
managerial decisions are made on ho
w much manpower and time 
to allocate to the project. Such decisions ar
e obviously 
important determinants of how th~ p
roject will develop. For 
the project EXAMPLE we must do the same, Le., 
initialize its 
manpower and schedule allocation var
iables. 
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As was stated earlier, in order to' maintain consistency 
in our characterization of the project EXAMPLE, we will 
characterize it totally on the basis of Boehm's TRW data. In 
calculating EXAMPLE's development effort, schedule, and 
staffing level, we will, therefore, use Boehm's COCOMO model. 
COCOMO stands for the Constructive COst MOdel, and is a 
software project estimation model that has been developed and 
is being used by TRW. COCOMO exists in a hierarchy of 
increasingly detailed forms. In our analysis we will use the 
version called "Basic COCOMO," and which, according to Boehm 
(1981) is "the version applicable to the large majority of 
software projects: small-to-medium size (projects) developed 
in a familiar in-house software development environment." 
The development ,period covered by COCOMO estimates 
begins at the beginning G'f the product design phase 
(successful completion of a software requirements review) and 
ends up at the end of the S}3tem testing phase, as does our 
model. The primary input to COCOMO is the Eerceived size of 
the project in KDSI (i.e., thousand delivered source 
instructions). Notice that it is the perceived not the real 
size of the project that is input to COCOMO to derive the 
estimates, since at the beginning of development (when the 
estimates are made) the real size of the project is often not 
known. 
As with other computer-based models, (COCOMO) is a 
'garbage in-garbage out' device: if you put poor sizing 
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(data) in one side, you will receive poor cost estimates out the other side (Boehm, 1981). 
Boehm further suggests (we assume on the basis of his 
TRW experience) that "The software undersizing problem is our 
most critical road block to accurate software cost 
estimation." This is substantiated by the exper.iences of 
several other authors (DeMarco, 1982), (Burchett, 1982), 
(Daly, 1977), (Devenny, 1976) • A major cause for this 
undersizing problem is, 
range 
•. , (the) powerful tendency to focus on the ~ighly visible mainline components of the software, and to underestimate or completely miss the unobtrusive components (e.g., help message processing, error processing, and moving data around) (Boehm,1981). 
But how much undersizing? There is, obviously, a wide 
of "reasonable possibilities." ror the project 
"EXAMPLE" we will assume that management (at the beginning of 
design) underestimates the project's size by a factor of 1.5. 
This value was, again, chosen to conform to Boehm's estimates 
(Boehm, 1981). That is, a project of size N (KDSI) would be 
incorrectly perceived as being only 0.67N (KDSI) in size. In 
terms of our EXAMPLE software project, this means that the 
project would be 'perceived (at the beginning of the 
simulation run) as being only 0.67 * 64 = 42.88 KDSI in size. 
In other words, we will assume that as the project 
EXAMPLE is initialized, project management's perception of 
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the project's size will (incorrectly) be 42,88 KDSI. This 
value then becomes the input that management uses in COCOMO's 
effort and schedule estimation equations. 
The COCOMO equation for the number of man-days (MD) to 
develop and test the project is: 
MD = 2.4 * 19 * (KDSI)1.05 
substituting for the EXAMPLE project we get, 
MD = 2.4 * 19 * (42.88) 1.05 
= 2,359 man-days 
This represents the total man-days to develop and test 
the software product. For planning purposes, this effort is 
then distributed among the project's life cycle phases. In 
our model there are two explicit phases, namely, development 
(which includes design and coding) and testing. So, how much 
would management allocate to development versus testing in 
our EXAMPLE project? Boehm provides a number of phase 
distribution guidelines. He notes (1981): 
The phase distribution varies as a function of size of 
the product. La~ger software projects require 
relatively more time and effort to perform integration 
and test activities ••• 
For a 42 KDSI project (which is what EXAMPLE is 
perceived as being) a development to testing distribution of 
80 to 20% is suggested (Boehm, 1981). That is, we will 
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initialize project EXAMPLE with the following allocation of 
man-days: 
MO for Development 
MO for Testing 
= O.B * 2,359 
= 1887 man-days 
= 0.2 * 2,359 
= 471 man-days 
In addition to estimating the project's man-day 
requirements, management also estimates the project's 
development time and the staffing level. 
The COCOMO equation for the developme~t time (TDEV) is: 
TDEV = 47.5 * (MO/19)o.38 days 
Substituting for the value of man-days (MO), we get 
TDEV = 47.5 * (2,359/19)°·38 
= 296 days 
Finally, the average staffing level (ASL) is determined 
by dividing the estimated value of the total man-days (lro), 
by the estimated value of the development time (TOEV). Thus, 
for project EXAMPLE we get 
ASL = MO / TDEV 
= 2,359 / 296 
= 8 full-time-equivalent software personnel 
We will assume that, on project EXAMPLE, project members 
will be working full-time on the project. That is, the 
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model's parameter "Average Daily Manpower per Staff fi would be 
set to 1 man-day. Thus, the average staffing level 
calculated above would be 8 actua.l software personnel. Not 
all 8 personnel will be on-board, however, at the beginning 
of the p"oject. Most software projects start with a smaller 
core of designers, and as the project develops, the workforce 
slowly builds up to higher levels. For project EXAMPLE, we 
will assume that the project starts with a workforce level 
equal to half the "Average Staffing Level," i.e., with 0.5 * 8 = 4 software personnel on board. (Again, this initial staffing level is based on the results reported in (Boehm, 1981).) 
With the above accomplished, our model initialization procedure is complete. Next, we run the model to simulate project EXAMPLE, and observe its behavior. The remaining part of this section will be devoted to a discussion of the 
model's results. The following will be discussed: 
* Project progress 
* Manpower distribution 
* Work intensity 
Project Prog~~ 
Six kei measures of progress are depicted in Figure V.l, 
namely, cumulative tasks developed (i.e., designed and 
I 
I 
I 
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coded), cumulative tasks tested, cumUlative man-days, the 
perceived job size in tasks, the perceived job si~e in 
man-days, and the scheduled completion date in days. And in 
Table V.l., the project's "Vital Statistics" are shown. 
As was mentioned above, at EXAMPLE's initiation, its 
size is underestimated by a factor of 1.5. That is, instead 
of being perceived as being a 64,000. DSI project, it would be 
perceived as being only 42,880 DSI. In terms of "Tasks" 
(where a "Task" is 60 DSI), the project would be perceived at 
its initiation as being only 714.6 tasks in size, rathe~ than 
1,067 tasks ... its true size. As we have already 
mentioned, the undersizing problem is largely due to the 
tendency to underestimate the size of the unobtrusive 
components of the, softw.are system e.g., help 
processing, error processing, support software, ••• etc. As 
the project develops, such "Undiscovered Job Tasks" are 
progressively discovered as the" ••• level of knowledge we 
have of what the software is intended to do (increases)" 
(Boehm, 1981). Notice, though, that the rate at which the 
"Undiscovered Job Tasks" are discovered remains low for a 
significant portion of the development phase, before it 
starts to accelerate rapidly. (Such behavior was also 
observed in the NASA case study.) The early phase of 
development constitutes the architectural design phase of the 
project. In the architectural design phase, the emphasis is 
on determining the overall structure of the system, 
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9RIGINAi. PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUALITY 
, 
1. Project Si ze 
= 64,000 DSI 
2. Man-Days 
Total 
Development 
= 3,795 
; = 2,681 
Coding + Design = 1,782 
Testing 
3. Completion Time 
4. Errors 
QA 
Rework 
= 
= 
380 
519 
= 1,114 
= 430 
man-days 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
working~days 
Total Error Generated = 1,494 -t- 23 Error/KOSI 
Total Error Caught 
During Development = 728 -to 49% of Error Generated 
TABLE V. I 
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decomposing the system into its major components, and 
specifing the interfaces between the components (Gagliardi, 
1980). At that level, implementation details such as help 
message processing or error processing would (still) not be 
visible. And thus thf~ rate of discovering such "Undiscovered 
(Unobtrusive) Job Tasks" remains low. The rate, however, 
starts to accelerate rapidly as the project work moves into 
the detailed design phase, where the emphasis is on the 
selection, evaluation, and design of the implementation 
algorithms (Gagliardi, 1980). 
As the additional tasks are discovered i.e., as project 
members start realizing that the project's scope is larger 
than what has been expected, adjustments are made in the 
project's plan to accomodate the additional work load. As 
Figure V.l indicates, both the "Job's Size in Man-Days" and 
the "Scheduled Completion Date" are adjusted upwards. There 
are, however, two interesting observations about these 
adjustments. Firstly, the adjustments prove to be inadequate 
to fully accomodate the additional work load, and secondly, 
the first adjustment to the schedule lags considerably behind 
the first adjustment to th~ man-days. 
The additions to the project's man-days and schedule 
that are triggered explicitly by the discovery of new tasks 
level off at approximately day 200 when almost all the 
"Undiscovered Job Tasks" have been discovered. As shown in 
i , 
, 
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Figure V.l., at approximately day 200 the value of perceived 
job size levels off at 1,067 tasks ••• the true size of the 
project. At that point, the project's size in man-days 
plateaus at a value of 3,200 man-days. Howevl~r, notice that 
while the perceived job size remains unchanged after day 200, 
further significant additions are made to the project's 
man-days and its schedule. These further adjustments are not 
trigg'ered the discovery of further "additional tasks" 
(since none are discovered after day 250). Their direct 
cause (as will be explained in more detail later) is the 
realization at approximately day 300 that the project is 
behind schedule i.e., that the "Total Man-Days Reported Still 
Needed" to complete the project is more than "Man-Days 
Remaining" in the project's plan. (Such a shortage in 
man-days can, of course, arise even if the project's size had 
not been underestimated. For example, it would arise if 
management overestimates its staff's productivity, and as a 
result does not allocate enough man-days to the project.) In 
this case, however, the man-day shortage problem is largely 
the indirect result of the project's undersizing problem. 
What happens is that when additional tasks are discovered in 
a software project (as they do up until day 200 in EXAMPLE), 
the additions that are made in the, project's man-days to 
accomodate those additional tasks are often not quite 
sufficient. The reason being that some of the discovered 
tasks are absorbed by the project members without any formal 
adjustments to the project's plans. Only if the additional 
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tasks are perceived as req'uiring a relatively significant 
amount of effort to handle, would project members "bother" to 
go through the trouble of formally developing cost estimates 
and incorporating them in the project's work plan. 
Thu.s, by day 200 when almost all the "Undiscovered Job 
Tasks" have been discovered i.e., when the value of the 
perceived job size attains the job's true size of 1,067 
tasks, the value to which the "Job's Size in Man-Days" would 
be raised, namely, 3,200 man-days, would not be high enough 
to accomodate all the additional tasks. An interesting 
comparison to make, and one which would provide us with some 
feel of how much higher the man-day level should have been 
raised, is to compare the 3,200 man-day value' (which is 
supposedly 
number of 
perceived 
in size. 
enough to develop a 1,067 task 
man-days that would be allocated 
from the start as being 1,067 tasks 
To do this we use COCOMO's man-days 
=2.4 * 19 * (KDSI)1.05 
= 2.4 * 19 * (64)1.05 
= 3,593 man-days 
product) to the 
to a project 
(i.e. , 64 KDSI) 
(MD) I;!r,uation, 
Thus, increasing the number of man-days allocated to the 
project from 2,359 (at the b.:ginning of EXAMPLE) to only 
3,200 (by day 200, when almost all the undiscovered tasks are 
discovered) , falls approximately 400 man-days short of the 
above 3,593 man-days benchmark, a significant deficit in the 
project's man-days budget. 
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When and how is this man-days deficit handled? It is 
handled when it becomes visible. This usually happens (as 
was explained in Chapter III) towards the later stages of 
development when the development work is almost finished 
and/or when the allocated man-days budget is almost used up. 
.Once visible, the man-days deficit would be handled by 
overworking (e.g., the staff members work overtime hours), 
and/or adjusting the project's man-days budget upwards. Both 
of these responses take place in project EXAMPLE, and will be 
discussed in some detail later. (Notice, though, that the 
latter response i.e., adjusting the man-day budget, is 
evident in Figure V.i., as the "Job.' s Size in Man-Days" makes 
a significant upward adjustment at around day 300.) 
The second interesting observation about Figure V.l. 
concerns the adjustments made in the schedule completion 
date. Notice that the first adjustment to the schedule lags 
considerably behind the first adjustment to the man-days. 
(Such behavior was also observed in the NASA case study.) 
Specifically, th~ first adjustment to the "Job's Size in 
Man-Days" is made around day 80, whereas the first adjustment 
to the schedule is made 60 days later, around day 140. Why? 
When the "Job's Size in Man-Days" is adjusted upwards, 
it is done by adjusting the men, the days, or both. That is, 
it is done by adjusting the project's workforce level, the 
project's schedule completion date or both. As was explained 
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in Chapter III. the decisiQn on which alternative to choose 
is really an expression of management's policy on how to 
balance workforce and schedule adjustments throughout the 
project. (A number of different policies will be explored 
later in this chapter.) In general, though, the decision is 
a function of the project's stage of completion. In the 
earlier stages of the project, project managers are generally 
willing to make any necessary adjustments to the workforce 
level to maintain the project on its scheduled course. 
However, as the project proceeds, management becomes 
increasingly reluctant to add new people to the project, as 
consideration is increasingly given to the stability of the 
workforce. As this happens, any additions to the project's 
man-days get absorbed, not only through adjustments to the 
project's workforce level, but, in addition, they get 
absorbed in part by adjustments to the schedule. This shift 
away from workforce adjustments to schedule adjustments 
cOfltinues as the project progresses. 
with this in mind we can now refer back to Figure V.l.,·· 
and explain why the first adjustment to project EXAMPLE's 
schedule completion date lags considerably behind the first 
adjustment to the man-days level. Notice that the first 
adjustment to the project's man-days is made at day 80. At 
that relatively early point, the additional man-days are 
absorbed totally by adding more people to the project, rather 
than by changing the schedule. This can be clearly seen in 
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Figure V.2. The figure depicts EXAMPLE's manpower level for 
the project's full life cycle. And it also sh0ws curve (*), 
which depicts what the manpower level of EXAMPLE would have 
been like (for the first 150 days) if none of the 
"Undiscovered Job Tasks" were ever discovered. Notice that 
the two curves coincide up until day 100 i.e .. , approximately 
40 days after "Undiscovered Job Tasks" are first discovered 
in EXAMPLE. This 40 day delay constitutes the "Hiring Delay" 
in project EXAMPLE. 
As explained above, as the project proceeds management 
becomes increasingly reluctant to add new people to the 
proj·ect. AS,this happens, any additions to the project's 
man-days 
project's 
get absorbed, not only through adjustments to the 
workforce level, but, in addition, they get 
absorbed in part by adjustments to the schedule. Thus, as 
EXAMPLE's man-days level continues to escalate (as a result 
of the continued discovery of new tasks), the point is 
reached (at around day 140) when the project's schedule 
starts absorbing part of the newly added man-days load. 
Notice that the rate at which the sche¢jule is adjust~d 
upwards remains low at fi rst, as most of the emphasis is 
still on adjusting the workforce level. However, as the 
project proceeds, the emphasis shifts away from workforce 
adjustments, and towards schedule adjustments. The result of 
this shift is clearly reflected in the much .faster rate at 
which the project's schedule completion date h; adjusted 
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upwards during the second set of adjustments in the project's 
man-days i.e., that start at around day 300. Notice also 
that during this second adjustment process, adjustments in 
the project's scheduled completion date do n£i lag behind the 
adjustments in man-days i.e., that both start around day 300. 
Manpower Distribution: 
In this section we will discuss, not one, but !~ 
manpower distributions. The first and foremost is, of 
course, the manpower distribution of project EXAMPLE. This 
is depicted in Figure V.2. The shape of EXAMPLE's manpower 
distribution curve shown in the figure conforms well with 
manpower distributions reported in the literature (e.g., see 
(DeMarco, 1982), (Boehm, 1981), and (Basili and Zelkowitz, 
1979». FO.1: example, Figure V. 3. represents the manpower 
distribution at IBM's DP Services organization reported in 
(Albrecht, 1979). 
The second workforce distribution we would like to 
comment on is the one we encountered in the NASA case study. 
For the reader's convenience, the simulated and the actual 
NASA workforce distributions are included below in Figures 
V.4. and V.5. What is interesting about the NASA workforce 
distribution is its non-conformance to the "typical" 
workforce patterns discussed in the literature. And it is 
quite encouraging that the model has proved capable of 
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reproducing both types of distributions. As was' explained in \ 
Chapter IV, the reason why the workforce level in the NASA 
project shoots upwards towards the end of the project has to 
do with NASA's tight scheduling constraints. Because 
software is embedded in a large and expensive space system, 
serious schedule slippages (e.g., that would jeopardize the 
launch date) can not be tolerated. Because of this, when 
software projects are planned, they are not only provided 
with a "Scheduled Completion Date," but, in addition, a 
"Maximum Tolerable Completion Date" is specified. As long as 
the "Ssheduled Completion Date" is below the "Maximum 
Tolerable Completion Date" then decision to adjust the 
schedule, add more people, or do a combination of both will 
continue to be based on the balancing of scheduling and 
workforce stability considerations. However, as the 
"Scheduled Completion Date" starts approaching the "Maximum 
Tolerable Completion Date," as it does in the NASA project, 
pressures develop that override the workforce stability 
considerations. That is, project management becomes 
increasingly willing to "pay any price" necessary to avoid 
overshooting the "Maximum Tolerable Completion Date." And 
this translates, as the results indicate, into a management 
that 'is increasingly willing to hire more people. 
Work Intensity: 
In Chapter III it was explained that the "typical" 8-hr 
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day of a full-time staff member on a software project is not 
entirely devoted to productive project-related work. Time is 
often lost on personal matters, coffee-breaks, non-project 
communication, and other miscellaneous non-project related 
activities. These slack components comprise about 40% of the 
software person's time on the job. 
The loss in productivity due to these slack components 
does not, of course, remain constant at the 40% level 
throughout the life of the project. The motivational effects 
of schedule pressures can push the "Actual Fraction of a 
Man-Day on Project" to both higher (under positive schedule 
pressure) as well as lower (under negative schedule pressure) 
vlllues. 
For example, positive schedule pressures arise whenever 
the project is perceived to be behind schedule. That is, 
whenever the total effort still needed to complete the 
project is perceived to be greater than the total effort 
actually remaining. Such a difference represents a perceived 
shortage in man-days on the project. When confronted with 
such a situation, software developers tend to work harder, 
i.e., allocate more man-hours to the project, in an attempt 
to compensate for the perceived shortage and bring the 
project back on schedule. This would be achieved by first 
compressing the slack time, and then, if needed, by working 
overtime. This then decreases the man-hour lost per-day, 
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while increasing the nA~tual Fractiori of a Man-Day on 
project. n 
The dynamic behavior of the "Actual Fraction of a 
Man-Day on Project" for project EXAMPLE is depicted in Figure 
V.G. Notice that the two "spikes" in overwork occur, in both 
occasions, as an explicit project milestone is approached. 
The first spike occurs towards the end of the development 
phase (which includes both design and coding), and the second 
spike occurs towards the end of the only other explicit 
milestone in our model, the end of the system testing phase. 
This behavior pattern was observed by Boehm, and which he 
labelled as the "Deadline Effect" phenomenon. Figure V.7. 
shows his measured data on two projects with three major 
milestones: a plans and requirements review (PRR); a 
product design review (PDR), and an acceptance test (Boehm, 
1981). It is clear that the Deadline Effect held strongly 
for both projects, generally producing a doubling of effort 
as each milestone is approached. 
With a simulation model (such as ours), one need not 
guess at the cause of, say, a spike in a particular variable. 
simulation experiments isolating and combining the effects of 
suspected factors can precisely pinpoint the mechanism(s) 
responsible. In the remaining part of this section, we will 
make use of this capability to trace out the set of actions 
and reactions that lead to the behavior pattern of ,the 
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~Actual Fraction of a Man-Day on Project" shown in Figure 
V.6. 
As was mentioned under "Project Progress," when project 
EXAMPLE is started, it is incorrectly perceived as being only 
714.6 tasks in size, rather than 1,067 tasks ... its true 
size. As the project develops, and those "Undiscovered Job 
Tasks" are progressively discovered, adjustments are then 
made in the project's man-days budget to accomodate the 
additional work load. However, as has been explained in 
detail, these additional man-day allocations turn out to be 
less that what is actually required. This, therefore, 
creates a man-day shortage in the project. Unfortunately, 
though, such a man-day shortage is not immediately visible. 
In fact, it only becomes visible towards the end of the 
development phase, when the development work is almost 
finished and the allocated man-days budget is almost used up. 
The "Perceived Shortage 
Figure V.B. The shortage 
in Man-Days" is depicted in 
in man-days is first perceived 
quite late in the development phase, at around day lBO. As 
project members perceive the shortage, they react by working 
harder i.e., allocating more man-hours to the project, in an 
attempt to compensate for the perceived shortage and to bring 
the project back on schedule. Working harder translates in 
the model into the higher values of the "Actual Fraction of a 
Man-Day on Project" as shown in Figure V.B. 
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Notice that even though the project members are workin.g 
harder, the shortage in man-days keeps on rising. The reason 
this happens is that as the development phase continues to 
approach its final stages, the degree of visibility increases 
rapidly, exposing even larger man-day shortages. Thus, by 
working harder, project members are in effect only cutting 
into, not eliminating the man-day shortage, whose real 
magnitude is becoming progressively apparent. To appreciate 
the significance of the workforce's contributions, we also 
plotted curve (*) which depicts what the level of the 
"Perceived Shortage in Man-Days" would have been, had the 
project members maintained their normal (lower) work rate. 
Project members would not, however, be willing to 
maintain an above-normal work rate indefinately. Once people 
start working harder, i.e., at a rate above their normal 
rate, their "Overwork Duration Threshold," which (as was' 
explained in Chapter III) at any point in time would 
represent the maximum remaining duration for which they would 
be willing to co~tinue working harder, would decrease. This 
happens because people enjoy their slack time (e.g., coffee 
breaks, social communications, personal business, ••• etc.), 
and they would not tolerate prolonged deprivation of such 
"breathers." Thus a compressed slack-time exhausts them in 
the sense that it cuts into their tolerance level for 
continued hard work since that would mean a continued 
"deprivation" of their slack time. As the "Overwork Duration 
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Threshold" decreases, the maximum amount of man-days of 
backlogged work that the project members would be willing to 
handle (in addition to their planned work) also decreases. 
If this "Maximum Shortage in Man-Days to be Handled" happens 
to drop below the value of the "Perceived Shortage in 
Man-Days," only the maximum value would be handled through 
overwork, while arrangements with project management would be 
made to adjust the project's man-days budget ·so as to handle 
what exceeds the "Maximum Shortage in Man-Days to be 
Handled." 
In project EXAMPLE, this is exactly what happens. That 
is, the persistence of the man-day shortage eventually 
overwhelms the workforce's intensified efforts, and around 
day 300 (Le., at the end of the development phase) 
arrangements with project management are made to hundle those 
remaining sho~tages through adjustments to both the project's 
man-days budget and its schedule. 
The same sequence of' events recur towards the end of the 
system testing phase. As testing progresses the system's 
error proneness becomes relatively more visible, and the 
project members become increasingly more able to perceive how 
productive (in testing) the workforce has actually been. As 
this happens, ~ny shortages in man-days (for the testing 
.phase) become more apparent. As Figure V.B. indicates, in 
project EXAMPLE such shortages are indeed perceived, and at 
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an accelerating rate, starting at day 370. It is interesting 
_,) note, though, that no such shortages weI'e experieO\~ed in 
the NASA project, which, at first sight, seems 
counter-intuitive since in the NASA project only 15% of the 
project's man-days were allocated to the systems testing 
phase, whereas here, in project EXAMPLE, 20% were allocated. 
The answer lies in NASA's exceptionally high expenditures on 
Quality Assurance activities, which, as a fraction of the 
development effort, is almost double that of EXAMPLE. As a 
result, in the NASA project a la~ger fraction of the errors 
is detected early on during the development phase (when--
errors are relatively less costly te detect and correct), 
which of course dramatically reduces the workload of the 
system testing activity. 
Returning to project EXAMPLE and Figure v.B., as the 
man-day shortage is detected, the workforce reacts again by 
working harder i.e., compressing their slack time and 
increasing the "Actual Fraction of a Man-Day on Project," At 
this stage, though, the magnitude of the shortages is not as 
high as those experienced towards the end of the development 
phase. Recall that at the end of development, the man-day 
shortage had to be handled, not only through a surge 'in 
productivity, but also through additions to the project's 
man-days budget. Here, however, the shortage in man-days is 
sufficiently low to be handled solely through this final 
surge in productivity. 
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Conclusion: 
The objective of this section was to define the 
experimental setting within which to conduct our 
experimentation and analysis of the dynamics of software 
development. We first characterized the "EXAMPLE" software 
project, which will serve as the prototype project for the 
experiments. We then ran the model to simulate EXAMPLE and 
observed its behavior. The behavior of a number of project 
variables were presented and explained. And we also 
demonstrated that the model's behavior pattern does replicate 
those repo',ted in the literature. With this done, we are now 
ready to move on to the next three sections, where we use the 
model as a laboratory tool to study the dynamic implications 
of an array of managerial actions, policies, and procedures 
in the four areas of (1) scheduling, (2) controlling, (3) 
quality assurance, and (4) staffing. 
V.3. Software Cost and Schedule Estimation: 
Over the years, estimation of software project 
development time and cost has been an intuitive process. 
Experience and analogy have been used as a basis to develop 
estimates for any given project (Oliver, 1982), (McKeen, 
1981) , (Gehring, 1976) • More recently, a number of 
quantitative goftware estimation models have been dev~loped. 
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They range from highly theoretical ones, such as Putman's 
model (1978), to empirical ones, such as the Walston and 
Felix model (1977), and Boehm's COCOMO model (Boehm, 1981). 
An empirical model uses data from previous projects to 
evaluate the current project and derives the basic formulae 
from analysis of the particular data base available. A 
theoretical model, on the other hand, uses formulae based 
upon global assumptions, such as the rate at which people 
solve problems, the number of problems 
solutions at a given point in time, ••• etc. 
available for 
Still. software cost schedule estimation continues to be 
a major difficulty associated with the management of software 
development (Devenny, 1976), (Distaso, 1980), (Mills, 1976), 
(Pooch and Gehring, 1980), (Yourdon, 1982), (Zelkowitz et aI, 
1979), (Zmud, 1980). "Even today, almost no model can 
estimate the true cost of software with any degree of 
accuracy" (Mohanty, 1981). Farquhar (1970), articulates the 
significance of the issue: 
unable to estimate accurately, the manager can know with certainty neither what resources to commit to an effort nor, in retrospect, how well these resources were used. The lack of a firm foundation for these two judgements can reduce programming management to a random process in that positive control is next to impossible. This situation often results in the budget overruns and schedule slippages that are all too common today. 
A number of reasons for the difficulty have been 
suggested in the literature, including: 
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1. Software development is a process, that is not yet 
fully understood by "estimators" (Myers, 1972), (Oliver, 
1982), (Gehring and Pooch, 1980), (Synnott and Gruber, 
1981), (Pietrasanta, 1968). 
2. ~he phases and functions which comprise the 
software development process are influenced by a large 
number of ill defined variables (Gehring and Pooch, 
1980) , (Devenny, 1976), (Aron, 1976), (Distaso, 1980), 
(Pressman, 1982), (Oliver, 1982). 
3. Most of the activities within the process are 
still primarily human rather than mechanical, and 
therefore prone to all the subjective factors which 
affect human performance (Gehring, and Pooch, 1980), 
(Pressman, 19B2),(Oliver, 1982). 
Identifying the causes of a difficulty or a problem is 
an important first step towards resolving tne difficul';y or 
problem. The next step is to then identify a strategy for 
handling those identified hurdles. For the software 
estimation problem, a strategy that has been frequently 
quoted in the literature was articulated by Pietrasanta more 
than a decade ago: 
The serious student of estimating must first be willing 
to probe deeply into the fascinating and complex system 
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development process, to uncover the phases and functions 
of the process, to highlight the subtle 
interrelationships of the program system being developed 
and the project organization doing ·the developing ••• 
relationships is precisely what is required if estimates 
are ever to be improved. Only then can we do meaningful 
quantitative research and scientific analysis of 
resource requirements (Pietrasanta, 1968). 
Having "probed deeply into the fascinating and complex 
system development process," and captured within our 
integrative system dynamics model (we hope) those "influence 
variables of· software development and their causal 
relationships," we will embark, in this section, on a 
quantitative analysis of software cost and schedule 
estimation. We will conduct three separate experiments. In 
one, we will focus on the most widely used estimation 
technique, namely, estimation by analogy. We will examine 
the long-term implications of using such a method. And we 
will demonstrate how the feedback concept is a useful tool to 
study those long-term dynamic issues. The second feature of 
our modeling approach, namely, its integrative perspective, 
will prove useful in a second experiment, in which we focus 
on the much heralded quantitative estimation tools. We will 
identify a number of managerial and organizational variables 
that the current models fail to "acknowledge," but which 
significantly influence the cost of software development. 
Finally, in the third experiment, we turn our attention from 
the techniques of software estimation, to address a more 
basic issue. It is the issue of estimation accuracy. 
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The above three experiments are discussed next, in 
reverse order. 
V.3.1. On the Accuracy of Software Estimation: 
In this section we will show firstly, why software cost 
estimators should reject the notion that a (new) software 
estimation tool can be adequately judged on the basis of how 
accurately it matches historical project results; and 
secondly, why a more accurate estimate is not necessarily a 
"better" estimate. 
Consider' the fol~owing situation: A 64 KDSI software 
project which has been estimated at its initiation, using an 
estimation method "A," to be 2,359 man-days, ends up actually 
consuming, at its completion, 3,795 man-days. The project's 
characteristics (e.g., its size, complexity, ... etc. ) are 
then fed into another estimation method "B" (e.g., that is 
being considered by management for adoption) and its results 
compared to the project's actual performance. And let us 
assume that method "B" produces a 5,900 man-day estimate. If 
we define "% of relative absolute error" in estimating 
man-days (MO) as, 
% Error 
Then, for estimation method "A," 
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% ErrorA =100 * ABS[3,795-2,359] / 3,795 
=38% 
And for method "B," 
% ErrorB =100 * ABS[3,795-5,900] / 3,795 
=55% 
Question: Can one conclude from this that estimation 
method "B n would have provided a less accurate estimate of 
.the project's man-days, had it been used instead of method 
"An? 
The answer is NO. And the reason why we cannot make 
such a conclusion is that we cannot, and should not, assume, 
that had the project been initiated with B's 5,900 man-day 
estimate, instead of A's 2,359 man-day estimate, that it 
would have still ended up actually consuming exactly 3,795 
man-days. In fact the project could end-up consuming much 
more or much less than 3,795 man-days. And before such a 
deter·mination can be made, no "accurate" assessment of the 
relative accuracy of the two methods can be made. 
The point we are trying to make is this: 
estimate creates a different project. 
a different 
This phenomenon is somewhat analogous to the "General 
Heisenberg" principle in experimentation. The principle is 
( " stated as follows: "When experimenting with the system about 
which we are trying to obtain knowledge, we create a new 
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system" (Koolhass, 1982). Koolhas gives a fine example of 
this: "A man who inquires through the door of the bedroom 
where his friend is sick, How are you? whereupon his friend 
replies Fine, and the effort kills him." 
In an analogous manner, by imposing different estimates 
on a software project we would, in a real 'sense, be creating 
different projects. In the remainder of this discussion we 
will explain how. 
Research fi.ndings clearly indicate that the decisions 
that people make in project situations, and the actions they 
choose to take are significantly influenced by the pressures 
and perceptions produced by the project's schedule (Roberts, 
1981b), (Hart, 1982), (Shooman, 1983), (Gagliardi, 1981), and 
(Brooks, 1978). 
influences. The 
In our 
most 
model, we capture such schedule 
significant of which are depicted in 
the causal loop diagram of Figure V.9. 
Schedules have a direct influence on the hiring and 
firing decisions throughout the life of a software project. 
As was shown earlier in this chapter, in TRW's COCOMO model, 
the project's'staff size is simply determined by dividing the 
man-days estimate (MO) by the development time estimate 
(TDEV). Thus, for example, a tight time schedule (i.e., a 
low TDEV value) means a larger workforce. We also saw how 
scheduling can dramatically change the manpower loading 
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throughout the life of a project. For example, we saw how 
the workforce level shoots upwards towards the end of the 
NASA project (but not in project EXAMPLE), because of NASA's 
strict constraints on the extent to which the project's 
schedule is allowed to slip. 
Through its effects on the workforce level, a project's 
schedule also affects productivity. This happens because a 
higher workforce level, for example, means more communication 
and training overhead, which in turn affects productivity 
negatively. 
As shown in Figure V.g. (and as we explained in detail 
in Chapter III), productivity is also influenced by the 
presence of any meh-day shortages. For example, if the 
project is perceived to be behind schedule i.e., when the 
total effort still needed to complete the proj~ct is 
perceived to be greater than the total effort actually 
remaining in the project's plan, software developers tend to 
work harder i.e., allocate more man-hours to the project, in 
an attempt to compensate for the perceived shortage and to 
bring the project back on schedule. Such man-day shortages 
are, obviously, more prone to occur when the project is 
initially underestimated. Conversely, if project management 
initially over-estimates the project, man-day "excesses" 
could arise. And when the project is perceived to be ahead 
of schedule i.e., when the total man-days remaining in the 
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project's plan exceed what the project members 'perceive is 
needed to complete the project, "Parkinson's Law indicates 
that people will use the extra time for ... personal 
activities, catching up on the mail, etc." (Boehm, 1961). 
Which, of course, means'that they become l~ss productive. 
Having identified how software project estimation can 
influence project behavior, are we now in a position to 
return back to the example we posited at the beginning of 
this section, and answer the still unanswered question, 
namely, whether estimation method "A" is truely more accurate 
than method "E"? 
Identif:ying the feedback relationships through which 
software estimation influences project behavior is one thing, 
and discerning the dynamic implications of such interactions 
on the total system is another. Paraphrasing Richardson and 
pugh (1961), 
The behavior of systems of interconnected feedback loops 
often confounds intuition and analysis, even though the 
dynamic implications of isolated loops may be reasonably 
obvious. 
One option that might be suggested, is to conduct a 
controlled experiment, whereby the 64 KDSI software project 
is conducted twice under exactly the same conditions, except 
that ;n one case it would be initiated with a 2,359 man-day 
estimate (i.e., on the basis of method "A"), and in the 
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second case with a 5,900 man-day estimate (i.e., on t ~ basis 
of method "B"). While theoretically possible, such an option 
is almost infeasible from a practical point of view because 
of its high cost, both in terms of money and time. 
Simulation experimentation provides an, obviously, more 
attractive alternative. In addition to permitting 
less-costly 
simulation 
and less-time-consuming experimentation, 
experimentaion makes "perfectly" controlled 
experiments possible (Forrester, 1961). 
However, rather than conduct a limited experiment simply 
to investigate methods "An and "B," above, we will instead 
conduct a broader experiment that answers a broader set of 
issues that were raised in one of the organizations we 
interviewed in. 
In the particular organization, project managers were 
rewarded on how close their projects met their initially 
estimated man-days budget. The estimation procedure that 
they informally used was as follows: 
1. Use Basic COCOMO to estimate the number of man-days 
(MD). That is, use 
MD = 2.4 * 19 * (KDSI)1.05 man-days 
2. Multiply this estimate by a Safety Factor. The 
safety factor ranged from 25% to 50%. 
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3. Use the new value of man-days (MD') to calculate the 
development time (TDEV) using COCOMO. That is, use 
TDEV = 47.5 * (MD'/19)o.38 days 
It is important to note, before we proceed with our 
experiment, that this "Safety Factor Philosophy" is not, in 
any way, unique to this one organization. For example, in a 
study of the software cost estimation process at the 
Electronic System Division of the'Air Force Systems Command, 
Devenny (1976) found that most program managers budget 
. 
additional funds for software as a "management reserve." He 
also found that these management reserves ranged in size (as 
a percentage of the estimated software cost) from 5% to 50% 
with a mean of 18%. And as was the case in the organization 
we interviewed in, the policy was an informal one: " . . . 
frequently the reserve was created by the program office with 
funds not placed on any particular contract. Most of the 
respondents indicated that the reserve was not identified as 
such to prevent its loss during a budget cut" (Devenny, 
1976) ~ 
To test the efficacy of such an informal policy we will 
run a number of simulations of our prototype project, namely, 
project EXAMPLE, with different values for the Safety Factor. 
We will experiment with values ranging from 0 (i.e., the base 
run) to 100%., For example, for a Safety Factor of 50%, the 
project would be initialized with the following estimates: 
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1. First, calculate MD, 
MD = 2.4 * 19 * (42.88)1.05 = 2,359 man-days 
2. Second, calculate MD' 
MD' =MD * (1+Safety-Factor/100) 
=MD * 1.5 = 3,538.5 man-days 3. Finally, calculate TDEV 
TDEV = 47.5 * (MD'/19)0.3a = 346 days 
The results of the experiment are exhibited in Figures 
V.1D. through V.13. 
In Figure V.1D., the % of the relative error in 
estimating man-days is plotted against different values of 
the Safety Factor. Notice that the "Safety Factor Policy" 
seems to be working. The larger the .Safety Factor the 
smaller the estimation error. In particular, in the 25-50% 
range (which is what was used in the organization) the 
estimation error drop~ from being approximately 40% in the 
base run, to values in the upper twenties. In fact, Figure 
V.1D. suggests that by using a Safety Factor in the 25-50% 
range, the project manager might not be going far enough, 
since a 100% Safety Factor, for example, would drop the 
estimation error down to a "more rewarding" 12%. 
'l'he rational, or the. justification, for using a Safety 
Factor (as provided by our interviewees) is based on the 
following set of assumptions: 
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1. Past experiences indicate a strong bias on the part 
of software developers to underestimate the scope of a 
software project. 
2. "(One) might think that a bias would be the easiest 
kind of estimating problem to rectify, since it involves 
an error that is always in the same direction ••• (But 
biases) are, almost by definition, invisible ... the 
same psychological mechanism (e.g., optimism of software 
developers), that creates the bias works to conceal it" 
(DeMarco, 1982). 
3. To rectify this bias on the part of software 
developers (e.g., systems analysts and designers), 
project management must use a Safety Factor. When the 
... adds a contingency factor (25%? project manager " 
50? 100?) he is, in effect, saying that: 'much more 
is going to happen that I don't know about, so I'll 
estimate the rest as a percentage of tnat which I do 
know something about'" (Pietrasanta, 1968). 
In other words, the assumption is that the Safety Factor 
is simply a mechanism to bring. the initial man-days estimate 
closer to the project's ~ size in man-days ••• as shown 
in Figure V.l1. 
Notice that such an assumption cannot be contested 
solely on the basis of Figure V.l0. which provides only part 
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of the story. A more complete picture is provided by Figure 
V.l2. In the figure we plot the actual man-dElYs that were 
consumed by the project EXAMPLE, when different Safety 
Factors are applied to its initial estimate. The assumption 
of Figure V.ll is obviously invalidated. As higher Safety 
Factors are used, leading to more and more generous initial 
man-day allocations, the actual amount of man-days consumed, 
does not remain at some inherently-defined value. For 
example, in the base run, project EXAMPLE would be initiated 
with a man-day estimate of 2,359 man-days and would end up 
consuming 3,795 man-days. When a Safety Factor of 50% is 
used, i.e., leading to a 3,538 man-day initial estimate, 
EXAMPLE ends up consuming, not 3,795 man-days, but 5,080 
man-days. To reiterate a point made earlier: 
A different estimate creates a different project. 
The reason why this happens (as was explained earlier) 
is that the project's initial estimates create pressures and 
perceptions that affect how people behave on the project. In 
particular, an overestimate of the project's man-days can 
lead to a larjer buildup of the project's workforce, leading 
to higher communication and training overheads, which in turn 
affect productivity negatively. In addition, when a project 
is overestimated, it often leads to an expansion of the 
project members' slack time activities (e.g., non-project 
communicatio~, personal activities, ... etc.), leading to 
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further reductions in productivity. 
Figure V.13. is a plot of "Gross Productivity," which 
is defined as the project size in DSI (i.e., 64,000 DSI) 
divided by the actual number of man-days expended, for the 
different Safety Factor situations. Gross Productivity drops 
from a value of .:.6.8 DSI/Man-Day in the base run, to as low 
as 12 when a 100% Safety Factor is used. Notice that the 
drop in productivity is initially significant, and then 
levels off for higher Safety Factors. The reason for this is 
that when the Safety Factor increases from 0 (i.e., in the 
base run) to say a relatively small value (e.g., 25%) most of 
the man-day excesses that result are absorbed by the 
employees. This happens in two ways, less overworking and 
more slack time. Recall t~at in project EXAMPLE's base run, 
man-day backlogs occurred towards the end of both the 
developm~nt phase and the system testing phase leading to 
periods of overwork. When a small Safety Factor is used, 
however, such backlogs will decrease, leading to less 
overwork durations. As the Safety Factor is increased 
further, man-day excesses, rather than backlogs will result. 
When these excesses are "reasonable" they tend to be largely 
absorbed in the form of reasonably expanded slack activities. 
However, as was explained in detail in Chapter III, there is 
a limit on how much "fat" employees would be, willing, or 
allowed, to absorb. Beyond these limits, man-day excesses 
would be translated into cuts in the project's workforce, 
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schedule, or both. Thus, as the Safety Factor increases to 
larger and larger values, losses in productivity due to the 
expansion of the slack time activities decreases, leading to 
lower and lower drops in Gross Productivity. 
We are now in a position to answer the q:uestion posited 
at the beginning of this discussion. The situation concerned 
a 64 KDSI project which is in fact our own project EXAMPLE, 
and a comparison of two estimation methods. Method "A" 
produces a 2,359 man-day estimate. It is, in other words, 
the estimate used in the base run. Since, project EXAMPLE 
ended up actually consuming 3,795 man-days, the % of relative 
absolute error in estimating man-days is 38%. We then 
questioned whether a new estimation methods "B," which 
produces a 5,900 man-day estimate for project example (i.e., 
an estimate that is 55% higher than EXAMPLE's actual man-day 
expenditures of 3,795), would bave provided a less accurate 
estimate of the project's man-days, had it been used instead 
of method A. 
Notice that method "B's" estimate of 5,900 man-days is 
150% higher than "A's" 2,359 estimate i.e., method "B" is 
eguivalent to a "Safety Factor Policy" in which the Safety 
Factor is set to 150%. To check the behavior of project 
EXAMPLE had it been estimated using Method "B," we re-ran the 
model with an initialized value of the man-days estimate (MD) 
equal to 5,900. The results of the run, together with those 
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of the base case are tabulated below: 
Method "B" Method "A" (Base Run) 
MD EST 5,900 2,359 
MD ACT 5,412. 3,795 
% Error 9 % 38 % 
The results are quite interesting. Method "B" turns out 
to be, in fact, a more accurate estimator. However, the 
improved accuracy is attained at a high cost. The project 
turns out consuming 43% more man-days! 
In terms of the real life organization we interviewed 
in, the message is the same. The "Safety Factor Policy" does 
achieve its intended objective, namely, produces relatively 
more accurate estimates. However, the organization is paying 
dearly for this. As Figure V.12. indicates, a Safety Factor 
in the 25-50 % range results in a 15-35% increase in the 
project's cost in terms of man-days. 
To co~~lude this section, we restate the two basic 
insights we gained: 
1. A different estimate creates a different project. 
The important implication that follows from this is that 
both the project manager as well as the student of 
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software estimation should reject the notion that a new 
software estimation model can be adequately judged on 
the basis of how accurately it can estimate historical 
projects. Because ot the significant influence that a 
schedule has on the behavior of a software project, the 
only real test of an estimation method is to try it. 
2. A more accurate estimate is not necessarily a better 
estimate. An estimation method should not be judged 
only on how accurate it is, but in addition it should be 
judged on how costly the projects it "creates" are. 
V.3.2. On the Portability of the Quantitative Software 
Estimation Models: 
There has been a fair amount of work towards developing 
different kinds of quantitative software estimation models. 
These models vary in what they provide (e.g., total cost, 
manning schedule) and what factors they use to calculate 
their estimates. They also vary with regard to the type of 
formula and parameters they incorporate. In almost all. 
cases, the model is based either directly or indirectly on 
past historical data (Shooman, 1983). Sometimes the 
collected data are translated into tables or graphs 
indicating the productivity (instructions per man-day, 
man~month, or man-year). Another approach is to formulate a 
mathematical function of several parametric model, a 
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variables, suggested by previous experimentation and 
engineering judgement. Statistical techniques are then 
applied to the data in order to reduce the number of model 
variables (analysis of variance and correlation) and to 
compute the constants in the equation (parameter estimation). 
However, "Even today, almost no model can estimate the 
true cost of software with any degree of accuracy" (Mohanty, 
1981). For example, the "Basic COCOMO" estimates come within 
a factor of 1.3 of the actual development figures for the 
projects in the COCOMO data base only 28% of the time, and 
with a factor of 2 only 60% of the time" (Boehm, 1981). The 
1965 SDC model had a standard deviation which was larger than 
the mean estimate (Nelson, 1966). The analysis of the 
IBM-FSD model in (Walston and Felix, 1977) reported a 
standard deviation of a factor of 1.71 (mean of 274 
instructions/man-month; range about the mean of 160-470 
instructions/man-month). 
Furthermore, the portability of such models from the 
companies in which they were developed to another, has proven 
to be poor (Benbasat and Vessey, 1980), (Boehm, 1981), 
(Mohanty, 1981). 
The thesis of this section is that both the accuracy as 
well as the portability of software estimation models can be 
significantly improved by taking into consideration not only 
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the technical aspects of the software development 
environment, as is the case with the current models, but, in 
addition, by accounting for the managerial and organizational 
characteristics of the environment. Specifically, we will 
identify a number of managerial and organizational variables 
that the current models fail to "acknowledge," but which 
significantly influence the cost of software development. 
To set the stage for our analysis, we will first report 
on an interesting experiment by Mohanty (1981), which 
cleverly demonstrates th~ above two weaknesses in the current 
models. 
Mohanty's objective was to examine the extent to which 
the available quantitative software estimation models produce 
the same cost estimate for a given project. The following 
models were included in the exercise: (1) The Farr and 
Zagorski Model1 (2) The Kustanowitz Model 1 (3) The 
Wolverton Model1' (4) The Walston-Felix Model~ (5) The 
Aerospace Model1 (6) The Aaron Model1 (7) The GRC Model1 
(8) The Naval Air Development Center Model 1 (9) The Doty 
Model; (10) The SDC Mode11 (11) The Schneider Model; and 
(12) The Price-S Model; 
In order to fully specify his hypothetical software 
project for the experiment, it was necessary to first 
identify the full set of factors that are collectivelY 
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incorporated in the 12 models. Once this set is identified, 
the software project could then be defined in terms of this 
set of parameters. Forty-nine factors were identified. They 
involved system size, data base, system complexity, type of 
program, documentation, environment (e.g. , requirements 
defini tion, security, and computer access), and an "other" 
category that includes such items as miles traveled, 
reliability, and growth requirements. However, none of the 
cost models described uses all the factors. Cost models 
developed before 1974, for example, emphasized productivity 
without considering the quality of the finished product. 
Newer cost models do consider quality; however, they do not 
include it explicitly. 
AS we said, a hypothetical software project was then 
defined in terms of the identified set of parameters. The 
size of the project was chosen to be 36,000 machine-language 
executable instructions. The resulting 12 cost estimates for 
the project are exhibited in Figure V.14. (Note: the 
estimates cover the design, coding, and testing phases only 
... as does our model.) AS the figure indicates, the 
estimated cost varies from a low of $362,500 (the Farr and 
Zagorski Model) to a high of 2,766,667 (the Kustanowitz 
Model) for the ~ software project. 
Since the size of the project and cost per instruction 
were the same for the different models, the variations in 
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cost are obviously caused by other factors. Two sources of 
variation were suggested by Mohanty. The first related to 
the quality of the final product. For example, when the 
costs of highly reliable software are collected into a cost 
data base, a model that uses this data base will estimate the 
cost of a reliable product. On the other hand, if the data 
base reflects software products with low reliability, any 
model based on it would invariably estimate the cost of a 
less reliable product. Since the cost data bases used in 
developing the cost models are different, embodying software 
with different qualities, one source of var.iation in 
estimated cost is the quality of the final product. 
The second source of variation suggested by Mohanty is 
environmental: 
••• That is, each model was developed for a cost data 
base collected in a given company environment. This 
data base thus embodies the specific nature of the 
organizational problems, work patterns, and management 
approaches and practices. Where this data base is 
regressed to derive coefficients for use in a givp-n 
model, the model reflects that company's environment 
only (Mohanty, 1981). 
This contention, on the significance of the managerial 
and organizational environment, is supported by others in the 
literature [(Tausworthe, 1977), (Bartol and Martin, 1982), 
(Pietrasanta, 1968), and (Clap, 1976)]. A few researchers 
have even suggested some managerial/organizational factors 
which they feel need to be accounted for in software cost 
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estimation. For example, Tausworthe (1977) discusses the 
importance of accounting for manpower turnover, while Clap 
(1976) argues for the consideration of managerial policy on 
both the acquisition of manpower and the distribution of 
effort among the software development activities. 
In the remaining part of this section we will discuss 
the results of a simulation experiment we conducted to 
quantify the impact of four managerial variables on the cost 
of software development. Two of the variables address 
manpower-acquisition and staffing policy issues, while the 
other two concern issues of effort distribution among the 
software development activities. The four variables were 
selected with two criteria in mind. The two criteria were 
proposed in (Boehm and Wolverton, 1980), and they are: (1) 
objectivity and (2) prospectiveness. According to Boehm and 
Wolverton, software cost estimation models should only 
include objective variables to avoid allocating the software 
cost variance to poorly calibrated subjective factors (e.g., 
complexity) • That is, the inclusion of only objective 
variables'makes it harder to manipulate the model to obtain 
any result that one wants. Secondly, a software cost 
estimation model should avoid the use of variables whose 
values cannot be determined until the project is complete. 
First we will examine the impact of each of the four 
variables individually. This will then be followed by an 
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experiment to evaluate the impact of the four variables 
combined. , The result is quite significant: project 
EXAMPLE's cost varies by a factor of two. 
Manpower-Acquisition and Staffinq var,~ables: 
As mentioned above, two model variables that address 
manpower-acquisition type policy issues, will be examined. 
The two model variables are: (1) "Average Daily Manpower per 
Staff," and (2) the "Willingness to Change Workforce." 
Our interviews at GM and Digital, revealed a difference 
in the two organizations' software project staffing policies. 
At GM, project members were assigned full-time to a single 
project (Hisamune, 15), whereas at Digital, it was more 
common to assign software people to more than one project 
(usually two) (Landolfi, 11), (Lombardi, 16). The practice 
of these two types of policy for staffing software projects 
has been aJ"so reported in the literature, e.g., in (Knutson, 
1980). In the'model, this staffirr9 issue is captured, as was 
explained in Chapter III, by the variable "Average Daily 
Manpower per Staff." For example, when project members are 
assigned full-time to the project, the value of the "Average 
Daily Manpower per Staff" would be set to 1 i.e., each 
project member contributes 1 man-day every (working) day to 
the project. On the other hand, if project members assign, 
on the average, only 50% of their time to the project (e. g. , 
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as is the case with the Digital groups we studied), the value 
of the "Average Da~ly Manpower per Staff" would be set to 
0.5. 
To examine the impact of these two different staffing 
policies on project cost, we ran ?roject EXAMPLE twice, in 
the first run the value of the "Average Daily Manpower per 
Staff" was set to 1, and in the second it was set to 0.5. 
And we compared EXAMPLE's cost under the two policies. The 
measure of project cost we will use is simply the value of 
the total number of man-days expended to complete the 
project. The results were as follows: 
Average Daily Manpower per Staff 
1.0 
0.5 
Man-Da'ys 
3,795 
4,641 
In other words, the policy of allocating project members 
half-time (on the average) to the project results in a cost 
that is 22% higher. And the r.eason for this increase in cost 
is two-fold. First, there is a loss in productivity due to 
the increased communication overhead. This factor accounts 
for approximately 90% of the increase in the project's cost. 
As was explained earlier, the aver.age staffing level of a 
project (in terms of full-time. equivalent employees) is 
determined by dividing the estimated value of the projects 
development time, i.e., 
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Staffing Level = MD / TDEV full-time equiv. employees 
If the "Average Daily Manpower per Staff" is less than 
1, adjustments would then be made to determine the actual 
number of employees needed. For example, if MD = 1000 
msn-days and TDEV = 200 days, the average staffing level in 
terms of full-time equivalent employees would be 5. And if 
employees w,ill be assigned only half-time, on the average, to 
the project, then the actual staffing level would be 10 
employees. Having 10 people involved in developing the 
system rather than 5 increases the communication overhead in 
the project, and, therefore, decreases the group's overall 
productivity. As was explained in detail in Chapter III, the 
productivity loss takes two forms. First, more time is lost 
on human communication, e.g., to resolve questions about 
design, testing, . , . etc • (Tausworthe, 1977). Secondly, 
the amount of work itself usually increases e.g., in the form 
of more documentation, more modules and interfaces, .,. etc. 
(Gagliardi, 19B1), (Conway, 196B). 
The second reason why the cost increases is because of 
an increase in the training overhead. This second factor 
accounts for the remaining 10% of the increase in the 
project's cost. Again, as was explained in detail in Chapter 
III, when new project members are recruited (from within the 
organization or from the outside), they pass through a 
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project orientation'period (Brooks, 1974) e.g., to learn the 
project's ground rules, the goals of the effort, the plan of 
the work, and all the details of the system (GRC, 1977), 
(Thayer and Lehman, 19'77). This training of newcomers, is 
usually carried out by the "old timers" (Tanniru, et al., 
1981), (GRC, 1977), (Winrow, 1962), (Corbato and Clingen, 
1976). This training overhead is, of course, costly, because 
"while (the oldtimer) is helping the new employee learn the 
job, his own productivity on his other work is reduced" 
(Canning, 1977). This training overhead is a function of the 
number of newcomers, ~ of the number of ~quivalent 
full-time neWCOl)lers (Brooks, .1975). For example, in (Gordon 
and Lamb, 1977) when project members were assigned half-time 
on the project, the team size was doubled, and as a result 
the. training overhead also doubled. When the "Average Daily 
Manpower pel." Staff" is, therefore, less than 1, a larger 
training overhead will be incurred, because as was shown 
above, it would mean a larger workforce buildup in terms of 
actual employees. 
The second manpower-acquisition variable we examined is 
the "Willingness to Change Workforce." In Chapter III we 
made the following note about the "Willingness to Change 
Workforce:" 
that the variable 
an expression of a 
Thus, a range of 
It is important to realize 
'Willingness to Change Workforce' is 
policf for managing projects. 
functlons are possible here, capturing different 
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for how to balance workforce and schedule 
throughout the project to minimize overruns 
Our objective now is to examine the sensitivity of the 
project's cost to this policy variable. In particular, we 
will examine two different policies that lie at different 
sides of the base case policy i.e., the one explained in 
Chapter I II. 
The first manpower acquisition policy, we'll call it 
policy (A), can be defined as follows: At the initiation of 
the project estimates are made for the project's total effort 
in man-days (MO), and its development time (TDEV). Based on 
this, the project's desired staffing level is determined 
i.e., by dividing MO by TDEV. People are hired, 
complementing the core of project members on hand at the 
initiation of the project, until the desired staffing level 
is reached. Once reached, the workforce is maintained at 
that level. That is, new people would be hired only to 
replace either those who quit or are transferred out. 
Such a policy was reported by Devenny (1976), in his 
study of software cost estimation at the Electronic Systems 
Division of the Air Force Systems Command. He observed: 
The data indicate that none of the ten contractors ever 
significantly altered the size of the original software 
team. The contractor will normally keep the initially 
formed team working until the software is eventually 
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completed. 
In terms of project EXAMPLE, this policy will be 
implemented as follows: Estimates for the total effort in 
man-days, the development time, and the staffing level will 
be calculated exactly as we did before in Section V.2. These 
values turn out, respectively, to be 2,359 man~days, 296 
days, and B people. We will also continue to assume that at 
the project's initiation only half the desired number of 
people (i. e., 4) will be actually on boat"d. To achieve the 
desired staffing level of B people, 4 more people will then 
be recruited into the project. Once, that desired level is 
achieved, it is maintained until the end of the project. 
That is, new people would be hired only to replace those who 
either quit or are transferred out. 
The result of this policy, together, with that of the 
base run, are tabulated below: 
Manpower Acquisition Policy 
Base Case 
A 
Man-Days 
3,795 
3,559 
Duration 
430 
488 
As the figures indicate, Policy (A) leads to a 6% drop 
in cost (i.e., below the base case). Notice, however, that 
this is achieved at the cost of a larger schedule slip. 
Under Policy (A), project EXAMPLE takes 13.5% more time to 
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complete (i.e., over the base case). Whether this tradeoff 
is made explicitly and willingly by the Electronic Systems 
Division contractors is not clear. However, by foregoing the 
flexibility of adjusting the workforce level to account for 
any initial errors in estimating the scope of the project, 
the policy leaves little room to. handle any initial 
under-estimate but to translate them into a software schedule 
slip. (Remember, project EXAMPLE's size is initially 
underestimated by 33%, i.e., it is initially perceived as 
being 42.BB KDSI in size, rather than being 64 KDSI, its true 
size. ) I n the base case, on the other hand, ~lhen the 
project's "Undiscovered Job Tasks" are prog!:'essively 
discovered i.e., as project management comes to realize that 
the project's scope is larger than what has been expected, 
adjustments are made (as we explained in datail in Section 
V.2.) not only to the schedule, but to the workforce level 
as well. 
The point here is not to decide which policy is better, 
since this can only be evaluated on the basis of what an 
organization's objectives are, but merely to point out that 
the.different policies do impact what the project's cost will 
end up being, and should, therefore, be explicitly considered 
when project cost estimates are ~ad~. 
Under the second manpower acquisition policy we will 
examine, call it policy (B), project management is not only 
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willing to adjust the workforce level to account for any 
initial underestimation error, but it is willing to continue 
making such adjustments further into the project's life cycle 
(that is, further than in the base case). 
In the base case (and based on discussions with 
(Lombardi, 23) , (Garett, 24) and (Nichols, 25», the 
"Willingness to Change Workforce" was formulated in terms of 
the sum of the "Hiring Delay" and the "Average Assimilation 
Delay." Specifically, in the early stages of the project 
when "Time Remaining" would generally be much larger than the 
sum of the "Hiring Delay" and the "Average Assimilation 
Delay" management would be willing to adjust the workforce 
level to meet the project's scheduled completion date. As 
the number of days perceived remaining drops below 
1.5 * (Hiring Delay + Average Assimilation Delay), though, 
management starts becoming reluctant, and increasingly so, to 
increase the workforce level. For example if the "Hiring 
Delay" is 40 working days and the "Average Assimilation 
Delay" is 80 days, then as "Time Remaining" drops below 180 
days, management, in the base case, starts becoming reluctant 
to hire new people, even though the time and effort perceived 
remaining might imply that more people are needed. The 
reluctance stems from the realization that most of those 
remaining 180 days, would be "wasted" in the hiring process 
and then in acquainting the new people with the mechanics of 
the project, in integrating them into the project team, and 
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in training them in the necessary technical areas. And when 
the "Time Remaining" drops below 0.3 * (Hiring Delay + 
Average Assimilation Delay), no more addition'would be made 
to the project's workforce i.e., the hiring rate will fall to 
zero. Thus, at that stage, if the project is 
schedule, project management would be coping only by 
back the schedule completion date. 
behind 
pushing 
As has been repeatedly, stressed, while the above 
formulation does express (what we feel is) a representitive 
policy for manpower acquisition, it 'is by no means the only 
policy. A range of policies are possible here, capturing 
different strategies for how to balance workforce and 
schedule adjustments throughout the project to minimize 
overruns costs. 
Policy (B) is one such policy. It is adopted by (at 
least) one group ,in a Massachusetts-based software 
development/consulting company. Policy (B) is similar in 
structure to the policy above, the only difference is that 
the "Willingness to Change Workforce" is formulated in terms 
of just the "Hiring Delay." This, of course, means that 
policy (B) is a more aggressive policy in terms of acquiring 
people. For example, while in the base case policy, 
management starts becoming reluctant to increase the 
workforce level when the perceived number of days remaining 
to complete the project drops below 1.5 * (Hiring Delay + 
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Average Assimilation Delay), i.e., below 1.5 * (40+80) = 180 
days, under policy (B) this happens much further into the 
project's life cycle, i.e., when only 1.5 * 40 = 60 working 
days are perceived remaining. {This aggressive manpower 
acquisition policy, is justified, we were told, because the 
firm is experiencing an impressive growth rate, fueled by a 
sizable backlog of client assignments. Hiring new people to 
a project that is "winding down" is, therefore, not 
inhibitted by management since securing the future 
utilization of the new people is almost always guaranteed.} 
The WCWF-l table function for policy (B) is shown in Figure 
V.15. It has exactly the same form as that of the base case 
(shown in Figure 111.34.), the only difference is that the 
denominator of the x-axis is simply the "Hiring Delay" rather 
than being the sum of the "Hiring delay" and the "Aver.age 
Assimilation Delay." 
The result of adopting such a policy in project EXAMPLE 
is shown below, togetner with the results of both the base 
case and policy (A). 
Manpower ACquisition Policy 
Base Case 
A 
B 
Man-Days 
3,795 
3,559 
4,321.5 
Duration 
430 
488 
373 
As the figures indicate, policy {B)'s cost is 14% higher 
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than the base case, and 21% higher than that of policy (A). 
On the other hand, under policy (B), the project takes 13% 
less time to complete than the base case, and almost 25% less 
t5.me than when policy (A) is used. Both the increase in the: 
cost and the decrease in the duration can be attributed to a 
single cause, namely, a higher workforce level. More people 
on the project means more work can be done faster. It also 
means that the project team's overall productivity would be 
lower because of the increased communication and training 
overheads. 
Once again, it is important to reiterate that the 
objective of this exercise is not to decide which policy is 
better, since this can only be decided on the basis of what 
an organization's objectives are, but merely to establish 
that manpower acquisition policy does have an impact on what 
the project's costs will end up being, and should, therefore, 
be explicitly considered when project cost estimates are 
made. 
From a pragmatic point of view, establishing the 
significance of a particular factor for cost estimation 
purposes is not enough. The factor must also be quantified, 
before it can be used in a quantitative cost estimation 
model. For example, paraphrasing Clapp (1976): 
variables used in cost estimation tend to be those which 
are easier to measure, quantify, and estimate, even if 
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they are not the most significant. 
We feel that our "Willingness to Change Workforc~" table 
function formulation does provide the software engineering 
communi ty with a valid measure of manpowe'r acquisition policy 
that is also easy to measure. We must note, however, that 
this measure if; not an original ona, for it has been 
previously used in other System Dynamics models e.g., of R&D 
project management (Roberts, 1964). Our role, here, is, 
therefore, that of transferring a useful idea from the System 
Dynamics field to the software enginee.ing community. 
A final note. Notice that our results above seem to 
contradict Brooks' Law, which states that "Adding manpower to 
a late software project makes it later" (Brooks, 1978). The 
most aggressive of the three policies in terms of adding 
manpower, namely, policy (B), actually leads to the earliest 
completion date. What our results indicate is that "adding 
manpower to a late software project makes it more costly." 
More on this later in this chapter. 
We turn next to the second category of variables, those 
addressing issues of effort distribution among the software 
development activity. 
Effort Distribution Variables: 
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In planning a software project, management does not only 
provide estimates for the project's total man-days 
expenditure, it in addition plans the distribution of this 
total effort among the project's phases (McKeen, 1983), 
(Davis, 1974), (Gunther, 1978). Numerous authors have 
presented figures indicating life cycle resource 
distributions among phases. In some cases the source of 
, 
their information has been reported1 in most instances, it 
has gone unreported causing some difficulty with 
interpretation and application. In Figure '11'.16. a 
comparison of three authors' results, done by McKeen (1981), 
indicates that substantial differences do exist particularly 
in the coding and testing phases of development. Commenting 
on the situation, McKeen (1981) wrote: 
A major conclusion ••• is that we do not possess an 
adequate understanding of resource consumption behavior 
over the life cycle development phases. 
In McKeen's own research work, he studied 32 software 
development projects. He found "no real support ••• for 
'typical' or 'dominant' development profiles at all" (McKeen, 
1981) • 
In this section, it is our objective to enhance our 
understanding of the "resource consumption behavior." In 
particular, we will investigate the impact of planned effort 
distribution among the project's phases on pr~ject cost. 
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Thibodeau and Dodson (1978) were the first to 
hypothesize the existance of such an impact: 
Past attempts to establish mathematical expressions that can predict the life cycle cost components for software systems have achieved only qualified success. The mathematical models for these relationships included only variables that describe the software characteristics and related environmental factors. This paper presents the hypothesis that software cost estimating relationships must include the effects of resources consumed in one life cycle phase on other phases. Such a model is difficult to validate. This is primarily due to the need for greater quantities of data of greater precision than is usually available. 
In our view, the difficulty arises because of the 
phenomenon. we discussed in detail in Section V.3.1., namely, 
that a different project estimate creates a different 
project, While, all the arguments we presented in Section 
V.3.1. were in terms of a project's total effort estimate, 
they do equally apply to estimates at the phase level. We 
can, therefore, restate the above assertion as follows: A 
different distribution of estimated effort among ~ project's 
phases creates ~ different project. And because of this, the 
impact of different effort distributions on the cost of a 
particular software project can only be determined by 
repeating the particular project under controlled conditions 
in which only the distribution of estimated effort among the 
project's phases would be allowed to change. 
In the remainder of this section we will use the model 
to conduct an experiment using our prototype project EXAMPLE 
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to examine the impact of the distribution of effort among the 
project's activities on project cost. Again remember the 
objective of this exercise is not to determine what the 
optimal effort distribution is, but rather to establish that 
effort distribution decisions do have an impact em what the 
project's cost will end up being, and should, therefore, be 
explicitly considered when project cost estimates are made. 
(Optimal effort distributions will be examined in another 
experiment later in this chapter.) 
The model has two effort distribution parameters. The 
first parameter allocates the project's estimated man-days 
among the model's two explici~ phases, namely, development 
(which includes design and coding) and system testing. In 
the base case 80% of the effort is allocated to development. 
and 20% to testing. The second effort distribution parameter 
is the nPlanned Fraction of Manpower for QA,n which is set to 
15%. That is, 15% of the development. effort is planned for 
QA activities during the design and coding stages. As was 
explained in Section V.2., these values were selected to 
conform to the TRW softw~re development environment. 
The selection of another effort distribution profile to 
experiment with and compare to the base case distribution 
was, in a sense, both easy and difficult~ It was easy, 
because there was a larg.e number of candidate profiles. As 
the remarks in the beginning of this discussion indicate, 
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there is a wide range of effort distribution profiles 
reported in the literature. However, the selection of an 
effort distribution profile was difficult, because, of the 
many that are reported, none seemed to be "typical" or 
"domioant" (e.g., as McKeen's (1981) study indicates). We 
finally decided to make our selection on the basis of our own 
data i.e., the data collected in our interviews. And from 
this we selected the case which we felt would provide the 
most interest. It involved one group at GM using the 
40-20-40 effort distribution profile i . e. , 40% for 
preliminary and detailed design, 20% for coding, and 40% for 
testing. We feel that this particular profile would interest 
many in the software engineering area because of the fact 
that this 40-20-40 rule is perhaps the most widely touted 
rule-of-thumb on the distribution of effort among the phases 
of software development projects (McKeen, 1981), (Bruce and 
pederson, 1982), (Oliver, 1982), (Jensen and Tonies, 1979). 
In terms of our model's effort distribution parameter 
this translates into a 60-40 distribution. That is, 60% of 
the total man-days would be allocated to development (i.e., 
design and coding) and 40% to system testing. As for the QA 
effort, the GM group allocated to i.t 20% of their development 
effort. This translates into a 0.20 value for the models 
"Planned Fraction of Manpower for QA.fi 
The result of running project EXAMPLE with this new 
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effort distribution profile, call it (C), were as follows: 
Effort Distribution Profile Man-Days 
Base Case 
C 
3,795 
4,442.5 
Thus, a change in project EXAMPLE's effort distribution 
profile from the base case to profile (C) leads to a 17% 
increase in cost. Four factors contributed to this increase 
in cost. The first obvious one is the (planned) increase in 
the QA effort. Secondly, and as a result of this increased 
QA effort, more errors were detected during development 
leading to a larger rework effort expenditure. Thirdly, the 
cost of development increased. The reason for this is, 
however, less obvious. Recall the sequence of steps followed 
in planning a project's various activities. First, total 
man-days is determined. Based on this total value, the 
project's schedule is calculated. Allocations to the 
development ve~~us testing activities are then made. What 
this means is that, since this run's total man-day estimate 
is the same as that of the base case, the scheduled duration 
would also be the same in both cases. However, since in the 
current case a lower fraction of the manpower is devoted to 
development work, a larger team will be required to meet the 
schedule. A larger team means larger training and 
communication overheads, and hence the larger development 
cost. The fourth, and final factor, is an increase in the 
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testing effort. Notice that the testing effort increases 
(i.e., over the base-case situation) even though it "should" 
be lower. It should be lower because more effort was devoted 
to QA leading to the detection of a larger fraction of the 
errors. The testing effort increases inspi te ·of a lower 
testing workload (because of the lower errors) because of a 
lower testing productivity. In the base-case, project 
members had to over-work during the testing phase, because 
there were more errors and less time. In the current case, 
on the other hand, there is more time, and the work expands 
to fill it. 
What the above suggests, is that (for an EXAMPLE-type 
software project) if 40% of development effort is allocated 
to the testing phase, a 20% allocation to QA would be 
excessive. Or conversely, for a 20% allocation to QA, a 40% 
testing phase is excessive. What is more interesting, and 
would be more useful, to determine, of course, is the 
"optimal" combination. This will be investigated in Section 
V.6. 
A Final Experiment: 
O\lr objective in this section was to demonstrclte the 
significant impact of a number of managerial variables on the 
cost of software developemt. We examined four managerial 
variables. Two variables related to the acquisition and 
() 
~:t},1 
~I 
" 
.. '. 
i i t)I 
J ' 
I 
~ 
:i 
( 
385 
staffing of the pro~ect's workforce, namely, the "Average 
Daily Manpower per Staff" and the "Willingness to change 
r7orkforce. " The other two variables concerned the 
distribtition of effort among the project's different 
activities i . e. I development, testing, and QA. The 
individual impact of the differ.ent variables on the project's 
cost was evaluated in separate experiments (except for the 2 
effort distribution variables which were tested together). 
The results indicate that, individually, the variables can 
make as much as a 20% difference in project EXAMPLE's total 
cost (in man-days). What we would like to evaluate next, in 
this final experiment, is the combined effect of the four 
managerial variables on cost. 
This is achieved by re-running project EXAMPLE with the 
following four adjustments: 
1. Set the value of the "Average Daily Manpower per 
Staff" to 0.5. (The base-case value is 1.) 
2. The "Willingness to Change Workforce" is formulated 
in terms of the "Hiring Delay," yielding a more 
aggressive manpower acquisition policy. (In the 
base-case it is formulated in terms of the (Hiring Delay 
+ Average Assimilation Delay).) 
3. Allocation of effort among. the development and 
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testing phases is set at 60% development and 40% '.i 
testing. (In the base case it is 80-20.) 
4. The "Planned Fraction of Manpower for QA" is set at 
20%. (In the base-case it is 15%.) 
The result of running project EXAMPLE with this 
different set of managerial policies is a total cost of 7,316 
man-days. That is, ~ £.£2i that is almost double ~ 
base-case cost of 3 z795 man-days. 
The implication of this significant result is clear: 
Because the above four managerial policies do vary from 
software development organization to another, the portability 
of software co~t estimation models can be improved 
significantly if such variables are accounted for. Recall 
Mohanty's (1981) comments: 
••• each {cost estimation) model was developed for a cost data base collected in a given company environment. This data base thus embodies the specific nature of the organizational problems, work patterns, and management approaches and practices. When this data base is regressed to derive coefficients for use in a given model, .the model reflects that company's environment only. 
Heretofore, the impact that a companY's'managerial 
environment can have on the software development has not be 
quantified. We feel that our work can be useful in three 
aspects. First, we have established that the impact is a 
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significant one i.e., we have shown that the effect of four 
managerial variables can modify the cost of a software 
project by a factor of 2. Second, by quantifying the impact, 
we are making it harder on the software engineering community 
to ignore the issue. And, finally, we have identified four 
aspects of a company's managerial environment that are 
significant determinants of software development cost, and 
which are, therefore, deserving of future research efforts. 
V.3.3. On the Analogy Method of Software Estimation: 
While in the previous section our focus was on the 
state-of-the-art software estimation 'methods,. namely, the 
quantitative models, in this section we turn our attention to 
the "state of the practice." In this section we focus on 
"Estimation by Analogy," probably the most commonly used 
method to estimate software projects. 
Estimation by analogy is defined as follows: 
Estim~tion by analogy involves reasoning by analogy with one or more completed projects to relate their actual costs to an estimate of the cost of a similar new project (Boehm, 1981). 
To employ this method at least one project with features must have been completed previously. project must be c1early specified at least functional levei, permitting comparison of elements (Benbasat and Vessey, 1980). 
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According to Aron of IBM, when methods of estimating are 
ranked, the list is headed by the analogy method (Aron, 
1976). More recently, Oliver (1982) wrote: "The most common 
technique on making operational estimates is ,the use of 
experience gained on one or more similar projects." These 
assertions are supported by at least one empirical study. In 
his Ph.D. dissertation, Thayer (1979) surveyed 60 software 
development projects in the aerospace industry, and found 
that the analogy method was used in 60% of the cases, making 
it, by far, the most common estimation method used. 
In the previous sections, we argued that software 
project estimation affects project behavior. That a 
project's estimate creates pressures and perceptions that 
directly influence the decisions that people ma~e, and the 
actions they choose to take, throughout the project's life 
cycle. For example, the causal loop diagram of Figure V.l7. 
depicts the influence of project estimation on hiring/firing 
decisions, perceived project status, and productivity. What 
this implies for the use of analogy in estimation, is the 
existence of a feedback loop (see Figure V.18.): The 
estimation by analogy method produces project estimates and 
schedules, which affect the decisions and actions of the 
technical performers and their managers, which in turn affect 
work performance, which would then eventually influence 
future estimations. 
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But what does the existence of such a feedback J,oop 
mean? Is it good or bad? These are some of the questions 
which we will attempt to answer in this ~ection's simulation 
experiment. 
The experiment involves a hypothetical situation in 
which a company undertakes a sequence of five identical 
software projects, all identical to project EXAMPLE, our 
prototype project. On the first such project, and let us 
call it EXAMPLE1, the company (lacking the benefit of 
previous experience) underestimates the size of the project 
by 33%, that is, estimates the project's size to be only 
48.22 KDSI, i.e., as in project EXAMPLE's base-case. And let 
us also assume that the base-case estimates for the project's 
man-days and duration were the estimates used in EXAMPLE1. 
That is, the project's man-days are estimated to be 2,359, 
and its development time is estimated to be 296 working days. 
In other words, EXAMPLEl is conducted under our base case 
conditions. 
As our base case analysis of Section V.2. indicates, 
EXAMPLEl will end up actually consuming 3,795 man-days, and 
will be completed in 430 working days', After completing 
EXAMPLE1, the following is, therefore, learned: 
* project EXAMPLEl is really 64 (and not 42.88) KDSI. 
* It consumes 3,795 man-days. 
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* It takes 430 days to complete. 
Some time later, when project EXAMPLE2 (which is 
identical to EXAMPLE1) comes along, project management will 
be in a better position to estimate its true size. In fact, 
we will assume that EXAMPLE2's size will be estimated 
perfectly, that is, to be 64 KDSI. Furthermore, realizing 
the analogy between the two projects, EXAMPLE1 and EXAMPLE2, 
management will estimate EXAMPLE2's man-days and duration to 
be 3,795 man--days and 430 days respectively i.e., the actual 
values for EXAMPLE1. Based on these figures, management 
estimates that a staff size of 3,795/430=9 (approx) full-time 
equivalent people will be required. 
Conducting project EXAMPLE 2 under such circumstances 
produces the following results: actual man-days expended = 
3,787, and actual duration = 454 days. That is, while the 
project is almost perfectly on target in terms of the man-day 
expenditures, it still finishes late, approximately 6% beyond 
the "improved" schedule. 
This result is not only surprising, it is also 
disturbing, the reason being that project EXAMPLE2 over-runs 
what amounts to be a "perfect" schedule estimate. And when 
we repeated the above sequence of actions and reactions three 
more times for projects EXAMPLE 3 through EXAMPLE5, this 
surprising behavior persisted. That is, the schedule was 
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overrun in each case. As a result, project management 
started each project (e.g., EXAMPLEi) with a slightly longer 
scheduled duration than the previous one (i.e., EXAMPLEi-l). 
However, EXAMPLEi would still overrun its schedule, which 
caused management to use an even longer schedule duration for 
the next project. The results for the five simulation runs 
are shown in Figure V.l9. 
It is important to pause here, and make one important 
clarification. The objective of this experiment is £2l to 
investigate the behavior of a sequence of five identical 
so,ftware projects! Such a scenario is admitt'edly unrealistic 
(recall that we carefully labelled our experiment as being 
hypothetical). Choosing to conduct such an "unreasonable" 
,experiment, and being able to do so, is, however, one of the 
strengths of simulation modeling. For it allows us to 
conduct experimentation with absolute control over variables. 
Remember, our objective is to study the effects of using 
analogy in estimation on the management of software projects, 
and the effects of that on future scheduling. And only that. 
Studying such relationships in a setting where projects and 
managers vary (albeit more realistic) can only and 
unnecessarily confuse the issues and complicate the analysis. 
For example, in our experiment when project EXAMPLE2 
overruns, we can definitively rule out under-scheduling as a 
cause, and instead look for a "better" explanation. If, 
however, EXAMPLE 2 had not been identical to EXAMPLEl, we 
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would not have been able to make such an argument. Instead 
we would have had to make unnecessary diversions, e.g., to 
investigate the 
projects. 
differences in scope between the two 
with this in mind, we can now proceed to interpret the 
experiment's results. There are two. First, there appears 
to be inherent factors in the management of a software 
project that would cause it to over-run even what amounts to 
a "perfect" schedule estimate. The second, more interesting 
finding, is that because of this inherent tendency to 
overshoot, the use of the analogy method in estimating would 
inject a bias in the scheduling process, a bias that 
generates in the long-run longer (than necessary) project 
schedules • 
. Concerning the first result, we have already noted that 
project EXAMPLE2 over-runs a schedule that was perfectly 
adequate to complete EXAMPLE1, which is a project identical 
to it (i.e., to EXAMPLE2). Through further experimentation 
with the model, it was possIble to isolate the real cause of 
this persisting schedule-overrun problem. It turned out to 
be a consequence of the interaction of two factors, the 
manpower-acquisition policy and the turnover of project 
personnel. 
As was explained in detail in Chapter III, in the 
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earlier stages of the project, the staffing of the project is 
maintained at that level which is perceived to be necessary 
and sufficient ~o complete the project on time i.e., on its 
(current) scheduled completion date. As the project proceeds 
towards its final stages, howe'.rer, project management becomes 
increasingly reluctant to hire new people. This reluctance 
stems from the realization that most of the time remaining on 
the project would be "wasted" in the hiring proces and then 
in acquainting the new people with the mechanics of the 
project, in integrating them into the project team, and in 
training them in the necessary technical areas. If at that 
stage, the project runs into schedule problems, management 
would react, not by adding more people, but rather by pushing 
the schedule completion date back. \ ) 
A project runs into scheduling problems whenever the 
"man-Days Perceived Still Needed" to complete the projec't 
exceeds the "man-Days Remaining." In previous sections we 
discussed how this can develop due to an increase in the 
former. For example, if the project's was 
under-estimated, the value of the "Man-Days Perceived Still 
Needed" could rise as the undiscovered tasks are discovered. 
In our current situation (e.g., in project ZXAMPLE2), though, 
this will not occur. Remember, we are assuming that the 
experience gained on project EXAMPLEl will lead to a 
"perfect" estimate of EXAMPLE2' s size._ What can happen, 
however, is that the value of the "Man-Days Remaining" for 
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project EXAMPLE 2 drops below the value of the "Man-Days 
Perceived Still Needed," and when ·this happens, EXAMPLE 2 
would run into scheduling problems. The 
"Man-Days Remaining" is simply the product of 
level (in full-time' equivalent employees) 
value of the 
the workforce 
and the time 
remaining in the schedule. Thus, any drop in the workforce 
level due ·to turnover will, in turn, decrease the value of 
the man-days remaining, creating a scheduling problem. And 
when this happens towards the end of the project, when 
management is reluctant to add new people, the adjustment 
that will be made will be to push the scheduled completion 
date back i.e., resulting into a schedule over-run. 
Thus far, we have been addressing only the first result 
of our experiment, namely, that a software project can still 
over-run what amounts to a "perfect" schedule estimate. The 
second result of the experiment can be stated as follows: 
because of the inherent tendency to overshoot, ~he use of the 
analogy method in estimating would inject a bias in an 
organization's scheduling process, a bias that generates in 
the long-run longer (than necessa~y) project schedules. 
The "surprising" phenomenon we a"e observing here (i.e., 
of projects consuming longer and longer schedules), is a 
phenomenon that has been frequently encountered ,in system 
dynamics studies of organizational,behavior (Sterman, 19B1). 
It has been termed "The policy Resistance of Social Systems," 
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"Shifting the Burden to the Intervenor," and "Addiction" 
among other things. A simple example of such a phenomenon is 
that of caffeine addiction, whereby an addict has to consume 
a certain amount of caffeine per day to maintain a certain 
level of alertness. As time goes on the burden of 
maintaining alertness will keep shifting from the normal 
physiological body processes to the externally supplied 
caffeine dose. The result, of course, is that higher and 
higher doses will be required to maintain the same level of 
alertness. 
Richardson and Pugh (1981) provide an explanation for 
why social systems have this tendency to resist policies 
designed to improve behavior (e.g., why a software project 
would tend to resist the policy of estimation by analogy 
which is designed to solve the schedule over-run problem, and 
continues to,over-run its schedule): 
(The) compensating feedback is a property of real systems, as well as system dynamics models, and is the reason real systems tend to be resistent to policies designed to improve behavior ••• (A) parameter change may weaken or strength a feedback loop, but multi-loop nature of a system dynamics model naturally strengthens or weakens other loops to compensate. The result is often little or no overall change in model behavior, 
In terms of our software project situation this is 
exactly what happens. To see how, let us first recall the 
steps followed to estimate a project. First, the estimates 
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of the project's man-days and its duration are made. These 
can be made using analogy, COCOMO, • • • etc • On the basis of 
these two estimates, the project's average staffing level is 
calculated i.e., by dividing the man-days estimate by the 
estimate for the development time. For example, in EXAMPLE 2 
the estimates were Me = 3,795, TDEV = 430 and the average 
staffing 
employees. 
level = 3,795/430 = 8.8 full-time equivalent 
And we also know that EXAMPLE2's actual man-days 
and duration end up being 3,787 and 454 respectively. From 
these figures, we can also calculate EXAMPLE2's actual 
average staffing level, namely, 3,787/454 = 8.3 full-time 
equivalent employees. When the analogy method is then used 
to estimate EXAMPLE3, EXAMPLE2's a~tual values will be used, 
yielding: Me = 3,787, TDEV = 454, i.i'.nd an average staffing 
level of 8.3 full-time equivalent employees. Notice what is 
happening: EXAMPLE2's actual average staffing level ends up 
(because of the turnover problem) to be slightly less than 
what was planned for i.e., 8.3 instead of 8.8, and the actual 
(lower) value is the one passed over to the next project. In 
terms of Richardson and Pugh's explanation: extending the 
project's schedule (from 430 to 454) weakens the strength of 
the schedule pressure in the system, to which the hiring loop 
simply compensates by causing the project to start with a 
small workforce level target. It is also important to note 
that such compensating behavior is often invisible to the 
participants. For example, it is quite unlikely that 
EXAMPLE3's project managers will realize such compensating 
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behavior because, for one, the 8.8 figure is only a planning 
(not an actual) figure for EXAMPLE2. It is quite possible, 
therefore, that it would not be preserved in any project 
records. And even if it is, it is unlikely that EXAMPLE3's 
manager will use it, after all, by concentrating 
EXAMPLE2's actual data, the manager would be behaving in what 
appears to be the rational way. 
It is interesting to note, that this managerial dilemma 
is not at all unique to the management of software projects. 
Paraphrasing Forrester (1971): 
••• social systems are inferently insensitive to most 
policy changes that people select in an effort to alter 
the behavior of the system. In fact, a social system 
tends to draw our attention to the very points at which 
an attempt to intervene will fail. Our exp~rience, 
which has been developed from contact with simple 
systems, leads us to look close to the symptoms of 
trouble for a cause. When we look, we discover that the 
social system presents us with an apparent cause that is 
plausible according to what we have learned from simple 
systems. But this apparent cause is usually a 
coincident occurrence that, like the trouble symptom 
itself, is being produced by the feedback-loop dynamic 
of a larger system. 
In the case of software development, where a project 
over-runs its schedule, the situation provides us with an 
apparent cause, namely, that the project was poorly 
estimated. It is a cause that is quite plausible according 
to what we have learned e.g., that software estimation is not 
yet an exact science. Furthermore, ana this is significant, 
it is often impossible in a real life situation to 
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demonstrate that under-estimation was not in fact the cause. 
(Note: Remember, we are excluding changes in requirements 
from our 'analysis.) 
Conclusion: 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from our 
"laboratory" experiment on the analogy method for estimating 
software projects: 
* A software project can still over-run what amounts to 
a "perfect" schedule estimate. 
* The software engineering community needs, therefore, 
to expand its research agenda on the causes of the 
schedule over-run problem, that is, beyond its current 
(limited) agenda on software estimation accuracy. 
* We have identified one such cause, namely, the 
interaction of the manpower-acquisition policy and 
personnel turnover. 
* Estimating, by analogy injects a bias in an 
organization's scheduling process, a 
generates, in the long run, longer (than 
project schedules • 
bias that 
necessary) 
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V.4. The "90% Syndrome:" 
In this section, we will focus on one control~type 
problem faced by many software project, managers, namely, the 
"90% syndrome" problem. Specifically, our aim is to 
demonstrate the model's capacity to generate this important 
phenomenon of software project management, and in the process 
provide some insights into its causes. 
There is ample evidence in the literature to support the 
pervasiveness of the "90% syndrome" problem in the management 
of software development projects (e.g., see (Baber, 1982), 
(DeMarco, 1982), (Synnott and Gruber, 1981), and (Devenny, 
1976).) Baber (1982) provides the following description of 
the problem: 
••• estimates of the fraction of work completed 
(increase) as originally planned until a level of about 
80-90% is reached. The programmer's individual 
estimates then increase only very slowly until the task 
is actually completed. 
To examine the model's capacity to generate the "90% 
syndrome" type of behavior, we simulated project EXAMPLE with 
three different initial conditions: 
1. The base case, where the size is init~ally 
under-estimated by 33%. That is, 
SIZE = 42.88 (and not 64) KDSI 
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MD = 2,359 man-days 
TDEV = 296 days 
2. When its size is properly estimated, but 
requirements are under-estimated by 33%. man-days 
its 
Such 
a situation could arise due to an under-estimate of the 
project's complexity or an over-estimate of the team's 
productivity, or both. As was mentioned before, COCOMO 
exists in a hierarchy of increasingly detailed forms. 
In its more detailed versions, the estimate of a 
project's man-day requirements can be aC:·,justed by a 
number of multipliers to account for factors such as 
complexity, required reliability, team's capability,. 
etc. For example, for a project that is perceived to 
have a "very low" complexity rating, the man-days 
estimate would be 30% below the "nominal" case. Thus, 
if a project is incorrectly perceived at its initiation 
as being "very low" in complexity, when in fact it'is 
not, an under-estimate of its man-day requirements will 
Thus, for this second case. 
SIZE = 64 KDSI 
MD = 0.67 (MDNOMINAl) 
= 0.67[2.4*19*(64)1.05] 
= 2,407 man-days 
TDEV = 47.5 * (2,407/19)°·36 
:= 299 days 
3. When neither size nor man-day requirements are 
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under-estimated. In this case, 
SIZE 
'" 
64 KDSI 
MD = 2.4 
* 
19 
* 
(64)1.05=3,593 man-days 
TDEV = 47.5 * (3,593/19)°·38 = 348 days 
The results of these three simulation runs are shown in 
Figure V.20. 
One result was expected, namely, that the "90% syndrome" 
arises only when a software project is initially 
under-estimated. Because of the lack of visibility in the 
earlier phases of development, progress is measured by the 
rate of expenditure of resources rather than by some count of 
actual accomplishments. .By measuring progress by the rate of 
expenditure of resources, status reporting ends up being 
nothing more than an echo of tI!€' project f s plan. This 
cr~ates the "illusion" that the project is right on target. 
However, as the project approaches its final stages (e.g., 
when 80-90% of the resources are consumed), discrepancies 
between % of tasks accomplished and % of resources expended 
become increasingly more apparent. At the same time, and as 
the project advances towards its final stages, the project 
members become increasingly able to perceive ho~ productive 
the wo~kforce has actually been. This results in a better 
and better appreciation of the amount of effort actually 
remaining. As this appreciation develops, it would, in 
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effect, be discounting the project's progress rate. Thus, as 
the project members proceed towards the final stages of the 
project, perhaps at a higher work rate, 
rate slows down considerably. 
project completes. 
This 
their net progress 
continues, until the 
What, however, was unexpected, was the significant 
difference in the acuteness of the problem between the two 
types of under-estimates. Notice that the "90% syndrome" is 
much more acute when the project's man-days requirements are 
underestimated than it is when the under-estimate is in the 
project's size. With a little reflection we can see why. 
When the project's man-days requirements are under-estimated 
the problem would often remain largely undetected (as was 
explained above) until the final stages when, first, most of 
the project's resources (i.e., budgeted man-days) are 
consumed, and second the project members become more able to 
perceive how productive the workforce has actually been. 
When, on the other hand, the initial under~estimate is in the 
project's size, the situation is, in a sense, less severe. 
And the reason for this is that the problem tends to be 
detected faster. As we saw in project EXAMPLE's base case 
behavior in Section V.2., the "Undiscovered Job Tasks" do not 
remain undiscovered until the very last sta~es of the 
project, but, instead, start to be discovered in a 
significant way during the detailed design phase of the 
project. Any new task that is discovered is by definition 
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visible. And as we saw, when such tasks are discovered, 
adjustments to the project's. man-days are often made. As a 
result of this, the project arrives at its final stages with 
its initial under-estimate largely detected, which, in turn, 
reduces the severity of the "90% syndrome" experienced. 
Some Concluding Remarks: The "90% syndrome" arises 
because of the interaction of two factors, under-estimation 
and imprecise measurement of progress. The reason why 
progress tends to be imprecisely measured, is because 
imprecise surrogates are used to measure it. "A surrogate is 
a substitute measure of some phenomenon that is used because 
it is not feasible to measure the phenomenon directly 
"(Anthony and Dearden 1980). In the case of software, 
consumption of resources is the (imprecise) surrogate often 
used to measure progress. 
To rectify this situation, attempts have been made to 
develop m~re precise measurements that would directly measure 
progress in a software project e.g., automated monitoring 
systems such as SIMON (Fleischer and Soitter, 1976). 
However, primarily because such tools only address one 
aspect of the problem i.e., the imprecise measurement of 
progress, but not the under-estimation aspect, their use 
could .possibly result in unintended and dysfunctional 
consequences. Consider, for example, the situation of 
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introducing an effective measurement tool in a (typical) 
environment where projects tend to be grossly under-estimated 
at their initiation. The batter the measurement tool, the 
earlier it will detect the fact that progress is not keeping 
up with the grossly under-estimated schedule. When such a 
discrepancy is detected early in the development cycle, 
management will, more often than not, react by adding more 
people rather than adjusting the schedule. This happens, 
according to DeMarco (1982), for political reasons: 
Once an original estimate is made, it's all too tempting 
to pass up subsequent opportunities to estimate by 
simply sticking with your previous numbers. This often 
happens even when you know your old estimates are 
substantially off. There are a few different possible 
explanations for this effect: 'It's too early to show 
slip' ••• 'I fIre-est imate now, I risk having to do it 
again later (and looking bad twice)' ••• As you can 
see, all such reasons are political in nature. 
The result of sticking with a wrong schedule that is too 
tight, is often an increase in the project's cost (Boehm, 
1981), e.g., due to a large workforce level. Thus, what an 
application of an effective measurement tool will result in, 
in such an environment, are projects that are compressed in 
duration, and inflated in cost. Such an outcome might not 
necessarily be expected or welcomed (e.g., in an organization 
where smaller costs are more critical than shorter 
durations) • 
Such a scenario of unintended and dysfunctional 
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consequences of some managerial intervention, it should be 
noted, is not at all unique to this pa.ticular situation: 
The chain of effects in going from a problem to 
immediate consequences then to second-order-consequence 
(i.e., those that appear subsequent to, or as a result 
of, the immediate and obvious consequences of an action) 
and newly created problems is one of the pervasive 
characteristics of modern social systems. Quite 
literally, in such systems everything depends on 
everything else and' often in ways so complex and round 
about that it is difficult to understand the 
interrelationships (Cleland and King, 1975). 
And as a result, 
.•• apparently logical solutions may prove faulty as 
their consequences ramify. Furthermore, since the 
consequences of a decision often occur much later than 
the decision itself, it is difficult for the members to 
trace backward from the disruptive consequences to 
determine precisely what caused them. The members 
cannot make such an analysis, simply because there are 
too many competing explanations. Thus, the only thing 
members can do when a new problem arises is to engage in 
more localized problem-solving (Weick, 1979). 
The reader might recall that the above two quotations, 
were used in Chapter I within our argument for an integrative 
perspective to the study of software project management. 
Indeed, even though the issues we are raising here, on the 
possible dysfunctional consequences of measurement tools, are 
beyond the scope of our current model, we do feel that our 
general integrative approach does provide the viable basis 
for future extensions to address them. 
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V.S. The Economics of Quality Assurance: 
" . . . 
The development of software systems involves a series of 
production activities where the opportunities for 
interjection of human fallibilities are enormous. 
Errors may begin to occur at the very inception of the 
process where the obj·ectives of the software system may 
be erroneously or imperfectly specified, as well as 
during the later design and development stages where 
these objectives are mechanized. The basic quality 
factor for software is that it performs its functions in 
the manner that was intended by its architects. In 
order to achieve this quality, the final product must 
contain a minimum of Inistakes in implementing their 
intentions as well as being void of misconception about 
the intentions themselves. Because of human inability 
to perform with perfection, software development is 
accompanied by a quality assurance activity (Deutsch, 
1979). 
Quality Assurance (QA) is, thus, a set of activities 
performed in conjunction with (the development of) a 
software product to guarantee the product meets the specified 
standards. These activities reduce doubts and risks about 
the pe~formance of the product in the target environment" 
(Pressman, 1982). 
Software quality assurance is approached by two distinct' 
and complementing methodologies. The first is that of 
assuring that the quality is initially built into the 
product. This involves emphasis on the early generation of a 
coherent, complete, unambiguous, and nonconflicting set of 
requirements. Then as the product is designed and coded, 
review and testing of the product, the second quality tool, 
are encountered (Deutsch, 1979) • 
. . ~< __ ~ :~:'. ' ....... _, ~,'1-" 
. 
( ) 
tf+y! ~'/I 
~I 
i j 
" 1 
I, 
Ie ,,1 
1- ,; '!"J 
I:/;:" _"! 
. --',' - I 
, ,.:. 
""":0;-""'1 
, 
1 , 
1 
!, 
I 
I. 1 j:" I 
\' :, ! 
r' \1 L: ! 
j', c· I e l .. ~ 
.. I 
. '. , ~ :'~ I 
:~ ] 
.\ 
", ~ , 
1 
~ ( r o! 
! 
, 
; , 
" r 
Ii ,-
~ 
,-j, 
! , 
, 
I 
1 
, 
" 
( 
411 
As was indicated in Section III .3. {on "Model 
Boundaryft) the model's development phase iRcludes both the 
design and coding activities, but excludes the development of 
the requirements. !t was also indicated then, that we will 
be assuming that software design commences (within the 
model's boundary) at the ftsuccessful completion ft of a 
software requirements review (outside the model's boundary), 
and that there would be no subsequent changes or 
modifications in the system's requirements. As a result, the 
analysis of this section on the economics of QA only applies 
to the second QA tool above, namely, the review and testing 
of the product. 
Several specific techniques are available for reviewing 
and testing the software product as it is designed and coded. 
These include, structured walkthroughs and technical reviews 
(Freedman and Weinberg, 1982), -inspections (Fagan, 1976), 
code reading (a process where code logic and code format is 
scrutinized by a programmer other than the original designer) 
(Weinberg, 1971) and integration testing (Daly, 1977) , 
(Jones, 1982) • Not included in this ac~ivity is module or 
unit testing, which is commonly considered to be part of the 
coding process (McKeen, 1979). 
In this section we will focus, not on the technica~ 
aspects of QA, but rather on the economics of the QA 
activity. We will investigate the tradeoff between the 
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benefits and costs of the QA effort in terms of the total 
project cost. 
The utilization of QA tools and techniques adds cost to 
the development of software. For example, man-hours are 
expended in developing test cases. running test cases, 
conducting structured walkthroughs, ••• etc. This added cost 
is, 
••• a source of concern to everyone associated with 
the.program, particularly the program manager and the 
customer ••• 
A (more) pressing concern to the software quality 
manager is how cost efficient are the QA operations 
during the development cycle. The QA organization, just 
as all elements of the development process, will and 
should be subject to detailed and continuing scrutiny 
regarding the cost of doing business (Knight, 1979). 
This "pressing concern" has not, however, been addressed 
in the literature. That is, as of yet, there are no 
publish~d studies investigating "how cost efficient are the 
QA operations during the development cycle." We can pr(l[->se 
three possible reasons for this deficiency in the field's 
research repertoire: (1) It is 0 managerial issue. Like 
many other aspects of software production, managerial 
considerations tend to attract less research attention. 
"Perhaps this is so because computer scientists believe that 
management per se is not their business" (Cooper, 1978). (2) 
"Software Quality assurance has only recently i.e., within 
the last four or five years, gained a place of formal status 
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and recognition within engineering hier'::ll:chies" (Stringer, 
1979). The emphasis, until now, has been on "selling" this 
"young" concept to p~acticing managers . . . hence the 
emphasis on stressing (only) the benefits (e.g., see (Ergott, 
1979) and (Cooper and Fisher, 1979).) (3) The high cost of 
controlled experimentation in software engineering (Myers, 
1978), (Glass, 1982). 
In the remaining part of this section we will use our 
model to investigate, not whether QA is justified, but how 
much QA is justified. To do this, we simulated project 
EXAMPLE under different levels of manpower commitments to the 
QA function and observed the benefits and costs in each case. 
The primary goal of QA is. "that errors be detected and 
corrected as early as possible and only a minimal amount of 
problems be alloweo to slip from one phase of the development 
to the next" (Tsui and Priven, 1976). Several studies have 
established the significant cost savings gained by the early 
detection and correction of errors. For example, in a study 
by Shooman reported in McClure (1981), it was determined that 
detecting and correcting a design error during the design 
phase (i.e., through the QA activities) is one-tenth the 
effort that would be needed to detect and correct it later 
during the system testing phase because of the additional 
inventory of specifications, code, user and maintenance 
manuals, etc., that uould require correction in the 
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later case. 
An important relationship to investigate is, therefore, 
the one between the QA effort expended and the % of errors 
detected during development. Such 
obtained from our experiment, and 
V.21. 
a relationship was 
is exhibited in Figure 
The significant feature of the relationship is the 
"diminishi.ng returns" of QA exhibited as QA expenditures 
extend beyond 20,"30% of development effort. This type of 
behavior is supported by two types of results in the 
literature. First, Shooman (1983) observed that "In any 
sizable program, it is impossible to remove all errors 
(during development) ••• some errors manifest themselves, 
and can be exhibited only after system integration." The 
second result, reported by Boehm (1981) and shown in Figure 
V.22., is a compilation of a number of studies that provide 
single points on error-removal functions. 
What the results of Figure V.21. suggest is that the 
savings in the cost of processing errors that result from the 
application of QA, flattens out as QA expenditures extend 
beyond 20-30% of development effort. This result is shown in 
Figure V.23. As can be seen, the combined costs of rework 
(i.e., correcting errors during development) and testing 
flatten out as QA expenditures extend beyond 20%. On the 
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other hand, notice that increasing 'QA as a % of the 
development effort results in an exponential increase in QA's 
absolute cost (in man-days). The reason why this happens is 
that as a larger fraction of the development effott is 
allocated to QA, the development effort itself increases. 
And the reason why this in turn happens is that as more 
man-days are allocated to QA (without corresponding 
reductions in Rework + Testing man-days), the project's total 
size in man-days gOes up. This in turn leads to the 
acquisition of a larger workforce. A large workforce, in 
turn, means a less productive workforce (e.g., due to 
training'and communication overheads) which, as a result, 
drives the project's development man-days effort higher. 
The final, and perhaps most useful, question to address 
concerns the "oI!ltimal" QA effort expenditure. For project 
EXAMPLE, the answer is shown in Figure V.24., which plots 
E~~PLE's total cost (in man-days) against QA effort defined 
in terms of % of development man-days. As can be seen, the 
"optimal" QA effort expenditure is 16% of the development 
man-days. 
Two important conclusions can be drawn from Figure V.24. 
The first, more generalizable conclusion, is that. QA policy 
does have a significant impact on total project cost. As can 
be seen from the. figure, project EXAMPLE's cost ranges from a 
low of 3,770 man-days, to values in the range of 5.,000 
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man-days i.e., values that are 33% higher. At low values of 
QA expenditures this increase in cost results from the large 
cost of the testing phase. On the other hand, at high values 
of QA expenditures, the excessive QA expenditures are 
themselves the culprit. The second result is, of course, 
der.iving the optimal QA expenditure level of 16%. What, in 
our opinion, is really significant about this result is not 
its value, since this cannot be generalized beyond an 
EXAMPLE-type software project, but rather the process of 
deriving it, namely, our integrative system dynamics 
approach. Beyond controlled experimentation (which are too 
costly and time consuming to be practically feasible), as far 
as we know, this model provides the first capability to 
quantitatively analyze the costs/benefits of QA policy for 
software production. And this, it is encouraging to note, is 
generalizable, in the sense that one can customize models for 
different software development environments to derive 
environment-specific optimality conditions. 
But why is the optimal value of 16% derived above not 
generalizable? To address this question we will test its 
sensitivity to two project variables, which can change from 
project to project and/or from organization to organiztion. 
Such an investigation will have two useful outcom~s: First, 
we will derive results of the form "An increase in factor (X) 
warrants a 
generalizable 
greater 
beyond 
QA 
our 
expenditure," which will be 
specific project EXAMPLE 
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environment. Such results could, for example, be useful 
"rules-of-thumb" for organizations to use when adapting 
published results or results from other o~ganizations to 
their own environments. Secondly, such "rules-of-thumb" can, 
in the same way, be applied to adapt and adjust our own 
results above, thus increasing their generalizability. 
The first project variable we consider concerns the 
distribution of effort among the project phases. In planning 
a software project, management does not only estimate the 
project's total effort in man-days, it in addition allocates 
that effort among the project's phases (Gunther. ·1978). As 
was explained in detail in Section V.3.2., substantial 
differences in opinion exist on how this effort distribution 
is or should be made (McKeen, 1983). In project EXAMPLE's 
base-case, we assumed a distribution of 80% for development 
(i.e., design and coding) and 20% for testing. As was 
explained in Section V.2., these values were chosen to 
conform to the TRW software development environment. In this 
experiment, we·· will examine the effect of another 
distribution, namely, the 40-20-40 effort distribution 
profile i.e., 40% for preliminary and detailed design, 20% 
for coding, and 40% for testing. Which, as was mentioned 
before, is perhaps the most widely touted rule-of-thumb for 
the distribution of effort among the phases of software 
develo.pment projects (McKeen, 1981) , (Bruce and Pederson, 
1982), (Oliver, 1982), (Jensen and Tonies, 1979). [As was 
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explained earlier, this effort profile is translated in our 
model into 60% for development (i.e., design and coding) and 
40% for system .testing.] 
Before we present the experiment's results, there is an 
important comment to make. Notice that we are examining the 
affects of how much effort is allocated to the testing phase 
on how much effort should be allocated to QA! It appears as 
though we have confused what the independent and dependent 
variables are. After all, QA is utilized not only earlier in 
the development cycle, but also for the explicit purpose of 
affecting the testing phase (i.e., minimizing its cost). Our 
experiment's (seemingly) lopsided set-up is, however, really 
a reflection of what the state-of-the-practice is in software 
project management. Both in the literature {e.g., (Boehm, 
1981» as well as in the organizations we interviewed {e.g., 
based on discussions with (McGowan, 3), (O'Conner, 10), 
{Landolfi, .11}, (Sheldon, 12), and (Hisamune·, 15» the 
sequence of steps followed in allocating the planned man-day 
expenditures are as a follows: First, the total project's 
effort is estimated. Then, the effort is distributed among 
the life-cycle phases (e.g., using the 40-20-40 rule). And 
then effort is allocated to QA as % of the development 
effort. For example, in Boehm's Software Engineering 
Economics, he uses a case study titled "The Hunt National 
Bank EFT System" to outline how COCOMO would be used to 
estimate and allocate a project's man-day expenditures. The 
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following sequence of steps is followed: 
1. COCOMO's effort and schedule equations are used to 
estim~te the project's man-days, and development time. 
2. Next, using guidelines for the distribution of 
effort among the project's life cycle phases, man-days 
are allocated to development (i.e., design and coding} 
and testing. 
3. Finally, effort is allocated to QA activities using 
some guidelines expressing QA as a % of development 
man-days. 
A final note. This lopsided approach to planning a 
software project is probably a result of how the (young) 
software engineering field has grown. First, there was no 
explicit development life cycle with the emphasis almost 
totally placed on the programming phase of a project. Next, 
we realized the value of breaking the development process 
into distinct life cycle phases, and emphasizing its earlier 
requirements and design phases. And, only recently have we 
also corne to realize the importance of emphasizing quality 
during the development of a software project. However, what 
the above lopsided planning sequence suggests is that 'the 
field has n£t yet grown to full maturity. 
Running project EXAMPLE with the new effort distribution 
profile i.e., where 40% of the man-days are allocated to 
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testing rather than the base-ease's 20%, produced the result 
shown in Figure V.25. (for exper.iment #1). That is, the 
optimal QA expenditure level drops to l~% of development 
effort. 
The fundamental reason for this is that effort 
expenditures are not only a function of the actual workload, 
but they are also a function of planned expenditures. This 
phenomenon was explained in detail in Section V.3. Thus, by 
allocating more to the testing activity, the testing effort 
will expand even though the workload itself might not. What 
our experiment's results is therefore suggesting, is that we 
"accomodate" this phenomenon of organizational behavior 
(rather than fight it). In other words, since the testing 
effort will expand anyhow (as a result of management's 
increased allocation to testing), it makes sense to also 
increase the workload itself and, in a sense, reap the most 
return from the increased investment in testing. And this, 
of-course, would be achieved by decreasing the investment in 
QA. (Note: the 11% allocation to QA is still within the 
range of QA expenditures reported both in the literature and 
in the organizations we studied. See Chapter III.) 
The second project variable we will consider concerns 
software development productivity. Recall that in our 
formulation of productivity we made a clear distinction 
between two sets of factors that can affect how productive 
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people will be on a software projeo't. The first set included 
those factors that affect producti vi ty dynamically throughout 
the development of a single project. These, included: 
workforce experience, learning, motivation, and 
communication. The second set included environmental factors 
which tend to remain invariant during the life of a 
project. This set inclu.ded factors such as: availability of 
software tools, computer-hardware characteristics, 
programming language, product pomplexity, ... etc. Because 
this second set of factors does not play any dynamic role 
during the life of a single project, we were able to capture 
them through a single parameter, na~ely, the project's 
"Nominal Potential Productivity." What we would like to 
investigate here is the following: The effect on the optimal 
QA expenditure c;>f changes in potential productivity (Le., 
due to changes in the software development environment). 
In Section V.2., we set project EXAMPLE's "Nominal 
Potential Producti vi ty" to 60 DSI/man-day. (Actually, it ,was 
set to 1 Task/man-day, where a task was then defined to be 60 
DSI.) This was done to conform to the TRW software 
development environment. In this, Experiment #2, we examine 
the effect of increasing the value of "Nominal Potential 
Productivity" by 25% i.e., to become 75 DSI/man-day. Notice 
that such an increase only affects the productivity of 
software development. Such an increase has no direct effect 
on the productivity of processing errors (i.e., detecting 
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them and correcting them). Of course, one could argue that 
there is some correlation between the two productivities 
e.g., higher quality people would be both more productive in 
producing code and in detecting and correcting errors. And 
that we, therefore, need to make corresponding adjustments to 
the error processing productivities in the model. While 
perfectly fea.sible to do, such adjustments would, -however, 
defeat the purpose of this experiment, and which we can now 
elaborate in more precise terms: We would like to examine 
the effects of increasing the differential between 
development productivity and error-processing productivity in 
an organization. 
The results of the experiment are shown in Figure V.25. 
That is, an increase in development productivity warrants an 
increase in QA expenditures relative to development 
expenditures. Higher development productivities mean that 
each man-day expended on the development of· software will 
yield more software. As a result more QA effort would be 
required to handle this increased output. It is important to 
note here this increased output will not, in ·and of itself, 
trigger adjustments in the amount of QA expended. And that 
the reguired increases in ~ must, therefore, be ~plicitly 
planned for. The reason for this has to do with the 
"Parkinsonian" execution of the QA activity. AS was 
discussed in Chapter III, both our own findings as well as 
findings reported in the literature, suggest that the QA rate 
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is often independent of the QA effort allocated. What 
usually happens is that the QA effort is' planned and 
allocated, usually in the form of a fixed schedule of 
periodic group-type functions (Mitchell, 1980). For example, 
a 2-hour walkthrough for the 5 members of team (A) is 
scheduled for every Friday. During these periodic "QA 
Windows," all tasks developed since the previous one are 
supposed to be processed. And what we were surprised to find 
was that, in an almost perfect realization of Parkinson's 
Law, irrespective of how many tasks need to to be processed 
within the specified "QA Window" they almost always do. No 
backlogs, therefore, develop in the QA pipeline. Even when 
QA activities are relaxed or suspended because of schedule 
pressure, no backlogs develop. That is, when walkthroughs 
are susp~nded for a while on a project, the requirement for a 
"walkthrough" is also suspe~ded, not postponed (Hart, 1982). 
We can propose an explanation for how and why this 
happens. Since the objective of the QA activity is to detect 
invisible errors, invisible that is until they are detected, 
it becomes almost impossible to tell whether the QA job was 
completely done (i.e., all those invisible errors were in 
fact detected). By the same token, it is as difficult to 
tell that the job has not been completely done (except much 
later in the life cycle). Under such circumstances it 
becomes quite easy to rationalize both to oneself and to 
management that the QA job that was possible to do, was not 
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insufficient. Furthermore, the QA effort that is possible to 
expend (i.e., in terms of available time and effort), is 
usually what is expended and not more (e.g., even if called 
for due to a larger than expected workload of developed 
tasks) because there seems to be no significant incentives to 
do otherwise. Firstly, at the psychological level, there are 
actually disincentives for working harder at QA, since it 
only ftexposes ft more of one's mistakes (Weinberg, 1971). And 
secondly, at the organizational level there are seldom any 
award mechanisms in place that promote quality or 
quality-related activities (Cooper and Fisher, 1979). 
V.6. Staffing: Brook's Law Revisited 
Our objective in this section is, in some sense, the 
reverse of t.hat of the previous section. In Sectlon V.5. 
Our aim was to generate new results that are generalizable. 
In this section, on the other hand, we will be questioning 
the generalizability of an old ftresult,ft namely, ftBrooks' 
;Law. " 
Brooks' Law was first publicized in Dr. Fred Brooks' 
1975 book titled The Mythical Man-Month: Essays on Software 
Engineering. The book embodies a number of insig~ts into the 
management of large software projects gained through Brooks' 
experience in managing the development of IBM's OS/360. 
Paraphrasing Brooks (1978): 
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'fter leaving IBM in 1965 to come to Chapel Hill as 
originally agreed when I took over OS/360, I began to 
analy~e the OS/360 experience to see what management and 
technical lessons were to be learned ••• 
My own conclusions are embodied in the essays that 
follow, which are intended for professional programmers, 
professional ,managers, and especially professional 
managers of programmers. 
Brook's Law is stated as follows: "Adding T.anpower to a 
late software project makes it later" (Brooks, 1978l. 
The lack of ~nterchangeability between men and months 
was recognized by Brooks as being caused by two factors, 
training and intercommunication overheadS: 
Each worker must be trained in the technology, 
of the effort, the overall strategy, and the 
work. This training cannot be partitioned, so 
of the added effort varies linearly with the 
workers. 
the goals 
plan of 
this part 
number of 
Intercommunication is worse. If each part of the task 
must be separately coordinated with' each other, the 
effort increases as n(n-1)/2. Three workers regulre 
three times as much pairwise intercommunication as two; 
four require six times as much as two ••• 
Since software construction is inherently a systems 
effort ••• an exercise in complex interrelationships 
••• communication effort is great ••• Adding more men 
then lengthens, not shortens, the schedule (Brooks, 
1978). 
Since its "enactment," Brooks' Law has been widely 
endorsed in the literature (e.g" see (Synnott_and Gruber, 
1981), (Paretta and Clark, 1976), (pressman, 1982), (Jensen 
and Tonies, 1979), and (Boehm, 1981).) Furthermore, it has 
often been endorsed indiscriminately i.e., for not only 
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projects, 
but also 
and not only 
applications 
systems 
s;,ftware 
systems. This, even though Brooks was quite explicit in 
specifying the domain of applicability of hiz insights, 
including his Brooks' Law, i.e., to what he calls "Jumbo" 
systems programming projects. For example, Pressman (1982) 
extends Brooks' Law to 6-10 man-year projects, while in 
(Jensen and Tonies, 1979) and (Synnott and Gruber, 1981) it 
is extended to the domain of applications software systems. 
Interestingly, this wide-spread endorsement of Brooks' 
Law has taken place, even though the "law" has not been 
formally verified. Our objective in this section is to do 
just that. Specifically we will investigate whether Brooks' 
Law does apply to the environment of "medium-sized 
applications projects developed in a familiar, in-house 
development environment," i.e., to our prototype project 
EXAMPLE • 
As we have seen in Section V.2., project EXAMPLE's size 
is (as are many such software pr.ojects) initially 
under-estimated. As a result the project experiences 
scheduling problems, and does in fact overshoot its original 
schedule. (The reader is advised to refer to the detailed 
description furnished in Section V.2.) We also saw that when 
the project's scheduling problems surface management first 
reacts by adju&ting the project's workforce level i.e., 
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adding more people. However, as the project proceeds towards 
its final stages, with its scheduling problems still 
persisting, management becomes increasingly reluctant, 
because of workforce stability considerations, to add more 
people, and as a result reacts instead by adjusting the 
project's schedule. 
Management's policy on how to balance workforce and 
schedule adjustments is captured in the model through the 
formulation of the variable "Willingness to Change 
Workforce." Through adjusting this variable we can, 
therefore, exami.ne the impact of more aggressive manpower 
acquisition policies on the project's cost and duration. 
That is, examine whether a policy (A) in which management 
continues adding more people to project EXAMPLE even as the 
project proceeds towards the end of its system testing phase, 
results in a larger schedule overshoot than does a p~licy (B) 
in which management refrains from adding more people much 
earlier e.g., towards the end of the development phase. 
Brooks' Law suggests that policy (A) would produce a longer 
project duration. 
In the base case (and based on discussions with 
(Lombardi, 23) , (Garett, 24) and (Nichols, 25», the 
"Willingness to Change Workforce" is formulated in terms of a 
time parameter that is the sum of the "Hiring Delay" and the 
"Assimilation Delay." Specifically, in the early stages of 
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the proj~ct when "Time Remaining" would' generaily be much 
larger than the sum of the "Hiring Delay and the 
"Assimi~ation Delay" management would be willing to adjust 
the workforce level to meet the 
completion date. As the number of days 
drops below 1.5 * (Hiring Delay + 
though, management starts be.:;oming 
project's scheduled 
perceived remaining 
Assimilation Delay), 
reluctant, and 
increasingly so, to increase workforce level. In the base 
case the values of the "Hiring Delay" and the "Assimilation 
Delay" are 40 and 80 working days, respectively. Thus, as 
"Time Remaining" drops below 180 days, management, in the 
base case, starts becoming reluctant to hire new people, even 
though the time and effort perceived remaining might imply 
that more people are needed. The reluctance stems from the 
realization that most of those remaining 180 days, would be 
"wasted" in the hiring process and then in acquainting the 
new people with the mechanics of the project, in integrating 
them into the project team, and in training them in the 
necessary technical areas. And when the "Time Remaining" 
drops below 0.3 * (Hiring Delay + Assimilation Delay) i.e., 
below 48 working days, no more additions would be made to the 
project's workforce i.e., the hiring rate falls to zero. 
It should now be clear how we can model more aggressive 
manpower acquisition policies through the "Willingness to 
, 
Change Workforce" formula,tion. We can do that simply by 
decreasing the value of the time parameter. For example, if 
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we set the time parameter to 30 working days (instead of its 
base-case value of 40 + 80 = 120) we would be modeling a 
situation where management's willigness to add to the 
workforce continues until much later into the project. In 
the base case, management starts becoming reluctant to 
increase the workforce level when the perceived number of 
days remaining to complete the project drops below 180 days, 
and stops hiring completely when it drops below 48 working 
days. Under the current more aggressive policy, management 
starts becoming reluctant at 45 days and stops manpower 
additions completely at 9 working days, or two weeks, before 
the perceived completion date. 
Thus, by adjusting the value of the time parameter we 
are able to examine the scheduling consequences of a number 
of manpower acquisition policies, ranging from the base-case 
policy to the above (somewhat extreme) policy. The results 
are depicted in Figure V.26. 
As can be seen from the figure the results do not 
support Brooks Law. What our results show is that adding 
more people to a late project causes it to become more 
costly, but not to complete later. The increase in the cost 
of the project is caused by the increased training and 
communication overheads, and which in effect decrease the 
productivity of the average team member, and thus increase 
the project's man-day requirements. For the project's 
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schedule to also suffer, the drop in productivity must be 
large enough to render an additional person's contribution to 
the project to be, in effect, a negative contribution. Our 
results indicate this is not the case in project EXAMPLE. 
The conclusion that we can draw from our experiment's 
results is that Brooks' Law does not universally apply to all 
software development environments. And that, in particular, 
it does not seem to apply to the EXAMPLE-type project 
environment i.e., the medium sized application project 
developed in a familiar, in-house development environment. 
It is, therefore, not necessarily an invalidation of BrooKs' 
ftBrooks's Law,ft but rather a disqualification of the notion 
(implied not by Brooks but by the writings of others in the 
literature) that "Brooks' Law" is a universal law of software 
development. 
The question, however, still remains: under what 
conditions would Brooks' Law apply? While the complete 
answer to this questi~n lies beyond the scope of this 
research, we are, however, able to present some preliminary 
results. One of the advantages of simulation modeling is the 
flexibility it provides in experimenting on the modeled 
system under perturbed conditions. The results of one such 
experiment Le., on a "perturbed EXAMPLE" project, is shown 
in Figure V. 27. 
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In this experiment, we guadrupled the training overhead 
for project EXAMPLE. In the base case, a new hiree consumes 
in training overhead, on the average, the equivalent of 20% 
of an experienced full-time employee's time for the duration 
of a training period that extends for 4 months. In this 
current experiment, a new hire consumes 40% of an experienced 
full-time employee's time for a training duration that 
extends for f months. Such an increase in the .training 
overhead, while admittedly somewhat extreme, is 
never-the-less the kind of perturbation that we would need to 
make if we were to model the software development environment 
of large and complex systems programming software (Corbato 
and Clingen, 1980), e.g., such as the IBM 05/360. 
Notice that, even with such a large training overhead, 
Brooks' Law does not always hold. It only holds, in this 
experiment, when the Time Parameter is less than 50 working 
days. As was exp~ained earlier, a smaller Time Parameter 
means that management's willingness to add more people to the 
project is maintained until later in the project's life 
cycle '. Specifically, when the Time Parameter is set to 50 
working days, management would be willing to add more people 
up until the point in time when it is perceived that the time 
remaining to complete the project is less than 
0.3 * 50 = 15 working days i.e., 3 weeks. That is, until the 
final stages of the testing phase. It is at such extremely 
aggressive manpower acquisition policies that Brooks' Law 
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holds for our "perturbed EXAMPLE" project. 
- There are several conclusions that we can draw from this 
analysis: 
* Adding more people to a late project does not 
necessarily make it later. 
* In particular, Brooks' Law does not seem to apply to 
the EXAMPLE-type software project environment i.e., the 
medium sized application project developed in a 
familiar, in-house development environment. 
* In such an environment, adding more people to late 
project does, however, make it more costly. 
* But even in a particular software development 
environment, our results indicate that adding more 
people to a late project mayor may not make the project 
later. Ii depends on where in the project's life cycle 
the people ~ added. 
V.7. Summary: 
In this chapter we used our integrative system 
dynamics model of software project management as an 
experimentation vehicle to study/predict the dynamic 
implications of an array of managerial actions, 
policies, and procedures pertaining to the development 
of software. Four areas were studied: (1) Scheduling1 
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(3) Quality Assurance~ and (4) 
Three experiments were conducted in the software 
scheduling area. We examined the impact that schedules 
have on project performance in the first experiment, the 
portability of the quantitative software estimation 
tools in the second, and in the third experiment we 
investigated the long-term impact of the "estimation by 
analogy method." 
In the area of project control, we examined the "90 
% Syndrome" phenomenon, and provided an analysis of its 
causes, namely, the lack of visibility and 
underestimation. 
The third area of investigation concerned the 
economics of software quality assurance. Two sets of 
experiments were conducted in this area. The objective 
of the first set was to investigate, not whether QA was 
justified, but how much QA was justified. In the second 
set of experiments, we examined the sensitivity of the 
derived "optimal" QA expenditure level, to two project 
variables, namely, the project's planned effort 
distribution profile, and the software development 
productivity • 
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Finally, in the area of project staffing, we tested 
the applicability of Brooks' Law to our prototype 
project envi.t'onment (Le., to the domain of medium-sized 
applications projects developed in a familiar, in-house 
development environment). 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The purpose for a concluding chapter is to provide the, 
oppo .. tuni ty for the researcher to look back in order' to 
assess what has been accomplished, and at the same time, to 
furnish an occasion for the researcher to look ahead in order 
to suggest future avenues for prospective research. These 
activities, while of different orientation, are closely 
interrelated; any statement of what has been done invites 
inquiry as to what remains to be done. This chapter, coming 
at the cUlmination of the research, provides the vantage 
point from which the r~Searcher can fulfill these express 
purposes. The following sections of the chapter entitled 
"Summary of Results" and "Suggestions for Future Research" 
provide the "look back" and "look ahead," respectively. 
VI.l. Summary of Results: 
The objective of this research effort is to enhance our 
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understanding of, and gain insight into, the general process 
by which software development i.s managed. To achieve this 
objective we accomplished the following three tasks: 
1. Developed an integrative system dynamics model of 
software development project management. 
2. Conducted a case study to test the model. 
3. Used the model as an experimentation vehicle to 
study/predict th~ dynamic implications of an array of 
managerial policies and procedures. 
In the remaining part of this section, we will elaborate 
further on the above three research accomplishments. 
Model Development: 
The development of the integrative system dynamics model 
of software development project management constitutes the 
following set of accomplishments: 
1. The model integrates our knowledge of the micro 
.components of software development project management 
(e.g., programming, prductivity, planning, controlling, 
••• etc.) into an integrated continuous view of the 
software development process. 
~ major defect in much of the research to date has been 
its inability to integrate our knowledge of such micro 
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components for deriving implications about the behavior 
of the organization in which the micro components are 
embedded (Thayer, 1979). Paraphrasing Jensen and Tonies 
(1979): 
There is much attfmtion on individual phases and functions of the software development sequence, but little on the whole Life cycle as an integral, continuous process a process that can and should be optimized. 
Clearly. this "micro-oriented" type of work is a useful 
beginning in helping us obtain a better understanding of 
the software development activity. However, before we 
can say that we have a complete und~rstanding of any 
such activity, " it is necessary to show that our ... 
knowledge of the individual components can be put 
together in a total system, i.e., an organization can be 
synthesized, which allows for the interactions of all 
the relevant variables and all the structural 
components" (Cohen and Cyert, 1965). 
In addition to the benefit of helping us achieve overall 
understanding, an integrative perspective is useful in 
two more "tactical" ways: problem diagnoses and 
solution evaluation. The interactions and 
interdependicies which characterize our management 
systems, will similarly chara~terize the problems that 
beset such systems (Cleland and King, 1975). In Brooks' 
" no one thing seems to cause the difficulty words: ••• 
(in software projects) ... But the accumulation of 
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simultaneous and interacting factors ••• " (Brooks, 
1978). An integrative perspective is, therefore, useful 
because it both "prompts" as well as "facilitates" the 
search for the multiple, and potentially diffused, set 
of factors that are interacting to cause software 
development problems. An example of this is the 
schedule overshoot problem, which, as was shown in 
Chapt~r v, can arise, not only because of schedule 
underestimation, but also as a result of management's 
hiring/firing policies. 
Again, because of the interaction~ and interdependencies 
that characterize management systems, managerial 
intervention (e.g., to solve a perceived problem) often 
leads to second- and third-order consequences and newly 
created problems (Weick, 1979). By providing us with a 
comprehensive world view, the model is a useful tool to 
fully assess such second- and third-order consequences. 
An example of this has been our analysis of the "Safety 
Factor policy" in scheduling software projects. It was 
shown that while such a policy "succeeds" in producing 
more accurate project estimates, the intended 
consequence of the policy, it also tended to "create" 
more costly projects, which is both an unintended and a 
dysfunctional consequence. 
2. The model identifies feedback mechanisms, and uses 
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them to structure and clarify relationships in software 
project management. While the significance and 
applicability of the feedback systems concept to the 
study of managerial systems has been substantiated in a 
large number of studies outside software engineering, it 
still remains foreign to the software 
engineering 
largely 
project management community. We, 
therefore, view our work as having an "educational" 
value to the software engineering community. 
3. The mathematical formulation of a system dynamics 
model forces explication i.e., structural relationships 
between variables must be explicitly and precisely 
defined. As such, the model sets the foundation for the 
development of a theory of software project management. 
Paraphrasing Dubin (1971): 
A theory is the attempt of a man to model some 
aspects of the empirical world ••• A theory tries 
to make sense out of the observable world by 
ordering the relationships among 'things' that 
constitute the theorist's focus of attention in the 
world 'out there' ••• The process of putting 
things or units together in lawful relation to each 
other establishes the fundamental building blocks 
out of which a theory is constructed. 
4. The high degree of explication required in the model 
helped us ferret out "knowledg~ gaps" in the literature. 
And a set of 27 interviews with soft,ware development 
managers in 5 organizat10ns helped us fill these 
knowledge gaps. The model, therefore, incorporates new 
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findings about the management of software project 
management (e.g., on manpower acquisition policies under 
different scheduling considerations). 
Case Study: 
The model was developed on the basis of both an 
extensive review of the literature and information gathered 
through the set of 27 interviews. After the model was 
developed, we then conducted a case-study in a sixth 
organization, namely, the Systems Development Section of 
NASA's Goddard Space Flight 'enter. The objective of the 
case-study was to examine the model's ability to reproduce 
the dynamic behavior patterns of a completed software 
project. 
The DE-A project was selected for the case-study by 
NASA. This project was selected so as to satisfy three 
criteria (furnished by us): (1) to be medium in size; (2) 
recent; and (3) "typical" Le., one that would be considered 
as having been developed in a familiar in-house software 
development environment. 
To simulate the DE-A project, the model was first 
parameterized. The process involved setting 14 model 
parameters that capture the particular DE-A project 
environment. The parameter values were obtained from two 
sources, namely, interviews at NASA and project 
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documentation. The 14 model parameters that were set (e.g., 
"Hiring Delay," "Turnover Rate," ••• etc.), it is important 
to note, do not involve any changes in the formulation of the 
model's policy structures. The parameter set merely defines 
the (DE-A) environment within whic~ the policies are 
exercised. This is significant, since the dynan,ic behavior 
patterns generated are largerly a result of the interaction 
of the model's (unchanged) policy structures. 
The model was highly accurate in reproducing the actual 
development history of the DE-A software project. 
Specifically, it accurately reproduced the dynamic behavior 
patterns of the project's completion-date estimates, man-day 
estimates, cost in man-days, and workforce loading. 
~xperimentation : 
If "understanding" is the intellectual outcome of a 
theoretical model, then "prediction" is its practical outcome 
(Dubin, 1971) • The model was used as an experimentation 
vehicle to study/predict the dynamic implications of an array 
of managerial policies and procedures. Three areas were 
studied: 
1. Software cost and schedule estimation. Three 
experiments were conducted in this area. in the first, 
we examined the impact that schedules have on project 
performance. We showed that "a different schedule 
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creates a different project.~ An important implication 
that follows from this is that both the project manager 
as well as the student of software estimation should 
reject the notion that a software estimation model can 
be adequately judged on the basis of how accurately it 
can estimate historical projects. Because of the 
significant influence that a schedule has on the 
behavior of a software project, the only real test of an 
estimation method is to try it. Furthermore, an 
estimation method should not be judged only on how 
accurate it is, but ill addition it should be judged on 
how costly the projects it "creates" are • 
The second experiment concerned the portability of 
quantitative software estimation tools. Evidence in the 
literature indicates that the portability of the 
currently available quantitative software estimation 
tools (i.e., from the companies in which they were 
developed to another) is poor {e.g., see (Boehm, 1981) 
and (Benbasat and Vessey, 1980». A primary reason for 
this is that almost all the current models fail to 
explicitly account for the managerial characteristics of 
the software producing organization, and which tend to 
vary significantly from one organization to another 
{Mohanty, 1981). A major stumbling block has, 
heretofore, been the inability to quantify the impact o.f 
managerial-type factors on the cost of software 
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development. In this experiment we take a first step 
towards rectifying this situation. Specifically, we 
identified four aspects of a company's 
environment (manpo\'rer acquisition, manpower 
managerial 
allocation, 
effort distribution; and QA allocation) that 
significantly impact the cost of software development, 
and we quantified that impact. Because the four areas 
identified are variables that the project manager can 
objectively evaluate at the beginning of a software 
project, it should be feasible to incorporate them 
explicitly in future cost estimation models. This, we 
feel, will improve both the accuracy as well as the 
portability of such models. 
The third and final experiment in this area 
concerned the analogy method of software estimation. 
The experiment generated two interesting insights. 
First,· it revealed that there are inherent factors in 
the management of a software project (resulting from the 
interaction of manpower acquisi tion policies and 
personnel turnover) that would cause it to over-run even 
what would amount to be a "perfect" schedule estimate. 
The second, more interesting finding, is that because of 
this inherent tendency to overshoot, the use of the 
analogy method in estimating would inject a bias in the 
scheduling process, a bias that generates, in the 
long-run longer (than necessary) project schedules. 
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2. The eqonomics of quality assurance (QA). Two sets 
of experiments were conducted in this area. The 
objective of the first set was to investigate, not 
whether QA is justified, but how much QA is justified. 
To do this we first examined the relationship between 
the QA effort expended and the % of errors detected 
during' development. A significant feature of this 
relationship is the "diminishing returns" of QA 
exhibited as QA expenditures extend beyond 20-30% of 
development effort. We then derived the "optimal" QA 
expenditure level i.e., that level that minimizes total 
project cost. The "optimal" QA effort expenditure level 
(for our prototype project) was found to be 16% of the 
development man-days. What, in our opin,ion, is really 
significant about this result is not its value, since 
this cannot be generalized beyond the type of project 
used in our experiment, but rather the process of 
deri ving , it, namely, our integrative system dynamics 
approach. Beyond controlled experimentation (which is 
too costly and time consuming to be practically 
feasible) this model, as far as we know, provides the 
first capability to quantitatively analyze the 
costs/benefits of QA policy for software production. 
And this, it is encouraging to note, is generalizable, 
in the sense that one can customize models for different 
software development environments to derive 
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environment-specific optimality conditions. The results 
of this first set of QA eXPQ~iments have also clearly 
demonstrated that QA policy doe0 have a significant 
impact on total project cost. That is, QA expenditures 
that are significantly lower or significantly higher 
than the" optimal" can result in a significant increase 
in the project's total cost. At low values of QA 
expenditures this increase in cost results from the 
large cost of the testing phase. On the other hand, at 
high values of QA expenditures, the excessive QA 
expenditures are themselves the culprit. 
The objective of the second set of QA experiments 
we conducted was to examine the sensitivity of the above 
results to two project variables, namely, the project's 
planned effort distribution profile (i.e. , how 
management plans the distribution of effort among the 
development versus testing phases of the project), and 
the software development productivity. The findings 
constitute "rules-of-thumb" that organizations can use 
to adapt published results, or results from other 
organizations, cO their own environment. 
3. Staffing. Our objective in this, the third and 
final area of investigation, was to test the 
applicabili ty of Brooks' Law to the domain of 
"medium-sized applications projects developed in a 
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familiar, in-house development environment." 
Since its "enactment," Brooks' Law has been widely 
endorsed in the literature {e.g., see (Synnott and 
Gruber, 1981), (Paretta and Clark, 1976), (Pressman, 
1982), (Jensen and O::'onies, 1979), and (Boehm, 1981». 
Furthermore, it has often been endorsed indiscriminately 
i.e., for not only large, but also small projects, and 
not only systems programming type projects, but also 
applications software systems. For example, Pressman 
(1982) extends Brooks' Law to 6-10 man-year projects, 
while in (Jensen and' Tonies, 1979) and (Synnott and 
Gruber, 1981) it is extended to the domain of 
software systems. Brooks was quite applications 
explici t in specifying the domain of applicability of 
his Brooks' Law to what he calls "Jumbo" systems 
programming projects. 
Our experimental results do not support Brooks' 
Law, for the type of project studied in this research. 
What our results show is that adding more people to a 
late project causes it to become more costly, but not to 
complete later. 
The conclusion that we can draw from our 
experiment's results is that Brooks' Law does not 
universally apply to all software development 
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environments. And that, in particular, it does not seem 
to apply to the medium sized appliction project 
developed in a familiar, in-house development 
environment. It is, therefore, not necessarily an 
invalidation of Brooks' "Brooks' Law," but rather a 
disqualification of the notion (implied not by Brooks 
but by the writings of others in the literature) that 
"Brooks' Law" is a universal law of software 
development. 
In a follow-up experiment, we re-tested Brooks' Law 
after quadrupling the training overhead in the project. 
Such an increase in the training overhead, while 
admittedly somewhat extreme, is never-the-Iess the kind 
of perturbation that we would need to make if we were to 
approximate the software development environment of 
large and complex systems programming software (Corbato 
and Clingen, 1980), e.g., such as the IBM 05/360. Under 
such conditions Brooks' Law applies, sometimes. The key 
is where in the life cycle people are added. Adding 
manpower to a late project can make it later only (our 
results indicate) if this takes place towards the end of 
the project's testing phase. 
VI.2. Sugqestions for Future Research: 
According to Nobel Prize Winner Alfred Kastler "All 
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knowledge is provisional --- never final. " This is certainly 
the case 'in this field where research is in the infancy 
stage. It is believed that this research has pointed up 
several areas requiring more intensive research. 
l~odel Enhancements: 
Further research needs to be performed within the 
framework of the existing model. We propose the following 
set of model extensions: 
1. Incorporating the requirements definition/analysis 
phase into the model's life cycle. "The technology of 
defining the requirements for a software system is an 
area in most urgent need for improvement and itself 
constitutes a major portion of the so-called 
'software-bottleneck'" (Bacon, 1982). Many in the field 
have hypothesized about the disruptive effects of 
changes in system requirements on software production, 
and on the direct link between such disruptions and 
cost/schedule slippages (~oehm, 1981). The system 
dynamics modeling approach provides a viable vehicle to 
test out such hypotheses, and to furnish a quantitative 
assessment of the claims made. 
2. Extend the model to capture the development of 
mUltiple projects e.g., two software projects developed 
in parallel. In such an environment project competition 
~.~~-- -- -_._- --. 
. . 
~~" tJ' • ! 
I 
I. 
I 
I 
! 
, 
I 
. r '. 
, 
i 
j 
1'---
455 
for company resources becomee a significant dimension, 
presenting an opportunity to examine the effects of 
various resource allocation policies e.g., of the 
manpower resource. 
3. Extending the model to other project environments. 
Particularly interesting (and challenging) would be an 
extension to the larger DOD-type software projects 
(e.g., projects that ara more than 1 million lines of 
code in size). Such an extension would entail a number 
of enhancements to the model. The development phase 
would be disaggregated into "finer" phases e.g., 
preliminary design, detailed design, and coding, with a 
set of formal milestones separating the' phases e.g., 
preliminary design review, critical design review, ... 
etc. Interesting questions to investigate here are the 
cost/benefits of such milestones e.g., administrative 
overhead versus visibil~ty benefits. It would be also 
of interest to investigate how and when serially planned 
phases are overlapped under schedule pressures, and the 
effects qf such unplanned overlapping on the project. 
Another needed enhancement would be to restructure the 
QA activity, which in such projects tends to be 
conducted by an independent organization. As a third 
enhancement, it would be u~eful to capture the deep 
vertical .structures that characterize the management of 
such "jumbo" projects, representing the communication 
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paths within the organization and including the various 
levels of information filtering and processing and of 
decision making. 
4. Another interesting extension would be to capture 
the quality of the produced software product. The first 
issue to address here is formulating the measure(s) of 
software quality (e.g., usability, maintainability, •• 
etc.). A valuable resource to tap in this area is the 
work done in the software metrics field e.g., see Perlis 
et al, Software Metrics (1981). A number of model 
enhancements would then be required. For example, 
software errors could be disaggregated into different 
types, some more serious than others. Another more 
challenging enhancement would be to capture the effects 
of motivational factors on quality. For exampl~, 
experiments have shown that explicit project goals 
(e.g., "produce code as fast as you can" versus "produce 
maintainable code" ) significantly impact project 
behavior e.g., productivity, error rates, . . . etc • 
(Weinberg and Schulman, 1974). This motivational issue 
is part icularly interesting because the different 
software development objectives conflict with each other 
in practice. For example, pure conc;:ent;ration on 
minimizing the software development budget and schedule 
is likely to have negative effects on software quality, 
and vice versa (Boehm, 1981). 
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New Modeling Applications: 
Rather than continuing to focus on software development 
projects per se, the system dynamics modeling approach 
outlined in this thesis could be extended to investigate a 
broader set of issues pertaining to the software development 
organization. That is, rather than trace the lifecycle{s) of 
one or more software projects, one would focus, instead, on 
the operations of a software development department as a 
continous stream of software products are developed, placed 
into operation, and maintained. A number of research 
questions are "ripe" for investigation, including: (1) the 
efficacy of different organizational structures (e.g., 
project, functional, amd matrix) in different software 
development environments; (2) Personnel turnover, its costs 
(e.g., recruiting and training overheads), its benefits 
(e.g., access to new ideas and methodologies), and its causes 
(i.g., schedule pressures, maintenance load, ... etc.); (3) 
The impact of such management approaches as Management By 
Objectives (MBO) in both the short-term and the long-term (a 
system dynamics study in the R&D area showed that the 
short-run effect of MBO on increasing motivation and 
productivity may be reversed in the long-run if social 
interaction and communication are allowed to erode); and (4) 
the organizational/environmental determinants of productivity 
e.g., standards, software tools, use of librarians, 
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documentation requirements • • • etc • Again, one needs to 
both short-term as well as long-term investigate 
implications. For example, beaause the software industry is 
unique in that we develop our own production tools, an 
investment in developing powerful software development tools 
(e.g., compilers, automa,ted testing tools, ••• etc.), while 
it might hamper productivity in the short-run, often leads to 
better software, which in turn could lead to even more 
powerful tools. 
THE END 
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APPENDIX: 
MODEL DOCUMENTATION 
• 
, 
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* BASE.S / BASE MODEL: VERSION S 
NOTE 
NOTE *************** 
-NOTE HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
NOTE *************** 
NOTE , 
L WFNEW.KzWFNEW.J+DT*(HIRERT.JK-ASIMRT.JK-NEWTRR.J) 
NOTE NEW WORKFORCE (PEOPLE) 
N WFNEW=O 
R HI RERT. KL"'MAX (O.WFGAP .K/H I REOY) 
NOTE HIRING RATE (PEOPLE/DAY) 
C HIREOYz40 
NOTE HIRING DELAY (DAYS) 
A WFGAP.K=WFS.K-TOTWF.K 
NOTE WORKFORCE GAP (PEOPLE) 
A- NEWTRR.K=MIN(TRNFRT.K,WFNEW.K/DT) 
NOTE NEW EMPLOYEES TRANSFER RATE OUT (PEOPLE/DAY) 
A TRNFRT.K=MAX(O,-WFGAP.K/TRNSDY) 
NOTE TRANSFER RATE OF PEOPLE OUT OF PROJECT (PEOPLE/DAY) 
C TRNSOY=10 
NOTE TIME DELAY TO TRANSFER PEOPLE OUT (DAYS) 
R ASIMRT.KL=WFNEW.K/ASIMDY 
NOTE ASSIMILATION RATE OF NEW EMPLOYEES (PEOPLE/DAY) 
C AS IMDY=80 
NOTE AVERAGE ASSIMILATION DELAY (DAYS) 
A DMPTRN.K=WFNEW.K*TRPNHR 
NOTE DAILY MANPOWER FOR TRAINING (MAN-DAYS/DAY) 
C TRPNHR=O • 2 
NOTE NUMBER OF TRAINERS PER NEW EMPLOYEE (DI~~NSIONLESS) 
L CMTRMD.K=CMTRMD.J+DT*DMPTRN.J 
NOTE CUMULATIVE TRAINING MAN-DAYS 
N CMTRMO=O 
L WFEXP. K=WFEXP. J+DT", (AS I MRT .JK-EXPTRR.J-QU ITRT .JK) 
NOTE EXPERIENCED WORKFORCE (PEOPLE) 
N WFEXP=WFSTRT 
NOTE INITIAL VALUE OF EXPERIENCED WORKFORCE LEVEL 
A EXPTRR.K=MIN(WFEXP.K/DT,TRNFRT.K-NEWTRR.K) 
NOTE EXPERIENCED EMPLOYEES TRANSFER RATE (PEOPLE/DAY) 
R QUITRT.KL=WFEXP,K/AVEMPT 
NOTE EXPERIENCED EMPLOYEES QUIT RATE (PEOPLE/DAY) 
C AVEMPT=673 
NOTE AVERAGE EMPLOYMENT TIME (DAYS) 
A FTEXWF.K=WFEXP.K*ADMPPS 
NOTE FULL-TIME-EQUIVALENT EXPERIENCED WF (MEN) 
A CELNWH.K=FTEXWF .K1'MNHPXS 
NOTE CEILING ON NEW HIREES (MEN) 
C ,MNHPXS=3 
NOTE MOST NEW HIREES PER EXPERIENCED STAFF (MEN/MEN) 
A CELTWF.K=CELNWH.K+WFEXP.K 
NOTE CEILING ON TOTAL WORKFORCE (PEOPLE) 
A WFS.K=MIN(CELTWF.K,WFNEED.K) 
NOTE WF SOUGHT (PEOPLE) 
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A TOTWF.K=WFNEW.K+WFEXP.K 
NOTE TOTAL WF LEVEL (PEOPLE) 
A FTEQWF.K=TOTWF.K*ADHPPS 
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NOTE FULL TIHE EQUIVALENT WF (EQUIVALENT PEOPLE) 
A FRWFEX.K=WFEXP.K/TOTWF.K 
·NOTE FRACTION OF WF THAT IS EXPERIENCED (DIHENSIOLESS) 
NOTE 
NOTE **'~******f,***** NOTE SOFTWARE PRODUCTION SUSBSYSTEH 
NOTE *************** 
NOTE 
NOTE (A) HAN POWER ALLOCATION SECTOR 
NOTE 
A TOTDHP.K=TOTWF.K*ADHPPS 
NOTE TOTAL DAILY MANPOWER (HAN-DAYS/DAY) 
C ADMPPS=I 
NOTE AVERAGE DAILY MANPOWER PER STAFF (DAY/DAY) 
L CUMMD. K=CUMMD. J+DTfrTDTDMP. J 
NOTE CUMULATIVE HAN-DAYS EXPENDED (MAN-DAYS) 
N CUMMD=.OOOI 
A DHPATR.K=TOTDMP.K-DMPTRN.K 
NOTE DAILY HANPOWER AVAILABLE AFTER TRAINING (HAN-DAYS/DAY) 
A AFMPQA,K=PFMPQA.Kfr (J+ADJQA.K) 
NOTE ACTUAL FRCATION OF HANPOWER FOR QA (DIMENSIONLESS) 
N AFHPQA=PFMPQA 
C QO=O 
NOTE QUALITY OBJECTIVE ••• NORMAL QO = 0 
A PFMPQA.K=TABHL(TPFMQA.PJBAWK.K.O.l •. I)*(I+QO/IOO) 
NOTE PLANNED FRACT ION OF MANPOWER FOR QA (0 I MENS I ONLESS) 
T TPFMQA=.IS/.IS/.IS/.IS/.IS/.I!;/.15/.IS/.15!.IS/O 
A ADJQA.K=TABHL (TADJQA.SCHPR.K.O • • S •• 1) 
NOTE % ADJUSTHENT IN PFMPQA (%) 
T TADJQA=O/-.02S/-.IS/-.35/-.47S/-.S 
A DM?QA.K=MI N «AFMPQA .K'~TOTDMP. K) •. 9*DHPATR. K) 
NOTE DAILY MANPOWER ALLOCATED FOR QA (MAN-DAYS/DAY) 
L CMQAMD.K=CMQAMD.J+DT*DHPQA.J 
NOTE CUMULATIVE QA MAN-DAYS (MAN-DAYS) 
N CMQAMD=O 
A DMPSWP.K=DMPATR.K-DMPQA.K 
NOTE DAILY HANPOWER FOR SOFTWARE PRODUCTION (MAN-DAYS/DAY) 
A DESECR.K~DTCERR.K/DESRWD 
NOTE DESIRED ERROR CORRECTION RATE (ERRORS/DAY) 
N DESECR=O 
C DESRWD=IS 
NOTE DESIRED REWORK DELAY (DAYS) 
A DMPRW. K=H I N «DESECR. K*PRWMPE. K) • DHPSWP .K) 
NOTE DA I LY HANPOWER ALLOCATED FOR REWORK (MAN-DAYS/DAY) 
N DHPRW=O 
L PRWHPE. K=PRWMPE. J+ (DT /TARMPE) (RWHPPE. J-PRWHPE.J) 
NOTE PERCEIVED REWORK HANPDWER NEEDED PER ERROR (MAN-DAYS/ERROR) 
N PRWHPE=.S 
C TARHPE=IO 
NOTE TIHE TO ADJUST PRWMPE (DAYS) 
L CHRWMD.K=CMRWMD.J+DT*DHPRW.J 
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NOTE CUMULATIVE REWORK MAN-DAYS (MAN-DAYS) 
N CMRWMD=O 
A DMPDVT.K=DMPSWP.K-DMPRW.K 
ORIGINAL PAGE HS 
OF POOR QUALITY 
NOTE DAILY. MANPOWER FOR DEVELOPMENT/TESTING (MAN-DAYS/DAYS) 
L CMDVMD.K=CMDVMD.J+DT*DMPDVT.J*(l-FREFTS.K) 
NOTE CUMULATVE DEVELOPMENT MAN-DAYS (MAN-DAYS) 
N CMDVMD=O 
NOTE 
NOTE (B) SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT SECTOR 
NOTE 
R SDvRT.KL=MIN«DMPSDV.K*SDVPRD.K),TSKPRM.K/DT) 
NOTE SDFTWARE DEVELOPMENT RATE (TASKS/DAY) 
N SDVRT=O 
A DMPSDV.K=DMPDVT.K*(l-FREFTS.K) 
NOTE DAILY MANPOWER FOR SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT (MAN-DAYS/DAY) 
A FREFTS.K=1'ABHL (TFEFTS,TSKPRM.K/PJBSl.K,O, .2, .04) 
NOTE FRACTION OF EFFORT FOR SYSTEM TESTING (DIMENSIONLESS) 
T TFEFTS=1/.5/.28/.15/.05/0 
A SDVPRD .I(=POTPRD .K>~MPDMCL.K 
NOTE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTIVITY (TASK§/MAN-DAY) 
A POTPRD. K=ANPPRD. K>~MPPTPD. K 
NOTE POTENTIAL PRODUCTIVTY (TASKS/MAN-DAY) 
A ANPPRD. K=FRWFEX. K>\NPWPEX+ (l-FRWFEX. K) *NPWPNE 
NOTE AVERAGE NOMINAL POTENTIAL PRODUCTIVITY (TASKS/MAN-DAY) 
C NPWPEX=l 
NOTE NOMINAL POTENTIAL PRODUCTIVITY OF EXP EMPLOYEE (TSK/M-D) 
C NPWPNE=0.5 
NOTE NOMINAL POTENTIAL PROD OF NEW EMPL. (TSK/M-D) 
A MPPTPD.K=TABHL (TMPTPD,PJBAWK.K,O. 1,.1) 
NOTE MULTIPLIER TO POTENTIAL PRODUCTIVITY DUE TO LEARNING (DIMENSIONLESS) 
T TMPTPD=1/1.0125/1.0325/1.055/1.09/1.15/1.2/1.22/1.245/1.25/1.25 
A MPDMCL. K=AFMDPJ. KI: (l-COMMDH. K) 
NOTE MULTIPLIER TO PRODUCTIVITY DUE TO MOTIVATION & COMM LOSSES (DIMENSIONLESS 
) 
A COMMOH.K=TABHL(TCOMOH,TOTWF.K.O,30,5) 
NOTE COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD (DIMENSIONLESS) 
T TCOMOH=O/.015/.o6/.135/.24/.375/.54 
C NFMDPJ=.6 
NOTE NOMINAL FRACTION OF A MAN-DAY ON PROJE~T (DIMENSIONLESS) 
L AFMDPJ.K=AFMDPJ.J+DT*WRADJR.JK 
NOTE ACTUAL FRACTION OF A MAN-DAY ON PROJECT (DIMENSIONLESS) 
N AFMDPJ=NFMDPJ 
R WRADJR.KL=(WKRTS.K-AFMOPJ.K)/WKRADY.K 
NOTE WORK RATE ADJUSTMENT RATE (l/DAY) 
A WKRADY.K=NWRADY.K*EWKRTS.K 
NOTE WORK RATE ADJUSTMENT DELAY (DAYS) 
A NWRADY.K=TABHL(TNWRAD,TIMERM.K,O,30.5) 
NOTE NORMAL WORK RATE ADJUSTMENT DELAY (DAYS) 
T TNWRAD=2/3.5/5/6.5/8/g.5/10 
A EWKRTS.K=CLIP(1,.75.WKRTS.K,AFMDPJ.K) 
NDTE EFFECT OF WORK RATE SOUGHT. (DIMENSIONLESS) 
A WKRTS.K= (l+PBWKRS.K) *NFMDPJ 
NOTE WORK RATE SOUGHT (DIMENSIONLESS) 
N MAXMHR=l 
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NOTE MAXIMUM BOOST IN MAN-HOURS (DIMENSIONLESS) 
ORIGINAL PAGE I[J 
OF POOR QUALITY 
A PBWKRS.K=CLIP«MDHDL.K/(FTEQWF.K*(OVWDTH.K+.0001»), 
X (MDHDL.K/ (TMDPSN.K-MDHDL.K+.()OOl» ,PMDSHR.K,O) 
NOTE % BOOST IN WORK RATE SOUGHT (%) 
A MDHDL.K=CL I P (I'll N (MAXSHR. K, PMDSHR.K) ,-EX5ABS. K, PMDSHR. K,O) *CTRLSW 
NOTE MAN-DAYS THAT WILL BE HANDLED OR ABSORBED (MAN-DAYS) 
C CTRLSW=l 
NOTE CONTROL SWITCH ••• ALLOWS US TO TEST POLICY OF NO OVERWORK (0 OR I) 
A EXSABS. K=MAX (0, ( 
X TABHL(TEXABS,TMDPSN.K/MDRM.IC,O,I,.l)*MDRM.K-TMDPSN.K» . 
NOTE MAN-DAY EXCESSES THAT WILL BE ABSOBED (MAN-DAYS) 
T TEXABS=0/.2/.4/.55/.7/.8/.9/.95/1/1/1 
A MAXSHR.K=(OVWDTH.K*FTEQWF.K*MAXMHR)*WTOVWK.K 
NOTE MAXIMUM SHORTAGE IN MAN-DAYS THAT CAN BE HANDLED (MAN-DAYS) 
A WTOVWK.K=CLIP(I,O,TIME.K,BRKOTM.K+RLXTMC.K) 
NOTE WILLINGNESS TO OVERWORK (0 OR 1) 
L BRKDTM.K=MAX (BRKDTM.J,SWITCH «TIME.J+DT) ,O,OVWDTH.K» 
NOTE TIME OF LAST EXHAUSTION BREAKDOWN 
N BRKDTM=-I 
L RLXTMC. K=RLXTMC. Jt,SW ITCH (0, 1 ,OVWDTH. K) +DTi, 
X CLIP(I,-RLXTMC.J/DT,EXHLEV.K/MXEXHT,.I) 
NOTE VARIABLE THAT CONTROLS TIME TO DE-EXHAUST 
N RLXTMC=O 
A OVWDTH. K=NOVWDT • Ki'MODTEX. K 
NOTE OVERWORK DURATION THRESHOLD (DAYS) 
A NOVWDT.K=TABHL(TNOWDT,TIMERM.K,O,50,lO) 
NOTE NOMINAL OVERWORK DURATION THRESHOLD (DAYS) 
T TNOWDT=O/IO/20/30/40/50 
A MODTEX.K=TABHL(TMODEX,EXHLEV.K/MXEXHT,O,I,.l) 
NOTE EFFECT OF EXHAUSTION ON OVERWORK DURATION THRESHOLD (DIMENSIONLESS) 
T TMODEX=1/.9/.8/.7/.6/.5/.4/.3/.2/.I/O 
L EXHLEV.K=EXHLEV.J+DT*(RIEXHL.JK-RDEXHL.JK) 
NOTE EXHAUST ION LEVEL (EXHAUST UN ITS) 
N EXHLEV=O 
R R I EXHL. KL=TABHL (TR I XHL, (J-AFMDPJ. K) / (J-NFMDPJ) , 
X -0.5,1,.1) . 
NOTE RATE OF INCREASE IN EXHAUSTION LEVEL (EXHAUST UNITS/DAY) 
T TRIXHL=2.5/2.2/1.9/1.6/1.3/1.15/.9/.8/.7/.6/.5/.4/.3/.2/0/0 
R RDEXHL.KL=CLIP(EXHLEV.K/EXHDDY,O,O,RIEXHL.JK) 
NOTE RATE OF DEPLETION IN EXHAUSTION LEVEL (EXHAUST UNITS/DAY) 
C EXHDDY=20 
NOTE EXHAUSTION DEPLETION DELAY TIME (DAYS) 
e MXEXHT=50 
NOTE MAXIMUM TOLERABLE EXHAUSTION (EXHAUST UNITS) 
NOTE 
NOTE (e) QUALITY ASSURANCE AND REWORK SECTOR 
NOTE 
R QART.KL=DELAY3(SDVRT.JK,AQADLY) 
NOTE FOR QA RATE (TASKS/DAY) 
L TSKWK.K=TSKWK.J+DT*(SDVRT.JK-QART.JK) 
NOTE TASKS WORKED (TASKS) 
N TSKWK=O 
C AQADLY=10 
NOTE AVERAGE DELAY FOR QA (DAYS) 
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L CUMTQA.KECUMTQA.J+DT*(QART.JK-TSRATE.JK) 
NOTE CUMULATIVE TASKS QA'ED (TASKS) 
N CUMTQA=O 
A ANERPT.KEMAX(PTDTER.K/(TSKWK.K+.0001) ,0) 
NOTE AVERAGE # OF ~RRORS PER TASK (ERRORS/TASK) 
'A QAMPNE.K=NQAMPE.K*(l/MPDMCL.K)*MDEFED.K 
ORIGINAL PAGE ~~ 
OF POOR QUAUT'I 
NOTE QA MANPOWER NEEDED TO DETECT AVERAGE ERROR (MAN-DAYS/ERROR) 
A NQAMPE.K=TABHL (TNQAPE, PJBAWK .K,O, I, • 1) 
NOTE NOMINAL QA MANPOWER NEEDED TO DETECT AVERAGE ERROR (MAN-DAYS/ERROR) 
T TNQAPE=.4/.4/.39/.375/.35/.3/.25/.225/.21/.2/.2 
A MDEFED.K=TABHL(TMDFED,ERRDSY.K,O,lO,l) 
NOTE MULTIPLIER TO DETECTION EFFORT DUE TO ERROR DENSITY (DIMENSIONLESS) 
T TMDFED=50/36/26/17.5/10/4/1.75/1.2/1/1/1 
A ERRDSY.K=ANERPT.K*lOOO/DSIPTK 
NOTE ERROR DENSITY (ERRORS/KOSI) 
A PERDRT.K=DMPQA.K/QAMPNE.K 
NOTE POTENTIAL ERROR DETECTION RATE (ERRORS/DAY) 
A ERRDRT.K=MIN(PERDRT.K,PTDTER.K/DT) 
NOTE ERROR DETECTION RATE (ERRORS/DAY) 
L CMERD.K=CMERD.J+DT*ERRDRT.J 
NOTE CUMULATIVE ERRORS DETECTED (ERRORS) 
N CMERD=O 
A PRCTDT.K=lOO*CMERD.K/(CUMERG.K+.001) 
NOT~ PERCENT ERRORS DETECTED (PERCENT) 
A ERRSRT.K=QART.JK*ANERPT.K 
NOTE ERROR ESCAPE RATE (ERRORS/DAY) 
L CMERES .K=CMERES. J+DT'·'ERRSRT. J 
NOTE CUMULATIVE ERRORS THAT ESCAPED (ERRORS) 
N CMERES=O 
L PTDTER.K=PTDTER.J+DT*(ERRGRT.JK-ERRDRT.J-ERRSRT.J) 
NOTE POTENTIALLY DETECTABLE ERRORS (ERRORS) 
N PTDTER=O 
R ERRGRT.KL=SDVRT.JK*ERRPTK.K 
NOTE ERROR GENERATION RATE (ERRORS/DAY) 
A ERRPTK. K=NERPTK. Ki'MERGSP. K*MERGWM. K 
NOTE ERRORS PER TASK (ERRORS/TASK) 
II NERPTK.K=NERPK.K*DS I PTK/1000 
NOTE NOMINAL # OF ERRORS COMMITTED PER TASK (ERRORS/TASK) 
A NERPK.K=TABHL(TNERPK,PJBAWK.K,O, 1,.2) 
NOTE NOMINAL # OF ERRORS COMMITTED PER KOSI (ERRORS/KOSI) 
T TNERPK=25/23.86/21.59/15.9/13.6/12.5 
A MERGSP.K=TABHL(TMEGSP,SCHPR.K,-.4,l,.2) 
NOTE MULTIPLIER TO ERROR GENERATION DUE TO SCHEDULE PRESSURE (DIMENSIONLESS) 
T TMEGSP=.9/.94/1/1.05/1.14/1.24/1.36/1.5 
A MERQWM.K=TABHL(TMEGWM,FRWFEX.K,O,l,.2) 
NOTE MULTIPLIER TO ERROR GENERATION DUE TO WORKFORCE MIX (DIMENSIONLESS) 
T TMEGWM=2/1.8/1.6/1.4/1.2/1 
L CUMERG.K=CUMERG.J+OT*ERRGRT.JK 
NOTE CUMULAT I VE ERRDRS GENERATED D I RECTL Y DUR I NG WORK I NG (ERRORS) 
N CUMERG=O 
L DTCERR. K=DTCERR. J+DT* (ERROR" • J-RWRATE . JK) 
NOTE DETECTED ERRORS (ERRORS) 
N DTCERR=O 
R RWRATE.KL=DMPRW.K/RWMPPE.K 
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503 OF POOR QUALITY 
NOTE REWORK RATE (ERRORS/DAY) 
A RWMPPE.K=NRWMPE.K/MPDMCL.K 
NOTE REWORK MANPOWER NEEDED PER ERROR (MAN-DAYS/ERROR) 
A NRWMPE.K=TABHL (TNRWME,PJBAWK.K,O, 1, .2) 
·NOTE NOMINAL REWORK MANPOWER NEEDED PER ERROR (MAN-DAYS/ERROR) 
T TNRWME=.6/ .575/ .5/ .4/ .325/.3 
L CMRWED.K=CMRWED.J+DT*RWRATE.JK 
NOTE CUMULATIVE REWORKED ERRORS DURING DEVELOpMENT (ERRORS) 
N CMRWED=O 
NOTE 
NOTE (D) SYSTEM TESTING SECTOR 
NOTE 
L UDAVER.K=UDAVER.J+DT*(AEGRT.JK+AERGRT.JK-AERRRT.JK-DCRTAE.JK) 
NOTE UNDETECTED ACT I VE ERR.ORS (ERRORS) 
N UDAVER"'O 
R f1EGRT .KL= (ERRSRT .K+BDFXGR. K) *FRAERR. K 
NOTE ACIVE ERRORS GENERATION RATE (ERRORS/DAY) 
A BDFXGR.KzRWRATE.JK*PBADFX 
NOTE BAD ·FIXES GENERATE RATE (ERRORS/DAY) 
C PBADFX=.075 
NOTE PERCENT BAD FIXES (FRACTION) 
A FRAERR.K=TABHL (TFRAER,PJBAWK.K,O, 1,. J) 
NOTE FRACTION OF ESCAPING ERRORS THAT WILL BE ACTIVE (DIMENSIONLESS) 
T TFRAER=1/1/1/1/.95/.85/.5/.2/.075/0/0 
R AERGRT.KL .. SDVRT.JK*SMOOTH(AERRDS.K,TSAEDS)*MAERED.K 
NOTE ACTIVE ERRORS REGENERATION RATE (ERRORS/DAY) 
A MAERED. KzTABHL (TMERED ,SMOOTH (AERRDS. K'~l OOO/DS I PTK, TSAEDS) ,0, 100, 10) 
: .. :, -
NOTE MULTIPLIER TO ACTIVE ERROR REGENERATION DUE TO ERROR DENSITY (DIMENSIONLE 
55) . 
T TMERED=1/1.1/1.2/1.325/1.45/1.6/2/2.5/3.25/4.35/6 
C TSAEDS=40 
NOTE TIME TO SMOOTH ACTIVE ERROR DENS ITY (AERRDS) (DAYS) 
A AERRDS. K=UDAVER .K/ (CUMTQA .K+. 1) 
NOTE ACTIVE ERROR DENSITY (ERRORS/TASK) 
R AERRRT.KL=UDAVER.K*AERRFR.K 
NOTE ACTIVE ERRORS RETIRING RATE (ERRORS/DAY) 
A AERRFR.K=TABHL (TERMFR,PJBAWK.K,O,l,. J) 
NOTE ACTIVE ERRORS RETIRING FRACTION (l/DAYS) 
T TERMFR=O/O/0/0/.01/.02/.03/.04/.1/.3/1 
R DCRTAE. Kl=MI N (TSRATE. JK{cAERRDS. K, UDAVER. K/DT) 
NOTE DETECTION/CORRECTION RATE OF ACTIVE ERRORS (ERRORS/DAY) 
L UDPVER.K=UDPVER.J+DT*(PEGRT.JK+AERRRT.JK-DCRTPE.JK) 
NOTE UNDETECTED PASSIVE ERRORS (ERRORS) 
N UDPVER=O 
R PEGRT.KL=(ERRSRT.K+BDFXGR.K)* (l-FRAERR.K) 
NOTE PASSIVE ERRORS GENERATION RATE (ERRORS/DAY) 
R DCRTPE.KL=MIN(TSRATE.JK*PERRDS.K,UDPVER.K/DT) 
NOTE DETECT/CORRECT RATE OF PASS I VE ERRORS (ERRORS/DAY) 
L CMRWET.K=CMRWET.J+DT*(OCRTPE.JK+DCRTAE.JK) 
NOTE CUMULATIVE ERRORS REWORKED IN TESTING PHASE (ERRORS) 
N CMRWET=O 
A ALESER. K=UDAVER. K+UDPVER. K+CMRWET • K 
NOTE ALL ERRORS THAT ESCAi'ED AND WERE GENERATED (ERRORS) 
A DMPTST.K=DMPDVT.K*FREFTS.K 
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NOTE DAILY MANPOWER FOR TESTING (MAN-DAYS/DAY) 
L CMTSMD.K=CMTSMD.J+DT*DMPTST.J 
NOTE CUMULATIVE TESTING MAN-DAYS (MAN-DAYS) 
N CMTSMD=O 
.R TSRATE. KLzM I N (CUMTQA. K/DT, DMPTST. K/TMPNPT. K) 
NUTE TESTING RATE (TASKS/DAY) 
A TMPNPT.K= (TSTOVH*DS I PTK/1000+TMPNPE.K* (PERRDS.K+AERRDS .K) 
X ) /MPDMCL. K 
NOTE TESTING MANPOWER NEEDED PER TASK (MAN-DAYS/TASK) 
C TSTOVH=1 
NOTE TESTING EFFORT OVERHEAD (MAN-DAYS/KDSI) 
C TMPNPE=.15 
NOTE TESTING MANPOWER NEEDED PER ERROR (MAN-DAY/ERROR) 
A PTKTST • K=CUMTiIT • K/PJBSZ. K 
NOTE % OF TASKS TESTED (%) 
A PERRDS.K=UDPVER.K/(CUMTQA.K+.0001) 
NOTE PASSIVE ERROR DENSITY (ERRORS/TASK) 
L CUMTKT.K=CUMTKT.J+DT*TSRATE.JK 
NOTE CUMULATIVE TASKS TESTED (TASKS) 
N CUMTKT=O 
A ALLERR.K=PTDTER.K+DTCERR.K+CMRWED.K+UDAVER.K+ 
X UDPVER.K+CMRWET.K . 
NOTE ALL ERRORS (ERRORS) ~ 
A ALLRWK.K=CMRWED.K+CMRWET.K 
NOTE ALL ERRORS REWORKED •.• IN DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING (ERRORS) 
NOTE 
NOTE ,b~f,************ 
NOTE CONTROL SUBSYSTEM 
NOTEi:i'*******i:i'*'~'~* 
NOTE 
L CMTKDV.K=CMTKDV.J+DT*SDVRT.JK 
NOTE CUMULATIVE TASKS DEVELOPED (TASKS) 
N CMTKDV=O 
A PJBAWK.K=CMTKDV.K/RJBSZ 
NOTE % OF JOB ACTUALLY WORKED (%) 
A PJDPRD.K=TSKPRM.K/(MDPRNT.K+.1) 
NOTE PROJECTED DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTIVITY (TASKS/MAN-DAY) 
A MDPRNT.K=MAX(O,MDRM.K-MDPNRW.K-MDPNTS.K) 
NOTE MAN DAYS PERCEIVED REMAINING FOR NEW TASKS (MAN-DAYS) 
A MDPNRW.K=DTCERR.K*PRWMPE.K 
/ 
NOTE MAN DAYS PERCEIVED NEEDED FOR REWORKING ALREADY DETECTED ERRORS (1'10) 
A ASSPRD.K=PJDPRD.K*WTPJDP.K+PRDPRD.K*(1-WTPJDP.K) 
NOTE ASSUMED PRODUCTIVITY (TASKS/MAN-DAY) 
A PRDPRD.K=CMTKDV.K/(CUMMD.K-CMTSMD.K) 
NOTE PERCEIVED DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTIVITY (TASKS/MAN-DAY) 
A . WTPJDP.K=MPWDEV.K*MPWREX.K 
NOTE WEIGHT TO PROJECTED DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTIVITY (DIMENSIONLESS) 
A MPWDEV.K=TABHL (TMPDEV,PJBPWK.K/100,O, 1 , .1) . 
NOTE MULTIPLIER TO PRODUCTIVITY WEIGHT DUE TO DEVELOMENT (DIMENSIONLESS) 
T TMPDEV=1/1/1/1/1/1/.975/.9/.75/.5/0 . 
A MPWREX.K=TABHL(TMPREX, (l-MDPRNT.K/(JBSZMD.K-TSSZMD.K», 
X 0,1,.1) 
NOTE MULTIPLIER TO PRODUCTIVITY WEIGHT DUE TO RESOURCE EXPENDITURE (DIMENSIONL 
ESS) 
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T TMPREX~1/1/1/1/lil/.975/.9/.75/.5/0 
A MDPNNT.K=TSKPRM.K/ASSPRD.K 
.-
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OF POOR QUALiTY 
NOTE MAN DAYS PERCEIVED STILL NEEDED FOR NEW TASKS (MAN-DAYS) 
A TMDPSN.KzMDPNNT.K+MDPNTS.K+MDPNRW.K 
NOTE TOTAL MAN DAYS PERCEIVED STILL NEEDED (MAN-DAYS) 
A MDPNTS.K~TSTPRM.K/PRTPRD.K 
NOTE MAN DAYS PERCEIVED STILL NEEDED FOR TESTING (MAN-DAYS) 
A TSTPRM.KzPJBSZ.K-CUMTKT.K 
NOTE TASKS REMAINING TO BE TESTED (TASKS) 
A PRTPRD.K~SMOOTH«CLIP(PLTSPD.K.ACTS?n.K.O,CUMTKT.K» ,TSTSPD) 
NOTE PERCEIVED TESTING PRODUCTIVITY (TASKS/MAN-DAY) 
C TSTSPD=50 
NOTE TIME TO SMOOTH TESTING PRODUCTIVITY (DAYS) 
A PLTSPD.K=PJBSZ.K/TSSZMD.K 
NOTE PLANNED TESTING PRODUCTIVITY (TASKS/MAN-DAY) 
A ACTS PD. K=CUMTKT. K/ (CMTSMD. K+. 00 1) 
NOTE ACTUAL TESTING PRODUCTIVITY (TASKS/MAN-DAY) 
A PMDSHR.K=TMDPSN.K-MDRM.K 
NOTE PERCEIVED SHORTAGE IN MAN DAYS (MAN-DAYS) 
A SHRRPT.K=PMDSHR.K-MDHDL.K 
NOTE SHORTAGE REPORTED (MAN-DAYS) 
A MDRPTN.K=MDRM.K+SHRRPT.K 
NOTE MAN DAYS REPORTED STILL NEEDED (MAN-DAYS) 
A SCHPR.K=(TMDPSN.K-MDRM.K)/MDRM.K 
NOTE SCHEDULE PRESSURE (0 I MENS IONLESS) 
A PTRPTC.K=SMOOTH «lOO-(MDRPTN.K/JBSZMD.K) *100) ,RPTDLY) 
NOTE % OF TASKS REPORTED COMPLETE (%) 
N PTRPTC=O 
C RPTDLY=lO 
NOTE REPORTING DELAY (DAYS) 
A PDEVRC.K=SMOOTH(MAX«lOO-«MDRPTN.K-MDPNTS.K)/(JBSZMD.K-TSSZMD.K) 
X )*100) ,PDEVRC.K) ,RPTDLY) 
N PDEVRC=O 
NOTE % DEVELOPMENT PERCEIVED COMPLETE % 
L UNDJTK.K=UNDJTK.J-DT*RTDSTK.JK 
NOTE UNOISCOVERED JOB TASKS (TASKS) 
N UNDJTK=RJBSZ-PJBSZ 
N RJBSZ=RJBDSI/DSIPTK 
NOTE REAL JOB SIZE IN TASKS (TASKS) 
R RTDSTK.KL=UNDJTK.K*PUTDPD.K/IOO 
NOTE RATE OF DISCOVERING TASKS (TASKS/DAY) 
A PUTOPD.K~TABHL(TPUTDD.PJBPWK.K,O,lOO.20) 
NOTE PERCENT OF UNDISCOVERED TASKS DISCOVERED PER DAY (l/DAY) 
T TPUTDD=0/0.4/2.5/5/10/100 
A PJBPWK.K=(CMTKDV.K/PJBSZ.K) *100 
NOTE % OF JOB PERCEIVED WORKED (%) 
R RTINCT.KL=DELAY3(RTDSTK.JK,DLINCT) 
NOTE RATE OF INCORPORATING DISCOVERED TASKS INTO PROJECT (TASKS/DAY) 
L TKDSCV .K=MAX «TKDSCV .J+DTi' (RTDSTK.JK-RTI NCT .JK» ,0) 
NOTE TASKS DISCOVERED (TASKS) 
N TKDSCV=O 
C DLlNCT=lO 
NOTE AVERAGE DELAY IN INCORPORATING DISCOVERED TASKS (DAYS) 
L PJBSZ. K=PJBSZ • J+DT"'RT I NCT .JK 
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NOTE CURRENTLY PERCEIVED JOB SIZE (TASKS) 
N PJBSZ=PJBDSI/DSIPTK 
A TSKPRM.K=PJBSZ.K-CMTKDV.K 
NOTE NEW TASKS PERCEIVED REMAINING (TASKS) 
A PSZDCT.K=TKDSCV.K/ASSPRD.K 
ORIGINAL PAGE is 
OF POOR QUALITY 
NOTE PERCEIVED SIZE OF DiSCOVERED TASKS IN MAN DAYS (MAN-DAYS) 
A RSZOCT. K=PSZDCT. K/ (MDPRNT .K+.OOOl) 
NOTE RELAT I VE SIZE OF DISCOVERED TASKS (D I MENS lotJLESS) 
A FADHWO.K=TABHL (TFAHWO,RSZDCT .. K/ (MSZTWO+.001) ,0,2, .2) 
NOTE FRACTION OF ADDITIONAL TASKS ADDING TO MAN-DAYS 
T TFAHWO=O/0/0/O/0/O/.7/.9/.975/1/1 
C MSZTWO=.Ol 
NOTE MAXIMUM RELATIVE SIZE OF ADDITIONS TOLERATED W/O ADDING TO PROJECT'S MAN-
DAYS 
R I RDVDT .KL= (RTI NCT .JK/ASSPRD .K) 1, (FADHWO. K) 
NOTE RATE OF INCREASE IN 'DEVELOPMENT MAN-DAYS DUE TO DISCOVERED TASKS (MD/D) 
L TSSZMD.K=TSSZMD.J+DT*IRTSDT.JK+ARTJBM.K*CLIP(l,O,FREFTS.J,.9) 
NOTE PLANNED TESTING SIZE IN MAN-DAYS ••• BEFORE WE START TESTING 
N TSSZMD=TSTMD 
R IRTSDT.KL=(RTINCT.JK/PRTPRD.K)* (FADHWO.K) 
NOTE RATE OF INCREASE IN TESTING MAN DAYS DUE TO DISCOVERED TASKS (MD/D) 
L JBSZMD .K=JBSZMO .J+DTi' (I ROVDT .JK+I RTSDT .JK+ART JaM.JK) 
NOTE TOTAL JOB SIZE IN MAN DAYA (MAN-DAYS) 
N JBSZMD=DEVMD+TSTMD 
R ARTJBM.KL=(MDRPTN.K+CUMMD.K-JBSZMD.K)/DAJBMD.K 
NOTE RATE OF ADJUSTING THE JOB SIZE IN MAN-DAYS (MAN-DAYS/DAY) 
A DAJBMD.K=TABHL(TDAJMD,TIMERM.K,0,20,20) 
NOTE DELAY IN ADJUSTING JOB'S SIZE IN MAN DAYS (DAYS) 
T TDAJMD=.5/3 
A MDRM.K=MAX (.0001 ,JBSZMD.K-CUMMD.K) 
NOTE 
NOTE **,'c*,'c*,·,*,','l:,'c·kf,,'c,', 
NOTE PLANNING SUBSYSTEM 
NOTE 
NOTE **,H<>h,**>',**,,*M, 
NOTE 
NOTE MAN DAYS REMAINING 
A TIMEPR.K=MDRM.K/(WFS.K*ADMPPS) 
NOTE TIME PERCEIVED STILL REQUIRED (DAYS) 
A INDCDT.K=TIME.K+TIMEPR.K 
NOTE INDICATED COMPLETION DATE 
L SCHCDT.K=SCHCOT.J+DT*(INDCDT.J-SCHCDT.J)/SCHADT.K 
NOTE SCHEDULE COMPLETION DATE 
N SCHCDT=TDEV 
A SCHADT.K=TABHL(TSHADT,TIMERM.K,0,5,5) 
NOTE SCHEDULE ADJUSTMENT TIME (DAYS) 
T TSHADT=.5/5 
A TIMERM.K=MAX(SCHCDT.K-TIME.K,O) 
NOTE TIME REMAINING (DAYS) 
A WF I NDC. K= (MDRM. K/ (TI MERM. K+:OO 1) ) /ADMPPS 
NOTE INDICATED WORKFORCE (PEOPLE) 
A WFNEED.K=MIN«WCWF.K*WFINDC.K+(l-WCWF.K)*TOTWF.K) ,WFINDC.K) 
NOTE WORKFORCE LEVEL NEEDED (PEDPLE) 
A WCWF • K=MAX (WCWF 1 . K, WCWF 2. K) 
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NOTE WILLINGNESS TO CHANGE WORKFORCE LEVEL (DIMENSIONLESS) 
A WCWF1.K~TABHL(TWCWF1,TIMERM.K/(HIREDY+ASIMDy),O,3,.3) 
NOTE WILL I NGNESS TO CHANGE WORKFORCE (1) (0 I MENS I ONLESS) 
T TWCWF1=O/O/.I/.4/.85/1/1/1/1/1/1 
A WCWF2.K=TABHL(TWCWF2,SCHCDT.K/MXTLCD,.86,I,.02) 
'NOTE WILl! NGNESS TO CHANGE Wf (2) (D I MENS I ONLESS) 
T TWCWF2~O/.I/.2/.35/.6/.7/.77/.80 
N MXTLCDz/'lXSCDX1'TDEV, 
NOTE MAXIMUM TOLERABLE COMLETION DATE (DAYS) 
C MXSCDX=1 E6 
NOTE MAX SCHEDULE COMPLETION DATE EXTENSION (DIMENSIONLESS) 
NOTE 
NOTE *************** 
NOTE INITIALIZATION 
NOTE 1<*1,1,****1,***,\** 
NOTE 
NOTE THE REAL JOB SIZE = 64,000 DSI 
NOTE FROM BOEHM PAGE 90: 
NOTE DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT BY PHASE IS: 
NOTE DESIGN (39%), PROGRAMMING (36%), INT TESTING (25%) 
NOTE FROM BOEHM PAGE 64-65: 
NOTE EFFORT = 2.4*(K051)*';1.05 
NOTE = 190 1'11'1 
NOTE = 190 * 19 = 3592 MAN-DAYS 
NOTE DEVELOPMENT EFFORT = 75 % 
NOTE = 2695 MAN DAYS 
NOTE GROSS DEV PRODUCTIVITY = 64,000/2695 = 24 DSI/MO 
NOTE 
NOTE SCHEDULE = 2.5 * (1'11'1)**.38 
NOTE = 18 MONTHS 
NOTE = 348 DAYS 
NOTE 
NOTE AVERAGE STAFF SIZE = 3592/348 
NOTE = 10 
NOTE 
NOTE GROSS PRODUCTIVITY INCORPORATES: DEV, FOR QA, & REWORKING 
NOTE ASSUMING 25% OF EFFORT GOES INTO QA & REWORKING 
NOTE 25% OF 2695 MAN DAYS = 674 MAN DAYS 
NOTE DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTIVITY = 64,000/(2695-674) 
NOTE = 31 DSI/MAN-DAY 
NOTE 
NOTE ASSUME LOSSES IN PRODUCTIVITY = 50 % 
NOTE THEREFORE POTENTIAL PRODUCTIVITY = 31 * 2 = APPROX 60 DSI/MD 
NOTE DEFINE 1 TASK = 60 DSI 
C DSIPTK=60 
NOTE DSI PER TASK 
C RJBDSI=64000 
NOTE RE~L JOB SIZE IN DSI 
C UNDEST=O 
NOTE TASKS UNDERESTIMATION FRACTION (FRACTION) 
_ N PJBDSI=RJBDSli'(J-UNDEST) 
NOTE PERCEIVED JOB SIZE IN DSI 
N TOTMD=MDSWCH,; « (2. 4*EXP (1 . 05*LOGN (PJBDS I /1000) ) ) *19) i, (j-UNDESM) ) 
X + (1-MDSWCH) *TOTMD 1 
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C UNDESM=O 
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NOTE MAN-DAYS UNDERESTIMATION FRACTION (FRACTION) 
N DEVMD=DEVPRT*TOTMD 
NOTE DEVELOPMENT MAN DAYS 
C MDSWCH=l 
NOTE SWITCH 0 OR 1 
C TOTMD1=0 
NOTE TOTAL MAN DAYS 
C DEVPRT=0.80 
NOTE % OF EFFORT ASSUMED NEEDED FOR DEVELOPMENT 
N TSTMD=(l-DEVPRT)*TOTMD 
NOTE TESTING MAN DAYS 
N WFSTRT=TEAMSZ*INUDST 
NOTE TEAM SIZE AT BEGINNING OF DESIGN (MEN) 
C INUDST=.5 
NOTE INITIAL UNDERSTAFFING FACTOR (DIMENSIONLESS) 
N TDEV=SCSWCH": ( (19"2 .5 f :EXP (0. 38":.LOGN (TOTMD/ 19) ) ) "SCHCOM) 
X + (1-SCSWCH) *TDEV1 
NOTE TOTAL DEVELOPMENT TIME (DAYS) 
C SCHCOM=l 
NOTE SCHEDULE COMPRESS I ON FACTOR (D I MENS I ONLESS) 
C SCSWCH=l 
NOTE SWITCH 0 OR 1 
C TDEV1=O 
NOTE TIME TO DEVELOP 
N TEAMSZ= (TOTMD/TDEV) / ADMPPS 
NOTE 
NOTE *""'***t",,,,,,***** 
NOTE V I I. CONTROL STATEMENTS 
NOTE ,h,*"**i:,.",,,f:i:**,': 
NOTE 
SPEC DT=.5,MAXLEN=lOOO,PLTPER=10 
A LENGTH .K=CLI P (T I ME. K,MAXLEN, PTKTST. K, .99) 
A PRTPER.K=LENGTH.K 
PRINT TOTMD,DEVMD,TSTMD,TDEV 
PRINT TOTWF,CUMMD,CMQAMD,CMRWMD,CMTSMD,CUMERG,CMERES,CMRWET,PRCTDT 
PLOT TOTWF=W(O,20) 
'PLOT PDEVRC=l (0,100) 
PLOT PJBSZ=J,CMTKDV=1,CUNTKT=T(0,1500)/CUMMD=C,JBSZMD=D(O, 
X 5000) /SCHCDT=S (200,600) /PTRPTC=R, PDEVRC=V (0,100) 
PLOT AFMDPJ=F(0,2.4) 
PLOT CUMERG=G,CMERD=D,CMERES=S(O,4000)/PRCTDT=P(O,100) 
PLOT AFMDPJ=I'(O,2.4)/EXHLEV=X,OVWDTH=V(O,100)/MDHDL=H,PMDSHR=P 
X (-500,500) /SHRRPT=l (-500,500) /SCHPR=S (-l,ll / 
X JBSZMD=D,CUMMD=C(0,5000)/SHRRPT=1 (-200,200) 
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